Volksgrenadiers

[Locksley]

Does anybody know how many assault guns were usually assigned to Volksgrenadier battalions. Thinking about I expect it was a certain number to a division rather than individual battalions, but any help would be great.

Thanks

Tom

[JasonC]

Most VG divisions were plain infantry and had no organic AFVs at all.

Some had a single company of StuGs, and sometimes another of Marders, in their divisional panzerjaeger battalion. That would mean 10 StuGs and 14 Marders to a division. When they had these, they were in place of towed PAK. (The third company was typically motorized light FLAK in these cases, to help protect the vehicles from air attack).

They would typically be used in platoon strength, sometimes all together as a company, but the second of those obviously only for a small portion of the force (e.g. a reaction reserve to plug break-throughs). 3 StuGs to a battalion of VG would be perfectly ordinary. Very low level, in other words.

But there were also StuG brigades as independent army level formations. These had 31 StuGs apiece (sometimes with some StuHs mixed in, sometimes not). And a full formation like that might be assigned to a VG division when it had an attacking role in a major offensive (e.g. the Battle of the Bulge). In which case, you'd see a company of them to a battalion or two of VG.

In CM size battles, you would essentially never see more than 10 StuGs on the same battlefield. And you'd only see that many in rare cases, typically with a battalion or more of VG infantry. 3 or none would be more typical levels of support.

You generally would not see them alone. A platoon of 3 was the basic tactical unit. You might sometimes see only a pair because one had broken down or something. With Marders, you'd typically see 2-4, and in place of StuGs not in addition.

The only other SP gun some VG units might occasionally see was the Bison, a self propelled 150mm infantry gun on a Pz 38 chassis. They have them in CMBB but not in CMBO. A Hummel is a reasonable approximation in CMBO, though. These were standard issue only in the mobile divisions, not the VG. But sometimes some attacking VG formations had them (e.g. in the Bulge again).

Again, understand that an infantry force type - towed 75mm PAK but no AFVs at all - would be the most common VG force. You can use a combined arms level of StuG/H support to represent units supported by a higher level independent StuG brigade. But don't imagine they usually had them - they didn't.

I hope this helps.

[Locksley]

This really is a great forum, whenever I ask a question I always get a great answer, often from JasonC, fantastic.

Cheers pal

Tom

[David I]

Locksley,

The US Army's "Handbook on German Military Forces" (a pretty goood source for TOE's for 1944 and beyond) puts the TOE for the Panzer Jager Abt in a Volksgrenadier Div to be 9 37mm AA guns, 9 75mm Pak and 14 Self Propelled 75mm Pak. For the self propelled weapons it could be Marders, Stugs, Hetzers or just paper. Nafzinger seems to bear this out. All in all that's it for armor in a VG Div.

David

[blue division]

I agree. Volks Grenadiers were raised from 3rd rate reservists - i.e. seriously sounded, veterans from the first world war, Desk bound soldiers etc.

They were rarely given heavy equipment - they were sort of a light infantry force. A lot of their equipment was stuff looted from the French and Polish armies. Any German equipment was often of poor quality. Some units were given a few assault guns - this was rare and probably just for show. All the regular soldiers knew the VolksGrenadiers would run away or surrender at the first sign of trouble - why give them valuable equipment? These units were regarded as liabilities by everyone, including the leaders of the Third Reich. They were intended to stiffen the resolve of the civilian population to fight the expected invasion.

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by blue division:

Volks Grenadiers were raised from 3rd rate reservists

That sounds more like Volksturm than Volksgrenadier units.

[Kingfish]

I agree with Sirocco, I think you are mistaking Volsturm with Volksgrenadier.

As I understand it, the Volksgrenadiers formations were the result of a structual reorganization of the '44 infantry division. Granted, they were formed at a time when Germany was hard pressed on all fronts, and their ranks were filled with whomever they could get. Still, I don't think there was a policy in place that said all 3rd rate reservists must go into the VG formations.

After all, if you look at a map of the battle of the bulge you will see that apart from 3rd and 5th FJ, all the other infantry divisions were VGs.

