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domfluff

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  1. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Amedeo in Different uses for 155mm and 120mm mortars   
    As is ever the case, the real-life utility of these is often because they are there.
    To take the Soviets, and Soviet-derived forces (so, Syrians and Russians in CMSF and CMBS), the 120mm mortars are a battalion asset, so each battalion would have a battery of mortars embedded within them, and these will always be available to the paper structure of this formation.
    122mm and 152mm artillery are brigade-level assets, so will be assigned to the main effort. That's often, but not always, what we're representing in CM scenarios. Call-in times will typically be longer, but not necessarily long enough to matter. 122mm and 152mm howitzers have a significantly longer range than mortars, so there will be tasks they will do which mortars are unsuitable for.
    A CM battle is an extremely limited perspective on a wider task. In that specific case, the roles of 152mm howitzers and 120mm mortars are very similar. They are providing the same four basic tasks that artillery carries out, destruction, suppression, obscuration and denial. The HE in a 120mm shell tends to be larger than the 155mm/152mm artillery, so bigger boom for less accuracy. This means that laying smoke for obscuration is the task which mortars are generally strictly better at, but most tasks can be done more or less equally well with either system. There will be some differences in things like the angle of incoming fire. Whether that matters will be terrain dependent.
    Accuracy is for the most part unimportant for suppression and denial, and only really matters when you're trying to actively destroy targets, which is a task that 152mm and 155mm artillery will be superior to 120mm mortars at... but still not ideal, since that's a task better suited for rocket artillery and more specialist munitions (sensor-fused munitions, for example), which are often not really a close support artillery role (and hence not necessarily something you'd see a lot of in CM terms).
    So, sure, if you want to phrase the question as "Why should I pick this system in a Quick Battle?", the answer may come down to points values, rarity and available ammunition. Mortars tend to be a little cheaper, but that will vary.
    If you want to phrase this question as "Why would you put this in a scenario?", the answer is (or should be) that this is something that is available to this unit, in this context.
    If you want to phrase the question as "How do I best use this unit?", then there's very little difference in how these are employed, they both do similar tasks to approximately the same degree of effectiveness, with minor differences.
     
  2. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from A Canadian Cat - was IanL in Different uses for 155mm and 120mm mortars   
    As is ever the case, the real-life utility of these is often because they are there.
    To take the Soviets, and Soviet-derived forces (so, Syrians and Russians in CMSF and CMBS), the 120mm mortars are a battalion asset, so each battalion would have a battery of mortars embedded within them, and these will always be available to the paper structure of this formation.
    122mm and 152mm artillery are brigade-level assets, so will be assigned to the main effort. That's often, but not always, what we're representing in CM scenarios. Call-in times will typically be longer, but not necessarily long enough to matter. 122mm and 152mm howitzers have a significantly longer range than mortars, so there will be tasks they will do which mortars are unsuitable for.
    A CM battle is an extremely limited perspective on a wider task. In that specific case, the roles of 152mm howitzers and 120mm mortars are very similar. They are providing the same four basic tasks that artillery carries out, destruction, suppression, obscuration and denial. The HE in a 120mm shell tends to be larger than the 155mm/152mm artillery, so bigger boom for less accuracy. This means that laying smoke for obscuration is the task which mortars are generally strictly better at, but most tasks can be done more or less equally well with either system. There will be some differences in things like the angle of incoming fire. Whether that matters will be terrain dependent.
    Accuracy is for the most part unimportant for suppression and denial, and only really matters when you're trying to actively destroy targets, which is a task that 152mm and 155mm artillery will be superior to 120mm mortars at... but still not ideal, since that's a task better suited for rocket artillery and more specialist munitions (sensor-fused munitions, for example), which are often not really a close support artillery role (and hence not necessarily something you'd see a lot of in CM terms).
    So, sure, if you want to phrase the question as "Why should I pick this system in a Quick Battle?", the answer may come down to points values, rarity and available ammunition. Mortars tend to be a little cheaper, but that will vary.
    If you want to phrase this question as "Why would you put this in a scenario?", the answer is (or should be) that this is something that is available to this unit, in this context.
    If you want to phrase the question as "How do I best use this unit?", then there's very little difference in how these are employed, they both do similar tasks to approximately the same degree of effectiveness, with minor differences.
     
