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Apocalypse 31

This is why I stopped playing...

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whats not fun? we're playing proper out of a box soldiers for gods sake, just like you did as a kid but its on the PC - the game works on many levels, im not a grog, couldnt tell you if the slope on the panthers front armour was right or not - dont care. But i bet it is right.

Me, i like to drive my tanks to where i think would be a good spot, sneak up on the enemy and deliver destruction at my whim, others like to make sure the wheels are turning round just exactly as they would, in a marsh, on a tiger, in the rain, under fire, near a tree, in 1944 - and thats cool - because they probably do.

I love small scale combat infantry, and this is where its at, im sure most of those complaining its too hard and doesnt do what its supposed to do were building Tezla coils, and double gunned chinese dragon tanks in red alert and loving THAT game - why? because its fun, you were playing the game for what it was.

Where on the box does it say 'this is a serious game and you must have a furrowed brow to play it?' just set the guys up, apply the spartan knowledge you have of what a real battlefield is and PLAY. When i played as a kid on the carpet with little soldiers and a squad got wiped out because the marble took a ricochet off a slipper there would be carnage between me and my friend, mass arguing, mass shouting - what did we do, set em up again and played again, and again.........

it was fun

and so is this

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That was a really cool review. I still feel my first 2 PBEMs with that battle are some of my all time favorites and that review was a motivator for selecting the battle.

Ahh for a quick stroll down memory lane

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1320848&postcount=589

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1320849&postcount=590

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showpost.php?p=1320850&postcount=591

OOOOO yeah I remember that one.... Ouch! That was me.

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This is a war game like no other. Although the map is big (10 feet) the game is smaller than other games (Europa for one). There are not as many rules as in ASL. And yet this is the biggest monster game out there for a number of reasons.

The game is detailed to a degree no other game has come close to. If using the full rules you keep track of every individual plane and pilot in the three year campaign. Each counter on the board representing a ground unit is composed of many units which are kept track of on logs. Supplies are kept track of and dispersed in a very detailed manner.

From the rulebook we read how to run a game. "CNA is a logistically-oriented game, and its play requires not only a lot of attention to logistics, but, if you will, a logistically sound methodology." It is suggested that you have 5 persons per side with the following duties.

..

...

In heaven there will be a wargaming room, and games such as this will always have players available, everyone will already know the rules, and no one will complain about it taking too long since we wouldn't have a shortage of time, with the whole eternity thing. A man can hope anyway :D

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whats not fun? we're playing proper out of a box soldiers for gods sake, just like you did as a kid but its on the PC -

...

When i played as a kid on the carpet with little soldiers and a squad got wiped out because the marble took a ricochet off a slipper there would be carnage between me and my friend, mass arguing, mass shouting - what did we do, set em up again and played again, and again.........

You brought a big smile to my face with that posting, some great memories. What you say is true - and for me so much of the enjoyment of CMBN/CW is the spectacle that's unleashed with my orders.

Much of the time my "fun meter" isn't determined by whether I am winning - it's to do with the unusual events that can happen, the drama of the struggle. Or just the sight of my armor rolling along in support.

I have read a lot of WW2 history, and read a lot of personal accounts. This game comes pretty close to what I've read. Each to their own though: if someone doesn't like it they are entitled to that opinion. I don't care - surely there are enough games out there that everyone can find their wargame nirvana.

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The lesson seems to fit the graph that people tend to fun over complexity.

Sweeping generalization...complexity and fun are subjective.

My "fun" comes from trying to solve a complex equation:

Move x men / vehicles over y terrain to accomplish z goal.

That is why I play, I hate puzzles, crosswords, sudoku.

I love the challenge of applying MY tactics and seeing the results. I don't mind the micro management, it's part of the challenge. I want complexity and CMBN provides it.

At the end of a battle / campaign regardless of the outcome (I prefer winning) I had FUN seeing if my tactics worked.

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can someone explain why "hunt"ing is so tiring on the soldiers?

You can experience this playing any of the combat-sport games like paintball or airsoft. "Duck Walking" around in a combat crouch, taking indirect paths to stay close to cover with your weapon at the ready and keeping your eyes and ears open for the slightest hint of the enemy is extremely fatiguing.