[blue division]

I think you overrate the German Army in late 1944 when the VolksGrenadiers were formed. It had been defeated on all fronts - and had largely been destroyed.

hence :

'He [Hitler] reacted to it by immediately putting into effect a series of drastic "Total War" measures, designed to supply him with additional forces for a final counteroffensive. By lowering the draft age to 16 years and extending it to include the 50-year-olds and by combing out the home front and armed forces, he put an additional three quarters of a million men under arms. He thus built up a new strategic reserve consisting of 25 Volksgrenadier divisions and at leas 6 panzer divisions. These were raised and trained under the newly appointed commander of the Replacement Army, Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler.

I would like to add that the VG divisions were not given much artillery - they were given lots of sub standard automatic weapons that were being rushed out from hundreds of small workshops across Germany (part of the 'Total War' drive by Speer).

So that's why I said WWI veterans (guys in their 50's), desk bound soldiers (clerks, cooks, garisson staff, airmen without aricraft, sailors without ships, soldiers with a disability but who could still walk and fire a gun etc.), poor weapons (shodily made MP40's).

Perhaps some of the VG divisions were lucky in that they had enough real soldiers from other destroyed units to fill out their ranks to a decent standard. But most were formed in the most ad-hoc manner, for example 1 week training and being equipped in the Ardenne just before going into battle. After the Ardenne, their strength collapsed even further. As some observers commented from regular units, all they had was high morale. Nobody seriously expected them to do much.

I think a lot of 'talking up' of the VG divisions goes on because it was they who were involved in the Ardenne. But they were a seriously reduced force compared to 1943 Wehrmacht infantry division.

Yuo have got to remember - the Wehrmacht was shattered in summer 1944. All that was left was the pieces.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by blue division:

I think you overrate the German Army in late 1944 when the VolksGrenadiers were formed. It had been defeated on all fronts - and had largely been destroyed.

I agree that the summer of '44 was a disaster for the German army, and it was because of those losses that the VGs were raised. However, there wasn't (AFAIK) an offical policy that stated only boys and old men go to the VGs, all others go to the Panzer, FJs, etc.

[blue division]

The point is, the VG's were raised by Himmler as his Replacement Army. The old German Army only raised 60,000 men per month - they were still choosey about who they recruited. This didn't go down well with Hitler. Hitler demanded more, and Himmler being the man he was was only too glad to oblige by recruiting any old person he could get his hands on. Himmler, remember was only too glad to expand his empire and reduce the role of the Army. It also pandered to Hitlers prejudice against the Army.

Hitler also knew that no-one (not even Goring) would say no to Himmler when he came knocking for more men. Himmler, being in charge of the Gestapo and pretty much all of the State Security services by 1944 was not the man to say no to.

Naturally, Himmler swept up all the no-hopers that the Army weren't interested in before. And they were pressed into his own VG divisions.

Remember, in the Third Reich there wasn't such a thing as 'policy' most of the time. It was whatever Hitler pronounced that day, and if he said to Himmler to raise a new Army, then that is what he did. There was always a race between Hitlers aides to be the most favoured. So they were all sycophants, and it wasn't whether the order from the Fuhrer made any sense, but just doing it unquestioningly that was what gained you favour.

I don't think there was any policy there, just desperation on Hitlers part and a total lack of any morality on the part of Himmler. He just packed the VG divisions with canon fodder.

[Liddell-Hart]

The truth is actually somewhere in between the two. It's definitely the Volkssturm that were the bottom of the barrel personnel wise, the Volksgrenadier were depleted standard infantry divisions brought back up to strength with substandard troops.

Confusingly both programs started life labelled Volksgrenadier.

[beholders]

At any rate those childeren from the Volksturm from the Hittler youth in Berlin WOLUPED some major a** with PANZERFAUSTS! :eek: AND were very eficent with their weapons.

[Andreas]

Working from memory here.

Volksgrenadierdivisionen were raised in two ways. One was rebuilding of shattered Grenadierdivisionen/Infanteriedivisionen - those are generally speaking the lower numbered ones. E.g. 12. VGD was built out of 12.ID.

The higher numbered ones (in the 500s) were newly raised divisions that were established in summer 1944. Some of these were briefly named Grenadier or Infanterie before becoming Volksgrenadier.

