Red v Red for real in Syria

[Erwin]

Spot on. The Chinese are the biggest threat and have been for maybe 20 years. At least now the issue is being aired.

However, if threatened am confident the Russian people would rally as they always have. A "fraying social contract" could just as well refer to the US.

[Jer]

hey bigduke would a good example of a "relatively stable dictatorship" be Kadyrov in Grozny?

[LongLeftFlank]

Maybe we should pursue this topic over in the Russia troops thread, but I'm not seeing Russia regaining more than regional power status in a contemporary world where China has stood up and Germans and French generally stand together when push comes to shove.

There's only 110m people in Russia today, right? and I think about 10% are non-Slavs. Tack Byelorussia back on and you add what, 20m more non-breeders? Ukraine is 40m or so, of whom 1/3(?) are actually Russian, and it's unclear even those are eager to resume being governed by Moscow. Of the non-Slavic republics only Kazakhstan seems to be a reliable ally (partly by virtue of its own Russian minority plus the generally tolerant nature of the Kazakhs) and that could change once Nazarbayev Khan goes, with Chinese influence.

There's more to power than population, sure, but it just seems to me that Moscow is very limited in terms of its power to either impose a new pax Sovietica on its neighbours, or be a beacon of relative stability incenting others to enter economic and political arrangements with them freely, as America still does. Rosneft and Lukoil bring nothing to the table that the Western oil majors don't, except a willingness to deal with unsavoury regimes (and the Chinese have broken their corner on that market). Just not seeing the raw material for a Russian renascence here; in contrast, a lot of factors seem to me to point to continuing decline.

[Bigduke6]

Jer,

I would say Razman Kadyrov is not a good example, he's a classic example. Yes I'm aware the insurgents are still out there, bless their gold-toothed little hearts, but it's not a coincidence most of them are operating in Dagestan not Chechnya these days. I saw his vehicle convoy go by once. It was like the court of Tamerlane, just with cop cars and sirens.

LLF,

One can always hope the Russians and Chinese will realize they are natural antagonists and leave the West to pick up the pieces, but frankly, Putin and Hu seem pretty much to have decided the game is economic development to create new superpower status, and ditzing around about ownership of islands in the Ussuri is a big fat waste. The Chinese need energy and have industrial capacity, the Russians have energy and need industrial capacity. They both know it, and they both know the country that plays its cards better gets to be the next superpower.

But they also know, that to develop economically it's way better to have peace and trade, than it is to argue about who really should own Manchuria or the Maritime provinces.

The Russians might just manage to ruin things because their leadership is just in love with its military-industrial complex, if they get a couple more successful wars under their belts then they might just decide they need all the military hardware their scientists can imagine, and then they bankrupt themselves and just maybe scare the Chinese into overspending on military as well.

But probably not. The Chinese and Russians these days are jousting over things like whose national oil company gets to help fraternal Kazakhstan drill the north Caspian, or who's turn it is to veto the latest US resolution on Syria in the UN Security Council. Heck, the Russians gave Damansky Island BACK (or maybe generously ceded, you decide) to the Chinese in 2004.

[Bigduke6]

Russia is the largest energy exporter in the world, and the EU is their key customer. If you tack on energy that travels to Europe via routes controlled by Russia ex the Caucasus and Central Asia, that's a pretty serious stick to swing if they want to.

As to military capacity, the Russians aren't in a frantic hurry but they're not screwing around. They've got the money and they're overhauling their military. They plan to launch something like 1.5 top-end attack subs a year for like the next eight years, they've shifted their entire army over to brigades, they plan to have their first 5th generation fighter squadron operational like in 2014, the military purchasing system is now actually rejecting gear that's over-budget or under-quality, they've fielded new major end items (attack helicopters, smart munitions) in pretty much every category you can pick.

In this modern day and age, population size isn't nearly as important as population willingness to back the war chosen by the leaders. Here the Russians have a strong advantage I would think, courtesy of national tradition and the state media.

It's not clear that, as the Russians claim, they can organize C3 coordinated warfare across all the spectra with all the cool gee-whiz weapons the Americans have, for about 1/2 the price or less. The Russians are of the opinion that their guided weapons and intelligence collection are as good as anybody's and better than most. They also point out that what are entire theaters of operation for the rest of the world, are just opposite ends of the Russian national railroad for them. Maybe they're wrong. But they don't seem to think so.