Back when I used to play on an organized paintball team, we used to play in a 100-acre, wooded area. So there was a lot of move to contact at the start of the matches. I'd actually say the move to contact phase was more fatiguing than the combat.

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Back when I used to play on an organized paintball team, we used to play in a 100-acre, wooded area. So there was a lot of move to contact at the start of the matches. I'd actually say the move to contact phase was more fatiguing than the combat.

Absolutely. I felt it mostly in my back from walking around hunched over.

There there's my brother, who's favorite tactic at the beginning of each match was to sprint down one of the boundary edges and come up behind the other team like he was JEB Stuart.

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sburke

Thanks for the link. It was an interesting read but at no point does it establish a commercial reason why they decided to spend effort on CMX2. Sorting out the infantry problems in CMx1 is what happened but as a businessman I would expect a reasoned argument for time invested against potential reward. And perhaps there was a business case but not one shared with the buying public.

In the rationale there is a lot of explaining the realism involved with relative spotting etc and firepower. Given the emphasis on realism at the squad level the areas which seem unrealistic are highlighted and two of these are carry overs from CMx1. Smoke is inordinately powerful in blocking fire even for HMG's that would be set up on fixed lines. While not wishing to be monotonous the vehicle modelling in respect of reverse speed is now, in a later version, improved on CMx1 however vehicles designed to travel equally fast in each direction cannot. This area seems outstandingly underdeveloped compared to squad mechanics detail. Sort of a schizophrenic realism.

However the gist of the thread is not getting enough fun - some people think it is just right and others think it is unduly klutzy. Design decisions such as ammo crews not being able to off-load ammo to the gun/mortar, tank crews swopping places when dead crew instantly disappear, etc , etc just seem strange.

Does it provide some great graphic moments and excitement - for sure it does. But then most people do not post all the unexciting irritating parts of the plotting etc. : ) We can all agree to differ as to whether it is enjoyable enough for the effort invested.

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It was an interesting read but at no point does it establish a commercial reason why they decided to spend effort on CMX2. Sorting out the infantry problems in CMx1 is what happened but as a businessman I would expect a reasoned argument for time invested against potential reward. And perhaps there was a business case but not one shared with the buying public.

What was the alternative?

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On the effectiveness of artillery, and in particular it’s destructiveness, this excerpt from a recent thesis is quite enlightening.

~-+-~-+-~-+-~-+-~-+-~

CANADIANS AGAINST FIRE; Canada's Soldiers and Marshall's “Ratio of Fire” 1944-1945 by Robert Engen

Master of Arts Thesis

Queen's University

Kingston, Ontario, Canada

March, 2008

The Big Guns: The Limits of Artillery (pages 51-61)

Carlo D'Este's comments about the infantry using artillery fire “as a crutch” are in some ways quite accurate, as Allied tactical doctrine from 1943 to 1945 was structured around the need for heavy artillery support on all offensive operations. This was in part because of the overwhelming material and industrial advantage held by the Allies, as historian Niall Ferguson has pointed out that the combined Allied GDP was three times that of the Axis powers in 1943, and that the gap continued to widen during the war.{14} The Allies could certainly manufacture many times what munitions and weaponry the Germans could produce, and pressed this advantage on the battlefield. A common perception from the German side was that the Allies were fighting materialschlacht, a “material battle.” Where the German army's policy was “Sweat Saves Blood” and placed a heavy emphasis on training soldiers, the Allied approach was that “Equipment Saves Men,” and that munitions and firepower could be expended instead of lives.{15} Indeed, as Ferguson points out, the Allies (and the Americans in particular) “were the masters of overkill, whose first principle was: 'always have on hand more of everything than you can ever conceivably need.'”{16} Playing to this strength was a strategic decision for the Allied powers, given that by 1944 two of the principal Allies fighting in Europe, Great Britain and Canada, were facing critical manpower shortages. Munitions and guns could be replaced swiftly and relatively easily; the same could not be said about soldiers.{17}