The manpower for the divisions was apparently far from scraping bottom of the barrel. There were a lot of capable protected men working in German industry as specialists in 1944 still. The raising of these divisions put an end to the protection of many of them. The problem was that these units were not well trained, and that their equipment was often somewhat sub-standard in many respects, especially in the artillery arm, where they were sometimes issued Feldkanonen instead of Haubitzen in the leichte Abteilungen (copying the Soviet 7.62, in effect, with a bad knockoff), to increase divisional AT capabilities. But that of course did nothing to their artillery arm. I also have my doubts about how many SP pieces of artillery they really did receive.

Vokssturm was scraping the barrel, and had nothing to do with Voksgrenadier.

[blue division]

I suspect that the truth of what constituted a VG division lies somewhere in between. Some were probably good, others fairly lousy.

I have heard descriptions of some of them as being constituted of regular experienced soldiers,

And :

I have heard descriptions of them as being looked down on by regular units because they were so hastily constituted and trained (one week for training for the Ardenne and being given their weapons from the back of the truck as they were about to attack the American positions).

Also that they had a preponderance of 16 year old boys and men in their '50's.

They were constituted very hastily, so it is probably very difficult to say what a VG division actually was like.

Both statements could be true depending on where you look.

Personally, I think they were sub-standard units that were not trained properly and not given equipment that required too much training.

I am sure that the German Army commanders would have far preferred having Parachute troops for example rather than VG. But they were all that was left as a strategic reserve.

[JasonC]

The combat history of VG divisions gives the lie to the claim they were untrained bottom of the barrel conscripts. Many fought very well, sometimes appreciably better than mobile arm forces more lavishly equipped (e.g. around Nancy, infiltrating tactics in the early Bulge fighting). They generally had experienced cadres, were well equipped with infantry weapons and were not without artillery.

The manpower used to fill them out came from the drastic reforms in practices after the disasters of the summer of 1944. The men came from the replacement army, from rear echelons of all services, from the navy, from Luftwaffe ground personnel (bloated with manpower as they ran out of fighters and fuel), from removal of exemptions for class of workers in important industries (and the economy peaked around the time they were drafted partially as a result).

The VG started forming in the summer and were manning positions in the field by the fall. They were important in stopping the western allies at the borders of Germany. Yes the quality declined after that, with units filled out with kids by the end of 1944 and regularly so in 1945. Uneven one can say, declining quality one can say. CM conscripts, one can't say.

[blue division]

As far as I know, VG divisions trained their new recruits for 2 - 4 weeks in late 1944.

And the average age dropped to 17 as the units got chewed up.

As far as infiltration in the Ardennes was concerned, I thought that it would have been easy to bypass American units as they were spread out, the short days and poor weather. And it is one enormous forest area - ideal for infiltration.

I would have thought that the fighting strength of the original VG formations would have been OK and would then have sharply declined as they got chewed up in the fighting. Weren't the Germans losing 1,000 men a day killed at the height of the fighting in 1944?

AS for the VG being well equipped I can't really agree. Increasing the number Machine Pistols in the platoon is really a bodge - they are too short ranged and expend their ammunition too quickly. I would think in an extended firefight in open terrain the average American unit would overwhelm the German VG one with greater long range firepower. I would have thought that the VG platoon would have to get in very close to effectively use all of those Machine Pistols.

I thought the main reason for giving large quantities of Machine Pistols to the VG was because this was what was being mass produced at that time in Germany. Rifles were too complicated to manufacture , whereas MP's could be rushed out in a quicker manner.

Also, MP's required a lot less skill from the operator - which fitted in well with the profile of the average German recruit in Autumn 1944.

[JasonC]

The reason to give them MPs was not any shortage of rifles. The Germans had plenty of rifles - they made something like 21 million of them during the war, far more than the number of MPs made. Much of the VG actually still had them, not because that was the plan but because there weren't as many MPs as wanted for all the new formations.

The reason MPs were wanted was to allow small numbers of men to have a large impact in close quarters fighting. German infantry got very good at close defense, which exploited small unit tactics, good NCOs, and special weapons like panzerfausts. If you are waiting for panzerfaust range to spring an ambush in the first place, you don't need the range of a rifle, and extra instant firepower is a welcome addition instead.