And as far as Russian state media goes, the threat isn't China, it's the aggressive militaristic West. You look at how the Russians are building their force, they are focusing on power projection into small conflicts, not a potential major war against a continental opponent. Like Georgia, which actually worked out pretty well for them.

Maybe we should pursue this topic over in the Russia troops thread, but I'm not seeing Russia regaining more than regional power status in a contemporary world where China has stood up and Germans and French generally stand together when push comes to shove.

There's only 110m people in Russia today, right? and I think about 10% are non-Slavs. Tack Byelorussia back on and you add what, 20m more non-breeders? Ukraine is 40m or so, of whom 1/3(?) are actually Russian, and it's unclear even those are eager to resume being governed by Moscow. Of the non-Slavic republics only Kazakhstan seems to be a reliable ally (partly by virtue of its own Russian minority plus the generally tolerant nature of the Kazakhs) and that could change once Nazarbayev Khan goes, with Chinese influence.

There's more to power than population, sure, but it just seems to me that Moscow is very limited in terms of its power to either impose a new pax Sovietica on its neighbours, or be a beacon of prosperity incenting others to enter economic and political arrangements with them freely, as America still does.

[LongLeftFlank]

I think we're talking past each other a little here; when you say "superpower" are you defining that as "can go head to head with NATO in a conventional war?" plus cut off a bunch of critical commodity exports at will? I lump those two kinds of "power" in with the 2000 ICBM's -- actually using either of them is pretty much unthinkable.

Superpower to me means a society that is capable of creating wealth both for itself and its partners, so much so that it becomes difficult to flout its rules without losing the benefits of trade. The US, EU and China all fall into this category. It's hard to see Russia joining them, no matter how advanced its army. And the second it looks serious about shutting off the gas tap, the EU will find permanent substutes pronto.

[Bigduke6]

I define superpower as "country able to dictate its terms, most of the time, globally; and whose behavior if not defines then sets direction to the behavior of most other major nations - with the exception of another superpower."

Further, the influence is by most measures and not just one or two measures. By my definition of superpower, the means of exercising that influence could vary and almost always are combined. It could be a bunch of ICBMs and the perceived wilingness to launch, it could be a greedy leadership controlling a resource very valuable internationally, it could be a populace really sure they have a global obligation to enforce their beliefs on other populaces.

The Russians aren't thinking globally - yet - but it is clear they are already committed to becoming the leading Eurasian power. The longer-term goal, and Putin is very frank about this, is making Russia the leading nation in a block of nations that counterweights Europe and the US. (He doesn't mention China, but we all know he's thinking about China too.)

That block is roughly the former Soviet Union for most issues but it could, real life example, include China for say a conflict over who whether it's ok for the international community to force regime change in Syria. Or it could include India AND China if the conflict is over, say, whose fighter jet system will be used for for pretty much all air forces between NATO and Japan. Or it could include India but exlude the Chinese, if the question is, who really has drilling rights in the Spratley Islands.

The bottom line is that Russia has a pretty substantial cash reserve thanks to energy, and the Kremlin's avowed goal is to use that reserve to convert the economy from an energy/raw resource-based economy to include manufacturing and much higher consumer consumption. Yeah right, that's laughable, the Russians could never manage that. They're too corrupt.

Of course, that's what a lot of people said about the Chinese in the early 1970s. Not many people are laughing at the idea of sustained Chinese economic now. And the top-level Russian position is, if the Chinese can do it without substantial resources, we can do it faster and give our people a better social contract in the process.

On China, well, it's possible to argue that the Chinese are flouting the rules pretty much flagrantly and with impunity, if you consider their national currency valuation and market access policies unfair to the EU and the US. To wit, the Chinese break the rules and the EU and the US can't do anything but complain. So does this mean China, not the US, is the superpower? It's not like the US can just boycott Chinese goods, what if the Chinese dump all their US treasury bonds? I call that interdependency, and evidence that the US is a lot less a superpower than it was even 20 years ago.

[Erwin]

Good analysis. Russia has the oil (and the high prices have made the oligarchs rich).

