accuracy/efficiency of machine gun fire

[Apocal]

I think it comes down to first experiences with wargames and such. Older wargamers will always have nostalgia for hexes, counters, and abstract numbers. I really dont see how an abstracted firepower number is more realistic than CM, even with MGs the way they were. Infantry combat was nowhere near as realistic. The only DEFINITE improvement besides fire I can think of is hand to hand combat. Which wasnt graphically depicted well but it did the job.

That is easy to explain: the rock-paper-scissors relationship worked as it did in RL in CMBB. In CMx2, it does not. The RL combined arms counter to HMGs wasn't to flood more infantry, that would just make piles of dead infantry while your opponent laughed at you. It was HE in the form of tank guns, artillery or mortars. Unfortunately in CMFI, using nothing but -2 motivation infantry, I'm still able to overwhelm a HMG using only a platoon, taking hilariously low losses (less than 5 total) attacking up a full kilometer of open terrain.

That's not realistic.

[Apocal]

Just double-posting to say that I finally got the combined arms relationship to 'work':

HMG, slight elevation advantage (10m), foxhole cover and 2 TRPs vs infantry platoon crossing open terrain, furthest advance was 300m from the HMG position, took 20-25 minutes to break the infantry. Both sets of troops -2 motivation. Defenders never took more than 3 casualties, attackers averaged 13. I've only run it 4 times so far, but the infantry finally are consistently breaking the way they should. Obviously this isn't a illustration for scenario design or balancing, just an indication of how far things are skewed.

Should I bother running it another six times?

[JasonC]

"you thought the T34s were majorly screwed up and the only recourse until 1944 or so was T34/57s"

That is a distortion. It was StuG fronts that were overmodeled against T-34s, and if the German player took StuGs, then gamey T-34/57s were a possible counter. My actual recommendation was that German players drive Panzer III longs and Marders in 1942, and Panzer IV longs in 1943, instead of cherry picking 30+50mm front StuGs (or Tigers) for every engagement. Against those vehicles, the T-34 (and 76mm towed) in CMBB was just fine, and I happily made literally dozens of scenarios featuring such match ups. Only if a German opponent insisted on all StuGs and Tigers did I recommend their Russian opponents respond in kind with T-34/57s, lend lease and captured vehicles, and SU-152s - or go assymmetric with equally overmodeled IL-2s.

As I said, I certainly did have issues with CMBB, but they were matters of detail that a scenario designer or mutual agreement between the players readily fixed. Overmodeled mortars and undermodeled machineguns are a much more basic problem. Combined, they create a novel, "this-game-only" set of tactical relationships, having essentially no relation to real WW II infantry tactics.

[JonS]

What do you mean 'how far things are skewed'?

I don't understand is this mindset that seems to run along the lines of "I haz teh l337 MG42. WHY ISN'T IT KILLINK ALL TEH ALLIEZ???"

As I posted in another thread: In CM it's not all that hard to set up MGs in effective defilade/enfilade positions with interlocking arcs. The main problem is, I think, is that most players can't spell defalide/enfalade, let alone apply it well, nor even know they need to apply it. The same applies to combined arms, although that one's easier to spell People have heard of it, know it's important but combined arms is, not surprisingly, darned hard to implement, especially against an active opponent.

It should come as small suprise that just plonking an HMG down directly in front of an approaching enemy platoon doesn't produce great results for the HMG. Your latest test, Apocal, seems to be getting further into the combined arms mindet - you have the HMGs using entrenchments, TRPs, and elevation. And, quelle surprise, your HMG is getting better results.

[Lanzfeld]

All this talk makes me want to play CMBB again! I'm off to London for 3 days tomorrow and I am bringing my laptop and my CMBB disk.

[Sublime]

That is a distortion.

Not a distortion. Just 9 years between reading your posts and this conversation. In the end it can be had both ways if anyone likes, because all of CMx1 is there. Im glad that BFC took the step to CMx2, 1:1 modelling etc. Though it's not exactly right in many cases, if the concept wasn't even tried it'll never be brought to standards where it is exactly right. Personally, I have no desire to go back to CMx1 anymore, and the Ost Front is my favorite theater.

