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ikalugin

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ikalugin last won the day on April 18 2019

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About ikalugin

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  1. The idea is that most of targets (even those that do get to the front lines - ie AFVs) are destroyed outside of the direct contact with the enemy. This is why direct fire weapons such as the (majority of) ATGMs provide fewer kills than indirect fire weapons (most of artillery). I think it is an interesting thing to think about - the impact of dumb artillery on AFVs.
  2. Read it, in my opinion this is not a smart idea militarily speaking.
  3. But I think we should get back on topic, or to separate this discussion from this thread, as it may kill it.
  4. Technically speaking this discussion that we are participating is against the forum rules, though we now all share that responsibility. As to the blood - political repressions are, sadly, nothing new for the region. And unless you can both go through the war resolution process, for example via the established Minsk-2/Steinmaer's implimentation compromise or some other path, a comprehensive reform, Ukraine is not going to recover. All said I see some light, with the investigations (and court trials) into the original events of Maidan and political murders (ie that of Sheremet) advancing. Maybe we would see some grievance resolution (ie regarding the language legislation) with the Ukrainian citizens next, as well as some real reforms.
  5. They are indeed Ukrainian citizens (well, most of them I would guess at this point due to them switching citizenship and/or moving), but there are legitimate grievances such as the ones related to the language problem, the church problem, etc. The peace thing is similar inside Donbas - the focus of fighting in civil war is on the frontlines (which drag out the fighters), unless there is a serious terroristic subtext (ie how it is sometimes with islamists). As to the scale of the militia - low rates of direct participation are fairly normal in (civil) wars, particularly low intensity ones. The citizenship initiative came in only after Kiev failed to enact the Minsk-2 relevant legislation, which was an important part of the proposed intial peace process. While those programs do exist and people do move out of Baltic states not all of them can and their right to having a passport had to be protected by the EU leadership via various measures against Baltic states. No such measures exist on part of EU or other such organisations to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens. We can also compare the agregate economics you have mentioned in a number of ways, for example in this per capita metric Russia was in the same ballpark as Baltics till around 2013-2014: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_pp_kd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:UKR:LTU:LVA:EST:RUS&ifdim=region&hl=ru&dl=ru&ind=false "Respecting" rights violations is not something that would improve your standing with the EU. Nor would it make the aggrieved citizens happier or more pro-Kiev, if anything this is a way to push them into the hands of ethnic nationalists (so called Russian world etc).
  6. You are not going to make peace with people of Donbas if you do not accept the existence of their grievances and agency.
  7. Hybrid war is a very bad term in the current usage (because it is not clearly defined) so I would prefer to avoid it. From Russian standpoint we are fairly flexible on Donbas, as there are no key interests there, so we can go ahead with compromises on Minsk-2 that seem to be less than popular in Ukraine such as Steinmaer's formula. The issue is in implimentation of those compromises both on the ground with many semi-independent actors that you need to pull from the front line and in the rear - where Kiev needs to pass the relevant (and unpopular in certain circles) legislation.
  8. The issue for both sides is control over the actors on the ground.
  9. Swedes looked at several NATO mobility exercises and came up with their time lines and some conclusions. You can see the relevant screenshots below. https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KItX0AEsiFY?format=png https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KJeXYAAi-sN?format=png https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KJcWsAAR-8B?format=png https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KwQXUAAc-Tw?format=png https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ELl5KwlWwAAzOZ5?format=png The long story cut short - it takes 2-4-6 weeks to reinforce Poland, which would imply that a rapidly developing crisis in Ukraine would not allow significant NATO reinforcements.
  10. The practices is actually the same - the scale is different, as Russia has over 1000 (over 1400?) T72B3s, while Armatas correspond to Oplot procurement.
  11. The mainstream is up to 3000km, note that the current Western node is still incomplete and offers only 240 degrees of coverage. The current program seems to be to complete that node for 360 degree coverage and add 3 more (North, South, East).
  12. A direct link to the original source you are citing would be a good move forward.
  13. O well, thanks for that clarification. So Ukraine has ~100 good T64BV mods with thermals now?
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