Infantry fights in close terrain often because that is the operational task of infantry. You don't put it on an open field unsupported. You defend at river lines, in large forests and hilly terrain, in towns. If you have fausts (and mines) and the enemy has armor, you set up short range ambushes in these places, defend from reserve slopes, etc.

At Nancy, the Germans threw several Panzer brigades along with 2 shells of full PDs (used for HQs, arty, etc) at an American AD, and did no better than exchange down, if that. But a VG division fighting in forest, with night attacks and in morning fog, ran that US AD out of infantry in a matter of days and put it back on its heels.

In the Bulge, VG divisions successfully put battalions through the US lines in forest marches, attacked artillery batteries and support elements in the battlefield rear, cut roads, etc. That is what you need infantry for. Sub-elements that didn't have enough - e.g. Peiper - couldn't keep the roads to the forward elements open. The attack on Bastogne failed mainly because the force inside the pocket had at least as much infantry as the force ringing it outside.

Infantry has a specific combat power, which is terrain dependent. If infantry is of sufficient quality it delivers this combat power - and by and large, the VG divisions did so. It does not depend fundamentally on ranged small arms to deliver it.

The long range fight is dominated by artillery fires, and by armored forces where the terrain allows them to operate easily. Ranged fire by infantry, useful in some forms of defense (areas surrounded by open e.g.) relies on infantry heavy weapons to deliver it - MGs and mortars - not on side arms. The VG had plenty of excellent MG42s and 81mm mortars for this.

[blue division]

I still don't see how an MP40 is a serious weapon to equip your infantry with as a standard weapon.

Surely a 9mm cartridge is designed for very close range shooting - I thought its maximum effective range was 50m - and perhaps only 10m in practice. I also heard that it lacked stopping power - lots of stories about the enemy being shot repeatedly with 9mm rounds and it failing to have an effect on them.

There is only one reason to solely equip your soldiers with SMG's and that is for either storming fixed positions or street fighting - both at very short range. And maybe for soldiers who needed the shorter weapon such as tank riders or officers / NCO's. Surely SMG's are basically civilian use weapons (for law enforcement) that have been adopted by western armies for specialist uses?

You say that they had MG42 - but surely the number of MG42's in the units were reduced for the VG units. And did they not remove the heavy mortar section as well (120mm)? Surely these were the two most feared weapons the Germans had at this unit level?

I think you need to address also the issue of training. To train a soldier how to use a weapon such as a full powered rifle takes weeks of tuition. To use an SMG at a low level of skill requires a lot less tuition. This is why they were used in the New Army of Fall 1944. You could take somebody from a factory or wherever, give them half a day on the firing range with an MP40 and they would be ready for the front.

Surely the MP40 was issued as it could be cheaply and quickly made from non-specialist workshops, rather than the specialised Mauser armouries.

Isn't this very similar to the story behind the development of the UZI in Isreal - i.e. giving a civilian militia a cheap weapon that is easy to operate, fires a standard cartridge and that can be made from non-specialised civilian workshops?

It just smacks of desperation to expect your infantry to take on full strength enemy formations with what is basically a pistol that has been modified for automatic fire.

[JasonC]

No, no and no. Practically every assertion you are making, backed up by calling me "Shirley", isn't remotely accurate. It is just a pet theory of your own with no relation to actual history. Drop your preconception and investigate the subject instead.

You say, for instance "SMG's are basically civilian use weapons". This is horsefeathers. The SMG was invented specifically with trench warfare in mind, as "trench brooms". Large numbers were issued by all sides in WW II for the obvious purpose, close in infantry fighting in terrain.

The Russians and Brits issued far more PPsHs and Stens than the Germans did MPs. Even the US issued more Thompsons and "grease guns" than the Germans issued MPs. The Finns started the rage for them in the winter war (1940) with the effectiveness of their Soumi SMG in woods fighting. Russians used them for tank riders (the tanks deal with range, infantry with them must clear terrain they can't just shoot through) and in city fighting, in particular. Brits widely issued their Stens to commando forces, used them in night fighting, etc.

As for training, it takes 3 weeks to pass BRM today and the pace is decidedly lackluster. It is not rocket science, all guns are designed to be used easily and naturally, and entirely average groups of people routinely hit what they aim at on ranges. In combat is another story, but not one primarily driven by marksmenship. (Most rounds miss because they are fired to suppress, targets are rarely visible or for long, etc).

Both the US army and the British army have at various times had fetishes for long ranged rifle fire, and advance notions only marginally less silly than the cult of the bayonet, on the subject. The reality is most infantry combat is dominated by heavier weapons than small arms, and this is particularly true of the ranged portion of the fighting. None of which differ substantially from army to army or turn on the choice of small arm.

The only place where it is not true that heavier weapons dominate the fighting, is in conditions where they cannot operate effectively, due to limited range and visibility conditions. At night. In forests or jungle. In urban areas. In those situations, heavy weapons are still used but they do not carry the entire fight. And those are precisely the occasions when SMGs (and grenades, actually) shine.

The VG divisions had MG42s. Lots of them. They had mortars. No the 120 at battalion was never standard, as we've established on other threads, and very few formations were ever equipped with them. The 81mm was standard throughout the whole war - 2 per company plus 4 at battalion.

The Germans produced more than 75 million rounds of 81mm mortar (and even more than that, of 105mm howitzer). The Allies didn't suffer even that number of casualties. Not only do you not need to hit with every bullet, you don't need to hit with every HE shell. There is a reason up to 70% of casualties are from HE fragments, while bullets are only a quarter or so (and MGs cause most of those).

The rifle vs. MP decision turns largely on the expected defense scheme the infantry is to use, whether it is "up" - contesting wide expanses of open ground, actively firing, etc - or "back" - on reverse slopes and inside terrain, short ambushes, night counterattacks, etc. The second works by avoiding superior attacker firepower in the long range systems (not rifles, artillery and tanks).

If you are going to fight on the Russian steppe rifles are clearly better, though SMGs will have special role uses. If you are going to fight back defenses in wooded hills at the edgees of Germany, plenty of uses for SMGs will be found. Oh and even at TOE, part of the VG was standard pattern LMG+rifle infantry, and they weren't all equipped with MPs up to TOE. Rifles remained common, with a loadout more like security infantry types in CM. Far from choosing MPs because they were cheaper, they still had rifles coming out of their ears and couldn't get enough MPs to equip units according to their desired plan.

[Bigduke6]

Originally posted by beholders:

At any rate those childeren from the Volksturm from the Hittler youth in Berlin WOLUPED some major a** with PANZERFAUSTS! :eek: AND were very eficent with their weapons.

Good point. I'm sure the Red Army had no idea what it was going. They probably got to Berlin by accident, misreading their maps or something.

[blue division]

Originally posted by JasonC:

You say, for instance "SMG's are basically civilian use weapons". This is horsefeathers. The SMG was invented specifically with trench warfare in mind, as "trench brooms". Large numbers were issued by all sides in WW II for the obvious purpose, close in infantry fighting in terrain.

Why is it that you always see SMG's on civilian duty i.e. Police etc, but never with military?

Could it be that the military see the limitations of these weapons, and would only use them as 'stop gap' measures if they knew the recruit could not be trained to use a rifle? Surely that was the thinking behind the Red Army first mass issuing them, followed by the Wehrmacht?

Of course, the Allies were far more conservative in this respect, with a lot of the SMG's being given to rear echelon soldiers who had no need of a rifle. I have heard that GI's were given 2 years training. If true, that is a lot of time to learn how to shoot a rifle.

The Russians and Brits issued far more PPsHs and Stens than the Germans did MPs.

Sorry to reel you in - but we were talking about VG divisions here?

As for training, it takes 3 weeks to pass BRM today and the pace is decidedly lackluster.

Training and the lack of it for new soldiers in Germany in late 1944 was critical. You can't overlook it.

In combat is another story, but not one primarily driven by marksmenship. (Most rounds miss because they are fired to suppress, targets are rarely visible or for long, etc).

We are getting a bit off subject here - but - I agree. The main use for rifles at long range would be suppressing an enemy. And very good they are at it too. A single rifleman can halt and then slow down a company at long ranges if he knows his weapon.

Both the US army and the British army have at various times had fetishes for long ranged rifle fire, and advance notions only marginally less silly than the cult of the bayonet, on the subject.