This principle of superior material warfare was expressed most obviously in the western Allies' considerable advantage in artillery fire. For the Germans, the ferocity of the British, American, and Canadian artillery fire was something altogether new, even for veterans of the Eastern Front. Fighting in Normandy, the soldiers of the 2nd Panzer Division, despite having previously served in the Soviet Union, described the Allied barrages as being able to “trample the nerves” of seasoned veterans, and as “literally soul-destroying” to inexperienced men.{18} The weight of Allied artillery was both punishing and ubiquitous along the front lines. As Canadian Brigadier Stanley Todd put it during Operation SWITCHBACK against the Leopold Canal in October 1944, one of the goals was for infantry to be given “fire when they want it for as long as they want it.”{19}

The Canadian officers who participated in the Battle Experience Questionnaires surveys reported similar experiences with artillery. Some 80 percent of the officers reported that they and their troops had carried out attacks under a creeping artillery barrage, although when broken down by theater of operations officers fighting in Italy were somewhat more likely to indicate that they had attacked under a barrage (86 percent) than those fighting in Northwest Europe (78 percent).{20} Artillery was the standard accompaniment for an infantry attack in either campaign, and the “creeping barrage” tactic of infantry advancing behind a “curtain” of falling shells to suppress enemy fire was a normal operating procedure, despite having originated in the First World War.{21} Many officers commented on the application of this technique, though not all were favourably inclined towards it. Captain Donald Findlay, who served with both the Canadian Queen's York Rangers and the British 1/6 Queen's Royal Regiment, briefly talked about advances supported by creeping barrages that could reliably advance over a mile per attack.{22} Likewise, Captain S.R. Lambert of the South Saskatchewan Regiment reported at least one instance, a night attack on the village of Rocquancourt during Operation GOODWOOD outside of Caen, where they achieved “success due to accurate [artillery] support and confidence in same” with a timed creeping barrage.{23} Major J.G. Stothart of the Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders was another major proponent of the creeping barrage, and claimed that:

It is my firm opinion that if the Army can register and even in some cases when they cannot the closer the inf[antry] can get to a...barrage the better the final result. The casualties they may suffer are not in proportion with those they may incur through hesitation or a lack of speed in reaching the objective. We have had several experiences which substantiate this opinion...and I know from discussing it with [the troops] that they do appreciate the advantage of being close to a barrage.{24}

On the other hand, Major John Irvin Mills, a company commander in the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, mentioned in his notes that if the infantry failed to keep up with the pace of the barrage, roughly 100 yards every four minutes, they were held up in the open without support.{25} Failure to keep up with the creeping barrage's timed program was a significant problem during the war, if not the norm. Fully one-third of officers serving in Italy and just over 20 percent in Northwest Europe reported problems with their troops keeping up with the creeping barrage.{26} Troops who became bogged down in the terrain or pinned down by snipers and failed to keep up with the artillery barrage were a constant danger, noted Captain G.C. Watt of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, and therefore, “the infantry must follow close in behind their artillery and not bog down and allow [the artillery] to do [the infantry's] job.”{27}

One feature of the Canadian experience with artillery that featured prominently in the Battle Experience Questionnaires was the heavy favouring of set-piece engagements and artillery “programs” timed to the minute for creeping barrages and concentrations upon enemy positions. This had advantages and disadvantages and received “mixed reviews” from the officers who participated in such battles. Many officers seemed to appreciate the predictability and consistency of the artillery support, and one of them, Captain James Bulloch of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, specifically noted that a lack of timed artillery support during the crossing of the Leopold Canal in October 1944 brought out “the most mental fatigue cases I have ever seen.”{28} Some soldiers apparently used the predictability of the barrage to orient themselves and maintain proper direction at night during the attack.{29} There seemed to be at least a tentative consensus among officers that preparation and planning for set-piece attacks would lead to success, or at least reduced casualties. Captain Warren Harvey, a mortar officer with the North Shore Regiment, stated that he believed in success “due to thorough preparation...without these thorough preparations I feel that while the final result might have been the same, there would have been considerable confusion and higher casualties.”{30} At the same time, though, the heavy reliance upon timed programs and set-piece attacks also reflects some of the inherent inflexibility of Allied doctrine and planning. As British historian Timothy Place has found, the British and Canadian armies excelled at planning for foreseeable eventualities, and banked on being able to win battles through planning and preparation. It was the unforeseeable and unpredictable circumstances that created problems, and as Place says, “Failure to prepare all ranks to function effectively when events defied the plan was the greatest flaw in the British Army's training programmes.”{31} Indeed, in the Battle Experience Questionnaires some officers complained bitterly about how when small but unexpected enemy positions were encountered it could bog down an entire force and defeat the attack.{32} Others, including Captain L. Leclerc, a company second-in-command in Le Régiment de Châteauguay [sic. Should be Régiment de la Chaudière? Or Royal 22e Regiment?], therefore gave detailed descriptions and plans for how to make artillery fire plans more flexible and adjustable in the field.{33} Reading the questionnaires provides one with a picture of a highly centralized command that adopted elaborate fire plans in order to substitute shells for men's lives. However, as Terry Copp has pointed out, those shells had to fall in the right place in order for this strategy to be effective.{34}