  3. Thanks
    domfluff got a reaction from ALBY in Different uses for 155mm and 120mm mortars   
    As is ever the case, the real-life utility of these is often because they are there.
    To take the Soviets, and Soviet-derived forces (so, Syrians and Russians in CMSF and CMBS), the 120mm mortars are a battalion asset, so each battalion would have a battery of mortars embedded within them, and these will always be available to the paper structure of this formation.
    122mm and 152mm artillery are brigade-level assets, so will be assigned to the main effort. That's often, but not always, what we're representing in CM scenarios. Call-in times will typically be longer, but not necessarily long enough to matter. 122mm and 152mm howitzers have a significantly longer range than mortars, so there will be tasks they will do which mortars are unsuitable for.
    A CM battle is an extremely limited perspective on a wider task. In that specific case, the roles of 152mm howitzers and 120mm mortars are very similar. They are providing the same four basic tasks that artillery carries out, destruction, suppression, obscuration and denial. The HE in a 120mm shell tends to be larger than the 155mm/152mm artillery, so bigger boom for less accuracy. This means that laying smoke for obscuration is the task which mortars are generally strictly better at, but most tasks can be done more or less equally well with either system. There will be some differences in things like the angle of incoming fire. Whether that matters will be terrain dependent.
    Accuracy is for the most part unimportant for suppression and denial, and only really matters when you're trying to actively destroy targets, which is a task that 152mm and 155mm artillery will be superior to 120mm mortars at... but still not ideal, since that's a task better suited for rocket artillery and more specialist munitions (sensor-fused munitions, for example), which are often not really a close support artillery role (and hence not necessarily something you'd see a lot of in CM terms).
    So, sure, if you want to phrase the question as "Why should I pick this system in a Quick Battle?", the answer may come down to points values, rarity and available ammunition. Mortars tend to be a little cheaper, but that will vary.
    If you want to phrase this question as "Why would you put this in a scenario?", the answer is (or should be) that this is something that is available to this unit, in this context.
    If you want to phrase the question as "How do I best use this unit?", then there's very little difference in how these are employed, they both do similar tasks to approximately the same degree of effectiveness, with minor differences.
     
  4. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from Vanir Ausf B in Different uses for 155mm and 120mm mortars   
    As is ever the case, the real-life utility of these is often because they are there.
    To take the Soviets, and Soviet-derived forces (so, Syrians and Russians in CMSF and CMBS), the 120mm mortars are a battalion asset, so each battalion would have a battery of mortars embedded within them, and these will always be available to the paper structure of this formation.
    122mm and 152mm artillery are brigade-level assets, so will be assigned to the main effort. That's often, but not always, what we're representing in CM scenarios. Call-in times will typically be longer, but not necessarily long enough to matter. 122mm and 152mm howitzers have a significantly longer range than mortars, so there will be tasks they will do which mortars are unsuitable for.
    A CM battle is an extremely limited perspective on a wider task. In that specific case, the roles of 152mm howitzers and 120mm mortars are very similar. They are providing the same four basic tasks that artillery carries out, destruction, suppression, obscuration and denial. The HE in a 120mm shell tends to be larger than the 155mm/152mm artillery, so bigger boom for less accuracy. This means that laying smoke for obscuration is the task which mortars are generally strictly better at, but most tasks can be done more or less equally well with either system. There will be some differences in things like the angle of incoming fire. Whether that matters will be terrain dependent.
    Accuracy is for the most part unimportant for suppression and denial, and only really matters when you're trying to actively destroy targets, which is a task that 152mm and 155mm artillery will be superior to 120mm mortars at... but still not ideal, since that's a task better suited for rocket artillery and more specialist munitions (sensor-fused munitions, for example), which are often not really a close support artillery role (and hence not necessarily something you'd see a lot of in CM terms).
    So, sure, if you want to phrase the question as "Why should I pick this system in a Quick Battle?", the answer may come down to points values, rarity and available ammunition. Mortars tend to be a little cheaper, but that will vary.
    If you want to phrase this question as "Why would you put this in a scenario?", the answer is (or should be) that this is something that is available to this unit, in this context.
    If you want to phrase the question as "How do I best use this unit?", then there's very little difference in how these are employed, they both do similar tasks to approximately the same degree of effectiveness, with minor differences.
     
  5. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Traitor in The Syrians   
    Playing the Syrians is hard. You've an army which is at least twenty years behind the US (more or less), nothing like the quality of optics and comms, and on top of that has worse soft factors on Typical settings. It's also far from impossible.

    First of all, one soldier = one soldier in Combat Mission. Regular troops are identical across the board. On top of that, they'll have organisational and equipment differences (radios, optics, body armour, etc.) that will add up to a larger difference over time.