You seem to have contradicted yourself here - didn't you just say that rifle fire can suppress the enemy - surely that is usefull? What have bayonets got to do with VG divisions (other than you can't fit them to MP40's)

The VG divisions had MG42s. Lots of them. They had mortars.

Can you check your facts here?

The Germans produced more than 75 million rounds of 81mm mortar (and even more than that, of 105mm howitzer). The Allies didn't suffer even that number of casualties.

As far as I know, the Allied soldier was not that afraid of the 81mm mortar round. It was the 120mm that really terrified them - if fired accurately, it could cause meny casualties.

There is a reason up to 70% of casualties are from HE fragments, while bullets are only a quarter or so (and MGs cause most of those).

So where does the VG division fit into your scheme of things, if bullets cause no casualties, and the VG were largely equipped with very short ranged machine pistols?

The rifle vs. MP decision turns largely on the expected defense scheme the infantry is to use,

As I said earlier - I agree - so when short range firing was on the agenda then ok. Over 50m, forget it.

Oh and even at TOE, part of the VG was standard pattern LMG+rifle infantry, and they weren't all equipped with MPs up to TOE.

I didn't say they were. But they were excessively equipped with SMG's - I believe the majority of the VG troops carried them. Issuing such a crude weapon in such large quantities to the VG suggests that the troops weren't that good!

Rifles remained common, with a loadout more like security infantry types in CM. Far from choosing MPs because they were cheaper, they still had rifles coming out of their ears and couldn't get enough MPs to equip units according to their desired plan.

I think you miss my point - I didn't say that Germany didn't have rifles any more. I pointed out issues with training and Germanys situation in late 1944 - and the connection of this and the new VG divisions.

I don't think you have addressed the inherent limitations of the 9mm round either here. What happened to the VG trooper when the enemy was further away than 50m?

[ March 23, 2005, 09:12 AM: Message edited by: blue division ]

[Andreas]

Germany produced 211,806 MG42 in 1944 - 51% of the total production. I am sure the odd one will have found its way to VG divisions.

It produced 26,341 GrW34 and 4,557 12cm GrW42 in 1944. Again, some of these may conceivably have found their way into the VG divisions.

All data from Lexikon der Wehrmacht.

I find it hard to believe that equipment of light infantry weapons was a major issue for these divisions. A quick look through Nafziger shows that TO&E for VGD was either the standard 9lMG or even a 13lMG rifle company.

[Krautman]

Blue Division,

"Why is it that you always see SMG's on civilian duty i.e. Police etc, but never with military?"

Because police officers usually don't take part in 250m distance firefights...

What they need is a lightweight weapon for self defence, effective in an urban area/close quarters.

This area was where the infantry was fighting.

With the tanks becoming more and more powerful, it was them who ruled the open terrain in ww2. The infantry was consequently driven to difficult terrain, where smgs are more useful than a rifle.

Remember: In 1941, you could take out many tanks with an AT rifle at long ranges- in 1945, you needed a giant gun to do so.

The perfect historical pair is soviet T-34/85 tanks with smg infantry riding on them- Extremely effective.

And take a closer look at what Andreas wrote:

"Volksgrenadierdivisionen were raised in two ways. One was rebuilding of shattered Grenadierdivisionen/Infanteriedivisionen - those are generally speaking the lower numbered ones. E.g. 12. VGD was built out of 12.ID."

Thus, some Infantry Divisions were merely re-named to VG Divisions, and others were raised from newly drafted men. In CM, you could represent VG units with mostly regulars (representing experienced NCOs leading inexperienced draftees), some vets and some green.

Also think of the almost mythical connotation the term "Volk" had for Hitler and Himmler. Giving new names (like making a "Schütze" to a "Grenadier") was also used to boost morale.

[beholders]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Krautman:

Blue Division,

"Why is it that you always see SMG's on civilian duty i.e. Police etc, but never with military?"

Because police officers usually don't take part in 250m distance firefights...

What they need is a lightweight weapon for self defence, effective in an urban area/close quarters.

The other reason is of course that all of today's militaries have full-auto assault rifles that mean you can have your cake, and eat it too.