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The_MonkeyKing

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Everything posted by The_MonkeyKing

  1. Seems the attack was not as successful as initially stated
  2. The sum was 500 million euros... Finland made the same investment last year to our own plants alone
  3. Yeah, Germany has been doing were well on the ground for the last year or so. Still PR and communication disaster.
  4. https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/ My notes: They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines". Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry. Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024 Some Russian challenges: Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3
  5. Battlefront has a pretty unique way of making many of its lets say "content packs". This has some unique properties, one of them is extreme variance in schedules and also very high tolerance for variances in schedule.
  6. Yeah, I agree. Even with refurbishments the quality problem is not yet materializing on lets say "to a critical" extent. T-80BV and T-72 2000's models keep coming. By many estimates (including "perun"), the cases of T-55 and T-62 have been because of totally different production, warehouse and ammo "pipelines" for these being fast and available. We shall see when Russia starts choking here. Next year by most estimates. https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1
  7. And that is why I was very careful not to use world "new". In past posts I have quoted that article extensively. For the end result now and this year, doesn't matter whether the equipment is "refurbished". Then when we zoom out to strategic level and long term planning it does matter because the stockpiles are going to run dry in the coming years.
  8. Yeah, but also record deliveries of equipment. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024 "This has led to significant increases in production output. For example, Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles of various types." Generally expected to match the loss rates this year.
  9. Well, if the strike went well we will soon see the full footage from the Ukrainians. If past trends continue
  10. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1763116800537997387.html "So Russia recently released footage of the targeting of Ukrainian Cars across the border aswell as Lancet, Sahed and Tornado-S footage. I have cut it to take out the gore footage and only show the Lancet and other hits. Here is the thread So lets start: AS-90(known) 2S1 Gvozdika Damaged Training Ground Hit T-64BV Damaged Group of T-72 Barely Damaged AN/TPQ-50 Destroyed BREM-1 ARV Destroyed BMP-1 Damaged T-64 Destroyed T-64 Damaged Bradley? Destroyed Unknown Vehicle Destroyed Leopard 2A6? Hit Buk-M1/M2 Destroyed BTR-80? Damaged? Unknown SAM Destroyed(claimed patriot) BMP-1 Damaged BM-27 Uragan/Bureviy Destroyed Msta-B Howitzer Damaged Leopard 2A5(known) Destroyed Destruction of a Ukrainian RM-70 Vampire MLRS Sahed and Iskander-M strikes on Infrastructure and Targets."
  11. https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1761453249180168647.html Ukraine faces a difficult period as Russia regains military momentum and Ukraine grapples with internal challenges. Key Points: Ukrainian Manpower Shortage: Political and military misalignments have delayed vital mobilization efforts. New troops likely won't be sufficiently trained and ready until late summer. Springtime Vulnerability: Russia is exploiting Ukraine's weakened state with multi-front offensives. Although Russian gains have been modest, they are prepared for high casualties and have more forces in reserve. External Aid Factors: Ukraine is reliant on external support, which has its own limitations and could be affected by future political events, such as the US elections. Worst-Case Scenario Focus: Urges a focus on worst-case scenarios for aid planning. He calls for a sense of urgency similar to that seen in early 2022.
  12. https://www.ft.com/content/428fdef6-57e8-4aeb-b7f6-9845fcc045f9 main points: "Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba told EU counterparts on Monday that Ukraine needed 2.5mn artillery shells this year but that the bloc had only sent 400,000. He pleaded with them to find a solution fast. “The Ukrainians couldn’t care less where these shells come from, and who pays for them,” said one EU diplomat. “We’re arguing over acronyms while they suffer on the front line.” Some EU members have already chipped in, say officials familiar with the Czech scheme. Prague needs financial contributions from national governments because EU capitals are at loggerheads over a proposed €5bn top-up of the European Peace Facility, the main EU vehicle for funding weapons supplies to Kyiv. EU ambassadors failed to reach agreement on the EPF at a meeting in Brussels on Wednesday and have set a target of agreeing the rules of a fresh capital injection before a summit of EU leaders on March 21. Germany is insisting that its notional contribution of roughly €1.25bn be reduced to reflect its large bilateral military aid to Ukraine, worth €7bn this year. “What is crucial for Ukraine is that military aid reaches it without bureaucratic delay. Bilateral support is very quick and efficient — it should be considered as an equivalent contribution to the European Peace Facility,” said Michael Clauss, Germany’s ambassador to the EU. France and Greece insist that an expanded EPF should only buy weapons and ammunition from EU and Norwegian manufacturers — which would prevent it financing the Czech plan or ammunition from the US. The French government maintains that EU funds should be used to strengthen the bloc’s defence industrial base. Greece is concerned that contracts could be signed with Turkish defence companies. “Of course we should be buying more to help Ukraine including from outside the EU,” said French military analyst François Heisbourg. “But politically it is going to become very difficult to buy artillery shells from the US when the US Congress is refusing to send further military aid.” EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has said EU annual production capacity will rise to 1.4mn shells by the end of 2024, outstripping the US, which is expected to hit 1.2mn next year. In a paper for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, analysts, Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman concluded that Ukraine would need 75,000-90,000 artillery shells a month “to sustain the war defensively, and more than double that — 200,000-250,000 — for a major offensive”. They added: “At this stage, the western coalition depends mostly on US stocks to sustain the lower range of this figure and does not have the ammunition to support a major offensive next year.” Russia is able to make 2.5mn shells a year, according to the Royal United Services Institute think-tank. Ukrainian officials say the figure is 4mn including refurbished munitions. But that rate is far below Russia’s own frontline needs. Its forces are estimated to have fired 12mn artillery shells in 2022 and 7mn in 2023."