    Pretty much no Syrian armour can penetrate an Abrams from the front. All of them can take out one from the side. This means that there's a good argument to either use the best possible armour (T-90/T-72 TURMS-T) with enhanced spotting, or use the worst possible armour available (and mostly fight unbuttoned)
    It also means that you need to distribute your fires. Two tank platoons in the same location can be faced frontally by an Abrams. Two platoons in different locations can't, and with good co-ordination can get flanking shots and kills. Exactly the same thinking applies to ATGMs - trading off decreased C2 for gaining an advantage through positioning.


    Syrian/Soviet doctrine is all about specialisation. Imagine going up against a Bradley platoon - this will have superiors optics, better armour than your IFV's, TOW missiles, dismounted Javelins, etc. The Bradley overmatches pretty much everything in the Syrian arsenal, so to get past that requires some careful thought.

    Your basic Soviet attack is extensive, active recon, followed by preliminary bombardment, followed by an attack in line with armour (in the open anyway), followed by an attack in line with mechanised infantry. The entire structure is built around overwhelming force and numbers at the sharp end - the organisation encourages you to use larger forces than you with Blufor.

    In the context of the Bradley Platoon then, each part of your force needs to deal with an element of theirs - your mortars need to suppress or kill their dismounted ATGMs, your armour needs to kill their Bradleys, and your infantry need to mop up. Getting this all to work together is hard, much more difficult than playing the US.
     
    Poor quality troops can be expected to do precisely one thing in the battle. This means that you need to plan such that the troops can have their moment, and if they survive afterwards, that's a bonus.

    IFV doctrine is to use the BMP as part of the squad firepower. If you don't, you're intentionally crippling yourself, with an undermanned and undergunned unit. BMPs also explode when you look at them funny, which means that you need to use hull-down positions, and great recon before you leap into contact.

    Soviet thinking around reconnaissance put more emphasis on recon by force than the West. The Motor rifle recon platoon are two BMPs, with an AT-4, an HQ and two scout units. The correct way to use this in a CM perspective is to be bold and aggressive - construct attacks on forward suspected positions, and try to maintain cover with a support element (either the second BMP, or the BMPs covering the dismounted units. This is far more likely to risk losing the recon platoon, but it will also reveal far more about the enemy, faster, which is what you need to achieve.
     
    Basically... it's hard, yes. It's supposed to be, since CMSF is about modern asymmetrical warfare. 
    Ideal scenario design can balance this with Preserve objectives, or harsh penalties for losing blue forces, but it's tough.
  6. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from A Canadian Cat - was IanL in Syrian Airborne NVGs bug?   
    That's harder to know, because we don't know exactly how line of fire calculations work, and can't see the information picture down to that level of fidelity.
    Intuitively, and from what has been said, spotting calculations are done individually, so only the equipped solider can actually see. The unequipped soldiers will get the spotting information shared with them, so will be able to resolve that into spots better than they would alone, but the targets still have to be visible.
    You can see something like this in a game like cmbs, where us troops with night vision can pass to Ukrainian troops without. In that, the spotting information is passed, but that still may not be enough to resolve into contact.
  7. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from PEB14 in Q on using the hull down command...   
    Do this:


    Get this:


  8. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Centurian52 in Q on using the hull down command...   
    Do this:


    Get this:


  9. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Anthony P. in Q on using the hull down command...   
    Do this:


    Get this:


  10. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Magnum50 in Q on using the hull down command...   
    Do this:


    Get this:


  11. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from Rice in Q on using the hull down command...   
    Do this:


    Get this:


  12. Like
    domfluff reacted to Centurian52 in Dazed. Confused.   
    So, after I learned more about how Soviet tactics are actually supposed to work from watching @domfluff's collaboration with Free Whisky, and giving FM 100-2-1 a full reread*, I found that Soviet doctrine actually works really well. I was even able to use it to good effect in CMBS, even against American forces.
    One of the most important things to remember is that it's not about just lining up and charging forward (in fact I rather got the impression that the founding principle of Cold War Soviet doctrine was "let's not do things the way we did them in WW2" (more emphasis on maneuver and avoiding frontal attacks, and more emphasis on artillery)). The most important part of the Soviet army isn't the tanks, it's the artillery. The tanks come in 2nd place in importance after the artillery, and the infantry come in 3rd place (though the infantry are still important, they understood completely that tanks need infantry support**). It's true that the Soviet army is less flexible than NATO armies at lower levels. It's true that lower ranked leaders (platoon and company commanders) were not supposed to exercise the kind of initiative that lower level NATO leaders were expected to exercise. So from the battalion level down it was a very battle-drill focused army. But from the regimental commanders up there is considerably more flexibility to come up with detailed plans, which should account for multiple contingencies. The lack of emphasis on lower level initiative (in fact outright discouragement of lower level initiative) isn't about stifling flexibility, it's about ensuring the will of the commander is carried out. So how well a given Soviet force performs will depend very heavily on the quality of their regimental and division commanders.
    Again, the battalions and companies fight according to battle drills. But the regimental commander had a lot of flexibility in how and where to employ his battalions. Assuming the regimental commander is competent (granted, a big assumption, based on what we've seen from Russian commanders), he would try not to just use his battalions as blunt instruments. He would come up with a detailed plan, using deception, maneuver, and overwhelming firepower. In Combat Mission terms, since you rarely have full regiments, you'll be wanting to do this detailed planning with whatever sized force you have available, even if it's only a battalion or company.
    When it comes time for the main attack you should go all in with everything you've got. But you shouldn't send the main attack in until you're ready. You'll want to spend a large chunk of the scenario just preparing things for your main attack. Think hard about the avenue of approach you want to use for your main attack. The Soviets would try to attack from an unexpected direction (for example: they absolutely will attack through forests if they think their vehicles can get through and it might allow them to emerge on the flank or rear of enemy defenses). So if you think you see an approach that the scenario designer wouldn't have thought to defend, and which you can get your forces through, then that approach is in line with Soviet thinking. A key element of the main attack, when it is finally time to send it in, is overwhelming firepower. The artillery fire plan is one of the most important elements of the overall plan. The Soviets were an artillery army first and foremost. Every attack would be supported by mass concentrations of artillery. You'll want to time your main attack to coincide with a full barrage consisting of all of your guns (the main attack is not the time to save ammunition), hitting both known and suspected enemy positions that might interfere with your advance. And don't just leave it up to the artillery either. Don't wait for your tanks to spot targets, but give them a large number of target briefly commands to hit every potential enemy position you can think of, even if you don't know for certain that it's really an enemy position (my rule of thumb as the Soviets/Russians is that my infantry never storm a town until every floor of every building has been hit by at least two HE rounds, regardless of whether enemy troops have actually been spotted in that building). Again, the main attack is not the time to try to save ammunition. I'll generally chain up multiple target briefly commands for each tank to execute each turn by targeting them from waypoints, sometimes with a 15 second pause order at each waypoint for better control (though firing on the move is probably more in line with how the Soviets wanted to fight). Whether I intend to bypass a position or storm it with infantry, I want to make sure no point in the position remains unhit with HE. And I always endeavor to have my infantry, coming up in their vehicles just behind the tanks, enter the enemy positions mere seconds after the last HE round has hit them (the timing on this can be tricky, but it is possible). Mass is an important component of Soviet doctrine. But it's really about massing firepower, not massing platforms. Massing platforms is merely a means to massing firepower.
    In a meeting engagement (or any attack that does not start with Soviet forces already in contact with the enemy), they would have an advance guard ahead of the main body, itself broken up into three parts. The first part is the Combat Reconnaissance Patrol (CRP), consisting of one platoon. Their job is to find the enemy. Ideally by spotting them, but if necessary by dying to them. The second part is the Forward Security Element (FSE), consisting of a company minus the platoon that was split off to form the CRP. Their job is to brush aside a weak enemy, or fix a strong enemy in place for the third part. The third part is the advance guard main body, consisting of the regiment's lead battalion, minus the company that was split off to form the FSE. Depending on the conditions set by the CRP and FSE they may try to flank the force that was fixed in place by the FSE, or pursue some other objective that the fixed force can't stop them from taking. In this sort of battalion-sized advance to contact the battalion commander has more of the flexibility and initiative normally reserved for the regimental commander. Technically the Advance Guard main body is still setting conditions for the regiment's main body to do whatever it intends to do (larger flank attack, breakthrough, exploitation). But in Combat Mission terms I think it's good enough to just think in terms of your CRP, FSE, and your main body (the regimental main body behind the advance guard main body is probably out of scope for a single Combat Mission scenario anyway). You may want to have an FO with your CRP or FSE to start calling in the barrage that will support your main attack. Or you will want to preplan your artillery (you can certainly have a more complex fire plan if it's preplanned), with your main attack timed to go in at the 15-minute mark, and the CRP and FSE expected to have done their jobs before the 15-minute mark.
    When an attack starts in contact with the enemy (they aren't moving to contact, and they already know what's in front of them), the Soviets wouldn't have an advance guard. The attack would go in more according to the 'deliberate attack' training scenarios. Whether you choose to employ a CRP and/or FSE in advance of your main attack, the important thing is that you have a good idea of what you are facing so that you can decide how, where, and when you want your main body to spring the main attack. Again, you are trying to avoid a frontal attack (hit their positions from the flank or rear if such an approach is available), and go in firepower-heavy with everything you've got, when (not before) you are ready to spring the main attack. Do everything you can to prepare the way for the main attack before springing it (recon, fix any forces that need to be fixed, start calling in fire-missions timed to support the main attack).
    *I had read parts of FM 100-2-1 before. But I had skipped to the parts about platoon, company, and battalion formations and battle drills. But those are just the building blocks of Soviet doctrine, not the actual substance of Soviet doctrine.
    **In fact they apparently decided that they were a bit too tank-heavy at some point in the 80s. One of their late 80s organizational reforms (which I don't think they ever actually completed before the Cold War ended (the 1991 edition of FM 100-2-3 suggested they were still early in the process of implementing this reform)) was to replace one of the tank regiments in each division with another motor rifle regiment. So tank divisions were to go from three tank regiments and a motor rifle regiment to two tank regiments and two motor rifle regiments. And motor rifle divisions were to go from three motor rifle regiments and a tank regiment to four motor rifle regiments, with the only tank support being the tank battalions organic to each motor rifle regiment. One can imagine how this would have resulted in a much more sensible ratio of tanks to infantry.
  13. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Flibby in Tactical Conundrum - Platoon Patrol 2022   
    I've not seen this scenario, but it's a conversion of an existing cmbn scenario. That's interesting for the comparison, but it does mean that the weapon ranges and effects are significantly more lethal - for example, your javelin team was originally a light mortar, which is both a little more useful in this context, but decidedly less impactful when it hits. Since that was a US 60mm, it similarly lacks smoke.
    So, caveats aside, the core principles are the same. For any river crossing one has to establish control of the far bank as much as possible, then cross, consolidate that position, then push on.
    Given the tools available to you, you have to do this with direct fires. This means finding covered approaches to the rivers edge, and forming a base of fire there. In CMBN you'd have bocage to help you do this, but I imagine in a CMBS conversion this would be harder.
    You're probably forced into doing this by stealth. Holding fire with short arcs, and sneaking up to the hedge lines - taking advantage of the javelin thermal optics and engaging in a short, sharp and probably costly firefight. The enemy's night vision will cut into this plan, but you should still have the advantage.
    You do still want to isolate sections as much as possible, so focusing on a single flank is probably the plan here.
  14. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Centurian52 in Combat Mission Cold War - British Army On the Rhine   
    Chieftain, mainly