JonS were you referring to me with the 'way things are skewed'?

Obviously plonking an HMG in front of a squad is stupid. However I think the MGs should be more accurate, and the bursts should be more randomized to seem real... It may not be the games modelling, it may the tile system, or a lot of things, but they dont *feel* right to me, and Im not the only one whose said it. I could of course be wrong, but whats a forum for if not to discuss things?

[JasonC]

Amplifying my point about suppression, continuous rally, and scaling...

Imagine 2 systems, one just like Panzer, the other an idealization of CM into a larger number of discrete shots and their impact.

In the first, the defending MG will get only 3 firing chances before the attackers reach spotting distance, but each shot has a 2/3s chance of pinning the attacker picked on, and a 1/3rd chance of cutting the squad in half. It takes 2 turns after a suppression for any suppressed squad to recover.

In the second, the MG gets 6 times as many shots, with each having 1 chance in 6 to cause significant morale impact and ding one man out of the squad. However, the squad rallies at 1/3rd of a single morale "ding" after each shot, and the first leaves the squad "cautious" but upright. It takes closer to a -2 morale state to send the squad to ground for a long period and slow its rally (by half), and a -3 to break it.

Run each process 20 times.

In the first, there are 2 occasions in which the squad ends unsuppressed and intact, in each case it suppressed at least once but in those it had recovered already by the end of the period. In 1 case it is cut in half but back to good order by the end. In 5 cases, the squad ends suppressed but otherwise intact. in 9 cases the squad is cut in half and suppressed (the most common result). In 3 cases, the squad is wiped out.

Those aren't odds one would accept, tactically. There is a modest chance of getting someone close enough to spot, balanced by an equal chance of getting them all killed, almost always they suppress without threatening or even spotting the MG, normally with serious losses.

The second system gives these results in 20 trials -

8 of the 20 cases end with the squad completely unsuppressed, and another 6 with trivial remaining levels of suppression (less than cautious). 3 cautious, 2 pinned, and 1 broken final morale states. One of the better end states had a deep-ish pin early, since recovered, and 7 had near pins. In the worst case the squad lost 7 men and broke, but that only happened in 1 of the 20 trials; another lost 6 and ended pinned. The other squads lost 3 men average and always at least 1 man hit.

Thus only an outlier 10% of outcomes feature a halved and pinned half-squad at the end, less common than the total wipeouts for the other process. Another 20% pin with modest loss, and a further 20% pinned at some point but got right up out of it and continued the advance. Fully half had no difficulties to speak of (just a man or two down) and 70% are continuing the mission at the end of the period.

The biggest difference in the two processes is the stronger rally power in the second, and the interaction that has with variably timed and thus unevenly clumped effective shots.

To get an outcome from the second process closer to the first, the chance of an effective result on each of the 6 shots per turn needs to be more like 1 in 4 rather than 1 in 6. The rally speed from the impact of 1 effective hit needs to be more like a full minute to recover, rather than half a minute. In other words, cutting rally speed in half and raising the hit chance 50% gets to about the right area.

With those parameters, 40% of the squads end broken, another 30% pinned. There are still about 30% that "skate by" with 2-3 men hit, modest suppression at some point, but only cautious or better at the end of the firing period. This is still a better outcome than the first process gives, but more nearly correct.

This is meant to illustrate what I mean by tuning the process. Rally speed needs to be turned down dramatically (halved), hit chance per burst turned up significantly (only against men in the open, up and moving, mind) but not as much as rally is slowed down. Faster pins will keep that higher hit rate from snowballing into unbelievable causalty figures, if going to ground and getting cover cuts the hit chance enough.

I hope that helps.

[JonS]

JonS were you referring to me with the 'way things are skewed'?

No, Apocal. The quoted phrase is from the end of his last post.

[Apocal]

Your latest test, Apocal, seems to be getting further into the combined arms mindet - you have the HMGs using entrenchments, TRPs, and elevation. And, quelle surprise, your HMG is getting better results.

If I use anything but -2 motivation troops (with a -2 platoon leader), the attacking infantry platoon wins.

If I give them any appreciable cover or concealment, the attacking infantry platoon wins.

If I take away the HMG's foxholes, the attacking infantry platoon wins.

If I take away the TRPs, the attacking infantry platoon wins.

If I start them off at 600 meters instead of 1km, the attacking infantry platoon wins.

Do you see what I'm getting at now?

EDIT: If I take any two of these and put them together, I can not only reliably win as the attacking infantry platoon, but do so at a minimal (in CM terms) cost.

[JonS]

Yes, I do. But I'm not - I think - coming to the same conclusions. My conclusions are:

* Combined arms is good.

* Prepared positions are good.

* High motivation troops makes the game more playable, but less 'realistic' (for some definition of realistic) (by 'high' I mean vet and even reg - despite the words, the motivation curve in CM doesn't seem to be centred over reg).

* Suppression effects could usefully be higher (but see the previous point).

I think the accuracy of MGs is ok. In an earlier post in this thread, someone pointed to the current USMC qualifying standard for MGs which equates, apparently, to something like 1 hit per 2-3,000 rounds fired in combat.

[Apocal]

Yes, I do. But I'm not - I think - coming to the same conclusions. My conclusions are:

* Combined arms is good.

* Prepared positions are good.

* High motivation troops makes the game more playable, but less 'realistic' (for some definition of realistic) (by 'high' I mean vet and even reg - despite the words, the motivation curve in CM doesn't seem to be centred over reg).

* Prepared positions are good.

* High motivation troops makes the game more playable, but less 'realistic' (for some definition of realistic) (by 'high' I mean vet and even reg - despite the words, the motivation curve in CM doesn't seem to be centred over reg).

* Suppression effects could usefully be higher (but see the previous point).

The thing is, I don't need combined arms with this. I just need an infantry platoon, they can be -2 motivation, with some cover and concealment up to rifle range and I'll win, reliably. Even with the HMG having foxholes and TRPs. The thing about the suppression effects cuts both ways, but it's an advantage to the infantry platoon since there is no discernible global suppression. I can have one assault element get shot to **** not 20 meters away from another assault element and they won't bat an eye as long as the tracers aren't going over their heads at that moment.

[JonS]

It's at the low end of the scale, but done right a rifle platoon IS combined arms. Right there in the platoon you've got a variety of different weapon systems, and you also have at least 4, maybe as many as 10, moving parts conducting fire and movement.

Edit: This ...

there is no discernible global suppression.

... is flat-out wrong.

[dieseltaylor]

Mortars may enjoy excessive flexibility in CM2 but in CM1 they were wimps, nerfed to the point of being present in a cameo role at best.

Hmmm. Without clarification I am more inclined to think it may be the way you used them. Always worked well for me.

I too agree with JasonC. IMO BF made some bad design decisions and have been wrestling with the fallout. I hate to harp on a subject but the very treatment of vehicle speed/ movement which should be surely one of the simplest concepts to engineer/model stopped with forward motion and never seemed to consider reverse. I still find it completely inexplicable.

An interesting thing is that when you read battle accounts the number of times tanks ditch themselves reversing or back into a house and immobilise is common. In games I can reverse at three times real speed for miles whilst buttoned up. Realism?

I agree totally that its the feel of the game has to be right and though scenery is lovely if you cannot believe in the "feel" then what is the point?

I await CMBN 2 to hear if the huge disparity in spotting times has changed. In my previous tests a Sherman under fire for two whole minutes failed to spot a MkIV at the other end of a 1600m firing lane. Now despite hits on the Sherman [two on the glacis] the commander stayed up looking .... balls of steel but blind! I mention the disparity because arguably it is quite realistic not to spot quickly - however I also record Shermans spotting on the same range after 1 second. Which may also be possible but probably not common.

But this leads to a problem in game play terms for me. I can have no "feel" for the likelihood of something happening so if I advance a tank up a road and it sees nothing is that because I have the blind TC or because there is nothing there? Now if I knew that my TC would routinely spot in a time window of 10 seconds - 1:30 a hull up MkIV firing at it at 1600 metres I would have a degree on confidence in my ordering.