  13. I think we just found out the reason why according to leaks US is thinking about supplying longer range ATACMS. Iran did it first...
  14. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/0QPb2M/sverige-skickar-stridsbat-90-till-ukraina The new Swedish military aid package includes ($700 million ) ▪ 10 Stridsbåt 90-class amphibious assault boats; ▪ 20 amphibious assault boats; ▪ underwater weapons (mines and torpedoes); ▪ a number of anti-aircraft systems such as Robot 70; ▪ anti-tank robots of the TOW model; ▪ grenade launchers with ammunition; ▪ artillery ammunition; ▪ hand grenades; ▪ Carl Gustaf grenade launchers; ▪ medical equipment; ▪ ambulances. In addition, ▪ $100M be spent on the purchase of military equipment through the funds, ▪ $100M will be spent on new Stridsfordon 90 combat vehicles for Ukraine.
  15. 5 "claimed" But yeah, someting is up. Ukraine surging air defence after Russia has started surgeing its air power.
  16. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/14/joe-biden-could-send-millions-of-artillery-shells-to-ukraine-for-free-tomorrow-and-its-perfectly-legal/?sh=539a38ba20c7 "The law caps annual transfers of so-called “excess defense articles” at a total value of $500 million a year. But the same law doesn’t dictate how much value the president assigns to a particular weapon. He in theory could price an item at zero dollars." "Biden only rarely has used his EDA authority for Ukraine. And where he has used it, lately it’s been a part of complex “ring-trades” where the U.S. government gives excess weapons to third countries—Ecuador and Greece, to name two—then encourages those same countries directly or indirectly to give to Ukraine some of their own surplus weapons." "Why Biden hasn’t already put in motion this plan is unclear. It’s possible—likely, even—he prefers to hold out for $60 billion in fresh funding, which gives him more options for buying, or even developing from scratch, a wide array of weapons for Ukraine. But once Biden decides, as many other observers already have decided, that Russia-aligned Republicans never will approve more money for Ukraine, he could lean on his EDA authority—and speed millions of shells to Ukraine’s starving batteries."
  17. And the third assumption is that key decisions on Ukraine aid keep being made on time. Also stated in the article.
  18. IMO most important parts: "This has led to significant increases in production output. For example, Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles of various types. Russian missile production has similarly increased. At the beginning of 2023, for instance, Russian production of Iskandr 9M723 ballistic missiles was six per month, with available missile stocks of 50 munitions." "Of the tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, for example, approximately 80% are not new production but are instead refurbished and modernised from Russian war stocks. The number of systems held in storage means that while Russia can maintain a consistent output through 2024, it will begin to find that vehicles require deeper refurbishment through 2025, and by 2026 it will have exhausted most of the available stocks." "Perhaps the most serious limitation for Russia, however, is ammunition manufacture. In order to achieve its aspiration to make significant territorial gains in 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has assessed an industrial requirement to manufacture or source approximately 4 million 152mm and 1.6 million 122mm artillery shells in 2024. Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period. Moreover, the Russian MoD does not believe it can significantly raise production in subsequent years," "This means that to properly resource the armed forces, Russia must – in the short term – further draw down its remaining 3 million rounds of stored ammunition, though much of this is in poor condition. To further compensate for shortages, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria, with the latter only able to provide forged shell casings rather than complete shells. Although the injection of around 2 million 122mm rounds from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for a significant shortfall in available 152mm" "The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners fail to properly resource the AFU. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia's prospects decline over time."
  19. republican house already telling us how they going to smash the bill
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