    So, Carl Gustav was the main section AT, alongside a pair of LAW.

    Milan was the main dismounted ATGM. Wombat was a 120mm recoilless rifle from the 1950s, but Milan is correct for the time period currently in the game (we might get both).

    Swingfire was the more powerful, longer ranged ATGM, and that would be mounted on FV432 or CVR(T) ("Swingfire" or "Striker")

    One thing you're going to find is that, similar to WW2, the BAOR should be made up of specialists. A single element isn't expected to be able to do everything, and you'll need to court synergies to be effective. As a simple example, the M60 MBT is more or less an all-rounder. It's not the fastest tank, doesn't have the biggest gun or the most armour, but it's at least acceptable at everything, and as such can play multiple roles and enable others. Chieftain is designed for a more defensive, static battle, so has a ton of armour and firepower (especially for the 1960s when it was introduced), but sacrifices mobility to do so.
    That means that they should generally be a little harder to use than the US, but potentially more effective if you can use them well.
  15. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from IdontknowhowtodoX in What's the difference between Counterstroke and Active Defence?   
    The British Army's approach for essentially all of the Cold War was defence in depth and counter-attack, with the emphasis on "depth" at all levels. This is in contrast to the German approach, which had the emphasis on the counter-attack. One of the fascinating things about Cold War doctrine is that everyone was trying to solve the same problems, but going about it differently.

    Active Defence wasn't about deploying in depth, but in creating depth through manoeuvre. AD had an up-front defence, with elements peeling back and rotating, creating successive kill-sacks. Counter-attack wasn't a formal part of this, and it's not clear where that element would have come from.

    The issue with AD is that it's very complex, and ambitious to the point of implausibility. It's also that it lacks a real theory of victory - the best an Active Defender can do is not lose, there's no real ability to win.
  16. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Centurian52 in What's the difference between Counterstroke and Active Defence?   
    The British Army's approach for essentially all of the Cold War was defence in depth and counter-attack, with the emphasis on "depth" at all levels. This is in contrast to the German approach, which had the emphasis on the counter-attack. One of the fascinating things about Cold War doctrine is that everyone was trying to solve the same problems, but going about it differently.

