Aquatica

As a South African, I can definitely say that your way off on the Trevor Noah accent. His accent is now as American as they come. Charlize Therons accent is also allot more American now, until she switches to Afrikaans. Both these individuals changed to get their accents allot to fit in with the tv/movie scene. So they are extremely poor examples. Arnold Vosloo (He had roles in the Mummy I & II and Blood Diamonds) has a proper English South African accent. Die Antwoord?? These guys are also an extremely bad example of South African accents in Afrikaans & English as they go out of their way to be as degenerate and "Brakpan" (What we call redneck hillbillies here in S.A) as they can be. Their going the way of Lady Gaga, which is to shock people with their antics to get fame. Im hoping that the Dev team got some decent actors in to do the voice overs.

Thank you all. Now if the game is still in development, I wonder if I still have time to get some more info to the Dev team in regards to making some scenario's or mini campaign featuring the South Africans? I've got some awesome info on: The Battle of Celleno (10th June, 1944) - First major combine arms engagement by the South Africans in Italy ------- Could be used for a Scenario The Battle of Monte Sole, Caprara & Abelle (15th - 18th April, 1945) - South Africans largest Infantry Assaults into the Mountains ------- Could be used for a Scenario The Bridge At Finale Emilia (22nd - 23rd April, 1945) - Last major combine arms engagement by the South Africans in Italy ------- Could be used for a Scenario or Mini-Campaign

Thanx for the update. I'm just super excited to see the final product especially the South Africans since I was the person to submit all my research (Info, TO&E, S.A Military Archive & Document Scans) into the 6th South African Armoured Division to ChrisND to properly and historically update the South Africans for the game. So naturally I'm waiting to see what my research looks like in the game

LOL, Now this gave me a laugh. Thanx mate, you made my day.

Hi All. This has probably been discussed at great lengths, but I just wanted to know when RtV would be released as I've already pre-ordered. Thanx for any info in advance.

Hi All. Glad to see the game is up and running. Everything is licensed and game ready, but I see, some armies selections are not selectable like the South Africans. Are they not yet included in the game and will be later released via DLC? Im just eager to see how my research came out in the game.

Hi Everyone. Could anyone please give me more detail on the "Weather Conditions" in CM. I cant really find anything going into depth on what the different weather condition features are and how they influence or impact the game. Any help or further information on this would be great please.

Howzit All Id also like to add myself to the PBEM gamer list. Ive got all 3 CM games and im ready to play. Due to me being in South Africa, ill be limited to 1 turn per day for the US players as timezones would make it difficult otherwise, but European and UK players will get more turn per day as the time zones are reasonably close. Regards JC

LOL. Thanx for the help guys. I mailed him and lets see if i get a reply. Cheers

Howzit All. Id like to get a hold of Steve, but seeing as there are so many on the forum, Im not sure which is which. Ive contacted the Helpdesk and all they said was to contact "Steve" on the forum with regards to the CM Series and their TO&E's. I would like to share info to have the South Africans updated and maybe added in a module for CMFI. And so id like to pass the info (scans of military documents from the military archives) and my extensive research on the matter on to Steve. Thanx in advance for the help. Regards JC

Thanx Borg. Ive got plenty more to put up. Ive got every book done on all the Regiments and General Division history of South Africa aswell. So the only obstacle is time to type everything up. If there is something specific anyone would like then id be happy upload the history and info as im doing everything. I also have everything on the Rhodesians that fought alongside the South Africans.