China doesn't and their expansion is dependent and desperate for oil, their car culture is just starting. Hence their aggressive expansion aims into the S China Sea and beyond... all the way to the Malacca Straits and some dubious claims elsewhere. That area could be where the first clashes with Indian and/or US naval forces occur... if they ever do.

Perhaps the only really good decision Bush admin did was to share nuke tech with India - I suspect hoping to have India and China have at it while we sit back and watch the show.

[LongLeftFlank]

OK, enough. I forbid any further mention of Russia or even worse, the decline of America and how the Chinese now own everybody, in this thread. Please take it to the "Russian troops in Syria" thread or to another forum. Thanks.

Back OT, I'm continuing my test-drives through the shattered streets of Baba Amr. Interestingly, while the T72s will edge past rubble (i.e. transit a half-square wide space) if the waypoints are set carefully, the BMPs invariably refuse and try to go around.

[Erwin]

That is weird re the BMP's. Any ideas why a narrower vehicle would be such a biatch about narrow roads?

[LongLeftFlank]

Empirically I'd say it's the BMP's narrower (and less robust) tracks, but I sincerely doubt that distinction ever found its way into the CMSF engine; no sign it's in CMBN either. My only other thoought would be the T72s turret height letting it "clear" the high walls opposite somehow (vehicles can "cut in" to walls and buildings to a limited extent).

I now have the full regime force set up; let me see how they handle it now.

[LongLeftFlank]

Some of the most intensive bombardment I've seen yet: Hamidiya, Homs March 26. Again, no military purpose whatever is being served by this -- it is pure terror. Note the church domes in the target area (second clip).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-L3k5rvE404

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lItpfXA3e54

A glimpse of the hell on the incoming end....

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aD2LwPSr6ME&feature=relmfu

[LongLeftFlank]

Building out the AI plans for the BLUE (Regime) force, tossing in some basic opposition for interest. T72-TURMS bushwhacked twice by RPG shots on the elevated highway; minimal damage. MBTs are tough to kill from the side with RPG-7ds.

[LongLeftFlank]

All right, nearly ready to start playtesting H2H here, although AI will take a while longer for single player. SBurke has kindly volunteered to be my opponent in the first go-through.

Here's a pano of the BLUE force setup, looking toward the objectives.

[LongLeftFlank]

For those interested, here are some excerpts from the BLUE mission briefing, giving background and context. As I've said many times, I'm more of an amateur historian than a gamer, so this stuff is important to me. But for the benefit of gamers who just want to get right into the fight, I've put the "Quick Start" bullets right up front (hat tip, Erwin).....

QUICK START (Dude, spare me the history lesson! How do I win?)

1. You have 3 Control objectives, the Consumer Centre traffic circle, the Thabit School and the nearby Zubair bin al Awam Mosque. If you control these and lose less than 8% of your force, you will win. Otherwise, you must inflict at least 50% losses on the enemy without losing more than 20% of your own force to win.

2. You have 2 mobile forces totaling 200 men (mostly Special Forces command units in body armour, without RPG-29s) mounted in 10 BMP-3s and various jeeps, plus 5 T-72 TURMS tanks. The second (commando) group will arrive after 10-15 minutes in the area marked "highway".

3. Your firepower is mostly mounted in your AFVs. Even though most of your infantry are "Special Forces" and part of an elite praetorian division, their morale and leadership is poor relative to NATO troops. They prefer not to die.

4. RED strength is unknown. The only known threats are RPGs and small arms. IEDs and mines have never yet been encountered. Roadblocks, both deliberate and incidental (rubble from the lengthy bombardments), create another hazard in the narrow backstreets. Their ammo is low but they know they won't be taken prisoner.

BACKGROUND

Strategic map

BABA AMR district, Homs, Syria, late February 2012.

In the twelve months since the popular protests of the "Arab Spring" reached the streets of Syria's cities, the Assad regime and army had reacted with increasingly brutal force.

The roots of the unrest were not primarily sectarian, but demographic and economic. With no oil revenues or Cold War Soviet aid to draw on, and the Levantine merchant classes of this ancient crossroads in economic and demographic decline, the Ba'ath welfare state was now failing. For millions of Sunni Arab young people crowding into crumbling cities, Syria had little future to offer beyond day labour and grinding poverty.