    Active Defence wasn't about deploying in depth, but in creating depth through manoeuvre. AD had an up-front defence, with elements peeling back and rotating, creating successive kill-sacks. Counter-attack wasn't a formal part of this, and it's not clear where that element would have come from.

    The issue with AD is that it's very complex, and ambitious to the point of implausibility. It's also that it lacks a real theory of victory - the best an Active Defender can do is not lose, there's no real ability to win.
  17. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from Vanir Ausf B in What's the difference between Counterstroke and Active Defence?   
    The British Army's approach for essentially all of the Cold War was defence in depth and counter-attack, with the emphasis on "depth" at all levels. This is in contrast to the German approach, which had the emphasis on the counter-attack. One of the fascinating things about Cold War doctrine is that everyone was trying to solve the same problems, but going about it differently.

    Active Defence wasn't about deploying in depth, but in creating depth through manoeuvre. AD had an up-front defence, with elements peeling back and rotating, creating successive kill-sacks. Counter-attack wasn't a formal part of this, and it's not clear where that element would have come from.

    The issue with AD is that it's very complex, and ambitious to the point of implausibility. It's also that it lacks a real theory of victory - the best an Active Defender can do is not lose, there's no real ability to win.
  18. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from IHC70 in Flamethrower Teams   
    Flamethrowers are engineering tools. They excel when you need to clear infantry out of a dug-in position quickly and efficiently.
    That implies that their main targets are trenches, bunkers and buildings, and they are a support asset, not a leading one.

    All of the man-portable flamethrowers operate within 30m or so - which is grenade range. This means that any use of a flamethrower should be when the fight has been won, and you have control over the surrounding area, but you have (or suspect you have) some dug-in infantry that need to not be there.
    This mean that you'll have established total fire superiority, have isolated and fixed the target, and what you're avoiding is the final kick-the-door-in approach, which is risky, slow and frequently costly.
     
    The vehicle mounted weapons give you some more flexibility. The principle is generally the same, but the employment can be different, because armour and mobility can reduce the risk. There's a panzergrenadier training video which shows them in use - this was in the context of a counter-penetration attack, with soviets occupying the german's previous position. In this context, the flame halftracks are useful after the battle is "won", to clear out the trenches of any stragglers with speed, and a fair degree of certainty.

    The Churchill Crocodile is somewhat in a league of it's own. The armour on a Churchill is so thick, that it's pretty much the only flame vehicle that can reasonably lead an assault. You still need to be mindful of the surroundings and have won the battle with the manoeuvre elements, because this is a secondary, engineering task, but you can roll up frontally to a bunker and burn it down from 100m or so away.
  19. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from LuckyDog in Frontal Attacks   
    I'm curious as to why you consider Goose Green or Wireless Ridge specifically to not be examples of flanking.



    For Goose Green, A company is fixing the main positions on Darwin Hill, with D and B using the dead ground around Boca House (what little there is in the area) to flank the Argentinian position.



    For Wireless Ridge, you have a similar story, at a higher level, with a two axis attack.

    Now, the Falklands is pretty barren, so you're not going to get the kind of density of terrain seen in Normandy, or even West Germany, because everything has to adapt to terrain.
    So... I'm not sure where this idea comes from. Clausewitz has a lot to say about flanking, and the general thrust of the thing is that there's nothing particularly magical about being on a flank, it's only relevant in the context of the enemy. This is true for all levels - you don't have to have an approach route that's a convenient line of trees to allow your assault element to close... you just need a safe route to get as close as you can, regardless of what that looks like or how close that actually is.
    The basic principles - attacking from two directions, with as much angular separation as you can manage between them - are as sound today as they've ever been, and even in extremely unsupportive terrain like the Falklands, it was still important enough to try to do in any way possible. It's certainly true that battlefield conditions won't match the textbook diagrams, but the purpose of that kind of thing is to teach you the core concepts, so you can apply them to rather more complex real-world situations later. You can't write a novel until you have a proper grasp of the alphabet. This definitely doesn't make the doctrinal manuals pointless or "just a guideline" - they're foundational, and foundations are what you build on.

    Now, a broader question that is the subject of rather more discussion is whether the manoeuvreist approach to warfare that's dominated western military thinking for decades is actually a sound one. As a theoretical basis, there are certainly more voices recently that have argued that this kind of thinking doesn't match practical experience, and instead something rather more attritional is more effective... but regardless of the evidence for that, it won't apply to the tactical level, on a CM-relevant scale. 
  20. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from A Canadian Cat - was IanL in Anti tank guns: No "Packing up" anymore ?   
    If you do some testing, the speed difference is very significant, especially with the heavier guns.