Hi Splinty. Here you go mate. A nice and long cover of the battle at Chiusi. Ive got the first part done. The second will follow shortly. Chiusi – The Hilltop Town The Plan and the Weather While the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade had been battling forward through the mud, with Pretoria Regiment, SAAC tanks in support, the rest of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade had been concentrated west of Orvieto, resting and doing maintenance. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was thus in good shape when it was placed on standby on June 17th, 1944, with the roads impassable owing to foul weather. The enemy, it was suspected, would now hold in the Lake Trasimene and further south than previously thought. His new line apparently ran from the southern end of the lake through Chiusi and Sarteano to the northern slopes of Monte Cetona, and aerial photographs confirmed to the 6th S.A Armoured Division that clearing Chiusi would be a tough proposition. A Divisional “I” Summary issued on June 19th, 1944 said that Partisans reported that there were a number of catacombs and cellars in Chiusi. If the German Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 “Hermann Göring” was in its usual form, the Summary concluded, some 24 hours of determined enemy resistance was most likely. Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole’s intentions for the night of June 19th/20th, 1944, stated that a patrol of Company strength from the ILH/KimR with two anti-tank guns would cover an Engineer reconnaissance of Brigades in the area which lay around the railway junction south of the actual town of Chiusi. In fact, it was the area of Stazione di Chiusi in terms of the North Italy, or Brown, grid. The route which was to be used was Route 71 through Citta della Pieve. On June 20th, 1944, the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade of which the ILH/KimR were not a part would concentrate astride the road east of Cetona which forked to both Chiusi town and to Stazione di Chiusi. The 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to be prepared to take the town of Chiusi itself. The 6th S.A Armoured Division’s advance would then continue along both Red & Green routes (Red Route to Chiusi & Green Route through Cetona and Sarteano), covered by the NMR with the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade using the road through Chiusi and the 24th Guards Infantry Brigade that through Cetona. The use of Route 71, which would greatly alleviate problems created by the heavy rains, had been temporarily lent by the British 78th Infantry Division. After experiencing some difficulty in getting their vehicles out of sodden field’s north-west of Orvieto on June 19th, 1944, the ILH/KimR accordingly moved up. For 24 miles, the soldiers squelched through mud towards the front line that had passed them by three days ago. The massive convoy wound across a high range of hills covered with thick woods on top of which was perched the village of Allerona. That evening, June 19th, 1944, the ILH/KimR arrived in the Divisional concentration area below the village of Fabro at 20:30. At 21:00 Maj. A.H. Rocyn-Jones of 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, attended an order group by Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, and Lt. M.P. Pearse was ordered to proceed up Route 71 on Engineer reconnaissance from Citta della Pieve to Chiusi with ILH/KimR, while Troop 1 stood by to support him. While others listened to the invasion news on the radio, “A” Company, ILH/KimR, set off at 21:15 for a reconnaissance up Route 71, the Via Cassia running through Citta della Pieve, past Lake Transimene and on to Arezzo. About 6km north of Citta della Pieve, the tarred road to Siena branched off to the left, to cross the railway line about a kilometre further on at Stazione di Chiusi and then continue to Chiusi itself, about 2km to the north-west and well above the station area. The Highway swinging round a double-storeyed block of farm buildings south of the railway, descended into a shallow basin, in which the rains had softened the fields on either side considerably. Past another big farmhouse, the route then flattened out into an almost dead level grassy plain, dotted with only occasional trees and cut by two or three little drainage and irrigation canals, over which the road ran almost straight for a mile or more before crossing the railway line. “A” Company, ILH/KimR, was directed to secure the road junction and the railway crossing. Lt. M.P. Pearse’s Engineers, an Artillery forward observation Officer and a Troop of anti-tank guns went with “A” Company, ILH/KimR, and at 03:00 on June 20th, 1944, the reconnaissance was held up by two demolitions north of Citta della Pieve. The Sappers reported one bridge blown, leaving a 20 metre gap and six craters needing bulldozing and repair. Patrols went forward at 03:30 to reconnoitre the road ahead and encountered no enemy. By 09:30 on the morning of June 20th, 1944, Capt. C.E. Hall (2iC) of “A” Company, ILH/KimR, with two platoons had reconnoitred the station area and its village about 2000 metres south of the actual town of Chiusi. Beyond the village the patrol carried on for 1830 metres without encountering any enemy bar two snipers and four deserters who gave themselves up. The latter being two Czechs from 362. Infantrie-Division & two Alsatians from 3. Panzer-Grenadier-Division and under interrogation one of the unwilling conscripts divulged that he had seen 30 Panzer IV’s north of Chiusi the previous day and two Companies of the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 “Hermann Göring” in the area. At 10:00 Troop 1 of 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, moved forward under Lt. M.P. Pearse to clear the road. The instructions to “A” Company, ILH/KimR, made it clear that its task was to secure the bridges and railway crossing on the road to Chiusi, and this it had done. 11th S.A Armoured Brigade HQ reported distinctly to Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole’s HQ that “A” Company, ILH/KimR, had reached Stazione di Chiusi. The information was passed on to British XIII Corps as received. No mention was made of Chiusi and the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade had already signalled Divisional HQ that no report had been received as to whether it was held or not. During the day, the British XIII Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. S.C. Kirkman, visited Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole and discussed their intentions for the immediate future. Written orders went out later. Meanwhile, Lt. G.A. Hosking of 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, had entered Chiusi itself as forward observation Officer for the artillery at 12:00 on June 20th, 1944, but after a number of targets had been engaged the “raiding party” had been withdrawn leaving a standing patrol in the town which as things still stood, was to be taken by the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade which was concentrating on the road east of Cetona, which forked in such a manner as to offer access to both Stazione di Chuisi and to the main road running out of Chiusi to the north. Inexplicably within the next few hours, the precision which had hitherto marked reports about the situation was released. At 16:45 the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade HQ reported to Divisional HQ that there was a Platoon in Chiusi (Right Information), but 16:50 the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade HQ reported to Divisional HQ that there was a Company of ILH/KimR in Chiusi (Wrong Information). Shortly afterwards Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole left his HQ to visit the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade. At 17:00 unaware of the exact wording of information passed to Divisional HQ, “B” Company, ILH/KimR was ordered by the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade to go forward to join “A” Company, ILH/KimR. 5km short of Chiusi Station area the Company had to debus owing to the demolitions and it continued its advance on foot. Maj. A.S. Arlington left one platoon at the first 5 demolitions for local protection and pushed on with the other two, who partly filled in one blow over a canal themselves, so that they could jump across it. The station are they found was like a ghost village, but a few civilians hiding in the basements told them that the enemy had pulled back to the high ground further on. Pushing on, with one of Lt. R. Metelerkamp’s mortar sections in support on either side of the road, Maj. A.S. Arlington’s company found two more demolitions between the station and Chiusi. Maj. A.S. Arlington’s company took up position about 550 metres short of Chiusi and sent a patrol up the road which climbs up to the town. They got right up to a big arch which marks the entrance to the town and there they were challenged by a German sentry. As they withdrew from the arch, the patrol heard the sentry running down the street to give the alarm and they heard vehicles starting up. When Maj. A.S. Arlington got the report of this development, he decided not to feel into Chiusi itself but to go around it, so he sent patrols to left and right to reconnoitre and report enemy movement. The patrol on the left infiltrated between two German posts, which must have heard the other patrol, on whom they opened fire, watched by the ILH/KimR men who had gone round on the left and now opened fire and threw some grenades at the Germans to create confusion before pulling back. Making a wide detour, they reported to Maj. A.S. Arlington, who soon also learned that the other patrol had lost one man killed. It was clear that the town was occupied. The information was passed back, and Maj. A.S. Arlington was then asked by Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore to scout round the back of Chiusi to discover whether the bridge 2750 metres beyond it had been blown. However, it was getting light and as Maj. A.S. Arlington reckoned there was already about a company of the Germans in Chiusi, the patrol was only sent to take up position to observe any German movement and report back. Through the mist they observed quite a lot of movement in Chiusi itself, but saw nothing go out. Listening posts were sent forward from the position Maj. A.S. Arlington had selected on the outskirts of Chiusi, but as the mist lifted he realized that they were completely overlooked from the Church tower to the right front and the castle to the left front. And as day broke “B” Company, ILH/KimR pulled back to the station area. The gunner forward observation officer, Lt. G.A. Hosking, had managed to get through with a jeep and wireless set, and the artillery started registering on German vehicles known to be in Chiusi, while the platoon covering the withdrawal stumbled into a minefield and had 11 men wounded. The Germans now brought up Nebelwerfers, but Lt. G.A. Hosking at 11:00 began firing on Chiusi itself and directed the fire of the South African guns all day, though under almost continuous concentrated mortar bombardment. Maj. A.S. Arlington established his own company HQ at the station, with his platoon on the outskirts of the station village so as to get observation up to the town itself. No indication was given that anyone would attack Chiusi. At 07:00 that morning of June 21st, 1944, the rest of the ILH/KimR with whom wireless communication had been bad during the night, began to move forward with a Squadron of SSB Tanks, a Battery of 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA and a troop from 3/24 Battery of 1/11 Anti-Tank Regiment, SAA under Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore as advance guard of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade who would pass through Chiusi after it had been taken by the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade. They were preceded by a Squadron of NMR Tanks under Divisional control and with “C” Company, FC/CTH under command. The NMR less “B” Squadron had moved through Citta della Pieve with “A” Squadron leading, to make contact with the enemy. They received a very hot reception and by 07:25 on June 21st, 1944, could make no further progress against enemy small arms fire and extremely heavy artillery, mortar and anti-tank fire thickened by Nebelwerfers, which prevented them crossing the low ground south and south-east of Chiusi. In the area close to where the road climbed up into the town, it was reported to Divisional HQ, no fewer than 17 Spandau MG’s and Nebelwerfes had been observed, and the enemy appeared to have infiltrated into the northern part of Chiusi. Beyond simply making contact, such was the Germans reaction that Lt. P. Haupt of the NMR, reckoned they had become involved in an initial frontal attack on the town, and by 07:45 the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was reporting some 200-250 enemy north, north-west and in Chiusi. Divisional HQ issued a midday situation report which the Germans had infiltrated back into the northern outskirts of the town and were also north and north-west of it. By 09:00 Troop 1 could do no further work on the road owing to intense mortar and “88” fire. At 11:27 Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole left his own HQ and went forward with a small Tactical HQ to consult with Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg. Divisional HQ left Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg to control the action which was developing. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered the SSB (less one Squadron) forward but later instructed them to clear the road and allow passage of the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA and 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA. Arriving in the situation area at 12:00, Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore quickly realized that Chiusi was strongly held and a flanking movement was tried in spite of the going being very bad owing to the rain. “A” Company & “C” Company, ILH/KimR, made for the high ground to the west, with “B” Company, ILH/KimR, holding the station area whilst also moving round towards the west. German anti-tank guns opened fire on the South African Armour, and Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore’s own M3 Honey Stuart narrowly escaped being hit. Maj. A.H. Rocyn-Jones moved more of his Sapper Squadron forward, and by 16:00, “A” Company, ILH/KimR was being engaged by German MG’s and Nebelwerfers. At 16:30 the SSB was ordered to secure a high feature to the west of Chiusi. In spite of terribly bad terrain the Tanks with “A” & “B” Squadrons in the lead managed to reach high ground some 3000 metres south-west of the town in the face of concentrated anti-tank fire. This placed them virtually at the junction of the roads from Sarteano and Cetona, leading to the tarred road north-west of Chiusi. Darkness descended over what the SSB, described as a pitched battle, with intense Spandau, Nebelwerfer & 15cm sFH 18 howitzer fire. “A” Company, ILH/KimR was meanwhile heavily engaged by German MG’s and Nebelwerfers, but outposts were established. Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore’s Companies occupied the area round Pozzo Tosoni, about 3000 metres south-west of Chiusi, and were heavily shelled. “B” Company, ILH/KimR had come under very heavy fire all the time it had been in the area of Stazione di Chiusi, and one of its jeeps went up on a mine in the village. By now there could not be the slightest doubt that Chiusi was strongly held by at the same time the layout of the roads did seem to prevent the possibility of bypassing it and thus threatening to cut off the Germans. The Tanks of “A” Squadron, NMR had moved out to the right flank along narrow tracks till further advances was rendered impossible by canals and extensive demolitions. By last light on June 21st, 1944, they had two Shermans from Lt. B.E. Rightford’s Troop knocked out and one damaged. Their “C” Squadron in trying to reconnoitre a route through to the left, had two Shermans bogged down in the soggy ground. The NMR’s only consolation was the arrival of men from the 1/12 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SAAF, as infantry component, for which the NMR had felt a pressing need during recent operations, to counter the efforts of German Panzerjäger teams and anti-tank posts lying in ambush for Tanks on reconnaissance. Meanwhile, FC/CTH had moved to Citta della Pieve and come under command of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, who didn’t pass on to Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer any detailed information about the state of affairs before Chiusi, about which the newcomers knew nothing. FC/CTH get their Orders That FC/CTH were given no details about Chiusi on reporting to the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade could hardly be wondered at. The intention almost up to that stage was for the town to be taken by the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade, and the situation in front of Chiusi itself was not clear except to those on the spot. At 08:30 on June 21st, 1944, some 3 ½ hours before Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore reached Chiusi station area with the advance Guard of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer of FC/CTH was told that his Battalion was to be ready to relieve the ILH/KimR at Chiusi. The CRE at 09:20 informed the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade that the road was clear to all traffic as far as the station – still a good 2000 metres as the crow flies from the town and more than that by way of the road which climbed up to it. About half a kilometre beyond the station there was a 18 metre gap where a bridge had been blown and Sappers were making a further reconnaissance in a effort to find a diversion. The information had barely been transmitted before Divisional HQ asked the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade whether it has advanced, and at 09:55 the NMR reported the position of leading elements still 2000 metres short of the town. From the bridge came the report that as far as the “position in Chiusi” was concerned, fighting was going on there. Whether this referred to Chiusi or to Stazione di Chiusi was left for the recipients to divine. At 10:30 Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer was called forward to the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade TAC HQ. There he learned at a Brigade Order Group that FC/CTH might possibly be used in a “Left or Right Hook” attack on the town of Chiusi, where the enemy was opposing further advance. There was no mention of any frontal attack on the maze of medieval alleyways which made up Chiusi. The SSB & ILH/KimR were at this stage reported to be on flat ground west of Chuisi and the NMR and some Infantry were said to be on the east of the town. There was no information about any German Panzers being in Chiusi. Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer set off to examine the terrain and select possible debussing points while his Battalion – less “C” Company commanded by Maj. L. Murray already forward with the NMR – halted on the road Le Piazze-Citta della Pieve, with the head of the column at the latter place, for which Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole was already heading to consult with Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg, who had also been told by Divisional HQ to liaise with the British Division on the right, as it would assist him in any attack on Chiusi. At 12:00 after seeing Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg indicated to Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer that in all probability FC/CTH would not be required and this ceased the Battalion Commander’s reconnaissance. British XIII Corps was impatient to have Chiusi free of the Germans so as to open the main road for further advance. The SSB was ordered forward immediately, followed by the 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA. At 13:45 Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg was still trying to get the BL 5.5” Medium Guns forward and appealing to Divisional HQ to help by clearing the road. At 14:25 the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was still asking for help to get the guns up. A signal from Maj. A.B. Theunissen, the GSO II who accompanied Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, had just informed Divisional HQ of the actual situation – the NMR with “C” Company, FC/CTH under command were on the left, there was a Company in the station area and a Company moving forward. But clearly the delay in getting the 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, guns forward was upsetting any programme of action for Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg. That night the ILH/KimR returned to their advanced positions in the station area, with two of Maj. A.S. Arlington’s platoons covering the road out of Chiusi to guard against any surprise by the Germans. The rest of the Battalion was on high ground south-west of the town and on the road which led west and north-west from Chiusi. Such was the position when the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade TAC HQ at 19:00 on June 21st, 1944, moved forward and arrived at Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg’s command post. Something was on the go, but neither Maj. A.S. Arlington nor the Artillery forward observation Officer with him had been contacted by anyone seeking first-hand information for an attack. Suddenly the full weight of the guns of both 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA & 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA hit the town, and the ILH/KimR men at Stazione di Chiusi were surprised to find South African Sappers wandering through their lines. In reply to queries about what was going on, they learned to their amazement that FC/CTH were attacking Chiusi. Lt. J.H. Smallwood with four Bren Carriers of his ILH/KimR Platoon, had pulled off the road on a hillside overlooking the railway station, and had no clear idea of what was happening ahead of his position and recorded “As darkness fell, the guns opened up. It seemed that they were in full support of Infantry activities inside the town, from where we could hear the sound of small arms fire” The Ill-Fated Attack At 16:00, on June 21st, 1944, four hours after being told that his Battalion would probably no be required, Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer had suddenly been instructed by Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg to attack and capture Chiusi that night, a most formidable undertaking if any faith were placed in the Divisional “I” Summary which let it be known that from ground observation, POW’s and civilian sources, it appeared that the enemy in Chiusi had a Battalion of the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 “Hermann Göring” with two Companies forward, supported by artillery and Neberwerfers, and with Panzers & self-propelled guns probably in the vicinity. If any doubt existed at all about how strongly the town was held, both the NMR & Maj. A.S. Arlington’s Company of the ILH/KimR could have provided valuable information on the subject as the ILH/KimR had already been through the village which was not strongly held. Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole had decided not to return to Divisional HQ and Col. E.O.C Maggs, the GSO I, had been informed accordingly at the very moment that Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer was being told to attack the town of Chiusi. Lt. Col. W.H. lawrance, who was with Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg all day, remained convinced that Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole had ordered the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade to take the town, as the Germans commanded the road and had to be subdued. The Divisional Commander established his TAC HQ east of Chiusi. Together Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg and Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer examined the approaches from a house giving a good view of the town from the main road, which swung round a block of double-storied farm buildings before descending into the rain-sodden station area. The start line was to be the railway line nearest Chiusi and about 2000 meters south-east of the town. The first object was to clear the area on either side of what was described as “The Castle” which appeared to be in the centre of the objective as seen from the position from which Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg and Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer issued their orders. With Chiusi cleared, FC/CTH were to consolidate on high ground about 800 metres to the north of it. H-Hour for the attack was to be the time at which the first shells were fired by both 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA & 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, both of which were in action off the main road. The artillery would concentrate on the general line of the foremost building along the southern outskirts of Chiusi including the cemetery, the block offlats and the Red House on the left, and then the Tower for 20 min. The fire would lift 500 metres across the town for 2 min before being concentrated on the final objective indicated as the Poplars, about 800 yards north of Chiusi. A further lift beyond this would be treated as a defensive fire task of the two Companies on the objective, and forward observation Officers were to report to Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer at first light. With his own “C’ Company still with the NMR, Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer’s task of driving back a whole Battalion of the Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 “Hermann Göring” was not an enviable one. Before Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer stood a hilltop town about which he knew virtually nothing, a labyrinth of twisting alleys which needed careful investigation by patrols for which there was no time now, as Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, who had visited by the British XIII Corps Commander only the previous day, must have known it was Lt. Gen. S.C. Kirkman’s intention to continue the advance, and had decided on a night attack. “B” Company, ILH/KimR was still in the station area, and armoured support for the attack was promised as soon as a deviation or bridge could be completed to clear the demolition holding up the Tanks. Rather vaguely, it was hoped that this would be by first light. The 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, after long delay, had got into position and instructed Lt. T.R.H. Gafney to relieve Lt. J. Goode as FOO with FC/CTH that evening, and M10’s were also promised as anti-tank support for the Infantry, who provided guides for the tank destroyers. Forward Observation Officers from the supporting artillery Regiments were only to report to Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer and no provision were made for any Gunner Officers to accompany the actual assault troops so as to provide immediate artillery support with observed fire if necessary. Sometime after 18:00 with the stage being set, the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade reported to Divisional HQ that Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg’s small party was moving up on the road and PAG were waiting to go forwards as soon as the road was clear. Capt. F. Waller was having a tough time trying to speed up traffic on the road from Citta della Pieve. At 18:30 on that evening of June 21st, 1944, Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer, who had made no contact with Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore of ILH/KimR or with anyone else in a position to know exactly what was going on in Stazione di Chiusi and beyond it, issued orders to his Company Commanders at the Battalion Order Group. Within ½ hour “A”, “B” & “D” Companies were moving up on foot after an advance from Citta della Pieve had been delayed owing to a water-tanker from another Unit becoming jammed on a sharp bend in the road. Though information passed to 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, indicated that the Germans already had two or three Companies in Chiusi, FC/CTH were left with the impression that ILH/KimR had been through the village the previous night and found it to be not strongly held – an ambiguous pieces of information which could have applied to Stazione di Chuisi or to the town itself. There was no suggestion of any German Panzers in Chiusi, but Divisional HQ had informed the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade of their probable presence in the neighbourhood. At 20:45 Divisional HQ reported to British XIII Corps that the SSB was attacking Chiusi from the south-west and was on high ground in the area just off the road from Cetona, FC/CTH would attack from the east at 23:00. In fact, the SSB had to make firm on the ground it held and German patrols got within 15 metres of its Tanks in the darkness. By 21:10 the Operations Staff at Divisional HQ were displaying some anxiety by telling the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade that it was imperative that they should have information about the attack. As if to oblige, the NMR at 21:30 reported that their squadron 2300 metres south-east of the town had three of its Tanks knocked out, but there was an ominous lack of news about developments in the sector for the next four hours. Only at 23:10 did Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer’s TAC HQ, which was in a white scout car, reach the station area – to the surprise of Maj. A.S. Arlington and his Company, who were not consulted and had not even been told that the FC/CTH would pass through them. The FC/CTH Companies had to struggle forward on foot debussed a good 3 miles short of their start line which, owing to the muddiness of the ground, they had to reach up the road and then across country cut by ditches and little canals draining sodden terrain like the marshes. “A” Company, FC/CTH, (Maj. F. Bartlett) had scant information but was ordered into the lead to clear the town. It had never been reconnoitred nor even seen the place from a distance in daylight, and crossed the start line only at 23:45. “D” Company, FC/CTH, which was to move on close touch with “A” Company, FC/CTH, before passing through to consolidate on the left flank of the second objective – known as “The Poplars” feature – was ready to advance 5 min later, by which time “B” Company, FC/CTH, was also on the start line ready to move behind “D” Company, FC/CTH, and to hold the right of the Poplars feature after establishing a firm base. A Composite Platoon from Support Company screened 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, reconnaissance along the road, and support weapons had been ordered forward to near the start line for consolidation at first light. Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer had seen the fairly consistent shelling of Route 71 and other places during the day, but still believed that a patrol of the ILH.KimR had already been through the village of Chiusi, which he had been given to understand was “Not Strongly Held”. But they did not realize that the ILH/KimR had been through only the station area, as Maj. A.S. Arlington had clearly indicated. The leading Platoon of FC/CTH under Lt. L. Wylie met an ILH/KimR carrier section near the railway yard and gathered that Chiusi was held by light rearguard elements, as was German custom. There was no indication that the FC/CTH spoke to any of the men who had actually tried to enter Chiusi. With the opening of the South African Artillery bombardment, whatever chance of surprise there may have been was blasted away. Completely mistaken or mislead as to the magnitude of the task with which they had been charged, the FC/CTH boldly set out on the long climb towards a most unhappy encounter. By 00:00 “A” Company, FC/CTH, was reported to be going well, though slowed down by terrain which it found difficult beyond expectations. Up steep slopes lined with terraces and dotted with gauntly twisted olive trees momentarily silhouetted against flash of shells and mortar bombs, the infantrymen groped tensely forward. Troop 1 of 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, began work on a blow in the road behind them. It was after 01:00 on June 22nd, 1944, when “A” Company, FC/CTH, contacted the enemy and deployed. A fusillade rang out along the Company front before a prisoner was taken and introduced a warning note saying that the town was held by 300 Infantry. At 01:45 Divisional HQ got its first report of progress through the CRA, whose information placed the FC/CTH about 300 metres short of the town, with Sappers busy clearing the road. The SSB, it was stated, was in position. Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole was informed accordingly. “A” Company, FC/CTH, was advancing up the winding road which climbs terraces surrounding the town, when Lt. L. Wylie’s Platoon was brought to a sudden halt by the familiar German challenge “Wer da?” Dropping to the ground, the FC/CTH were almost immediately lit up by flares and came under fire while grenades were lobbed down on them from the terraces above. Intense MG and grenade fire was directed on to the whole Battalion from 3 sides. As flares burned out and darkness returned Lt. E.P. Hardy’s Platoon moved forward from reserve to relieve Lt. L. Wylie’s men. They found movement severely restricted by a 4 metre terrace, and knew the road to be well covered by the enemy, but when firing unaccountably died down, Lt. E.P. Hardy’s platoon climbed on one another’s back till Pte. H. Clarke succeeded in heaving himself on to the terrace, where he was joined by the rest of the platoon. The FC/CTH fired bursts from their Bren guns in to two shelters dug into the next terrace, and soon the Germans who had been throwing grenades surrendered. The encounter had unfortunately betrayed the platoon’s position to enemy MG gunners elsewhere and a burst of fire killed Cpl. A.J. Hooper and wounded Cpl. Swan who dropped one on either side of Lt. E.P. Hardy, whose own head was shaved by searing bullets. Once more lights tuned night into day and the South Africans were pinned down. As the garish light faded, two strangers joined Lt. E.P. Hardy’s men and some time passed before anyone realized that the newcomers were Germans. Struck by the same thought, they vanished so rapidly that no one had time to fire on them. Pushing on determinedly, Lt. E.P. Hardy’s men scaled up yet another of the high steps on the long climb to Chiusi. Clambering up on to the third terrace, they rightly estimated their position to be on the right of the town, which was still hidden in darkness. The platoon was some distance from the rest of “A” Company, FC/CTH and Lt. L. Wylie decided he should try to clear the road ahead to help the Company enter the town from the left of his platoon. So as not to slow themselves down, the platoon left its PIAT behind and pressed on while the rest of “A” Company charged the slopes determinedly. With supporting artillery fire falling very close to its left flank, it was pinned down when the Germans developed a counter-attack in that sector. Lt. E.P. Hardy’s Platoon meanwhile continued its cautious advance through gardens on the outskirts of the town and came upon the road leading into Chiusi, near a small square at the lower edge of which stood the Teatro Comunale, which was used as a cinema and stood across the road from a double storied winery with large cellar and vats below ground. Working their way up a road on the right of the cinema, the FC/CTH made out a bulky shape blocking the entrance to the building. As they crept closer towards it the sound of voices reached them, and when they realised that the shape was a German Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” Ausf. E which must have been responsible for their earlier casualties caused from MG fire. Having left their PIAT behind, Lt. E.P. Hardy’s men rolled hand grenades under the Panzer but the explosions had little effect other than to cause the crew to move the Panzers rumbling bulk out of the square. It was enough to enable Lt. E.P. Hardy to send off a runner to contact the rest of the Company and tell them the road was clear. Shortly afterwards under the impression that the Germans had been taken by surprise, the whole “A” Company was in the vicinity of the theatre. As yet, there was no clear indication that the operation would be anything but successful, and at 02:00, “A” Company, FC/CTH, sent back a message to the effect that no support would be required from “D” Company, FC/CTH, until its own position had been consolidated. Immediately afterwards Maj. F. Bartlett received a signal to tell him that Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg insisted that FC/CTH should push on with all speed. 3 min later with “A” Company aware of enemy transport moving at the crossroads ahead of it, “D” Company, FC/CTH, was ordered to push through “A” Company and continue the advance. So far, “A” Company, FC/CTH, had only suffered six casualties, and at 02:07 a prisoner was taken from the Sturm Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Fallschirm-Panzer-Division 1 “Hermann Göring” who divulged that the town was held by three Companies, the centre one of which had been struck by FC/CTH. Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer had two Companies forward and only three available altogether, so the situation was not quite as rosy as 11th S.A Armoured Brigade HQ or even FC/CTH had thought. By 02:30 an Engineer Officer reported the road into town clear, thought his working parties were badly sniped. All seemed to be going well and 02:57 “A” Company reported having consolidated its position in the theatre and two adjoining houses, with one Platoon already at the Castle. A Turn for the Worse At 03:15, events took an ominous turn when a German Panzer began milling about in front of the theatre which “A” Company, FC/CTH, had entered by a flight of steps at the back of the building, with Company HQ, Lt. L. Wylie & No. 1 Platoon consolidating inside, while Lt. E.P. Hardy and No. 2 Platoon occupied the winery on the right of the theatre and No. 3 Platoon took up position in a building across the road, to the left of the theatre, and the men waited confidently for the rest of the Battalion to pass through. One Platoon actually patrolled as far as the Castle – well to the left – and the South African guns were shelling the town itself and some rounds were dangerously close to the theatre, and the rest of FC/CTH could make no progress. Both “B” & “D” Companies, FC/CTH, were pinned down outside the town by extremely heavy fire. Understandably after a lapse of 2 hours since hearing from the CRA that FC/CTH were near Chiusi, Divisional HQ was eager for further news. At 03:35 they asked the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade if it had any information yet. Though the Brigade Commander had already insisted that FC/CTH should push on, Divisional HQ was told that there was no information as yet. The Engineers of Troop 3 of 8th Field Squadron, on the other hand, reported to their Squadron HQ that they could not get into the town owing to enemy shellfire which was holding the infantry. It was obvious that Chiusi was much more strongly held than had been thought and Maj. A.H. Rocyn-Jones withdrew his sappers to cover. Over to the west the SSB at 04:30 managed to drive the Germans back from their high ground in front of the South African Tanks, and “A” & “B” Squadrons, SSB, could move to strong positions dominating the exits from the town on that side, but this had no effect on the situation inside Chiusi. Outside the town, ideas about what was happening were quite naturally befogged, but a message from the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA, at 04:40 indicated the one sub-unit of FC/CTH was in the “Village” and the remainder following up, with the Germans resisting. Regardless of the hour, the news was passed to Col. E.O.C Maggs at once and, after waiting 40 min in vain for further reports, the information was relayed to Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, who within 5 min phoned from his TAC HQ to say that he was leaving for the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade. Lt. E.P. Hardy didn’t initially place his men inside the building allotted to his Platoon, but posted them in positions from which they could see what was going on. As a cold, misty dawn was breaking, and in the eerie murk German movement could be discerned within and around the square where FC/CTH especially Pte. Collins & Pte. H. Clarke picked off a number of Germans before enemy Panzers appeared moving into the square. The South Africans behind the sturdy walls of the Teatro Comunale watched as one of the Panzers rumbled towards the entrance to the building. With casualties rising, it was becoming increasingly clear that the attack was running into serious trouble. Cpl. Strydom of the SAEC, who had accompanied FC/CTH was among the wounded. At 05:22 “A” Company, FC/CTH, could report that it’s HQ and two Platoons were only 50 metres to the right of the tower – a prominent landmark – with one platoon 100 metres behind them. “D” Company HQ, FC/CTH, had now reached a house next to a high wall on the right of the road leading into the town. Barely 10 min later the Panzer in the square was firing point blank at the walls of the buildings affording cover to “A” Company, FC/CTH, who required assistance quickly. Within 12 min “A” Company, FC/CTH, had suffered a dozen further casualties and was helplessly watching missiles from a PIAT bouncing off the Panzers front armour plating. Pte. F.W. Touzel unhesitatingly volunteered when Lt. E.P. Hardy called for someone to fetch the Platoon’s own PIAT, but he was wounded and reported missing for some time until he returned to the Battalion and had to be evacuated. With his own three available Companies engaged, Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer would have been hard put to find any means of offering relief to “A” Company, FC/CTH, and no orders were given to Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore to assist FC/CTH in any way from the station area. The British XIII Corps was becoming impatient, and at 05:40 they signalled the 6th South African Armoured Division: “Please, give us some news of Chiusi”. 10 min later the Germans were infiltrating all around “A” Company, FC/CTH and battering the theatre building with the Panzers and at 06:00, Divisional HQ learned from the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade that two sub-units of FC/CTH were in the village. The Germans had two or three Companies there, with anti-tank guns, and a liaison Officer would convey further information which could not be sent in the normal way for security reasons. The slightly mysterious news was passed to Col. E.O.C Maggs, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, British XIII Corps HQ and to both of the other Brigades under the 6th South African Armoured Division command. At 06:20 “D” Company, FC/CTH, reported a Panzer Panzer III & Panzer IV identified and at 06:35 spotted yet another Panzer IV “Special”. Attempts were made to bring down artillery fire on the German Panzers, but without success. Still full of determination but with German Infantry now crossing the tops of the buildings about 150 meters away in broad daylight, “A” Company, FC/CTH, at 08:15 reported some success at sniping with Bren’s and rifles from the round windows down the side of the dress circle, and shortly afterwards the Panzers across the road fire on the first storey building occupied by No. 2 Platoon across the road. Lt. E.P. Hardy’s men firing from there and from the room immediately below, had also accounted for a number of the Germans in the square, and as the shells burst, Pte. J. Jarman – who was killed not long afterwards – and L/Cpl. R. McGregor got out of the room by jumping from the first floor to the ground, through shocked and temporarily blinded by the explosion and the dust it created. In the ground floor room, Pte. Bartie & Pte. G.D. Willis were also forced to withdraw, as the Panzer was using both its 75mm and MGs on the building. Failing to dislodge the rest of the Platoon, the Panzer turned its attention back to the theatre, pouring shells at the building. Meanwhile, however, German Infantry with rifles and Spandaus moved to cover every window and it was becoming impossible for the South Africans to retaliate. Turning Panzerfausts onto the theatre to bash the walls in, the enemy created clouds of choking smoke and dust. The Panzers tried backing into the stonework to smash the walls down, but failed, whilst another Panzer tried similar tactics on the neighboring buildings were small groups of South Africans still held out. Lt. E.P. Hardy’s Platoon, with the Germans pounding one side of their hide-out, no longer had the Company HQ in sight, but they could see Germans on the roof of the Teatro Comunale throwing grenades, till they brought two of them down. There was a brief lull in the fighting and then two sections of Germans dashed down the road separating No. 2 Platoon from the theatre, apparently to cut off the South Africans retreat and open up on them from the rear. Anticipating such a move, Lt. E.P. Hardy had placed one man behind the theatre and three on the same side of the building as No. 2 Platoon, in a field and protected by a low wall about two feet high. They immediately opened fire with telling effect, but unfortunately several of the Germans got through and occupied a building on the left flank of No. 2 Platoon, who then withdrew back to the shelter of their own building. The Panzer which had been firing on the theatre now moved down the road also, stopping immediately beneath a window of the theatre, in full view of No. 2 Platoon. Several Fallschirmjäger were on the back of the Panzer and one clambered onto the turret and shouted in English in the direction of the theatre: “Come out, well show you how to fight!”, but L/Cpl. R. McGregor who had now rejoined Lt. E.P. Hardy, opened fire on him with his Bren, through a crack in the door and others on the back of the Panzer with good effect. Fallschirmjäger, some prone and some kneeling, were immediately outside the door of the building housing No. 2 Platoon, but concentrated on a position to the rear of the Platoon. The Panzer, barely 8 paces from the door, began swinging its 75mm gun onto No. 2 Platoon, but then it rumbled slowly away, with the Fallschirmjäger accompanying it. No. 2 Platoon were soon getting out of their two rooms commanding the square, so as to escape the shelling. At 09:18 “A” Company, FC/CTH reported that the enemy were creeping into their last defences. Across the road from No. 2 Platoon, some Germans managed to break into the theatre and made for the stairs leading to the circle, but quick action killed two of them and all the rest were wounded. That resistance against this sort of attack could not be maintained indefinitely. Blasting a gap in the walls with guns and MG’s, the Germans brought the roof of the theatre collapsing onto the South Africans, and it became impossible to see through the dense dust and smoke. Fire broke out within the building itself, all the Officers and many others were wounded and the situation was desperate. Sgt. Campbell ordered all who were not wounded to follow him down the stairs. Fighting their way into the street they ran almost straight into a Panzer, with its gun pointing at them from less than 10 yards. There was no possibility of escape, and was forced to surrender. Battalion HQ had lost all contact with “A” Company, FC/CTH. Now there was a lull in the fighting, Italian civilians acting as stretcher-bearers under cover of the Red Cross flag, could be seen by the survivors of No. 2 Platoon picking up the dead and wounded in the road. They had withdrawn by the time the South African guns opened up on the town. With a considerable weight of shells falling all over the area of the theatre, the Germans kept under cover and would certainly not hazard their lives to bring in anyone still left behind. Capt. E.S. Rivett-Carnac, though himself already quite seriously wounded before being forced out of the theatre building into German hands sheltering in the basement of a nearby building, was deeply concerned about the number of men still left there, too seriously hurt to get out by themselves. With sufficient knowledge of German to make himself understood, he persuaded a German Officer to allow him to return to the building with one or two of the others who had already been captured. He managed to bring out those who had been left helplessly behind, and they were carried to a small Italian hospital working under a German Medical Officer. Capt. E.S. Rivett-Carnac himself spent some time in hospital further north before being sent off to Moosburg POW camp in Bavaria, but his bravery had not gone unnoticed by others and was later rewarded the Military Cross. “D” Company, FC/CTH, advancing in single file after having had to call up Sappers to clear anti-personnel mines, had also come under grenades lobbed at it from close range as it climbed towards Chiusi, and Capt. D. Lloyd was seriously wounded. A number of men had become casualties before they struck German Panzers and Infantry in the town itself. Having accounted for “A” Company, FC/CTH, the enemy turned on Lt. A.M. Caro’s Platoon, who had taken up position in the grounds of a house in the main street. Having been beaten off at first, the Germans then tried to encircle Lt. A.M. Caro’s Platoon with Panzers, one of which the South Africans stopped with their PIAT. When a Panzer came up on the Platoon’s left and a Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” Ausf. E on the right flank, firing armour-piercing shells and calling on the South Africans to surrender, Lt. A.M. Caro decided to fight his way out, Cpl. J. Ferguson volunteered to remain with the wounded. Lt. A.M. Caro led the rest of his Platoon as they fought their way through the southern edge of town and back down the slopes towards Stazione Chiusi in a tough fight with only Lt. A.M. Caro and two others, all three wounded, got back to Battalion HQ. Cpl. Knight, who had gone in with them from 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, was missing. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, with “A” Company, FC/CTH, on the point of being overwhelmed reported confused fighting at 09:25, but “B” Company, FC/CTH – Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer’s only reserve – was also falling back by 10:00 and Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer was calling for the promised armoured support which Brigade HQ had hoped to provide at first light. No Tanks arrived to ease the strain on the decimated Infantry, but “D” Company HQ, FC/CTH, and one Platoon managed to withdraw, out of touch with the rest of the Company, which was now in contact with “B” Company, FC/CTH. Meanwhile, ILH/KimR were being heavily shelled and harassed by Neberwerfer fire. Only at this stage – more than 4 hours after first light – did “B” Squadron, PAG, leave the armoured Regiments harbour area, where it had been since 04:00. The leading Troop of Sherman V’s under Lt. P. Melck was to climb the slopes to relieve “A” Company, FC/CTH, whilst covered by the rest of the Squadron, but the road selected as the best approach turned out to be nothing more than a goat track, quite unnegotiable by the Tanks. They had to halt in dead ground while the Troop Commander set off on foot to search for a more suitable route. There had been no previous reconnaissance of any approach for Tanks. The British XIII Corps being worried was obvious, for at 11:40 it signalled the 6th S.A. Armoured Division that Lt. Gen. S.C. Kirkman was on his way to see Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole, who had himself, already gone to see Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg. What little hope there may have remained for aiding “A” Company, FC/CTH, dissolved in a peal of thunder heralding pelting rain that almost immediately immobilized the Sherman V’s. The Val di Chiana resumed its ancient character as a morass of mud. In Chiusi itself it was obvious to the survivors of “A” Company, FC/CTH that they were surrounded. As the shelling died down, a lone German crept up to the door of the cellar in which No. 2 Platoon had now taken cover. Lt. E.P. Hardy winged him with his .38 revolver and he withdrew. Lt. E.P. Hardy realising that the position had become hopeless, told the members of his Platoon that it was now: “Each man for himself” and Pte. Bartie scrambled into one of the vats and lay low. Shortly afterwards, a German Panzer again appeared. Several Fallschirmjäger dismounted and rushed into the winery. Resistance was useless, Lt. E.P. Hardy was relieved of his revolver and L/Cpl. R. McGregor, who was hiding behind a wine vat, was discovered and also disarmed. A German Officer, Luger in hand, scrutinised the vats suspiciously but luckily accepted Lt. E.P. Hardy’s assurance that they were unoccupied. The other survivors of the Platoon were rounded up in an adjoining cellar, and they were all marched off, Lt. E.P. Hardy’s ears ringing with the remark of the Austrian Feldwebel who had taken his revolver: “For you the war is over, you go to the finest country in the world!” Soon they met up with the other remnants of “A” Company HQ, FC/CTH, and Lt. L. Wylie’s Platoon, who had been captured earlier. Lt. R.G. Metelerkamp of ILH/KimR, whose mortars had supported Maj. A.S. Arlington’s Company in the initial approach to Chiusi and could have given the FC/CTH a very good idea of what to expect, met Lt. Col. O.N. Flemmer and found him deeply depressed at what had happened. At 13:00 on June 22nd, 1944, arrangements were made for hot meals and ammunition to be sent up to “B” & “D” Companies. FC/CTH with the support weapons carried in jeeps. Two Platoons of “B” Company, FC/CTH, supported by the stationary Sherman V’s, never got beyond high ground 1000 metres south of the town, and at 13:25 the Tanks were ordered to stay in position for the night. At 13:35 the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade told Divisional HQ it was still trying to drive the Germans out of Chiusi. The attack had been a failure, and the South Africans suffered their first reverse in Italy. “B” & “D” Companies, FC/CTH, stayed with PAG’s forward Tanks that night, together with part of “C” Company and a Company of the ILH/KimR in reserve round the station. The weather remained atrocious, and it was a most unpleasant experience, with German 150mm sFH18 howitzers shelling the area and eventually wounding 5 members of PAG, including Lt. P. Melck. That evening the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade learned from wireless intercept that the Germans in Chiusi reported the town to be clear, but admitting that their own casualties being heavy. They added that they had about 50 prisoners. The news was little consolation to the FC/CTH. Chiusi, a town dating back to before the birth of Christ, was the kind of objective which demanded thorough reconnaissance, detailed preparation and adequate support for its capture even in daylight. The continued advance of British XIII Corps required the town to be quickly cleared so as to open Route 71 and the road to Sina, and the original intention had been for the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade to take Chiusi. FC/CTH lost 17 killed, 27 wounded & 75 missing in the ill-fated attack on Chiusi, leaving the Battalion altogether 12 Officers & 134 other ranks under strength. Killed: Sgt. J.E.S. Ervine Sgt. O.M. Sangster Cpl. A.J. Hooper Cpl. D.M. Mackenzine L/Cpl. F.J. Ritchie L/Cpl. S. Lakati (Cape Corps) Pte. D.R. Abrahamson Pte. M.G. Golden Pte. G.H. Gush Pte. R.G. Gush Pte. J. Jarman Pte. F.H.J. Klose Pte. J. McNaught-Davis Pte. L.G. Nash Pte. S.B. Page Pte. A.T. Parkes Pte. T.W. Tobin Pte. W. Tosen This episode was not forgotten by the Italians of Chiusi, who on June 26th, 1959, set up a plaque in the Teatro Communale, carrying the inscription: “In memory of the sacrifice of blood and ruins which occurred in this threatre during the night of June 21st/22nd, 1944 in the bitter encounter between an Allied patrol of liberating South African Troops and the occupying Germans, the Comune of Chiusi has placed this epigraph in devoted recognition for the fallen and with renewed homage to the ideals which guided and sustained the struggle for liberation” Chiusi, June 26th, 1959 After the Surrender & Captivity With a slight wound sustained in the early stages, Lt. E.P. Hardy asked for medical attention and was taken to a medical aid post where his wound was dressed and he saw many German dead before he was escorted to a German HQ in a dugout for interrogation. Upon completion of the interrogation Lt. E.P. Hardy was dismissed and rejoined his men, with whom he was sent some 5 miles back and locked up in a chemical factory, where they were affected by the fumes till the guards improved the ventilation. Being an Officer, Lt. E.P. Hardy was soon separated from his men and placed in a room, but not before Sgt. Campbell told him of his intention to escape. They were escorted back to Montepulciano are where they were imprisoned in the high-walled yard of a factory. The South African prisoners were watched over by 6 German guards, but Sgt. Campbell noticed that 3 of them were escorting prisoners to the latrines, 2 were preparing a meal and the remaining 1 had few thoughts except for 3 pretty Italian girls at the factory. Snatching at a momentary chance, Sgt. Campbell scaled the wall and dropped to the ground, only to find himself beside a German soldier. “So – you’ve got a prisoner’s clothes!”, the startled German seemed to remark, “Ja, ja!” Sgt. Campbell, and walked off as if there was nothing odd in such a situation at all and the German sentry chose not to follow. Inside the factory, a rather agitated German Officer demanded from Lt. E.P. Hardy the number of POW’s confined in the building. The South African, guessing what had happened, quickly cut the total by one before replying and the German Officer seemed quite relieved. Sgt. Campbell was sheltered and directed by Italians, who provided him with clothes and food. At one stage, Sgt. Campbell almost ran into the crew of a Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” Ausf. E whilst they were having a meal. Spotting them too late to get away without attracting unwelcome attention, he begged some food, which was provided in return for his washing their mess tins. By good fortune, borrowed clothes, an unshaven face and general unkeptness proved sufficient to disguise Sgt. Campbell’s identity until he was picked up by a patrol of the 24th Guards Infantry Brigade and sent back to battalion HQ. A dozen other men of “A” Company, FC/CTh, some of whom were wounded, managed to hide in a wine cellar and were later released. ILH/KimR – Imperial Light Horse/Kimberley Regiment FC/CTH – First City/Cape Town Highlanders NMR – Natal Mounted Rifles SSB – Special Service Battalion PAG – Prince Alfred’s Guard SAA – South African Artillery SAHA – South African Heavy Artillery SAAF – South African Air Force SAEC – South African Engineers Corps