The other side is that from a club tournament point of view the lack of uniformity in results makes it a very unreliable if everyone playes the same battle. Now I realise that BF has consistently said that PBEM is a minority section so from that point of view no problem. I have suggested, and I do not know if it is possible, that they really tighten up the spotting time as an option for players. The idea that players can dial it would make it arguably less realistic but at least more playable.

Incidentally the spotting does have anther problem revealed in another players test where a Tiger was surrounded by about 50 squads each on their own action point. It managed to spot them all within a minute or so. Remarkable as you would think with enemy infantry surrounding it the crew would be busy targetting and shooting at what they could see immediately to the front.

My suggestion would be that BF have to consider fuzzying up or restricting the amount of information that a crew/commander can deal with. Most people have quite a low threshold on number of ideas they can juggle - around 6 AFAIR.

[Apocal]

It's at the low end of the scale, but done right a rifle platoon IS combined arms. Right there in the platoon you've got a variety of different weapon systems, and you also have at least 4, maybe as many as 10, moving parts conducting fire and movement.

It's a single arm overcoming what should be it's direct counter.

Edit: This ...

... is flat-out wrong.

Are you sure you aren't mixing up morale state with suppression?

OK, this one I just came off testing five times (real easy, around two minute per test), half company of conscript, poor motivation troops placed in the open in front of 6x dug-in elite HMGs, minus three half-squads placed out of HMG line-of-sight. HMGs obviously tear the company a new *******, all survivors at max suppression states or close enough, the three half-squads never get any more than 1 bar of suppression. Morale state obviously break, but it's pretty clear that suppression is only carried on a per-unit basis, not globally.

[JonS]

It's a single arm

In an organisational sense, sure. But the main experiential and development history of WWI was the transformation of companys and platoons from being followers into distinct self contained tactical elements with a range of capabilities, able to tackle minor tactical problems on their own.

A late-WWII platoon has rifles, LMGs, SMGs, probably a mortar or at least rifle grenades, some smoke, and usually at least one anti-tank weapon that can double as an HE thrower.

A single HMG is a minor tactical problem, and as a rule of thumb shouldn't really require anything more than a platoon to take down.

overcoming what should be it's direct counter.

[citation required]

Are you sure you aren't mixing up morale state with suppression?

Sorry, you're right. I was thinking of morale

I don't see why there should be global suppression though :confused: As I said before, suppression effects could usefully be greater (subject to playability) but I don't see why - in addition to morale effects - guys that aren't receiving fire should be suppressed. It's not hard to imagine a range of totally borked results that would easily and repeatedly come up if global suppression were a 'thing'.

[Apocal]

In an organisational sense, sure. But the main experiential and development history of WWI was the transformation of companys and platoons from being followers into distinct self contained tactical elements with a range of capabilities, able to tackle minor tactical problems on their own.

A late-WWII platoon has rifles, LMGs, SMGs, probably a mortar or at least rifle grenades, some smoke, and usually at least one anti-tank weapon that can double as an HE thrower.

I'm not using anything but rifles and MGs/BARs to get the HMG pinned. By time they get close enough to use bazookas, shreks, rifle grenades, etc. the issue is decided.

A single HMG is a minor tactical problem, and as a rule of thumb shouldn't really require anything more than a platoon to take down.

[citation required]

You're asking for a citation that HMGs were used to counter infantry on the attack?

Sorry, you're right. I was thinking of morale

Don't worry about it, it happens.

I don't see why there should be global suppression though :confused: As I said before, suppression effects could usefully be greater (subject to playability) but I don't see why - in addition to morale effects - guys that aren't receiving fire should be suppressed.

Because it rewards splitting units arbitrarily. A big chunk of the reason the HMGs work currently is that men taking hits (injured or WIA/KIA) cause bucketloads of suppression, even if the fire is otherwise ineffective. Hitting one man will generally pin a squad down for a solid minute, with change to spare. Unless you've split that squad into 3 elements, in which case the other two elements will continue to advance and not immediately shy away from the enemy.

It's not hard to imagine a range of totally borked results that would easily and repeatedly come up if global suppression were a 'thing'.

This is true, and could be helped with something like a greater suppression radius for casualties inflicted, similar to HE, rather than a truly global suppression.

[dieseltaylor]

A late-WWII platoon has rifles, LMGs, SMGs, probably a mortar or at least rifle grenades, some smoke, and usually at least one anti-tank weapon that can double as an HE thrower.

Apocal is testing in 1943 so late war platoon is possibly immaterial.

The Rifle Company - the ultimate staying power of the Battalion was provided by its three Rifle Companies, each with a Weapons Platoon and three Rifle Platoons.

The Rifle Squad was commanded by a Sergeant assisted by a Corporal, promoted to Staff Sergeant and Sergeant respectively by 1944. They commanded an assault group of seven men, two of whom were designated as scouts, and an Automatic Rifle group of an automatic rifleman, his assistant and an ammunition bearer. On paper, the automatic rifleman carried the Squad's single Browning Automatic Rifle, and every other man an M1 Rifle. The BAR was a well liked but limited weapon. It could not be truly described as a light machine gun in the same way as a Bren or German MG34/42. Instead, it was what is was called; a rifle capable of firing short bursts of automatic fire from its 20 round magazine. The barrel could not be changed, and so prolonged use was not advisable. It had been designed for use back in the First World War, hence its designation M1918, and no replacement had been sought. That was because the US Army placed its emphasis not on a small number of light machine guns, but on a large number of semi-automatic rifles. The M1 Rifle, the Garand, was the weapon chosen to employ this doctrine. Each man could fire his eight round magazine in seconds, without pausing to operate the manual bolt action required by other rifles. This gave the US soldier an undoubted advantage that was the envy of every ally and adversary. The British No.6 Commando was issued Garands during Operation Torch. Following its conclusion, they declined to return them in favour of their Lee Enfields. High praise indeed. When the M1 received a rifle grenade adapter during 1943 three were issued to each Squad.

The real scale at which Thompson and the later M3 'Grease' gun submachine guns supplanted rifles in the squad can only be guessed at. Such weapons tend to gravitate towards NCOs who are not necessarily needed to engage in long range fire fights, but who do need to lead the close assault when such a weapon becomes vital. One or two would seem reasonable, with perhaps a lightweight Carbine finding its way into the gun group. Certainly any greater issue would diminish the rifle power upon which the squad was predicated. In action, the assistant leader would control the fire of the BAR, while the assault group would manoeuvre towards the enemy. The leader could be found anywhere he was needed. The function of the scouts was to probe the enemy line, but they were also needed to add their fire to that of the assault group.

http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/UnitedStates/Infantry/united_states_infantry_battalion%20mid%201943%20to%201945.htm

U.S. Army Ordnance designed a new launcher attachment for the M1 Garand, designated the M7, which could fire much heavier grenades up to 250 yards. M7 compatible fragmentation grenades had a fatality radius of 11 yards (10 meters).[1][2] It entered production and service in 1943.[1

Wikipedia

It would seem that the fancier weapons are aimed for closer ranges than the test. For 1944 aparently they had three launchers per platoon which in Normandy would be very much.

[Killkess]

A single HMG is a minor tactical problem, and as a rule of thumb shouldn't really require anything more than a platoon to take down.

I am keen to read any evidence/anectode for your personal point of view in this case. What I´ve read, as most other most likely have, suggest something very different.

Originally Posted by JonS View Post

Your latest test, Apocal, seems to be getting further into the combined arms mindet - you have the HMGs using entrenchments, TRPs, and elevation. And, quelle surprise, your HMG is getting better results.

And i would also be eager to hear what TRPs, elevation and entrenchments have to do with combined arms.

[dieseltaylor]

Just to round things off here is an interesting link to a US rifle greande thread. Always nice to find out what really happened with in-action comments compared to the dry figures given in books. The 250 metres figure I quoted previously from Wikipedia looks a tad suspect in practical terms.

http://forums.gunbroker.com/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=492997

[Redwolf]

Maybe. I remember CMBB. Mortars may enjoy excessive flexibility in CM2 but in CM1 they were wimps, nerfed to the point of being present in a cameo role at best.