    It means that the correct SOP is to unlimber behind a slope, then set up and push it 1-2 action spots forward into position. The time not to do this is if you don't have the terrain to conceal the carrier vehicle nearby.
  21. Like
    domfluff reacted to FlemFire in Does anyone enjoy MOUT   
    Yes. MOUT is amazing in SF2 and the primary draw of the game for me. It simulates the action well enough given the engine's limitations w/ urban elements. 
    I actually think getting good at SF2 will make you much, much better at the other games. It wasn't until I nailed down the MOUT-elements in Shock Force did I realize how lackadaisical my tactics were in the WWII ones.
  22. Upvote
    domfluff got a reaction from Grey_Fox in Battle pack - how do you tackle "PAK fronts" on a huge open map?   
    Worth mentioning that the scenario designer (GeorgeMC) spends a large amount of time finding the best sites for his AT guns - it's one of the characteristics of his scenarios.

    In terms of dealing with this:

    This is where your terrain analysis/intelligence preparation of the battlefield needs to come in.
    You're completely correct that you can't scout every possible piece of terrain, but good IPB is supposed to mean that you don't have to.

    Basic course of action analysis (so the step up from terrain analysis) looks something like this sequence:
    What do I need to do? What will enable me to do it? What can the enemy do to stop me? What can I do to prevent that enemy action? A good scenario designer (and GeorgeMC makes some of the very best), will place their assets in strong and logical positions. If the enemy AT guns are their key assets in your initial assessment, then you need to identify their potential positions before you begin.
    The above sequence would be followed one section of the battlefield at a time.
     
    For example, you might need to cross a bridge with an infantry company.
    "What do I need to do?"
    I need to get the lead company over the bridge in good order.
    "What will enable me to do it?"
    I judge that as a baseline, I should be able to do this with the organic assets of the company.
    Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons. Send the first platoon across First platoon forms a base of fire, and one of the others crosses Final platoon crosses. "What can the enemy do to stop me?"
    Overlooking this crossing area is a small bunch of houses nearby, and a treeline further out to the flank, onto which I have no direct observation. The treeline would be the worst-possible position to find AT guns, and the houses could contain infantry, perhaps a forward OP.
    "What can I do to prevent that enemy action?"
    The basic plan remains intact, but I need to assign additional enablers to avoid this crossing. I determine that whilst there's no direct observation of the dangerous treeline, I can get LOS from the buildings.
    The plan then becomes:
    Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons, as well as a single assault gun, set up to support an assault into the buildings. Send the first platoon across, with attached forward observer, to clear the buildings. First platoon clears the buildings, and the Forward Observer starts to call down harassing fire on the suspicious treeline When the fires start coming in, the other two platoons cross, and establish a base of fire on the opposing bank. It's entirely possible that this means that your artillery is firing on nothing. That's fine - what you've gained is the knowledge that nothing is there to fire at you, and this kind of shaping operation is really the point of artillery to begin with.
  23. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from Vergeltungswaffe in Frontal Attacks   
    I'm curious as to why you consider Goose Green or Wireless Ridge specifically to not be examples of flanking.



    For Goose Green, A company is fixing the main positions on Darwin Hill, with D and B using the dead ground around Boca House (what little there is in the area) to flank the Argentinian position.



    For Wireless Ridge, you have a similar story, at a higher level, with a two axis attack.

    Now, the Falklands is pretty barren, so you're not going to get the kind of density of terrain seen in Normandy, or even West Germany, because everything has to adapt to terrain.
    So... I'm not sure where this idea comes from. Clausewitz has a lot to say about flanking, and the general thrust of the thing is that there's nothing particularly magical about being on a flank, it's only relevant in the context of the enemy. This is true for all levels - you don't have to have an approach route that's a convenient line of trees to allow your assault element to close... you just need a safe route to get as close as you can, regardless of what that looks like or how close that actually is.
    The basic principles - attacking from two directions, with as much angular separation as you can manage between them - are as sound today as they've ever been, and even in extremely unsupportive terrain like the Falklands, it was still important enough to try to do in any way possible. It's certainly true that battlefield conditions won't match the textbook diagrams, but the purpose of that kind of thing is to teach you the core concepts, so you can apply them to rather more complex real-world situations later. You can't write a novel until you have a proper grasp of the alphabet. This definitely doesn't make the doctrinal manuals pointless or "just a guideline" - they're foundational, and foundations are what you build on.