Hi John. Thanx for the help and info. As CMAK was before my time (i.e. I really only started playing CMBN) i didnt know about these missions already designed. My hat goes off to Kingfish for his great works. And thanx for the history info. As i said in my first post on this topic: So me and some mates started the S.A Games Project last year to bring the South Africans into the gaming market through Flames of War. We successfully achieved this and the S.A boys are now represented nicely within the rules. What we managed to do was to build the most complete OOB there is of the 6th South African Armored Division (1944 - 1945) and in so doing bought every book written on the matter and so also acquired allot of info & photos (Photos mainly from the museum here in JHB) to put together a nice painting guide & historical brief aswell. And as ive had difficulty uploading the info. Here are the links to the info posted on the Flames of War website. Hope you'll find this useful. 6th South African Armoured Division History & Bibliography (Part 1) http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4400 6th South African Armoured Division History & Bibliography (Part 2) http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4401 6th South African Armoured Division History & Bibliography (Part 3) http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4402 6th South African Armoured Division History & Bibliography (Part 4) http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4406 6th South African Armoured Division History & Bibliography (Part 5) http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4407 Notes and details on the 6th South African Armoured Division http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4420 6th South African OOB January 1944 – May 1945 http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4419 German Units & Elements Encountered by the South Africans 1944 - 1945 http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4423 South African Paint Guide: Colour Schemes, Tactical Markings & Insignias http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4469 And here are 3 scenarios we researched and added for the game. It makes for some good reading (And maybe even some CMFI scenarios): The Battle of Celleno, 10 June 1944 http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4477 The Battle of “Hell-House”, 25 July 1944 http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4491 The Clearing of Monte Pezza, 17 October 1944 http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=4531 I have all these articles in PDF format if anyone would like them in their original format (They were slightly changed for the website). Just pop me a PM with your E-mail address and ill gladly send the info along.