It is also clear that somewhere along the training line there were administrative difficulties, however, because despite the large numbers of infantry soldiers who took part in attacks supported by artillery, the number who were explicitly trained to do so was much smaller. Results from the surveys indicate that overall, according to the officers, just under half of all combat soldiers had received preliminary training in working under artillery barrages.{35} This number did not vary significantly based on which theater of operations the officer was engaged in, though the longer an officer was in combat the more likely he was to report that his troops had not received any such preliminary training, perhaps reflecting how ill-trained Canadian reinforcements tended to be.{36}

While artillery may well have been a ubiquitous element of Allied doctrine, it had serious drawbacks and limitations that also need to be discussed in the context of the infantry. While the Allied barrages may have seemed “soul-shattering” to the Germans, it is possible that they were more spiritually than physically effective.{37} One aspect of the Second World War that has come to historiographical light recently is just how ineffective the furious Allied artillery barrages could be. Terry Copp was among the first to seriously explore this issue from the Canadian perspective. His examination of documents from the Operational Research Section of the 21st Army Group (which included the Canadian Army in Northwest Europe) turned up studies demonstrating that, from D-Day onwards in that campaign, fire support was only marginally effective.{38} Operational Research scientists discovered that the “50 percent zone” – the area in which half the shells fired could be expected to land – was far larger than had been projected, and “only 5 percent of rounds fired by prediction [indirect, non-line-of-sight fire] could be expected to fall in an area 100 yards by 100 yards.” The mean point of impact for shells was extremely wide for line and over or under for range, with the result that not even the heaviest artillery barrages could reliably concentrate that heavy fire upon a designated area.{39} On the ground this meant that while artillery barrages were loud, explosive, disruptive, and potentially very lethal, an inability to put down accurate fire meant their fire potential was distributed and therefore dissipated over a much larger area than was actually being targeted. As in the First World War, when the same phenomenon had been discovered, even heavy concentrations of artillery fired by prediction could not be counted on to kill enemy soldiers, nor to obliterate their fixed positions.{40} Only directly observed artillery fire could be counted on to be particularly effective, with the guns either acquiring targets that they could see, which was hazardous, or with forward observers selecting targets. Imperfect communication with observers, however, made artillery spotting sufficiently hazardous and sporadic that the wildly inaccurate and rigid pre-planned barrages were still favoured.{41}