    Now, a broader question that is the subject of rather more discussion is whether the manoeuvreist approach to warfare that's dominated western military thinking for decades is actually a sound one. As a theoretical basis, there are certainly more voices recently that have argued that this kind of thinking doesn't match practical experience, and instead something rather more attritional is more effective... but regardless of the evidence for that, it won't apply to the tactical level, on a CM-relevant scale. 
  24. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from chuckdyke in Frontal Attacks   
    I'm curious as to why you consider Goose Green or Wireless Ridge specifically to not be examples of flanking.



    For Goose Green, A company is fixing the main positions on Darwin Hill, with D and B using the dead ground around Boca House (what little there is in the area) to flank the Argentinian position.



    For Wireless Ridge, you have a similar story, at a higher level, with a two axis attack.

    Now, the Falklands is pretty barren, so you're not going to get the kind of density of terrain seen in Normandy, or even West Germany, because everything has to adapt to terrain.
    So... I'm not sure where this idea comes from. Clausewitz has a lot to say about flanking, and the general thrust of the thing is that there's nothing particularly magical about being on a flank, it's only relevant in the context of the enemy. This is true for all levels - you don't have to have an approach route that's a convenient line of trees to allow your assault element to close... you just need a safe route to get as close as you can, regardless of what that looks like or how close that actually is.
    The basic principles - attacking from two directions, with as much angular separation as you can manage between them - are as sound today as they've ever been, and even in extremely unsupportive terrain like the Falklands, it was still important enough to try to do in any way possible. It's certainly true that battlefield conditions won't match the textbook diagrams, but the purpose of that kind of thing is to teach you the core concepts, so you can apply them to rather more complex real-world situations later. You can't write a novel until you have a proper grasp of the alphabet. This definitely doesn't make the doctrinal manuals pointless or "just a guideline" - they're foundational, and foundations are what you build on.

    Now, a broader question that is the subject of rather more discussion is whether the manoeuvreist approach to warfare that's dominated western military thinking for decades is actually a sound one. As a theoretical basis, there are certainly more voices recently that have argued that this kind of thinking doesn't match practical experience, and instead something rather more attritional is more effective... but regardless of the evidence for that, it won't apply to the tactical level, on a CM-relevant scale. 
  25. Like
    domfluff got a reaction from George MC in Battle pack - how do you tackle "PAK fronts" on a huge open map?   
    Worth mentioning that the scenario designer (GeorgeMC) spends a large amount of time finding the best sites for his AT guns - it's one of the characteristics of his scenarios.

    In terms of dealing with this:

    This is where your terrain analysis/intelligence preparation of the battlefield needs to come in.
    You're completely correct that you can't scout every possible piece of terrain, but good IPB is supposed to mean that you don't have to.

    Basic course of action analysis (so the step up from terrain analysis) looks something like this sequence:
    What do I need to do? What will enable me to do it? What can the enemy do to stop me? What can I do to prevent that enemy action? A good scenario designer (and GeorgeMC makes some of the very best), will place their assets in strong and logical positions. If the enemy AT guns are their key assets in your initial assessment, then you need to identify their potential positions before you begin.
    The above sequence would be followed one section of the battlefield at a time.
     
    For example, you might need to cross a bridge with an infantry company.
    "What do I need to do?"
    I need to get the lead company over the bridge in good order.
    "What will enable me to do it?"
    I judge that as a baseline, I should be able to do this with the organic assets of the company.
    Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons. Send the first platoon across First platoon forms a base of fire, and one of the others crosses Final platoon crosses. "What can the enemy do to stop me?"
    Overlooking this crossing area is a small bunch of houses nearby, and a treeline further out to the flank, onto which I have no direct observation. The treeline would be the worst-possible position to find AT guns, and the houses could contain infantry, perhaps a forward OP.
    "What can I do to prevent that enemy action?"
    The basic plan remains intact, but I need to assign additional enablers to avoid this crossing. I determine that whilst there's no direct observation of the dangerous treeline, I can get LOS from the buildings.
    The plan then becomes:
    Form a base of fire on the near bank with two of the platoons and the organic weapons, as well as a single assault gun, set up to support an assault into the buildings. Send the first platoon across, with attached forward observer, to clear the buildings. First platoon clears the buildings, and the Forward Observer starts to call down harassing fire on the suspicious treeline When the fires start coming in, the other two platoons cross, and establish a base of fire on the opposing bank. It's entirely possible that this means that your artillery is firing on nothing. That's fine - what you've gained is the knowledge that nothing is there to fire at you, and this kind of shaping operation is really the point of artillery to begin with.
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