Hi Slinty Sorry for taking so long but im compiling allot of info for the battle Chuisi. Ill have it done in a few days more.

Hey Splinty. it would be interesting to know if your grandfather served with the Irish regiment in all. My one Uncle passed during the war while serving with the Irish Regiment. He passed on April 24th, 1942. He won the Military Medal with the 5th South African Infantry Brigade at Sidi Rezegh as a mortar man when he refused to retreat. If your dad served in the South African forces, what would you do to get your fathers service cards, medical file and personnel file? Before you wonder why im asking. I found my grandfathers, hence the info i shared, so im able to help. Ive got a guy that has access (Legal Access) to the South African Military Archives and for a price he can acquire the info. If something is there, he'll find it. All ill need is his full names & birthday date, and if possible his military number.

Ill get typing on the battle

It was a really bad choice of Clark to have done that seeing as allot of South Africans died trying to take the town and those that got cut off in the main square who had to fight the Germans on their own and paid for it with their lives. Only a handful were able to surrender. Ive got a book detailing the complete story, if you'd like for me to post it here, ill do a write up.

188539 V - Eliza Heystek PROMOTIONS: 14/08/40 – Promoted to Bdr (Cpl) 01/03/42 – Promoted to T/Bdr (T/Cpl) 31/01/44 – Demoted to Gunner 24/04/44 – Promoted to T/L/Bdr (T/L/Cpl) MEDALS & AWARDS: • 1939/1945 Star • Africa Star o 8th Army Clasp • Italy Star • British Defence Medal • The War Medal 1939/1945 • Africa Service Medal TIME SPENT IN HOSPITAL: 1. 19/03/41 – Admitted to Hospital – 30/4/41 – Discharged from Hospital. (43 Days) 2. 27/03/41 – Admitted to Field Hospital (Both Hands Burned) – 3/4/41 – Discharged from Field Hospital. (6 Days) 3. 31/07/41 – Admitted to Hospital – 10/8/41 – Discharged from Hospital. (10 Days) 4. 09/08/43 – Admitted to Hospital – 17/8/43 – Discharged from Hospital. (9 Days) 5. 29/11/43 – Admitted to Hospital – 29/1/44 – Discharged from Hospital. (32 Days)

Nice to meet you Splinty. Its sad to know that the South Africans were treated so poorly even thought they fought so hard. During North Africa the British didn’t even want our men to be lead by South African Officers but by British Officers. They even gave us shoddy equipment and restricted us from proper equipment like anti-tank bombs. This I know firsthand as my grandfather told me a story of how the South Africans dealt with this problem but ill share the story further down. Only after North Africa did we EARN the right lead our own men and have proper equipment. But i guess that’s what you get when you invade someone country and enslave the populace. What you get from that is a complete and utter distaste for the governing body. After the Boer War the Afrikaners and English never saw eye-to-eye. Allot of South Africa wanted to fight alongside the Germans as they helped us in the Boer War. That’s why the S.A government (Jan Smuts) never made it mandatory to send the entire South African army as they couldn’t afford to send them and they just turn and join the Germans. That could have been disastrous in North Africa, hence the reason they made it voluntary. That’s why some my grandfathers and uncles didn’t fight as they didn’t want to fight for the British and they didn’t want to pick up arms against the Germans. My one Grandfather volunteered. He enlisted on April 20th, 1940. After volunteering for service and finishing basic training, he initially served with “Q” Services, 8th Motor Transport Company then transferred to the 7th Mechanical Transport Company and later the 4th Motor Transport (Reserve) Company. He was then sent to East Africa during the East Africa Campaign against the Italians and later up to North Africa. He was admitted to hospital five times, one of the admittance was for having “Both Hands Burnt” on March 27th, 1941. “A story that was shared with me was that he told a story of how the British left the South African Troops without proper personnel anti-tank Grenades / Mines. So the S.A boys took their peach cans and shook the cans till the peaches were pulp, knocked 2 holes into the can and sucked the peaches out and then filled the cans with petrol and added a piece of material as a fuse. They used these homemade petrol bombs when they were attacked by German Panzers by rushing the Panzers from their lines and jumping onto the Panzer and throwing the lit can of petrol down the main turret whilst holding onto the main cannon. Oupa Smokie also added that these cannons would be so warm that you’d leave the skin from your hands behind when you tried to remove them.” On November 3rd, 1941 he appears to have been posted to the South African Army’s Anti-Aircraft Regiment as transport. On September 30th, 1942 he was transferred from the “Q” Services permanently to the South African Army as a gunner for the Anti-Air. On December 11th, 1942 he was with the S.A Army’s 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment in Egypt (Suez) (the unit was probably left behind when the 1st South African Infantry Division went home (after the 2nd Battle of El-Alamein, November 1942). They were probably left here to await the arrival of the newly-formed 6th South African Armoured Division which would do its training in Egypt. He came back to the Union (Durban) on January 1st, 1943 and was transferred from the 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment to the 42nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment on March 25th, 1943, posted specifically to 126th Battery. He departed again for Egypt on July 10th, 1943 as part of the 42nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. 42nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SAAF – Lt. Col. I.B. Guilford, Lt. Col. G.N. Lever • 124 LAA Battery • 125 LAA Battery • 126 LAA Battery On October 21st, 1943 he was transferred to the 1/12th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SAAF from 42nd Light Anti-Aircraft. The 1/12th is listed as a South African Air Force Unit and the transfer order (U.O. 67/44/8) show that he was for a time part of the Air Force, transferring back to the Army (Officially) on July 1st, 1945. However, before that he was with the 6th South African Armoured Division’s Reserve Artillery (March 3rd, 1944), then sent back to 1/12th Light Anti-Aircraft. He returned to the Union and was demobilised at the Pretoria Show grounds on November 23rd, 1945 with the rest of the 6th South African Armoured Division. 1/12 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SAAF – Lt. Col. G.W. Meister • 1/7 LAA Battery o A Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors o B Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm SP o C Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors • 2/8 LAA Battery o D Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors o E Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm SP o F Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors • 3/56 LAA Battery (Transferred to 7/23 Medium on February 5th, 1945 from a LAA to an HAA) o G Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors o H Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm SP o I Troop – 6x QF Bofors 40mm with Morris 3t LAA Tractors

