Salerno Discussion

[ASL Veteran]

I read"day of battle" then went out and bought "an army at dawn"both excellent reads but I was curious about one omission in DoB and emailed Atkinson.

I asked him why he had not mentioned general Hube?

He emailed me back and said that he could'nt cover all the commanders in his book.

But was'ent he the overall german commander on sicily?

His name is not even mentioned in the book as far as I can see.

Yes, in fact he was flown out of Stalingrad specifically because he was considered too valuable to be allowed to be captured. When he took over command in Sicily it was a pretty big deal for the Germans. I would consider omitting mention of General Hube as a big oversight unless the German side of the ledger just wasn't the focus of the book. German books about the eastern front frequently mention Soviets as nameless hordes, so if the Germans on Sicily are just faceless enemy soldiers in his book then not mentioning Hube is understandable.

[Sublime]

Well it's really because Atkinson is really telling it from the Allied point of view, not so much the Germans, who are thrown in more out of necessity. This is why the first book is also named An Army At Dawn. Because his primary focus is on the US Army and it's evolution through N Africa to the end of the war in N. Italy. FWIW the Germans aren't nameless hordes in the book, there are German quotes and he frequently discusses what they were doing/thinking and episodes involving Kesselring and others. In An Army at Dawn he laid a good amount of attention on Rommel and Arnim.

[Michael Emrys]

I read"day of battle" then went out and bought "an army at dawn"both excellent reads but I was curious about one omission in DoB and emailed Atkinson.

I asked him why he had not mentioned general Hube?

He emailed me back and said that he could'nt cover all the commanders in his book.

But was'ent he the overall german commander on sicily?

His name is not even mentioned in the book as far as I can see.

This is the kind of thing I had in mind when I said his narratives were incomplete. I don't think he gets much factually wrong per se, but he leaves things out and sometimes that can leave the wrong impression. Regrettable, but look how long these volumes are already. His subject is the US army in WW II and he only shows as much of other forces as is necessary to show how his main subject was challenged and evolved. For a general history, the reader will have to look elsewhere...probably a lot of elsewheres as most historians do the same thing in covering their nation's forces as Atkinson does.

Michael

[Chek]

Atkinson tells a ripping good yarn.I always feel like I'm reading a newspaper article for the folks back home though and yet strangely I still enjoy reading his stuff even though I know he's leaving a fair bit out.

And as for Monty-vain,arrogant,obnoxious who wrankled his superiors and gained the undying support of his soldiers.

A brief glance at his past speaks volumes of a man who new his business inside out and aside from Slim was probably the only British General who did.The average 8th Army soldier could've passed the Auk and not even known him but within a week of Monty's arrival he'd gone around every unit so that every grunt new who he was and what they were doing there,none of this drop back and fight dashing cavalry maneuvers,stand fast we stop the hun here.A simple,achievable plan enacted by a previously demoralised but now motivated army due solely to his efforts.

Like has nothing to do with it,he knew his business.

[JonS]

Well it's really because Atkinson is really telling it from the Allied point of view, not so much the Germans, who are thrown in more out of necessity.

Not really. Despite the subtiltle - "The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943-1944" - he's telling it from the US ground forces point of view, with anyone else thown in more out of necessity.

[Sublime]

Yes, the US Army is his primary focus. But the Allied chain of command, especially in North Africa, with battalions of different armies operating together on the regular, it means the British get a significant amount of coverage. Of course there was cooperation later in the war, but it seems the later it got, the more armies fought by nationality, grouped together where possible. Makes sense honestly, provided they do what they did, and make a Supreme Command.

[barkhorn45]

He details the overall italian commander and Senger von Etterling

and Ramcke, Kesslering,Rommel and so forth.

The overall strategy used,very effectivly I might add,was his.

Just a strange omission his name is'nt even in the index.

[sorry for delay am on the road and can't check computer as often as i like]

[JonS]

5th Army suffered about 7-8,000 casualties, in the same period 8th Army advancing from the south 67.

I was curious about this, because it didn't seem right, so I had a look in the relevant British OH. The number given there is 625. Granted that's not high for a corps-level activity in WWII, but it is an order of magnitude higher than 67.

Do you recall where the figure of 67 came from?

[Badger73]

I was curious about this, because it didn't seem right, so I had a look in the relevant British OH. The number given there is 625. Granted that's not high for a corps-level activity in WWII, but it is an order of magnitude higher than 67.

Do you recall where the figure of 67 came from?