Not surprisingly, this shortcoming on the part of the artillery was a recurring theme in the notes of Canadian officers from all fronts during the war, paralleling the ubiquity of artillery support. “Timed [artillery] barrages were not very effective,” wrote Major J.W. Ostiguy, company commander in Le Régiment de Maisonneuve, “as the nature of German defensive emplacements in some sectors were so strong that they were not harmed by [artillery] and could not be bypassed.”{42} Often Canadian troops would approach a German position that had been targeted by a heavy barrage, only to be caught off-guard, sustaining heavy casualties when they found the position still fully manned and defended despite the concentrated fire.{43} Lieutenant-Colonel T.P. Gilday, a battalion commander in Italy, perhaps summed this up best, and claimed that, “Artillery only keeps enemy heads down and does not kill. The heads are always up and guns firing when the infantry closes.”{44} While at least one officer rightly observed that the Germans feared the Allied artillery,{45} equally relevant were comments that while the artillery support was very good, any dug-in German position was relatively safe from the worst of its effects. Captain D.A.J. Paré, again of Le Régiment de Châteauguay [sic. Should be Régiment de la Chaudière], told in his notes of how, “Jerry was well dug-in on high ground, and he didn't bother much with [Canadian artillery].”{46} Fire plans, even the heaviest, could not be counted on to obliterate the enemy on their own. While the artillery branch undeniably inflicted casualties upon the enemy, the high degree of inaccuracy meant that the key positions being targeted would seldom be destroyed, particularly if the troops were well dug-in. At best artillery made the enemy keep their heads down, producing more of a “neutralizing” effect than an explicitly “destructive” one.

Examining these shortcomings, however, demonstrates the true role of artillery in the combined-arms team, and also explains why so many Canadian officers discussed artillery barrages and fire plans in such agreeable terms. The artillery was useful for the infantry not in terms of its raw destructive power – which is never mentioned in the surveys – but as a way of keeping the enemy fire suppressed and with their heads down so that the Canadian infantry could advance to their objectives. The fear that the guns inspired in the Germans, coupled with the need to huddle in trenches or bunkers to avoid the worst of the barrage, made artillery the perfect weapon to “shepherd” infantry through a normally fire-swept zone to close with the enemy. This was why so many officers indicated the importance of the creeping barrage; “hugging” the edge of a rolling artillery bombardment as closely as possible minimized the time between when the barrage lifted and when the infantry were on top of their objectives. As Major Daniel Tremblay pointed out, “If you come in just after the barrage, it is much easier [to take an objective], but not always possible.”{47} Artillery was not a certain method of moving forward by any means, and German troops that braved the barrage and kept their “heads up” throughout were likely to catch Canadian troops rushing forward in the open. But with the weight of the Allied material advantage keeping the guns well-supplied, artillery fire could prove effective in escorting infantry in close, suppressing enemy fire if not destroying it outright, and thereby providing cover for the movement of infantry behind the barrage. A great majority of officers, particularly in Northwest Europe, reported that their troops could keep up effectively with the barrage even when they had not received preliminary training, which is a testament to how well Canadians typically performed under this system.{48} Furthermore, if there was not an observable learning curve over the course of the war, there was at least a steady effort to improve the accuracy of artillery on the part of the Canadian army.

Relating the ineffectiveness of artillery back to S.L.A. Marshall, the discussions of artillery in the Battle Experience Questionnaires reveals that while indirect fire support played an important role on the battlefield, it was never going to be a decisive weapon, given its inherent inaccuracy. The point of amassing such a preponderance of artillery on the battlefield was not to use it to obliterate the enemy, which was rarely possible, but to essentially “escort” the infantry in close enough to an objective to avoid the brunt of enemy fire. When it came down to the final advance on a position, infantry would be expected – and, indeed, would have to – use their small arms to engage and kill the enemy in a fight for the position. And they would certainly be required to engage the practically inevitable German counter-attack the same way. So despite the reputation that the Allied armies might have had for using artillery as a “crutch,” the fact is that artillery was hardly the senior partner in the combined-arms team. The massive barrages characteristic of Allied doctrine, particularly in Northwest Europe, often left the bulk of German defenders still alive and the core of the defence intact.{49} The skillful application of infantry small-arms fire was still needed to take and hold an objective, no matter the power of the barrage that may have preceded it.

14 Niall Ferguson, The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 515.

15 Stephen G. Fritz, Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 61.

16 Ferguson, War of the World, 520.

17 English, Canadian Army in Normandy, 174-175.

18 Fritz, Frontsoldaten, 62-63.

19 Quoted in: Copp, Cinderella Army, 92.

20 Statistics compiled based on answers to survey “H” question 12(a), “Did your unit carry out an attack under an artillery barrage?” Overall: “Yes” 116 surveys, “No” 19 surveys, “Unknown” 5, “No Answer” 4. The difference between the Italian and NW Europe campaigns can possibly be accounted for by the broken terrain of the Italian peninsula, which limited the use of armoured vehicles and maximized the responsibility of infantry.

21 For a good discussion, see: Hew Strachan, The First World War, (New York: Viking, 2003), 168, 313-315.

22 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain Donald Findlay, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 15.

23 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain S.R. Lambert, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 182.

24 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major J.G. Stothart, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 205.

25 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Major John Irvin Mills, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 36.

26 Statistics compiled based on answers to survey “H” question 12©: “Did [troops] keep up with the barrage effectively?” Overall: “Yes” 87 surveys; “No” 21 surveys; “No Answer” 8 surveys.

27 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Captain G.C. Watt, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 173.

28 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain James Bulloch, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 283.

29 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major John Campbell, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 75.

30 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain Warren G. Harvey, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 180.

31 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army: 1940-1944, From Dunkirk to D-Day, (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 173-174.

32 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Major D.M. Ripley, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 83.

33 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain L. Leclerc, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 229.

34 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 21.

35 Statistics compiled based on answers to survey “H” question 12(B): “did [troops] have preliminary training [in attacking under a barrage]?” Overall: “Yes” 58 surveys; “No” 54 surveys; “Unknown” 1 survey; “No Answer” 4 surveys.

36 Statistics again based on answers to survey “H” question 12(B), compiled according to the number of months an officer had served in the theater of operations.

37 While this seems to have been true of heavier battery-based artillery, the use of mortars...

38 Copp, Fields of Fire, 43, 124-125.

39 Ibid., 125-126. Copp's research indicates that this was true at least through the Battle of Normandy, and by implication in Italy as well up to that point, though through the rest of 1944 and 1945 the Operational Research Section assisted in developing ways to improve the artillery's accuracy.

40 Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War, (London: Basic Books, 1998), 307-308.

41 For some critiques of wireless communications in particular, see: Battle Experience Questionnaires, Captain Reginald Harvey Smith, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 146; Major J.W. Ostiguy, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 192. Fully half of the questions (nos. 16 through 30) on survey “H” of the questionnaires ask questions about the effectiveness of communications and signaling in battle, so it was clearly an area that the surveyors felt there was room for improvement to be made in.

42 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major J.W. Ostiguy, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 192.

43 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Major D.M. Ripley, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 83.

44 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lt.-Colonel T.P. Gilday, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 54.

45 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Captain Skinkewicz, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 48.

46 Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain D.A.J. Paré, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 246.

47 Battle Experience Questionnaire, A/Major Daniel Tremblay, LAC RG 24, Vol. 10450, 243.

48 Based on compiled answers to survey “H” questions 12(a), 12(B), 12©.

49 David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada's Second World War, (Toronto: Stoddart, 2002), 220.

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Full thesis available here: http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/handle/1974/1081

Book level treatment of thesis here: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Canadians-Under-Fire-Infantry-Effectiveness/dp/0773536264/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1338076137&sr=1-1

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dieseltaylor,

Ammo bearers who can't transport ammo and deliver same? How'd they manage to pull that one off? Apparently, ammo bearers are encumbered rifle or carbine equipped infantry. Fabulous decision, that. Guess we're lucky we can at least offload stuff from vehicles.

Regards,

John Kettler

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From the collected works of J D Salt : )

Many thanks for making them more public and presenting the outcomes.

"WO 291/946 Effects of bombardment – present state of knowledge.

This summary was published in 1946.

Against men in slit trenches, 25-pdr groundburst must hit the trench or parapet to be effective.

If firing 1000 25-pdr shells into a 300 ´ 300 yard box with 100 men in it in slit trenches, the expected number of casualties would be nine.

Four kinds of effect from bombardment are distinguished:

Lethal: Killing or incapacitating personnel.

Material: Destroying weapons and equipment.

Neutralisation: Preventing the enemy from observing or using his weapons for the duration of the

bombardment.

Morale effects: Reduction in effectiveness lasting after the bombardment has ceased.

Two possible morale effects are mentioned.

"Sensitization" means that greater weights of bombardment have progressively more morale effect. The existence of this effect was supported by "abundant evidence". "Habituation" means the lowering of morale effect by men getting used to small

bombardments. The occurrence of this was "more difficult to support by adequate evidence".

The "minimum effective density" of a bombardment is 0.3 lbs/sq yd for 25-pdr shell.

"If the enemy is in protected positions such as pillboxes or concrete gun casemates instead of in open positions the state of affairs is different. No projectile which cannot pierce the protection has any noticeable effect. The neutralising, morale and lethal effects do not exist until the material effect is achieved."

Experience on the Normandy beaches suggested that one 81mm mortar had the same casualty-causing effect as 1 MG. Casualties were weapon were one-and-a-half times more on Omaha than the British beaches, where they were in turn four times greater than on Utah. The difference is attributed to greater effectiveness of preliminary bombardment.

Morale effect (lasting after the bombardment ceases) "...can only be achieved against enemy in open positions, unless the duration is about 8 hours or more, in which case lightly protected positions may be affected especially if retaliation is impossible."

On open positions a bombardment intensity of 0.1 lb/sq yd/hour in 25-pdr equivalents produces collapse in about 4 hours; 1.0 lb/sq yd/hour in about ¼ hour.

Neutralising effect, in NW Europe, on an enemy in open positions, was achieved with a bombardment intensity of 0.02–0.08 lb/sq yd/hr. in 25-pdr equivalents.

Lethal effect: A density of 0.1 lb/sq yd causes 2% casualties on targets in slit trenches, about 20% on targets in the open.

Material effect: A density of 0.1 lb/sq yd damages about 1½% of weapons or guns in pits, 20% of soft vehicles in the open."

There is also WO research on how different terrains affect the lethality of bombardment. etc. and of course most things an army should be interested in.

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dieseltaylor,

According to the manual, ammo bearers ARE functional in the game--as long as they're close enough to the supported weapon. From what I can tell, you don't want to lose ammo bearers, for losing them WILL put a major crimp in your ability to keep firing.

Regards,

John Kettler

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Your analysis of me is incorrect.

I'd just like the AI to perform the way a human would if they had just received 15-20 rounds of 60mm and 105mm HE mix.

That's all.

I am playing the Vierville scenario in response to this thread and you are mistaken about the size of the German force. (spoilers below)

In this battle, the High Ground objective is occupied by an infantry platoon plus HMG and panzerfaust team at the least, not just an HMG and HQ. I don't know if that is all the Germans forces there because I have not finished the scenario (25 minutes left in my game). In any case, it is not surprising your 15-20 rounds aimed at a minority of your opposition did not suppress or destroy the enemies you are unaware of.

Practice better recon.

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JK

From what people have posted here it seems you cannot have your ammo bearers dump the ammo with the ordnance but have to stay until the ordnance finishes using its stock and then it will start using the bearers supply - whilst they remain there I assume.

If I what I am reading from posters is wrong please do say.

If the ammo was dumped and the ordnance, say a mortar team, moved you could have everything above their intrinsic lift capability lost. Or perhaps a percentage is lost anyway if stockpiled rather than bearers to hand.

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From what people have posted ... it seems ... I assume ... what I am reading ...

Interesting. But not surprising.

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Interesting. But not surprising.

SO JonS do you know whether it is true or not?

I have only tested myself vehicle speeds and spotting with tank v.tank so am content that others will have tested other aspects and I will rely on what they post. Given of course numbers who say the same thing, or one person where the methodology is explained and others confirm. :)

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sburke

Thanks for the link. It was an interesting read but at no point does it establish a commercial reason why they decided to spend effort on CMX2. Sorting out the infantry problems in CMx1 is what happened but as a businessman I would expect a reasoned argument for time invested against potential reward. And perhaps there was a business case but not one shared with the buying public.

I have to admit you completely lost me here. Steve explicitly states in the process of developing CMBB they decided the engine just wasn't capable of doing what they wanted to do and he and Charles then decided they would begin focusing on development of a new engine. What do you mean "establishing a commercial reason"?

I can only assume that rather than accept at face value that the folks who created CM were intent on creating something they felt could be better developed to do what they wanted as they felt CMx1 was a dead end, you prefer instead think there is some secret other undocumented reason that no one can substantiate behind the move to CMx2. Honestly I feel a credibility gap forming here and it isn't on BFCs behalf.