Here is a list of some of the battles & engagements id like to make: Battle of Celleno - June 10th, 1944 Celleno “A” Squadron, SSB “B” Squadron, SSB “C” Squadron, SSB “A” Company, ILH/KimR “B” Company, ILH/KimR “C” Company, ILH/KimR 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA (OQF 25-pdr Guns) 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA (BL 5.5” Guns) “C” Squadron, NMR Attack on Chiusi - June 21st - 22nd, 1944 “A” Company, FC/CTH The Clearing of Monte Pezza - October 17th, 1944 “B” Company, RNC “A” Company, FC/CTH “D” Company, FC/CTH 1/6 Field Regiment, SAA 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA There is still plenty more but these will do for now. Ill put a complete list up in a few days with the history behind them.

Hi Fizou No harm done, were all human. Its not that im impatient, im just over eager to do my intended project as ive good a ton of books on the South African perspective and there are some battles id like to recreate hence the search for someone to do the vehicle & uniform mods. But that mainly the reason for the post.

Hi Fizou Thanx for the reply. As for your statement "Modding CMx2 uniforms and vehicles takes a lot of time. The modders have their priorities and projects going, cant expect them to drop that for a request." I never intended for anyone to drop their projects and simply come running. All i wanted was a reply - Yes or No. If yes, i would have like to discuss the matter before just jumping into my intended project. If the people said No, then i have my answer and i can move on to someone else that might help or isnt too busy. So as to your statement once again, with the way you stated your message, i find it a bit in my face. I came here to have fun, work on some ideas and enjoy the game and not to get stuck into something that is appearing to turn into something ugly. If you cant say anything nice or you dont like what someone says, please refrain from answering and move on. Everyone has their opinions and i respect that but no need for unpleasantries if you dont like what i said.

Lol. Lots of views but still no interest from the Modders. Ive sent PM's but no reply.

Hi AKD Actually the first into combat was the 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade with Artillery & Support Elements under Brig. R.J. Palmer that were detached from the 6th S.A Armoured Division, and ordered to move to the S. Elia area, a mountainous sector of the line North of Cassino in preparation to relieve the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade came under the command of the 2nd New Zealand Division in the British X Corps. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade took over the sector on May 6th, 1944, and relinquished it on May 23rd, 1944. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade held these positions until after the fall of Monte Cassino and the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, when they were withdrawn and reunited with the Division. The first real combat for the 6th S.A Armoured Divisions was on June 10th, 1944 at Celleno. The Battle of Celleno, June 10th, 1944 By J.C von Winterbach, Mike Bersiks, Rex Barrett By June 9th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was spearheading the Allied advance towards Florence and captured Vallerano, Canepina, & Viterbo. But the move towards Florence was delayed by demolitions north of Viterbo, where a blown bridge was covered by German Infantry and 3 Tiger I E tanks. With both 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA & 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, guns heavily shelling enemy targets, 1/8 & 2/8 Troop of 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, began construction of a culvert under spasmodic fire but had to withdraw to defensive positions for awhile when a Tiger I E tank approached. Then, when it became obvious after dark that the newly constructed crossing would not stand up to continual use by tanks, 2/8 Troop had to put a Bailey bridge beside it. It was after midnight on June 9th, 1944 that a bridgehead was established over the Acqua Rossa and the exhausted men of 8th Field Squadron, SAEC, were later relieved by the men of 12th Field Squadron, SAEC. The advance on the German’s right flank started at first light on June 10th, 1944, with the ILH/KimR & SSB moving up to establish contact with the German defensive line North of the town of Aqua Rossa. The advance North was intended to secure the bridgehead around Aqua Rossa, but the ILH/KimR & SSB advance was soon halted by German heavy mortar fire. “C” Squadron, NMR passed through on reconnaissance at 8:00, and almost immediately drew heavy fire from the German anti-tank screen consisting of 88mm & 75mm PaK guns, losing two tanks with their entire crew all being killed. On hearing the distress calls over the air, the SSB was immediately ordered forward to their assistance. Heavy resistance was coming from the German 356. Infantrie-Division, which had recently arrived from Genoa under Generalmajor Hans von Rohr. The freshly committed German Division was still raw but it was supported by elements of the 4. Fallschirmjäger Division, 3. Panzer-Grenadier-Division, 362. Infantrie-Division & 26. Panzer-Division. Instead of passing the 24th Guards Brigade through the bridgehead as intended, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole now ordered the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade in with the SSB leading the way, though the 4/22 Field Regiment was not yet in position to give covering fire. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg realised that German forces were withdrawing North-wards up the axis of Route 2 and intended to turn the German left flank by ordering the SSB to advance on the right flank. The Rhodesians of “C” Squadron were at breakfast when the call came for support. Mess tins, plates & mugs were abandoned with contents unfinished as the men raced to their tanks. The SSB Squadrons were in the lead along the road and had covered barely a kilometre when its tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and anti-tank fire. They had struck the enemy anti-tank screen south of the Railway running across their line of advance. With “A” Squadron, SSB in right rear and “B” Squadron, SSB in left rear North of the bridgehead, the SSB had hardly formed up for the attack before they came under heavy shellfire. Without waiting for Reconnaissance or Artillery support Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz boldly decided to move on in the same formation, with “A” Squadron, SSB forming a firm base on high ground on the right flank as the NMR tanks withdrew from action, “C” Squadron, SSB moved forward against heavy anti-tank fire from guns of all calibres from 20 to 88mm, backed by some 50 to 60 Spandau machine-guns sited in houses and tree’s, and from a number of Nebelwerfer’s. While two troops of “A” Squadron, SSB held a firm base, the rest of the Squadron were ordered right and forward, to take up hull-down positions from which they put down heavy fire on the enemy’s left flank to such good effect that the German Infantry broke and were mown down as they tried to get away. “C” Squadron, SSB had been brought to a halt, but Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz ordered “B” Squadron, SSB round in a wide left hook which ran into anti-tank fire. This was silenced by superb marksmanship on the part of the S.A & Rhodesian tank gunners, before the SSB turned machine-guns on the enemy Infantry, who broke and fled. Parts of “A” Company, ILH/KimR accompanied the advance of the SSB, by going into action on the back off the advancing tanks. Soon after, two leading tanks were blown up by panzerfausts at point-blank range after the Germans had shown the “White Flag”. Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz then issued the order over the radio to the troops to “Show no Mercy”. Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz reckoned that the enemy was holding with a strength equivalent to a Brigade with two Battalions up and one in Reserve, supported by Divisional as well as Regimental anti-tank guns. All SSB tanks except his own command tank had been committed, and they were rapidly replenished from the rear, with truck drivers displaying great courage in coming right forward in their open vehicles under fire and was once again ready to move on to the offensive. “C” Company, ILH/KimR was winkling out enemy remnants hiding among farmhouses, holes, bushes, cornfields, caves & hedges. At this point, Artillery forward observation Officers at last came forward to report to Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz. From 11:45 the guns of the 4/22 Field Regiment were engaging numerous targets, including enemy infantry who were effectively pinned by air-burst. Anti-tank guns to the right, in the area of Grotte S. Stefano, were knocked out by fire from 7/64 Field Battery’s 25-pdr’s, and the 7/23 Medium Regiment’s 5.5’s brought down fire with devastating effect shortly before midday. In less than 2 hours artillery fire had knocked out five 88’s, sixteen 50mm anti-tank guns, three Machine-guns, a Panzer IV, four Panzer III’s and numerous Infantry. “B” Company, ILH/KimR at 14:30 joined “C” Company, ILH/KimR with the SSB, while “A” Company, ILH/KimR swept the slopes towards Celleno village, beyond the enemy’s prepared positions, which followed the steep bank of the railway line running east to west through Grotte and some 4500 m South of Celleno. Working in close co-operation with the tanks, ILH/KimR cleared the approaches to Celleno through a thickly wooded area studded with enemy machine-guns and Panzerfaust anti-tank posts. Wiping up enemy pockets was a dangerous and slow process, and in order not to lose the momentum of the attack Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz decided to keep the tanks moving towards Dismounting from the Sherman’s, “B” & “C” Companies, ILH/KimR kept working with the armour, whose “C” Squadron, SSB now advanced under the railway line and immediately met anti-tank fire from guns sited in depth along the road, and with Infantry opposition from panzerfausts, Spandaus & Snipers in the trees. With the railway atop a high embankment, it was impossible to cross it anywhere except where the road ran beneath the line, but “C” Squadron, SSB got through and made firm on high ground running across the road about 180 meters North of the railway. Having driven through the wooded area cleared by ILH/KimR, the tanks acted as artillery and very effectively shelled Celleno before the Infantry moved in. With “C” Squadron, SSB firm beyond the railway line, “B” Squadron, SSB passed through, carrying men of ILH/KimR on the backs of the tanks again as they made for high ground North of Celleno. Fighting with every weapon at its disposal, the Squadron got one troop on to high ground North-West of the village and overlooking it, and “C” Squadron, SSB then moved up on the right into an area which had to be cleared of determined German tank hunting parties and snipers by ILH/KimR, who were brought up by “A” Squadron, SSB and SSB Reconnaissance tanks. While Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore’s men of ILH/KimR fought their way towards the outskirts of Celleno, their mopping-up developed into an attack on the village itself, and the SSB moved more tanks on to higher ground North-East of it, thus holding the area and providing sufficient fire support while the Infantry prised the Germans out house by house. In farmhouses scattered around about 10 large buildings which looked like schools, German remnants had good cover and resisted bitterly, but they were unable to hold back the men of ILH/KimR, who took a large number of prisoners and inflicted heavy casualties. By 20:00 that night as the SSB tanks had run out of petrol and ammunition, and the enemy’s fire had died down. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz not to continue the advance until the Divisional Artillery could come into action further forward to search the wooded country ahead. It was decided not to hold the ground occupied at the end of the day, and as the SSB tanks withdrew to replenish and to rest their crews, many whom had not eaten since the previous night, they took the ILH/KimR men out with them to a position about 3 km South, to wait for the 24th Guards Brigade to pass through and continue the advance the next morning. During the action at Celleno, Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered the PAG to cover the SSB’s right flank, with support from the 4/22 Field Regiment, whose guns effectively engaged the enemy. The PAG Regiment moved up the Viterbo-Bagnoregio road (The area between Viterbo-Bagnoregio is characterized by modest little farms, each with a few rows of vines and assortment of fruit trees. The hills and gullies are rugged and forested), and by 12:30 on June 10th, 1944 it had reached a point about 11 km North of Viterbo, with “A” Squadron, PAG and the Reconnaissance Troop searching for a crossing over the River Malone. “B” Squadron, PAG coming up from reserve, crossed the river but was pinned by anti-tank fire. “A” Squadron, PAG was already moving along sunken lanes only some 1370 meters from Grotte when enemy anti-tank guns scored hits on five Sherman’s, three of which “brewed up”. “C” Squadron, PAG covered “A” Squadron’s left and “B” Squadron, PAG moved up to take over from “A” Squadron, PAG but was halted by anti-tank fire, some of which was from a range of only 180 meters. No further progress in this sector was possible without Infantry support, but casualties were inflicted on the enemy and prisoners were taken. Though it had just come under command of the 24th Guard Brigade, the Pretoria Regiment (PR), at 18:00 that day was ordered to move immediately for fire support of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, and from turret-down positions plastered the Celleno-Grotte area with high explosive rounds. The Battle of Celleno lasted for 12 hours and culminated as South Africa’s first Victory in the Italian Campaign. The 11th Armoured Brigade had suffered a total of 53 casualties, but it had severely mauled the 356. Infantrie-Division east of Lake Bolsena for a total of 252 casualties and capturing many prisoners. A year prior to the battle, however, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was still training in the desert expanses of Khataba. Under-equipped, under-strength, and unsure of their future, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was able to turn themselves into a capable, armoured, fighting force within less than a year.