It would not surprise me to learn it can be attributed to a typo error for "627" missed by the copy editor and overlooked by Atkins in the galley proofs.

[Sublime]

Yes I got 67 from the Atkinson book. I'll dig up the page if you like later. I won't dispute the probability of an error and would trust your source more than Atkinson, after all in an Army At Dawn he claims VT fused artillery shells were introduced by the Americans.. in Tunisia in early '43

Atkinson spurred this whole thread from me, it'd been years since I'd read about Torch, and Avalanche. The press corps outrunning the 8th Army story, along with the claim the German rear guard troops in Calabria were averaging 10 casualties a day. And of course, the two successive orders from Alexander ( I believe ) to hurry up towards Salerno. Montgomery also apparently sent 'Clarke' an odd, out of character misspelled message promising eventual help that Clark took as an insult. Finally, Atkinson claims that Montgomery told his diary after receiving the 2nd order to hurry up (or that day) 'must proceed with caution.'

I will state though that Atkinson doesn't act like it was Monty just being slow because the Americans, there were obviously quite a good amount of British troops at Salerno. And Atkinson states they suffered more casualties than the US in Sicily and Salerno.

[kensal]

I think that the 'cult' (for want of a better expression) of WWII generals is a fascinating subject, comparable to that of the Napoleonic and US Civil War eras I think the reason is to do with the idea of "the war of movement" where one individual can supposedly influence the outcome of a battle with daring manoeuvre. Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Patton epitomise this idea, but the reality is that all generals are subject to the circumstances of their situation, whether favourable or negative.

Rommel is generally viewed as a tactical genius as a result of his supposed impact in the western desert but his own subordinates viewed him differently. Major General Streich was removed from command of 5th Light Division following the failure of the attack on Tobruk in April-May 1941. Rommel complained that "you were far too concerned with the well being of your troops". Streich replied "I can imagine no greater words of praise for a division commander". Major General Kirchheim, his subordinate wrote "I do not like to be reminded of that time, because so much blood was needlessly shed".

In both cases they viewed Rommel's attacks on Tobruk as doomed to failure from the outset but that he was determined to press ahead nonetheless. Rommel's conduct of the Crusader battles, and Alam Halfa can be similarly criticised.

All generals can be criticised as too reckless or too careless of their troops, or too cautious with the benefit of hindsight. The reality is though that most of the time, they all benefited or suffered (as the case may be) from factors over which they had little or no control and their reputations as good or bad generals, more often than not, relates to those factors, rather than their actual ability to control the outcome of the battles they were engaged in.

[JonS]

Yes I got 67 from the Atkinson book. I'll dig up the page if you like later.

Actually, I’d be more interested in the reference he used as a source for the figure.

For completeness, here’s the ref. for the 625 figure: Molony, “The Mediterranean and the Middle East, vol. V”, p.252. “… up to 16th September total casualties were 625.” On p.325 Molony gives Allied cas at Salerno over the period 9-18 Sept as around 8,659.

In terms of the advance, the distance from Reggio to Vallo (where patrols from 5th UK Inf Div and 36th US Inf Div first met) covered by 8th Army is ~340km, or about 26km/day from 3-16 Sept.

By comparison, 3rd US Army's swan across France from Pontaubault to east of le Mans in early August 1944, a distance of ~230km, also took 13 days, at 18km/day. That might, perhaps, put the "slowness" of 8th Army in Calabria into some kind of perspective?

Kensai: good post.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Mr Atkinson's second book, while a riveting read, is a poor shadow of his first and not that great on history. Too often an attack is just described in the vaguest of generalities.

As for bias, to my mind there can be very little doubt there is plenty in the book. While several US generals do not come out of the story unscathed, pretty much all non American generals are described as rigid, out of their depth and a bit thick. Only Juin comes off looking good.

Somewhat less clear cut is whether Clark gets off too easy. I think so.

His glory seeking character comes under fire throughout the book but his generalship pretty much only gets attacked after he lunges for Rome. And even then every damning statement is followed by justification. Pretty much the only thing Atkinson comes out strongly against is Clark's disobedience and subterfuge. Personally, I think that his lackluster performances throughout Italy might have drawn more mention. His direction was often either absent or erroneous. Off the top of my head I cannot think off any action where his directions to his divisional commanders changed things for the better.

It is a REALLY good book if you want to get a feel for the US side of things but borders on misinformation about the other allies.

[Sublime]

Ok its page 232 of Atkinson's second book. "The rear guard 26th Panzer division was suffering just ten combat casualties a day and Montgomery's army on Monday reported a total of 62 British dead since arriving in Italy."

232 is also where the journalist reference is made. The time period it's referring to would be mid September somewhere I suspect, as the Salerno landings are ongoing at this point - I think the Monday referred to was known as Bloody Monday in Salerno, the low point of the invasion.

[Chek]

The reality is though that most of the time, they all benefited or suffered (as the case may be) from factors over which they had little or no control and their reputations as good or bad generals, more often than not, relates to those factors, rather than their actual ability to control the outcome of the battles they were engaged in.

Wouldn't a great general utilise factors in such a way that when others would suffer they benefit,while a poor general would do just the opposite.

[Sgt Joch]

Too much of military history focuses on the Generals. In WW2, as now, the role of generals is much more as a planner/administrator.

The General develops/shapes the plans to carry out the objective he is assigned. This is often a collegial efforts with higher HQ, lower ranking officers, specialized planning staff. D-Day was a good example, no one person thought up the entire plan, input came from many sources.

Once the plan has been developped, the General has to make sure he has the resources: men, equipment, supply to carry it out. He has to make sure everyone understands the plan, that the officers have the capacity to carry it out.

Once the battle actually starts, there is actually very little for the General to do other than hope everyone knows his job and that he did not forget anything. D-Day was the most pre-planned operation of WW2, but ultimately the battle on Omaha beach was decided by small groups of non-coms who advanced on their own.

In fact, the General's presence may not even be required. In november 41, during the "dash to the wire", Rommel was out of radio contact with his HQ for two days. His chief of staff, a lt. col., became the "de facto" HQ and issued orders in Rommel's name based on the plan, the situation and what he thought Rommel would do. When Rommel came back, he ratified all his chief of staff's decisions.

[JasonC]

Joch - kinda sorta.

First, really good generals have a huge portion of their effect on the formations they command long before the battle is actually joined. They oversee its organization, in the case of the most senior generals in a national force even the basis of its formation or selection procedures. Particular lower generals "stand up" their formations, training them to combat pitch and realism about conditions they will face, selecting the appropriate men to hold key posts, finding uses for the lesser talents of other candidates, etc. They set an example of justice to subordinates, objectivity in analyzing reports and commands from below and above, fairness in assessing blame for inevitable failures and a willingness to carry much of that weight themselves to cultivate their followers and shield them from first time mistakes, and the like.

When they actually get to the battle, the men directing the major subformations under them, and the staff planning all the details, are people they have groomed or selected or promoted into those positions specifically for their ability to discharge those duties. The higher ups may need to intervene in a more "hands on" fashion with a specific subcommander "out of his depth" and support or relieve them. They need to assess the incoming data stream with all its fog of war confusions and delays and see ahead through that fog. The good ones can guide their subordinates with correct anticipations of the likely flow of the battle, enemy countermeasures, reactions to empirical success and failure. All the sound ones keep some kind of reserve to intervene in the flow of the battle to use what they learn during its course to affect the ultimate outcome.

A commander who throws up his hands instead and just thinks "now it is all up to the sergeants and the lieutenants" is not one at the top of the profession. Yes that is objectively true for some of the time and some of the decisions once battle is joined - but the good ones have cards still to play and grasp the art of timing their use. A truly hands off commander at that stage is usually a sub-par commander, sometimes no more than a bureaucrat.

Some of the best also led from the front at critical times - Ohama Beach had General Cota on the ground putting together groups of effectives, Guderian and Rommel each drove with the "point" at times to assess things personally with their own "coup d'ouil" (visual assessment of the key terrain and enemy dispositions). Normally the right place for a commander at the height of a battle is in his headquarters standing in the middle of the information flow, awake to everything it is saying, waiting for the moment to commit his reserve or to break off an attack.

Needless to say, not all officers met that standard. But generals who actually did meet it made a huge difference in the performance of their units, from the training and selection phase to the key decision at the climax of the battle proper.

[kensal]

JasonC

I'm not convinced by this. I agree that some exceptional leaders could inspire and some dire leaders could make appalling decisions. But if you look at the majority of divisional commanders and upwards and you switched them all around so you had patton commanding Panzergruppe 1 in 1941 in Russia or Zhukov commanding Panzergroup West in 1944 in France or Rundstedt in command of the Allied armies in Italy etc, would the outcome have been any different in those theatres? I think not because in each case the outcomes of those and all other campaigns / battles were determined by other far more important factors like troop numbers, logistics etc.

There are only a few cases I think where you can point to an outcome being dependent on decisions made by individuals - perhaps France in 1940 or Mark Clark going for Rome instead of seeking to cut off the German tenth (?) army following the breakout from Anzio.

[JonS]

Kensai,

the pre-battle stuff is very important. Montgomery, for example, trained 3rd UK Div to a very whigh pitch prior to 10 May 1940. As a result, 3rd Div held togehter better than the other divs, and was able to pull off a complicated lateral move at night and under pressure. If that move had failed, the Dunkirk perimeter probably wouldn't have formed, with dire consequences for the British Army.

But if, say, Montgomery had been wounded on the day before the move, and one of his Brigadiers had taken over then ... yeah. They'd likely have been able to play the cards they'd been handed about as well as Montgomery did. The point here is that Montgomery had dealt himself a strong hand by ensuring his command was well trained and imbued with his ethos.

Another hypothetical: say Montgomery had been taken out of 3rd Division, and dropped into 48th Division, and told to execute the lateral move - would it have succeeded?

Also, as you move up the command food chain, you tend to be looking further and further ahead, and become less and less concerned with the immediate conduct of battles. Platoon commanders deal with the right here and right now, but Army and Army Group commanders should be looking forward at least 7-14 days, planning and preparing for those activies, rather than wondering whether to insert 10th Battalion into a left flanking move on some grotty little hamlet in half an hour's time.

[Wodin]

Jason..Cota sounds like a superb leader that day..I always see him as a smells like victory figure on that beach..

[Michael Emrys]

Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. was also a great leader before and during D-Day even though he was only assistant divisional commander. His loss was grievous indeed, not perhaps so much due to his tactical skills as to his impact on morale and his example of cool and resolute courage under fire.

Michael

[Sgt Joch]

I did not mean to imply that a general has no role to play during the battle, but the higher up the food chain you go, the more your influence should be felt during the pre-battle planning. A good leader will have gamed out the battle/operation before hand: when and where to commit his forces, when and where to commit his reserves, what to do if the enemy does X or Y, etc.

Cota and Roosevelt jr. were both good officers, but on D-Day, they were both assistant division commanders, basically glorified XOs. The actual infantry division commanders were sitting on ships most of the day trying to figure out what was going on. The only major decison they had to make on D-Day was when and where to commit their divisional reserve.

Back to Salerno. I have read that Monty was opposed to the landing at Messina. He did not think the germans would be fooled by the diversion or would defend southern italy. He also thought it was dangerous to split up the armies since the Germans could concentrate against the landing at Salerno. All his predictions turned out to be true. Is this discussed by Atkinson in his book?

[JasonC]

Kensal - (1) US performance under Fredendall in Tunisia vs what they did after he was replaced. (2) Patton's left hook in Tunisia compared to Bradley's uninspired mountain push straight north. (3) American dithering and stuff ups at the Gustav line and at Anzio, compared to the French breakthrough through the western mountains later. (4) Patton in Cobra, compared to Goodwood if you like. (5) Patton in the meeting engagement in Lorraine compared to the other side of the hill on the same occasion. (6) Ridgeway replacing MacArthur in Korea and winning the battle against the Chinese Mac thought was unwillable. (7) Any of Vatutin's offensives compared to Budenny or even Timoshenko a year or two earlier. (8) Graziani in north Africa against the British (with 5 to 1 odds, lost his entire command in months). (9) Manstein's 1940 plan against the plan before he arrived, Guderian's execution vs what his higher ups were ordering him to do (halt a lot). (10) German operational direction in Russia before and after they canned Guderian, Rundstadt and Bock (11) German operational direction in 1942-4 without, with, and again without Manstein. (12) Russian command direction when Stalin called the moves and when Vasilevsky got his way.

Etc, etc. Command quality matters and it matters a ton. The depths of incompetence produce effects even larger than the heights of ability, as deviations around a solid professional's trend.

[JonS]

(4) Patton in Cobra, compared to Goodwood if you like.

Bad example, for two reasons.

1) Patton would have been utterly stumped around Caen, just as he was at Metz.

2) COBRA wasn't Patton's battle.

Edit: 3 reasons

3) COBRA was successful because of GOODWOOD. They weren't independent operations.

[Chek]

The preparation, planning, and placement prior to the battles participation will prevent particularly poor performance.....perhaps!