However the gist of the thread is not getting enough fun - some people think it is just right and others think it is unduly klutzy. Design decisions such as ammo crews not being able to off-load ammo to the gun/mortar, tank crews swopping places when dead crew instantly disappear, etc , etc just seem strange.

Does it provide some great graphic moments and excitement - for sure it does. But then most people do not post all the unexciting irritating parts of the plotting etc. : ) We can all agree to differ as to whether it is enjoyable enough for the effort invested.

Most people don't post at all and yes we can certainly differ on how much we enjoy it or not. I'd be really surprised if there was a universal level of enjoyment on anything. The gist of this thread is totally subjective and was begun with a statement made with no corroborating data to show that it first of all wasn't a one off or that given variables that we are unable examine possibly expected behavior. No offense to the OP but there is nothing to work with there. He's not happy with the game, battles don't work the way he expects and he may not play it because of that. That's it, that's all we have.

Yeah CM has issues, BFC readily admits that. Some are items they are unable to surmount right now (I am referring here to gun elevation treatment) others are design decisions that they made based on how other things interact (ammo sharing). Show me a comparable product however that even comes close. There are similar products in the genre, but nothing quite like this.

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sburke

I would hate to think you find my post incomprehensible. If you re-read the link you posted, I am sorry it is lengthy, you will see the reasons why they wanted a new engine as being more realistic.

Changing a game system because it can provide more realism/colour is not the same thing as saying we will have more sales because the game is realistic. The argument might be that further complexity may deter ...

As it happens I believe at the time CMx2 was being whispered about BF did provide a rationale and that was that a modular system design would allow them to provide more games in a timely way. Apparently the CMx1 was a real bugger to code when going from CMBO to CMBB to CMAK as it was not modular.

"Show me a comparable product however that even comes close. There are similar products in the genre, but nothing quite like this." I don't think there is a comparable product but that is irrelevant. In the scheme of things people play what they enjoy be it a wargame or any of a number of other games/hobbies. Campaign of North Africa was without a near challenger so the phrase ""Show me a comparable product however that even comes close. There are similar products in the genre, but nothing quite like this." is equally true.

If BF ever sought my advice! then it would be to try to think of the end user and ease of use. I think rather like boardgame designers and testers they get so close to the coalface that they don't recognise klutzy parts of the game.

I mean whats with the effing countdown clock for Pet's sake. For the general population time goes forward and I am confident 100% of the population understands it. Of course suspending my normal habits during play of a game that works the other way around is just peachy.

CMBN is possibly a great game and can have some great moments but it is bordering on my "Can I be arsed to play it" level. : )

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I mean whats with the effing countdown clock for Pet's sake. For the general population time goes forward and I am confident 100% of the population understands it. Of course suspending my normal habits during play of a game that works the other way around is just peachy.

Not sure what you mean here... "Game" clocks like Hockey and North American Football and Basketball have countdown clocks. Soccer/Football timing goes forward is that what you are meaning? :confused:

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Good point General Lee. But that is three primarily US sports versus the World! : ).

Actually it is surprising that in a realistic game where you are given time of day for the battle there is the implication that time advances.

The randomly chosen scenario Bois De Bauguin kicks off at 14.50 and you have to 16.00 for the mission. Note that the artillery will be available after 5-10 minutes. So just remember to deduct 5-10 from 70 .... easy-peasy and remember it. Just running the clock forwards so 5-10 minutes is on the clock would be really difficult for people. And of course CMBN games with variable endings is just plain daft, I mean whats with -3 minutes. Lets see if it would catch on : )

"Darling I am sorry I am minus 93 minutes late from the office."

"But darling that surely must mean you are 186 minutes early!"

I honestly do not know what historically happened in WW2 but I assume they carried watches that only advanced forwards without a countdown function ......

PS

"Canada and US, the two major countries for hockey, started using this timer. For sports in all other countries, the timers all counted up to make it easier to announce. (ie: A goal with 7:47 left on the olympic clock would be read as 12:13, which is the time they announce.)"

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