No, I think that most here considered CMx1 on-board mortars to be "just right".

Certainly they were used to spank people a lot, they were pretty effective. They would be used to take out guns in a way that looks like a realistic timeframe, they could disrupt infantry moving in the open. Nothing wrong with them. Just right.

The only screwup about CMx1 mortars were the British 3" mortars since they had 3x the amount of ammunition than the others. That made them appear in choose-your-forces battle too often, and they could fire all day long even when they were not in a prestocked position.

[slysniper]

Way back when the game was first released, I ran some test on what a machine gun can and cannot do in the game.

Just how we set up the test can make things hard to get any data worth understanding.

But some things I learned while doing the test. Any test with one MG only is likely to reflect on a machine gun poorly.

Once the gun is pinned or stops firing for any reason, incoming fire will pretty much keep them in a state where they will have problems from that point on to recover and win the firepower battle.

The real question is, what can a machine take on in enemy troops and control the battlefield by generally pinning the enemy and with time killing exposed troops that do not find cover.

What I found or use as a rule of thumb for the game anyway is.

One machine gun will generally always win against a group of 10 men.

One machine gun will hold its own against 20 men, but the battle will swing either way.

One machine gun will always lose against a group of 30 men.

Now if I tested this with 2 machine guns against double the units , the results were more consistant.

Also, rifle grenades were a big impact in any results. If I removed the rifle grenade. The Mg's preformed much better. in other words, I noticed most of the time if the MG was to lose the battle, it started with a Rifle Grenade hit and generally the MG unit never recovering from that to gain control on the battlefield again.

So after thinking about my results, it dawned on me, one crew served weapon was handling 10 enemy guns easily, somewhere between 15- 20 enemy guns the advantage is starting to swing and at 30 guns, there is no way it can take on them odds.

So from what little of this post I thread i have read, I would question is there really a game modeling problem or not. (maybe your expectations are incorrect and how you test it might not be helping the situation.

[dieseltaylor]

The rip-off was that the British 3" mortar in RL came with its own Universal carrier. In game you had to buy that also, though at least the ammo supply was a makewight for that omission.

[JasonC]

Apocal - very useful results for the tuning question.

I think the direct fire effect of each burst against men in the open is low, but within a factor of 2 of the right amount. A modest uptick is fire effect is needed there, but it can be limited in size - 10 or 25%, on that order, to start with.

I think the suppression effect (how deep the morale dives) from a succesful burst (that hits one man, say) is too low, and that the average such "hit" should send an average motivation regular squad to prone and pinned. Occasional panic, occasional only cautious, but the middle of the distribution should be right over "go prone, pinned". It can be just cautious for vets and similar (though, see the next), but regulars that lose a man should normally react by ceasing the movement attempt and trying to protect themselves.

And I think the continuous rally from suppression is clearly too fast - like, twice as fast as it should be - and is the biggest single problem with the current tuning. It currently allows the average squad to recover its morale completely, from the average morale effect of the last burst, by the time the next arrives. Only an above average series of effective hits or morale impacts result in an accumulating hit to morale state. And those are matched by equal or more stretches of below average hits or effects.

The effect we want to see, instead, is that morale drops if the fire stays on, and it keeps dropping, unless the accuracy or morale hits are well below the expectation level. This will eventually send a single target to ground, and will not let it get up again unless the fire shifts to a new target. Even then, it should take on the order of a minute for a squad to get out of pinned to cautious, and twice that long to clear a panic to pinned.

I hope this helps...

[JonS]

I am keen to read any evidence/anectode for your personal point of view in this case. What I´ve read, as most other most likely have, suggest something very different.

In late-WWI (second half of 1917 and into 1918), for example, German pillboxes were considered platoon objectives. An HMG in the open is a considerably simpler problem than an HMG in a pillbox.

[Killkess]

Sorry that i have to ask again: What are your sources for this statements?