In contrast, on the age-old despotic pattern, the Assad court clan of the Alawite Shia sect had systematically amassed to itself all political, military and economic power. The armed forces remained lavishly funded, but unlike Egypt, Turkey or Pakistan their commanders no longer had any institutional loyalty to the nation, only to the Assads.

With little ability or inclination to create broader wealth or opportunity, the rulers had devolved into pure kleptocracy, extracting a Mercedes Benz lifestyle for a shrinking elite. They feared that a Sunni-majority government would exact a brutal sectarian revenge on its oppressors. Thus, with nothing to offer the people, the regime's sole option was to crush them with armed force. And the more blood they spilled, the more there was no turning back.

During 2011, as troops began firing on demonstrators, thousands of ordinary soldiers deserted in disgust to the loose collection of armed opposition groups known as the "Free Syria Army", taking their rifles. This influx of dedicated fighters, who knew there was no going back, allowed rebels to carve out large denied areas in the vehicle-unfriendly cities, and in hilly areas near the borders. More ominous still for the regime, the FSA negotiated informal truces with local garrisons, allowing supplies and arms to flow in.

By the end of 2011, aware that its control was slipping away, the regime marshaled its most reliable forces to crush key rebel centers using brutal, overwhelming force, in the hope of intimidating the rest, as it had done in Hama in 1982.

Its first target was Homs, Syria's third largest city, an ancient trading center whose multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian population had a long tradition of thwarting the will of rulers. In December 2011, hundreds of tanks arrived to seal off restive districts. The siege conditions, together with chill winter weather, began taking a toll on the FSA rebels and their civilian hosts.

But ejecting the FSA from the Old City and the crowded Sunni tenement districts that had sprung up all around it continued to pose a formidable challenge for the armour-heavy regime forces. The neighbourhood of Baba Amr was particularly hazardous. As BMPs and tanks spread out into the narrow streets, unable to support each other, the rebels would incinerate a few with point blank RPG shots, then melt away. They would then return at night in force to overrun isolated outposts. Inevitably, the army was forced to withdraw to defensible bases, unable to hold what it had taken.

Frustrated at the lack of progress, the army ratcheted up the siege of Baba Amr in February, using weapons the rebels could not counter: weeks of intensive bombardment by 122mm artillery and 140mm rockets. Tactically, these weapons were ineffective, as rebel fighters were killed only by accident. But the suffering inflicted on civilians, combined with the privations of the ongoing siege, was grievous.

Situation: Friendly Forces

You command a company of the 402nd Guards Mechanized Infantry Battalion, reinforced by T72s of the 417th Armoured Battalion and Special Forces commandos (see below). Your parent formation is the elite Fourth Armoured Division, commanded by the President's younger brother Maher al-Assad.

The Syrian army suffers the same rot afflicting other Ba'ath institutions. For years, its officer corps has been selected and promoted for loyalty, not effectiveness, and has focused its efforts on graft, neglecting training and readiness. Soldiers and NCOs are virtually unpaid conscript labour, their scant wages routinely skimmed by their superiors.

The army's primary strength is that it remains lavishly equipped owing to generous aid from Russia and Iran. Even with slipshod maintenance and logistics, more than enough mechanized forces can be moved about the aging highway network to saturate flashpoints with an intimidating presence and overmatch lightly armed rebels.

In addition to leadership, the most awkward point is the ordinary soldiers (jundi), who are drafted from the same poor populations they are now being ordered to beat, shoot and lately, bombard with heavy artillery. Even "elite" troops are showing themselves highly unwilling to risk life and limb against determined opposition. They remain in or near their vehicles, sending bullets and shells, not men, allowing the streetwise guerrillas to escape and strike in another place.

Moreover, as of early 2012 the army finds itself badly short of infantry. Many soldiers in frontline combat formations deserted to the opposition in 2011, bolstering FSA combat power. In response, the command hastily reorganized its frontline forces, keeping large numbers of Sunni draftees locked down in barracks.

Reliable troops have now been redeployed to a smaller number of mechanized divisions which have large amounts of armour and artillery, but whose bayonet strength is as little as half their full establishment. In multiethnic cities like Homs, these units are augmented by paramilitaries known as Shabiha (Ghosts), drawn from Alawite and other loyalist sects. However, while these thugs know the locale, their combat effectiveness is even poorer than the regular Army. All in all, the Army units have massive firepower, but lack cohesion, competence and determination in closing with the rebels, much less fighting door-to-door.

As a Praetorian formation tasked with crushing the rebellion, the 4th division has an attached battalion of better paid and trained Special Forces commandos (Wahdat al-Khassa). These experienced fighters are more likely to close with and kill the enemy, although they too have limits on their willingness to die for the regime.

Situation: Enemy Forces

Regime propaganda notwithstanding, it appears none of the Baba Amr fighters are Al Qaeda fanatics, but rather a mix of army deserters and local militiamen, largely though not exclusively Sunni. No foreign volunteers have been confirmed, dead or alive. Furthermore the trademark tools of AQ -- IEDs and suicide belts -- are not (yet) in noticeable use here. The primary resistance weapons at present are what the deserters took with them: rifles, a few machine guns and an even smaller number of RPGs. Ammunition is very short, so they are unable to sustain lengthy firefights.

Their C3 and discipline is extremely poor; they tend to flock to firefights in an unruly mob, and this could be used to trap them if army troops would act more aggressively. As it is, they tend to vanish when confronted with superior force.

A few foreigners remain in Homs; ostensibly doctors and journalists. As far as the regime is concerned they are spies and provocateurs working arm in arm with the traitors. Rumours aside, there is no evidence of Western military support or advisers.

ALL SUBUNIT COMMANDERS BE ADVISED: The irahibin (terrorists) have announced their retreat from Baba Amr under heavy pressure from our forces. Our sniper/observation posts in the high rises have reported a noticeable decrease in activity of all kinds. It is also reported that fewer than 4,000 residents remain of the original 50,000+. Any rafidha (renegades) remaining have no civilians to hide among. Thus, anybody seen on the streets may be deemed an enemy and treated accordingly. [the Population Density setting has been lowered to reflect this].

Mission: Overall Description

Heartened by FSA announcements to the foreign press that its fighters are withdrawing "temporarily" from Baba Amr, the Division has ordered your units to spearhead a final advance into the rubble and trash-filled streets. Your force objectives are to establish a permanent command post in the heart of the district and secure a nearby mosque that is a known center of rebel activity.

Your attack has been devised personally by General Assad and, with typical flair, dubbed Operation "Adiyat" (Warhorse), after a sura of the Holy Qu'ran. Your forces are effectively committed, and needless to say, you are not inclined to modify your orders.

Operational map

Departing from the battalion's forward operating base near the University high rises, your reinforced company is advancing west (South on the map) along the district's wide commercial boulevards. This move is expected to draw any remaining rafidha north toward you.

Meanwhile, a jeep-mounted Special Forces commando platoon accompanied by two tanks is to dash boldly along the elevated highway that forms the eastern boundary of Baba Amr [REMINDER: "East" is North on the game map] and secure the mosque. As the irahibin react to this coup de main, you will catch them on the move between your forces and slaughter them like the traitorous rats they are.

[Erwin]

Good briefing, and the summary of what needs to done up front is helpful.

[LongLeftFlank]

I thought you'd dig it, thanks.

All in all, this is likely to resemble the ASL Warsaw liberation scenario "To the Square". The FSA haven't a prayer of stopping the regime tanks, but they can certainly make them bleed. As you recall from Ramadi, the map fights for the defender.

[LongLeftFlank]

....Can't imagine why.

SB, I'm working on the Red forces setup and then we should be able to get started.

[LongLeftFlank]

Detailed and thoughtful US think tank paper here on the Syrian resistance, dated last month.

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf

Senator John McCain said in early March 2012, “Increasingly, the question for U.S. policy is not whether foreign forces will intervene militarily in Syria. We can be confident that Syria’s neighbors will do so eventually, if they have not already.” The danger, he continued is that these neighbors “will try to pick the winners, and this will not always be to our liking or in our interest.”

....Regarding concerns that Syria’s armed opposition remains disorganized, it is important to distinguish between fragmentation and localized organization. The armed opposition has shown a propensity for organization at the local level. Insurgencies are inherently decentralized; finding a single leader who commands the allegiance of the grassroots resistance movement is not a reasonable expectation. Despite this natural constraint the, rebels across Syria have shown a willingness to share in the brand-name of the Free Syrian Army, even if this affiliation comes without meaningful logistical support or a chain of command.

....by early 2012, the insurgents demonstrated increasing effectiveness, and were able to maintain control of key terrain near Damascus and central Homs for weeks at a time, despite the regime’s efforts. The rebels have achieved these victories by forcing the regime to fight in many places at once, stretching the security forces thin. ....The operations the regime has conducted in Homs and Zabadani have driven insurgents out into the countryside but have not destroyed the fighting units.

....The Assad regime is likely to continue its strategy of disproportionate force in an attempt to end the uprising as quickly as possible. Indiscriminate artillery fire allows the regime to raise cost of dissent while preserving its increasingly stretched maneuver force. The Syrian regime has not yet demonstrated the capacity to conduct enough large, simultaneous, or successive operations in multiple urban areas to suppress the insurgency. But it is possible that the technical and material support that Iran and Russia provide will enable the regime to increase its span of control.

....This increase in weapons prices in neighboring Lebanon and Iraq demonstrated the fact that weapons were flowing into Syria.... Shortly afterwards, the same rebels met with an Iraqi Shammar tribesman who sold them assault rifles, RPGs, and a medium machine gun. One of the smugglers explained the high weapons prices. “We have emptied Mosul; no more guns there,” he said.

....Journalists on the ground have noted that the armed opposition is fundamentally a popular resistance movement. But as the militias continue to face overwhelming regime firepower the likelihood of their radicalization may increase.

....Iraqis probably represent the bulk of foreign fighter participation in Syria, although many of these “foreign fighters” are in reality Syrians who fought in Iraq with Sunni Arab insurgent groups....the cross-border networks Syrian and Iraqi militants developed during their fight against U.S. forces in Iraq may now be reversed, facilitating the flow of experienced fighters from Iraq into Syria. The Sunni Arab tribes of western Iraq would benefit from the Assad regime’s fall, especially as they move to resist Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s consolidation of power in Iraq.

Sadoun al-Husseini, a 36-year-old engineer from Ramadi, a veteran of combat against U.S. forces in Iraq and a member of the Anbar Awakening, was interviewed in Idlib province near the Turkish border.

Watch out, regime mech forces. Looks like Ramadi's washing-machine-timer IEDs and paint can EFPs are coming soon, to roadsides near you! They are probably setting up the clandestine bomb factories already. Notwithstanding gloomy current BBC headlines about "the opposition failing", this fight is nowhere near finished.

[Erwin]

Yes, it is strange that the insurgency in Syria hasn't been more successful than the Iraq one was vs the US. But, then probably(?) the US was hamstrung by ROE's and the Syrians are not.

[LongLeftFlank]

No, it took the Iraqis some time to get going as well. The Sunnis started attacking US forces in earnest in late 2003; as you know April 2004 was a military disaster for them (although like Tet it got spun otherwise by antiwar Western media). By 2005 they had settled into their "groove" of IEDs plus sniping. All that is going to happen in Syria too. Regime core forces will lose their mobility, and control of much of the countryside will go with it. Commerce will grind to a halt, and cities and towns will be indiscriminatelt bombarded and their public infrastructure torn to bits. There's no win here for the regime, or the people. This genie is out of the bottle.

[LongLeftFlank]

I have the RED force selected. Now, how to defend?

[LongLeftFlank]

Still testing concepts for the FSA defense here -- it's tricky. In the meantime, here's a suitably atmospheric screenie I took of the regime's notorious Shabiha (Ghost) thugs rolling with the 402nd Mechanized battalion. Mord's Mix and Match Fighters mod gives them a great paramilitary look.

[Erwin]

Looks really good LLF.

[LongLeftFlank]

Any momentary feeling of invincibility provided by the roar of 20 heavy diesels dissipates now into the chill morning as Major Hassan's armour takes up positions facing into the brooding maze of streets. Half a battalion can vanish here.... quickly.