The Advance from the Appenines The first months of 1945 saw important changes in the organisation of the 6th S.A Armoured Division. It was known that the 24th Guards Brigade would pass out of command after relief, and it was essential to have another S.A Infantry Brigade in the Division. On January 13th, 1945, the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade came into being and Lt. Col. J. Bester, Battalion Commander of the WR/DLR, was appointed Brigadier. The Infantry Battalion of the Brigade was provided initially by the RDLI & NMR/SAAF, whom reverted to Infantry and began training in Infantry tactics. Artillery support was provided by the 15th Field Regiment, SAA which was formed from elements of the Divisional Artillery and reinforcements from the Union. 5th Field Squadron, SAEC came under command, and the Brigade commenced training in the Prato-Pistoia area. The 6th S.A Armoured Division concentrated in the Lucca area at the end of February. The men were delighted with their new quarters, situated in a lovely countryside, and took advantage of the opportunity of having some leave and recreation. Enthusiasm waned, however, when an intensive training programme began. On leaving the line the 6th S.A Armoured Division bade farewell to its comrades in the 24th Guards Brigade, and it was with genuine regret that the South Africans saw these splendid troops depart to the British 8th Army. Brig. M.D. Erskine, said the Guards would always be proud to have served in the 6th S.A Armoured Division. The leave and training programme had been planned on a six weeks cycle, but this had to be curtailed. On March 28th, 1945 the 6th S.A Armoured Division issued detailed orders for the relief of the 1st US Armoured Division in the old sector between the Reno and the Setta. The great offensive which was to destroy the German armies in Italy was about to begin. Generalfeldmarschall A. Kesselring’s successor, Generaloberst H.G.O.R. von Vietinghoff, was under no illusions about the coming storm, and the possibility of resisting it. He would have preferred to withdraw to the line of the PO. The German High Command, so far from agreeing to this, would not even allow Von Vietinghoff to carry out a limited withdrawal on the Eighth Army Front, which would have effectually frustrated the Allied air and artillery programme. By insisting on the retention of the Appenine Line, Hitler had tied the German Army in Italy to an anvil. During January & February 4 German Divisions were drawn from Italy to attempt to dam the Russian tide, and these included the old opponents of the South Africans the 16. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division “Reichsführer-SS” & 356. Infanterie-Division. More would probably have been demanded, if the Allied Air Force had not played such havoc with communications in Northern Italy that it took weeks to move a Division through the Alpine passes. By comparison with their forces on other fronts, the German Army in Italy was still a formidable fighting machine, and on April 10th, 1945 Generaloberst H.G.O.R. von Vietinghoff had under his command 21 German Divisions of all types, supported by a powerful force of artillery. Although the Allied armies were now pouring into Germany, morale was still high. The greatest weakness was an almost total lack of air support. Generaloberst H.G.O.R. von Vietinghoff had only 260 tanks, and the petrol shortage compelled him to rely excessively on animal transport. The Allies planned to attack along practically the whole Italian front. Preliminary blows along the shores of the Adriatic and the Tuscan sea were to be followed a week later by an all-out assault by the British 8th Army in the marshy country between Lake Commachio and the Appenines. Three days later the US 5th Army was to unleash the US II & IV Corps in an offensive aimed at Bologna and the plain to the North West. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was given an important role in the US 5th Army plan. During the night of March 31st / April 1st, 1945 the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade began its movement back into the line, and on April 4th, 1945 took over command of the Brigade sector from Combat Command A of the 1st US Armoured Division. The 11th Armoured Brigade took over their sector from Combat Command B on April 5th, 1945. The Divisional sector laid between the rivers Reno and Setta and was held by the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade on the right and the 11th Armoured Brigade on the left. The river Torricella was the inter-Brigade boundary. The 11th Armoured Brigade had the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles and two American units (19th Reconnaissance Squadron & 1st Battalion 135 RCT) under their command. The Americans were serving as infantry. The 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to move up later on the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade right. Certain regrouping would then take place between the two Brigades. Early in March the Germans had withdrawn his line to the crest of the Sole-Caprara massif, and the South African Forward Defence Lines were now about 1000 yards nearer to the enemy. The 77 Eastings Grid was the boundary line of 2 German Divisions. The 94. Infanterie-Division held the sector to the west, and there was little activity apart from some scattered shelling and harassing fire. An outline plan had been drawn up by Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole at the end of March. The initial attack was to be made on Mt. Sole-Caprara by the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade, which was to exploit to Mt. Abelle. On the capture of the Sole-Caprara-Abelle area, the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to advance along the ridge running north-east of Mt. Sole, and capture Mt. Santa Barbara. The 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to cover the right flank. Thereafter the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to take Mt. Giovule and Mt. Baco and destroy any German forces remaining between the Setta and the Reno. When this phase had been completed 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to be prepared to cross the Reno. All attacks were to be supported by the Divisional Artillery and air support was promised on an unprecedented scale. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was the left-flanking formation of the US II Corps. The US IV Corps was to open the battle on the US 5th Army front by attacking in the mountains west of the Reno, and then the US II Corps was to launch its assault. Detailed planning for the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s attack began on April 5th, 1945. The Divisional Commander met his Staff and Brigade commander, and they in turn had full discussions with their subordinates, and the commanders of supporting arms. The 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade carried out detailed patrolling to reconnoitre the enemy’s outpost positions, and to decide on suitable lines of advance. There was little interference from the enemy, but the area had been heavily mined, and a number of casualties were suffered. On the night of April 7th/8th, 1945 the first of a series of full scale artillery shoots was carried out against enemy positions on the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s front. The intention was to deceive the enemy regarding the time of the main assault and to shatter his morale and to induce him to disclose his defensive fire tasks. The second and third objects were certainly not achieved, and the enemy showed little interest in the elaborate bombardments. Meanwhile the great offensive had already begun on other sectors of the front. On April 1st, 1945 a brilliant commando attack on the Andriatic coast threw the 162. Turkoman-Division into disorder. On April 5th, 1945 the Japanese-Americans opened an offensive along the shore of the Tuscan sea. The attack met with great success, and the threat to the naval base of Spezia brought German reserves from the valley of the PO. On April 10th, 1945 an artillery and air bombardment surpassing anything seen in Italy, heralded the advance of the British 8th Army. The enemy made the mistake of anticipating an attack along Route 9, while the main weight of the British 8th Army fell in the area south of Lake Commachio. The enemy was shaken by the intense air and artillery bombardment, and disconcerted by the use of large numbers of flame-throwing tanks. On April 10th, 1945 saw the Britih 8th Army made deep penetrations and although the Germans rallied, and fought back with their usual skill and tenacity, yet they were never able to recover from the initial shock or amend their faulty dispositions. Retreat to the much vaunted Genghis Khan Line brought no security, and on April 15th, 1945 the British 8th Army captured Bastia, and threatened the flank of all the German forces in Italy. It had been intended that the US IV Corps should open the US 5th Army attack on April 12th, 1945, but the weather was unfavourable for bombers and the offensive did not begin until Aptil 14th, 1945. By the evening of that day advance units of the 1st US Armoured Division, on the left of the South Africans, had entered Vergato. Further to the west the 10th US Mountain Division had taken its objectives, and was thrusting forward with great determination. On April 15th, 1945 the US II Corps began its attack, and the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was launched against Sole and Caprara. Although not as high as Mt. Stanco or Mt. Salvaro, the extremely steep, bush-covered slopes of Sole and Caprara presented a most formidable obstacle. The ridge running along the crest of Sole and extending north east to Collina was a complete razorback, with no facilities for deployment. Mt. Abelle was considerably lower than Sole or Caprara, but itgave depth to the defence, and enemy posted here could shoot up any troops advancing down the northern slopes of these two mountains. The 6th S.A Armoured Division regrouped for the attack. On April 9th, 1945, the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade moved up, with its HQ located at La Torre. On April 10th, 1945 the RNC came under command of the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade, and the Brigade took over the sector between Mt. Sole and the river Setta, to protect the right flank of the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade. The 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade now consisted of the NMR/SAAF and the RNC with one Squadron of the SSB under command. On April 8th, 1945, the RDLI relieved two Companies of the FC/CTH in the centre of the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade’s front, thus releasing the latter Battalion for the atack on Mt. Sole. On the same day the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles came under the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade command, and relieved the WR/DLR in the Brigades left sector. The latter were now available to attack Mt. Caprara. The 12th Field Squadron, SAEC was ordered to support the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade, which had one Squadron of PAG under command. On April 11th, 1945 Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole addressed the Officers and men of the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade down to the Platoon Sergeants and put them in the picture. On April 13th, 1945 the enemy broke contact on the British 8th Army front south east of Bologna and it was suspected that a general withdrawal had been ordered. Patrols were sent out, and one from the RDLI got within 200 yards of the crest of Sole. A blaze of fire established that the enemy was holding the position. Deserters confirmed this, and stated that extra ammunition had been issued to meet the expected attack, and orders had been given to fight to the last man. On the night of April 14th, 1945 the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles made a successful two Platoon attack on an enemy post (Casa Poggiolo) which would have threatened the left flank of the attack on Caprara. April 15th, 1945 was fine and clear and the blue sky augured well for the air bombardment and at 13:00 the heavy bombers started to come over. For an hour and a half a steady stream of bombers in line abreast or Vic formation passed across the sky, but they dropped their loads well north of the Divisional front. At 16:15 the first fighter bombers appeared and dropped special liquid fuel type bombs on the slopes of Mt. Caprara. There was a terrific flash of flame in each case followed by billowing black smoke. Every fifteen minutes six aircraft swooped down on Sole and Caprara, coming in extremely low and letting lose a mixture of fire-bombs and high explosives. Some aircraft used rockets and cannon-shell. Apart from a little machinegun and cannon fire there was no reaction from the enemy. Indeed, although the bombardment was most spectacular and did much to encourage the troops, the results achieved were negligible. A few Germans suffered burns, but the enemy was well concealed in caves and dug-outs and the attacks made little impression. One fighter-bomber straffed the FC/CTH dump area, nearly exploding the mortar ammunition. Casualties were caused and a panic started among the Italian porters. At 22:30 the artillery of the US II Corps and the Divisional Artillery supported by selected troops of tanks, opened the most violent bombardment which the South Africans had seen in the campaign. The fire was so concentrated that it seemed more impressive than Alamein or Cassino. Under cover of the guns the WR/DLR & FC/CTH went into the attack. It was about a mile from FC/CTH assembly area to the crest of Sole, and the axis of advance lay along a ridge leading up to the mountain. “C” & “D” Companies, FC/CTH led the attack and crossed their Start Line at 23:00. The enemy fired his mortar in defensive fire, but casualties were light, and at 23:50 “C” & “D” Companies, FC/CTH started to climb Mt. Sole. Nearing the crest “C” Company, FC/CTH was held up by mines, but without waiting for the mines to be cleared, a party of five men dashed through the mines and reached the summit. One of the men was killed, but the party caught the enemy coming out of his deep shelters, and used their bayonets and grenades with good effect. Passages were cleared through the minefields and “C” & “D” Companies, FC/CTH both got Platoons on to the summit. By 04:30 hours Mt. Sole was firmly held with the German mortar fire increasing in intensity, but the artillery and 4.2” mortars brought down counter-mortar fire and broke up weak attempts to counter-attack. Meanwhile a grim struggle was being waged for Mt. Caprara. So steep are the slopes of Caprara that the only suitable approach is from the direction of Caprara village. This meant that the WR/DLR had to make a long march from the Assembly Areas in the Mt. Termine area, skirt the southern slopes of Mt. Caprara, take Caprara village, and then assault up the steep, shaly slopes of the mountain. At 20:30 “A” & “B” Companies, WR/DLR moved off from their assembly area to the forming up point, situated in a valley south of San Martino. “A” & “B” Companies, WR/DLR had not yet arrived at the forming up point when their difficulties began with advance parties, laying lamps to indicate the Start Line, were fired on by the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles on the left flank. As soon as the artillery barrage opened, the German artillery and mortars came to life, brought down their defensive fire tasks, and laid searching fire along the gullies. “B” Company, WR/DLR was caught in heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire when moving up from the forming up point, and suffered many casualties. The advance of “A” & “B” Companies, WR/DLR continued on Caprara village, but “B” Company, WR/DLR’s losses were so heavy, that at midnight “C” Company, WR/DLR received orders to take over their task. Throughout the night the Start Line was subjected to intense mortar and artillery fire, and the Italian stretcher-bearers became demoralised. Cape Corps batmen were improvised into stretcher-bearing parties. “B” Company, WR/DLR was soon reduced to 17 men and “D” Company moving up in support, had 32 casualties between the Start Line and the first bound. At 02:00, “A” & “C” Companies, WR/DLR skirted Caprara village and began the assault up the precipitous mountain. At this stage communications became almost impossible. “A” & “C” Companies, WR/DLR for a time lost contact with each other but continued the advance meeting stiff resistance, wire obstacles were encountered and casualties suffered on Shu mines causing “A” Company, WR/DLR to move over to “C” Company, WR/DLR. Halfway up the mountain “A” & “C” Companies, WR/DLR were pinned down by machine-gun fire emanating from a pill-box. As further progress could not be made after several attempts, and as daylight was fast approaching, which event would leave the companies in a precarious situation, the Company Commanders decided to join forces and storm the obstacle. This they did, making a desperate bayonet charge up the steep almost precipitous slopes, and rooted the enemy out of the pill-box and out of his foxholes and dugouts. The area round the crest was found to be alive with mines, and small arms fire came from the Mt. Sole direction. By 08:00 the firing died down, and “A” & “C” Companies, WR/DLR dugin on their objectives. Throughout the morning the enemy continued to mortar the axis of advance. Three PAG Tanks succeeded in getting onto the neck between Sole and Caprara but another troop which followed the track through San Martino ran into mines, and 2 Tanks were immobilised. The attack on Mt. Caprara cost the WR/DLR 168 casualties of whom 24 were killed. The enemy still contested the North West slopes of the mountain, but the Battalion held positions providing observation over Mt. Castellino and the Caprara-Abelle valley. It was now possible for the FC/CTH to exploit to Mt. Abelle. The morning of April 16th, 1945 passed quietly with only intermittent mortaring by the enemy. At 17:30 “A” & “B” Companies, FC/CTH moved to the attack on Mt. Abelle supported by artillery and mortar fire. A dangerous cross-fire developed from Point 606 to the north east of Mt. Sole, and this position was engaged by the artillery and Battalion 3” mortars. Mt. Abelle was captured after slight resistance, but machine-gun fire from Point 606 continued to be troublesome. During the operation “B” Company, RDLI moved on to the eastern crest of Sole to give flank support. Towards last light an enemy counter-attack on the WR/DLR came in from the direction of Campodello. The artillery brought down Defensive Fire and the 4.2” mortars, which had been Brigaded for the action, joined in with their heavy bombs. The Infantry then charged down the slope and put the enemy to flight. Thus by the evening of April 16th, 1945 the capture of the three main features – Mt. Sole, Mt. Abelle & Mt. Caprara - had been successfully completed. The American Division of the II US Corps were not so fortunate in their attacks east of the Setta. After violent fighting on April 16th, 1945 the Germans still held Monterumici and Mt. Adone. On the other hand, west of the Reno, both Vergato and Mt. Pero were now in American hands. The success of the South African attack was due to the sheer determination of the assaulting infantry coupled with the sound tactical judgement of the Battalion, Company & Platoon Commander’s. The artillery support was heavy and accurate, but the German dug-outs were so deep and well-constructed that the enemy suffered little from artillery fire. On the night of April 16th/17th, 1945, the RDLI began their task of exploiting along the ridge running north east from Mt. Sole. In their advance to the Start Line “A” & “C” Companies engaged and drove back an enemy counter-attack force advancing on Mt. Sole. Confusion was caused by having to fight for the Start Line and considerable machine-gun fire was encountered. Points 606 & 551 were occupied, but Collina was not reached. Towards dawn a counter-attack on Point 606 was repulsed, while the FC/CTH’s beat off a raid on the North West slopes of Mt. Sole. During the night the RDLI took 30 prisoners for a loss of 12 wounded. Subsequent information showed that the advance of the RDLI had dislocated a strong attempt to recapture Mt. Sole. During the afternoon of April 17th, 1945, patrols of the WR/DLR got across to Mt. Castellino and reported that it was clear of the enemy. The RDLI, however, failed in its attempts to reach Collina. The Germans held the position in strength, and their mortar fire was heavy. The ridge was a complete razor-back with no opportunities whatsoever for deployment, while the enemy positions along the very crest of the ridge were largely immune to artillery and mortar fire which was ineffective if it fell either slightly short or slightly over. At 20:40 on the night of April 17th/18th, 1945, “C” Company, RDLI launched a set-piece attack on Collina. Despite concentrated artillery and mortar support, the attack was repulsed. The Germns fire was heavy and thry launched a number of rockets at close range. One of these wounded the “Company Commander” and knocked out a whole Platoon. It seemed as though the 6th S.A Armoured Division was in for a long and bloody struggle on the ridge leading to Mt. Santa Barbara, but the morning of April 18th, 1945, brought a miraculous change. On April 17th, 1945, the US II Corps had warned that a breakdown of enemy resistance might take place at any moment, and preparations should be made for a rapid follow-up. The stern resistance to the RDLI seemed to disprove this optimistic theory, and plans were considered for pushing the PR and the ILH/KimR down the Reno, in the hope of attacking the Collina - Santa Barbara ridge from the rear. At 08:00 on April 18th, 1945, however, two deserters on the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade front brought news that the 157. Gebirgs-Division had received orders to withdraw during the night. Reports from 88th US Infantry Division stated that Monterumici and Mt. Adone had been abandoned. The RDLI at once pushed forward patrols and first Nuvoleta and then Mt. Santa Barbara were reported clear. A number of prisoners were picked up, who confirmed the order to retreat to the Genghis Khan Line. It was fairly certain however, that the Germans would have to fall back to the PO. The Germans had no alternative to a rapid withdrawal on US II Corps front. On April 17th, 1945, the British 8th Army captured Argenta and threatened a breakthrough to Ferrara. On US IV Corps front, the 10th U.S Mountain Division had made a remarkable advance and reached Mt. Pastore, thus outflanking the so-called Genghis Khan Line. The Germans were on the run and the pursuit to the Alps had begun. THE PURSUIT TO THE ALPS The 6th S.A Armoured Division was re-organising for the pursuit, but a delay was inevitable while US II Corps adjusted its dispositions. On the evening of April 18th, 1945, the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade had occupied Mt. Giovule and Mt. Baco without resistance. Reinforced by the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles and with the SSB temporarily under command this Brigade was ordered to secure a bridgehead over the Reno, and continue the advance until relieved by II Armoured Brigade. The latter Brigade, with the FCity/CTH under command, was to act as the main thrust of the 6th S.A Armoured Division. The 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade with the PAG under command was to support the main thrust. The situation was so fluid that it proved impossible to adhere to the pre-arranged plans. Four American Divisions, and the 6th S.A Armoured Division, were all trying to debouch into the PO valley west of Bologna, with mines and demolitions blocking the few available roads. But for the US 5th Army engineers and staff, the traffic congestion did not become acute, and the 34th US Infantry Division was able to enter Bologna on April 21st, 1945. The 6th S.A Armoured Division had virtually no more fighting in the Appenines. The one aim of the Germns was to get to the PO crossings, but left a considerable number of stragglers in the mountains, and several hundred prisoners were picked up during the thrust down Route 64. These stragglers seldom showed any fight. The SSB leading the advance of 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade reached the outskirts of Casalecchio on the evening of April 20th, 1945, and then the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade with the SSB back under command, passed through on April 21st, 1945. The long bloody struggle in the mountains was over, and the fertile plains of Northern Italy lay ahead. On April 21st, 1945, the The 6th S.A Armoured Division was given the task of leading the advance of US II Corps. The advance was to be carried out with the utmost speed and boldness on a broad front. German rearguards and delaying positions were to be by-passed. Important road centres, stream crossings, etc., to be held until relieved by the Infantry Divisions. II Armoured Brigade was directed through San Giovanni to Finale Nel Emillia and the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade to Camposanto. Both Brigades were to seize crossings over the Panaro River. The 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was to concentrate north of Route 9 in Divisional reserve. The PR was detached from the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade command, and was ordered to protect the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s right flank, and contact the British 8th Army in the vicinity of Bondeno. The American Units under the command of the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade had now left. By-passing Bologna, the tanks of the SSB rumbled off at 10:30 on April 21st, 1945. After many weary months the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade had returned to mobile warfare. The tank crews were filled with tremendous enthusiasm and were determined to make the most of the opportunity. Sweeping up the long straight road to San Giovanni, the SSB soon started to collect prisoners and stragglers. At 11:00 hours shots were exchanged with enemy tanks, supported by self-propelled guns and panzershrecks. The SSB was confined to a strip of ground on bothsides of the road, bounded by a railway line on one flank and a dyke on the other. After a severe fire-fight the SSB tanks fought their way forward to within 11-miles of San Giovanni, but further progress was barred by a blown bridge. The SSB knocked out 2 Panzer IV’s and PaK40 guns, for a loss of 3 Sherman’s disabled. Meanwhile the ILH/KimR and “A” Squadron, SSB struck opposition at Calderara Di Reno to the east of the railway line, and the village was bombarded by the 4/22 Field Regiment. A Panzer IV was put out of action and the place was occupied that evening. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade rounded up 300 prisoners on April 21st, 1945, and identifications from many Battalions illustrated the confusion of the retreat. Further to the east the PR reached Longara at nightfall, after meeting considerable opposition from panzerhrecks and losing two Shermans but they managed to round up 150 prisoners. It had been a successful day for the South Africans, but the country was badly cut bydykes and canals, and the going was by no means easy. San Giovanni was occupied by American troops on the night of April 21st/22nd, 1945, and the advance of the 6th S.A Armoured Division was resumed on April 22nd, 1945, on a two Brigade front with the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade advancing on Finale Nell Emilia while the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade advancing on Camposanto. The 6th S.A Armoured Division’s orders were to seize the crossings over the Panaro River at all costs. The SSB, with “B” Company, ILH/KimR under command, met considerable opposition just north of San Giovanni. The Germans had organised a very strong anti-tank defence with guns and Panzers concealed among houses and hayricks. “B” Squadron, SSB, executed a flanking movement, and after severe fighting the Germns withdrew. Another strong rearguard position was encountered at Decima. “B” Squadron, SSB, again moved to a flank, while the ILH/KimR assisted the tanks by taking out Snipers & Panzershrecks. At nightfall the column was still some 5 miles south of Finale. The SSB claimed the destruction of 7 Panzers, with 8 Shermans and 3 Stuarts being destroyed or disabled. The WR/DLR with “C” Squadron, PAG, and one Battery of 1/6 Field Regiment under command, led the advance of 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade, and moving very fast through San Giovanni and Crevalcore, reached the outskirts of Camposanto at 12:45. There was no opposition, and progress was not impeded by demolitions or mines. Endless columns of American marching troops were passed on the road. The Panaro has high banks overgrown by grass, and the river is unfordable on foot. “B” Company, WR/DLR, leading the advance, reached the bridge at Camposanto at about 10:30 and found it intact. Camposanto lay on the northern bank of the Panaro. American troops had already reached the river, but drew back in the face of heavy small arms fire. The WR/DLR made an attempt to rush the bridge with an Infantry Platoon, but the Platoon was driven back by machine-gun fire along a fixed line. For two hours nothing was achieved, and it was impossible for the troops to show themselves without being shot. The Germans had no cable to demolish the bridge from a distance and tried to send parties on to the bridge to destroy it. These were driven back by the fire of the WR/DLR. Finally PAG tanks were brought up to give supporting fire and artillery concentrations were laid on. Covered by this fire, three Carriers loaded with troops rushed the bridge resulting in 46 prisoners taken in Camprosanto. The WR/DLR had achieved a notable success. On the evening of April 22nd, 1945, the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade received orders to hand over Camposanto to an American Unit, and to move with all speed along the south bank of the Panaro to Finale Nell Emillia. The plan was designed to trap considerable enemy forces caught between the converging US 5th Army & British 8th Army, and still south of the Panaro. The German army in Italy was now in its death-throes. The pace of withdrawal was limited to that of animals and Infantry, all the reserves had been engaged, and allied aircraft speedily turned the PO crossings into deathtraps. On April 21st, 1945, a British 8th Army Armoured column burst out from the Argenta area, and driving along the Reno occupied Reggio Renaticio that night. Sweeping on in a north westerly direction the British 8th Army spearheads reached the outskirts of Bondeno on the evening of April 22nd, 1945. A battle of annihilation began between the Panaro and the Reno. Both 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade & 11th S.A Armoured Brigade were now directed on Finale. This small town lay on the northern bank of the Panaro River, and now that Bondeno was lost, the bridges across the Panaro at Finale were virtually the only escape route for the numerous German forces in the Cento area. The Panaro was not a formidable obstacle, but its steep banks form an impassable obstacle for vehicles. There were two bridges at Finale - a stone bridge leading into the town, and a wooden bridge some hundreds of yards to the east. Although the SSB had halted about 5 miles from Finale on the evening of April 22nd, 1945, the Germans in that area had already felt the weight of the 6th S.A Armoured Division. On the evening of April 22nd, 1945, the 7/23 Medium Regiment observed a great numbers of vehicles moving along the roads into Finale, where upon the 7/23 Medium Regiment and the 4/22 Field Regiment put down a series of concentrations and did tremendous damage. The advance of 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was led by the RDLI with “B” Squadron, PAG under command. The RDLI column advanced rapidly along the south bank of the Panaro, and by 20:45 on April 22nd, 1945, the troops were within a mile of Finale. Here they struck against the flank of an enemy column of vehicles and Panzers which was moving into the town. Confused fighting broke out in the darkness, and 2 PAG tanks were destroyed. But the RDLI maintained positions within 500 yards of the road, and the PAG tanks and Battalion mortars fired steadily into the column. During the proceedings the stonebridge was demolished. The Germans opposing the RDLI then betook themselves to the wooden bridge and crossed the Panaro by this means with the fighting dying down at dawn, and a patrol of the RDLI entered Finale and found the place clear of the enemy. At 07:05 on April 23rd, 1945, the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade received orders to concentrate and resume the advance through Camposanto to the PO. The RDLI was ordered to relieve the ILH/KimR and the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was ordered to clear up the Finale area and during the day the SSB, ILH/KimR & FC/CTH rounded up some 900 prisoners south of the town. The Germans had a number of trenches in the area, and considerable opposition was encountered from snipers and Spandau posts, but organized resistance broke down during the day. The utter confusion of the enemy is shown by the fact that prisoners were taken from no less than 8 Divisions. During the morning contact was made with Britih 6th Armoured Division. The road leading into Finale was choked with vehicles of every description all jammed together in a shattered mass. From the bridge over the canal to the Panaro there was a solid mass of carts, oxen, mules and horses followed by trucks, guns towed and self-propelled and Panzers. On the morning of April 24th, 1945, a way had been bulldozed through the mass with many of the vehicles still smouldering. Prisoners stated that the initial block was caused by fighter bombers, and then the artillery took full advantage of the congestion. German aircraft put in an appearance on the nights of the April 21st/22nd & 22nd/23rd, 1945 and inflicted some casualties on the 6th S.A Armoured Division. A Junker Ju-87 “Stuka” was shot down by “B” Troop of 1/12 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery. On the morning of April 23rd, 1945, 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade began its drive to the PO. After a delay of some hours caused by the bridge at Camposanto being blocked by American traffic the WR/DLR crossed the Panaro at 10:30. The advance was pressed during the afternoon and “C” Squadron, PAG which accompanied the advance guard, got in some effective shooting at disorganised groups. 150 prisoners were collected, but progress was hampered by American Units moving along the roads in the same area. The WR/DLR column harboured some 5 miles from the PO. During the advance they noted that the northern sky was black with smoke, and that fighter bombers were continually overhead. On the afternoon of April 24th, 1945, 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade reached the PO in the Felonica area. Large numbers of stragglers were trapped on the south bank and the area was littered with guns, Panzers, transport and war material of all sorts. TheWR/DLR rounded up 487 prisoners and the RDLI 250. The latter Battalion captured a complete German hospital & Staff. The PR, which was acting in an independent role, also reached the PO that day and took 363 prisoners. Opposition was sporadic and unorganised. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade completed the c1earing up of the Finale area on April 24th, 1945, while the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade concentrated south of the Panaro ready to support the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade. Further to the west 10th US Mountain Division had crossed the PO in the San Bennetto area. On the night of April 24th/25th, 1945, a RDLI patrol swam the PO and reported that the north bank was only lightly held. This was fortunate for the PO at this point was over 150 yards broad, and a very difficult obstacle. Bridging material was not immediately available but five assault boats were brought up during the night. “A” & “B” Companies, RDLI crossed the river the next morning and established a bridgehead against slight opposition. 12th Field Squadron operated a raft for jeeps, carriers and 10 DUKWS (Amphibious Lorries) were used to ferry troops over. 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade Group concentrated on the south bank to follow up the crossing. More rafts arrived on April 26th, 1945, but heavy rain made the banks of the river soft and muddy and greatly impeded loading operations. The crossing of 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was completed on April 27th, 1945. The greater part of the Brigade crossed via ferries but 240 vehicles were sent over a bridge at Ostiglia. Wholesale disaster was overtaking the Germans in Northern Italy. On April 25th, 1945, 88th US Infantry Division made a remarkable advance from the Ostiglia bridgehead and reached Verona. All lateral communication between the German forces in the plain was cut, and the retreat of German forces west of the Tyrol was finally closed when US 5th Army spearheads took Como on April 28th, 1945. The German Army Group C was now a mere skeleton force and of its experienced and well trained Divisions wasn’t worth the name. All their energy had been expended south of the PO and without weapons and ammunition their retreat had become a rout. South of the PO practically all the tanks, assault guns, and heavy anti-tank guns were lost or stranded for lack of petrol and there was little left of the artillery. In these circumstances it was hopeless for the German command to hold a line along the Adige, or even to put up a serious defence in the Tyrol. Strong defences had been constructed during the winter east of the Adige River, but neither troops nor guns were available to hold them. On April 27th, 1945, the RDLI led the advance of 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade to the Adige, and the river was reached in the Castagnaro area. At 14:20 “D” Company, RDLI commenced a crossing using a boat supplied by partisans. These were soon supplemented by American DUKWS, and during the evening the whole Battalion crossed the river, together with a troop for PAG tanks. The crossing was unopposed and a number of stragglers were collected on the East bank. On the morning of April 28th, 1945, the RDLI occupied Boschi, and at this point 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade passed into reserve. 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade with the PR under command was ordered to take the lead, with 11th S.A Armoured Brigade moving in close support. The task of 6th S.A Armoured Division was to maintain contact with the Britih 8th Army, and protect the right flank of the US II Corps. On the morning of April 28th, 1945, 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade crossed the Adige near Legnago, on a bridge laid by American engineers. The NMR/SAAF led the way without waiting for the PR tanks to cross the river. No resistance was encountered until Noventa was reached, some 15 miles from the Adige. PR tanks were called up and the advance continued until the head of the column struck the strong defences of the Venetian Line, and came under heavy anti-tank fire with 1 Sherman destroyed & 2 Shermans immobilised. A group of PR tanks moved to flank the Germans and broke their defences west of the Legnaro -Vicenza road. Barbed wire obstacles and anti-tank ditches were not covered by fire. Pillboxes were found unoccupied. The 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade continued its drive to the Bacchiglione River, which was reached that evening. PR tanks advancing up the main Vicenza road were held up by a canal and a blown bridge, and were received with heavy fire. Accordingly the RNC with PR reconnaissance tanks under command, were ordered to move to Montegaldella. The RNC collected a number of prisoners but failed to capture the bridge at this point in the face of machinegun fire. The enemy blew the bridge in the early hours of April 29th, 1945. During the day the 88th US Infantry Division captured Vicenza after stiff fighting and the 2nd New Zealand Division reached the outskirts of Padua. On the night of April 28th, 1945, the 6th S.A Armoured Division HQ ordered the advance to continue on a two Brigade front with the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade advancing on Treviso and assisting the Americans in capturing that important town, while the 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade were to maintain touch with the British 8th Army and follow a route south of the main Vicenza - Treviso axis. Both the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade and 13th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade succeeded in capturing bridges across the Bacchiglione. Early on April 29th, 1945, carriers of the ILH/KimR occupied Longare and found the bridge undamaged, while the RNC crossed by a bridge south east of Monte Galdella. Both Brigades drove on to the Brenta against slight opposition. They collected hundreds of prisoners, and reached Brenta that evening. “D” Company, RNC was involved in a sharp action at Limena, and the enemy’s resistance was not overcome until the Battalion mortars and the guns of 15th Field Regiment, RA had been brought into action. A PR tank was destroyed here. A RNC patrol crossed the Brenta at Curtarolo using a captured raft, and 8th Field Squadron threw a Bailey bridge over the river during the night of April 29th/30th, 1945. While reconnoitring the bridging site the Commanding Officer & 8th Field Squadron and two Other Ranks were killed by Panzershreck fire. 11th S.A Armoured Brigade crossed at Curtarolo on the morning of April 30th, 1945, and by nightfall was within 3 miles of Treviso. 500 prisoners were collected during the day, and it was clear that the war in Italy was virtually over. The New Zealanders were in Venice, and the Americans had taken Treviso. The 6th S.A Armoured Division concentrated in the Scorze area. From there it set off, on May 1st, 1945, for Milan, to meet a threat from a German force. En route the 6th S.A Armoured Division heard of the surrender of the German Armies in Italy. 6th S.A Armoured Division casualties in Italy totalled 5176 of which 753 were killed. Axis Surrender & End of the War Early on May 2nd, 1945 the German Theatre Commander, Generalfeldmarschall A. Kesselring, agreed to Fieldmarshal H.R.L.G Alexander’s surrender terms and broadcast orders to cease fire. By May 3rd, 1945, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was North East of Milan when General der Panzertruppe Fridolin Rudolf Theodor, Ritter und Edler von Senger und Etterlin delivered the surrender of the German forces in Italy to Lt. Gen. M.W. Clark in Florence. This was followed by Winston Churchill’s announcement of the end of the war in Europe on May 8th, 1945. On May 14th, 1945 the whole of 6th S.A Armoured Division assembled on the Monza motor racing circuit, complete with its Tanks, Artillery & Vehicles. The Guard of Honour was formed by the SSB, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole’s first command. As Prime Minister (Field Marshal) J.C Smuts was in San Francisco writing the preamble on Human Rights for the United Nation’s Charter, he was represented by the Acting Minister of Defence, Commodore the Hon F.C. Sturrock who opened with a speech, bringing the 6th S.A Armoured Division the thanks of Prime Minister (Field Marshal) J.C. Smuts and the people of South Africa for its part in the victory in Italy. The “Top Brass” included Lieutenant-General Mark Wayne Clark (15th Army Group), General Lucian King Truscott, Jr. (5th Army) & Lieutenant-General Willis Dale Crittenberger (IV US Corps), all three having had the 6th S.A Armoured Division under their command during operations from the Arno to the Aalps. General Sir Pierre Helpperus Andries van Ryneveld & Major-General Francois Henry “Frank” Theron were the distinguished South African Generals present, together with senior Allied Officers, including Italians. The parade was led by the ubiquitous TAC Division HQ Command Jeep with its 2 Star Plate and, as usual, flying the GOC’s pennant which so many men had seen during the year-long trek from Caddino. Maj. Gen. W.H.E Poole stood smartly at the salute as the battle-worn jeep came abreast of Commodore the Hon F.C. Sturrock. The Air OP pilots coincided their fly-past with the head of the huge march past. The Command Jeep then broke away, so that Maj. Gen. W.H.E Poole could join Commodore the Hon F.C. Sturrock at the saluting base. During the proceedings Lt. Gen. M.W Clark, presumably in his capacity as the senior US Officer in the Theatre, decorated Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole on behalf of the President of the United States with the Legion of Merit (Commander), the Highest Award which could be made to a non-American citizen. The South African Brigades were then deployed to the Swiss and French borders for frontier duties with the 11th Armoured Brigade along the Swiss border, 13th Motorised Brigade around Turin & 12th Motorised Brigade in the Aosta Valley contiguous to the Franco-Italian border which was drawn on the high ground separating the two countries. On July 16th, 1945 the Italian Cremona & Mantova Battle Groups were placed under command of the 6th S.A Armoured Division to assist in these duties, allowing some of the Battalions to be withdrawn for repatriation to South Africa. The two Motorised Brigades were amalgamated and remained responsible for guarding duties in the province of Imperia until August 18th, 1945 while the 11th Armoured Brigade was amalgamated with the Division Artillery. Lt. Gen. M.W. Clark commented on the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s achievements during the Spring Offensive, stating: “One of my visits was to the 6th S.A Armoured Division, under a most competent leader, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole. This unit had previously been shifted to the 5th Army front, and had performed splendidly under adverse conditions. It was a battle-wise outfit, bold and aggressive against the enemy and willing to do whatever job was necessary. In fact, after a period of day-and-night fighting, the 6th S.A Armoured Division had in an emergency gone into the line as infantrymen. When the snow stalled their armour they dug in their tanks and used them as artillery to make up for our shortage of heavy guns... Their attacks against strongly organised German positions were made with great élan and without regard for casualties. Despite their comparatively small numbers, they never complained about losses. Neither did Smuts, who made it clear that the Union of South Africa intended to do its part in the War - and it most certainly did. Enough said! Lt. Gen. M.W. Clark – Military Memoirs” Helwan Riots By the beginning of April 1945, it had become obvious that the war was coming to a close and that the 6th S.A Armoured Division as well as many other South African troops serving as Divisional, Corps & Army troops would require transportation back to South Africa for demobilisation. On May 1st, 1945, the Union Defence Force realised that no plans had yet been made to get all men back and instructions were prepared, whereby No. 1 & No. 5 Wings of the SAAF were to be merged to form No. 4 Group which was to be used in an Intensified Transport Service/Shuttle Service to move 5000 troops per month by air commencing July 1st, 1945. A further 15000 men were to be transported home by sea during the second half of the year, resulting in the repatriation of 45000 soldiers by the end of the year. In addition to the 6th S.A Armoured Division and other troops in Italy, there were thousands of recently released South African prisoners from the 2nd S.A Infantry Division who had been captured at the battles of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk who had been held in Italy. And this also created problems as their numbers had not been factored into the demobilisation plans. The staging depot at Helwan north of Cairo was soon overcrowded and by August 20th, 1945, the depot, designed to hold 5000 men was holding 9000. An official announcement on August 9th, 1945, stated that 3000 – 5000 men were expected to be repatriated by sea at the end of the month, but less than a week later it was announced that the expected shipping had been delayed, and that further announcements would be made later. Food was in short supply and the lack of adequate numbers of chefs caused extended queues and delays at meal times. The standard of discipline deteriorated further as the men arriving at the depot were split up alphabetically by surname, and then according to their demobilisation categories. Priority was determined by the length of service in the UDF, The basic principle was “First in, first out”. All the members of the UDF were classified in groups ranging from Group A with attestation dates between September 1939 and April 30th, 1940 to Group M with attestation dates from January 1st, 1945 onwards. White men and women, the Cape Corps and Indian and Malay Corps, and the Native Military Corps were grouped separately. Demobilisation took place on an individual basis rather than a Unit basis since the whole dispersal depot machinery, which was built up during the war, was based on a system of individual discharges. This meant that men were grouped together with fellow soldiers and NCO’s whom they did not know and unit structures were lost. Military personnel within the Union were considered for demobilisation first, with the exception of those personnel serving in certain key positions and those whose demobilisation depended on the complete demobilisation of personnel from other theatres of war. The second stage commenced on the arrival of troops from areas elsewhere in Africa; and the final stage was reached on return of troops from other operations, those held P.O,W. and those on duties in enemy territory. Delays in the repatriation process arouse with problems relating to the reconversion of aircraft to passenger planes, shortages in finding fuel and a general lack of shipping space, created problems in the repatriation of soldiers from overseas. Some of the soldiers were of the opinion that the whole situation was pretty shocking and some described the air evacuation scheme as a complete failure. Some soldiers even questioned the sincerity of the government's promise of a speedy return and their smooth reinstatement into civilian life. More changes in the official discharge policy led to a severe criticism and delays in finding suitable post-war employment. Initially, the discharges were to take place on a FIFO basis according to the soldier's date of attestation. However, this changed when the military authorities discovered that practically all A and B groups consisted of officers and NCO's; and decided to adopt a ratio scheme of 3 officers, 14 NCO's and 18 other ranks to be discharged in that order. Consequently, privates were released before officers who had a longer service record. This led to widespread criticism. The soldiers felt that those who were most likely to be prejudiced by their return to civilian life being postponed should receive priority. Morale declined even further when it was decided that 500 volunteers would go home as a top priority to assist in the demobilisation process back in South Africa, their return home irrespective of their demobilisation category. In addition, all trading rights except those of the NAAFI were controlled by Egyptians; the men felt that they were being exploited by inflated prices charged by these traders. There was also unhappiness over the two cinemas, when men who had bought tickets frequently found that they were unable to get in due to lack of space. A protest meeting was held on August 20th, 1945, where a crowd of 1500 men were addressed by various individuals. As the size of the crowd increased, the meeting became violent. The usually disciplined soldiers became a mob bent on trashing, looting and burning and their first objectives were the two Egyptian owned cinemas which were set alight. The mob then split up and further Egyptian premises, blocks of shops, motor cars, bungalows and book stalls were set alight. They also set fire to one of their own messes and broke down and looted the NAAFI store. Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole flew in from Italy to address the troops, promising that immediate steps were to be taken to speed up the rate of repatriation. To tighten up on discipline and improve morale at Helwan, the housing of troops on a Unit basis was instituted and a Brigadier was appointed to command the depot. A public address system was installed to keep everybody in camp up to date on the latest news and free outdoor film-shows were implemented. On August 26th, 1945,, the Director General Officer - Administration (DGQ-A Italy & Egypt), appointed a court of enquiry to investigate, their report detailed the frustration and despondency related to overcrowding which had been one major contributing factor, as had the failure of the airlift to repatriate the published number of troops per day. The first official statements on May 24th & 31st, 1945, declared that the repatriation rate by air would be 500 a day. From July 1st, 1945, this figure was amended to 300 a day. The average daily number of men repatriated during the first twenty days of July was only 108. The court assessed the total cost of the damage at £22,768,431. Then by January 25th, 1946, 101676 men had been ferried back to South Africa with the last aircraft leaving Egypt on February 26th, 1946, which included Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole.