ppo1001

Well, there is alot there to chew upon. I would say that the thousands of long range fighters in 1944 made the difference because they allowed the heavies to bomb properly--not sure I would separate them out--to me they are airpower. As for the reason they made the difference. My estimate about the cost of the air campaign is actually spot on, based on War production reports monthly averages (the best collection I have found of them are in the Hopkins Mss and the Roosevelt Mss in the FDR library in Hyde Park NY. in 1943 and 1944 the USA spent about 40 percent of its war output on air munitions. Numerically the heavy bombers were actually a relatively small percentage of this, (about 16.3k of overall production of 96k--these figures are off the top of my head, so might be slightly off). Of course the heavies were by far the most expensive element of aircraft production (particularly the B-29s--but of course they werent used against Germany). I think its safe to say that the B-17s and B-24s used against German in 1944 would have been in value terms about 30 percent of US aircraft output--that is why I used what I consider an overestimation of its cost of overall out put above 15-20%. This investment also took a far larger percentage of the German war economy in 1944 than any other element. For the year over 45% of German war production was aircraft (not including the ammunition needed to arm them)--overwhelmingly single engine fighters. The Germans deployed about 80% (and that really is probably a low figure) of these to fight the air war in the west. I agree that tactical air power was very effective ( a friend of mine, the historian Graham Cross is working on a book about this which should be really interesting), however I think separating out different components partly distorts the picture. All airpower was mutually supporting in 1944--it was the sum total that ground the Germans down. Now we can get into strategic airpower in 1943 if you want--thats a really interesting discussion...

A relly interesting discussion. When it comes to 4-engine bombers being 'ineffective'--I think that is a very bold and unsupported claim. The strategic bombing of Germany basically shaped the war as a whole in 1943 and 1944, even if it didnt have the desired impact on German production until the second half of 1944. Starting in 1943 it: 1) Led to the Luftwaffe basically being stripped from the battlefield--particularly of fighter cover--leading to the colossal losses of 1944 2) Led to the Germans investing huge resources into V-2 production--much more in fact than they spent of AFV production from 1943-1945 3) Destroyed more production (Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat and through factory dispersal) than land battles such as Kursk IN 1944 it lead to massive redeployment of civilian workers to contend with bomb damage. Caused a huge diversion of resources into anti-aircraft production (for instance in 1944 the Germans were spending as much of their economy building anti aircraft weapons and supplying them with ammunition as they were building AFV), and eventually lead to a one third decline in German production from July to December 1944--a decline that had nothing to do with the land war as the germans had stockpiles of all raw materials needed to keep production rising until 1946. Considering that the building and arming of 4-engine bombers took approximately 15-20% of American war production (and a little higher of the UKs) it was a sensible allocation of force. The ME 262 is a really fascinating case. Partly I think Galland and the rest of the Luftwaffe like to blame Hitler for delaying the project, when actually getting the kinks out of all aircraft production actually took much longer than expected. The Germans, in fact, had a terrible time developing aircraft during the war--see not only the HE-177 but he ME-210 and many others. IN many ways the only aircraft that they developed efficiently during the war was the FW-190. Even had the ME 262 been introduced 6 months earlier, its hard to see exactly how it would have changed the air war materially. By 1944 the real problem the Germans had was that they were running out of fuel to train pilots (because of the pressure of the strategic air war). Its hard to see how they could have provided that many extra pilots for the ME 262. As it was, by 1944 poor German pilot training meant that 25% of German aircraft were actually lost simpy being flown to their deployment areas. Their pilots really were flawed. Such a loss percentage would have been even higher for the ME 262 as it was really tricky to fly. That being said, more ME 262's would certainly have lead to an increase in Anglo-American strategic bomber losses, but its hard to say how big of an increase. I doubt that Allied jets would have made a big difference because the big problem with all early jets (which the Germans never really solved with the ME 262, was their incredibly short flying time. They could only fly for a short period of time because of fuel consumption. Allied jets could probably only have actually met ME 262s in combat had they been based in France.

Theres alot going on here. Starting with strategic bombing. Certainly in 1943 it fails to meet the (ludicrously high) expectations put forward by commanders such as Harris or Eaker. However, at least imho) it plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of the landwar as the Germans are forced to strip the battlefield of fighter cover. Im struck by the larger question of German strategy, however. I wonder if actually we dont realize how potentially strong Germany could have been had it been able to relatively efficiently organize Europe's resources, without the threat of strategic bombing in 1943 and 1944. For instance, even though people throw around the idea that Germany had to beat the USSR in 1941 or 1942 because it couldnt fight a long war against the Russians, the opposite might actually have been true. If Germany fights just the Russians it would have been able to significantly and increasingly outproduce the USSR (take a look at how much more steel and bauxite the Germans were producing on an annual basis in 1943 than the Russians). Germany actually has far greater resources than Russia in everything but manpower, they just cant use them efficiently, which was one of the great benefits of the failed strategic bombing campaign of 1943--you are spot on about this Capt Hawkeye. The longer that Germany and the USSR have a war a deux, the more likely it becomes that the Germans would wear the Russians down.

Hi Jon, Thanks for that. Ive been reading some of the discussions on the webpage and Im impressed with the level of knowledge. So, if anyone does have comments, let me know. Im turning now to write a biography of William D. Leahy (first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) so I might come back and run ideas by you guys. As for the idea of Germany and strategic bombing. The Germans did develop quite a sensible strategic bombing plan for the Battle of Britain (imho) the problem was always hardware more than software. They simply couldnt design a bomber capable of doing the job--or even a fighter capable of the range needed for escort duty even if they had the bomber. THey certainly tried to come up with a 4 engine bomber. Though its really hard to find the exact costs, probably the most expensive aircraft the Germans ever produced was the 4-engine HE-177--a true dog if there ever was one. It has its four engines in two linked front to back casings, and often exploded. Some Luftwaffe experts claim that they had worked out the kinks by 1944 (its certainly possible) but by then it was too late. Development costs of the aircraft were probably equal to a few years of German AFV construction during the war. OH, there was one other supposed German strategic bombing plan--at least according to Albert Speer. And that was an attempt to hit Soviet Power production near the Urals using the HE 177, but the German army was pushed out of range before it could be attempted. As its Speer making the case, you can never be sure if it was a small idea that he exagerrated after the war to make himself look like a genius.

Hello guys, Im writing this because I came across your discussion of an article I wrote a few years ago (Im Phil OBrien, the author of East Versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany--mentioned above). I really enjoyed reading your discussion of it--I can say that nothing I wrote was an attempt to defend airpower in the 1990s. Anyway, I just published a longer book in which the argument of machines versus men--east versus west--are developed in much greater depth. Its been released by Cambridge University Press and its called, How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II. You can read alot of it online through google books. https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9hh2BgAAQBAJ&pg=PR4&lpg=PR4&dq=phillips+o%27brien+how+the+war+was+won&source=bl&ots=gNdGucQdb9&sig=JxDdMVgm1sRLlVpLTmTJRswaMPE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7BDfVLTLCMrpapifgpgO&ved=0CEYQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=phillips%20o'brien%20how%20the%20war%20was%20won&f=false If anyone takes a look and has some thoughts, Id like to hear them. cheers,