kensal

This is quite a famous description of elements of 2nd Panzer attacking towards St Denisiere during the Mortain counterattack, observed by an American officer. He describes 3 parallel columns consisting of 2-3 tanks accompanied by sp guns and probably half-tracks: http://mceacsc.archive.org/stream/1944-12IntelligenceBulletinVol03No04/1944-12%20Intelligence%20Bulletin%20Vol%2003%20No%2004_djvu.txt Scroll down to page 57 of the report. "For a period of 36 hours in the last days of July (1944), an officer of an Allied army group staff had an excellent opportunity of observing German tanks and infantry of the 2nd Panzer Division attacking an Allied force in France. The following notes, which are based on this report, describe the tactics that the Germans employed. The general situation was fluid at the time of the attack. The Germans advanced westward in three parallel columns, each consisting of tanks accompanied by infantry. The center column followed a main road, firing rapidly and moving at a brisk rate. It went from hill to hill, with the accompanying infantry dog-trotting through the fields on each side of the road and over the hedgerows. The infantry was employed over no more than the width of a single field on each side. The center column had a total of only eight tracked vehicles. At least three of these were tanks, one or two probably were self-propelled guns, and the remainder probably were half-tracked personnel carriers. Although the total German strength which had been sent to capture and hold an important crossroads at St. Denisiere consisted of two companies of infantry and probably not more than ten tanks, the Allied officer observed only the tracked vehicles previously mentioned and possibly a platoon of infantry. (Actually about 20 tanks and 2 companies of Panzergrenadiers in half-tracks (Sd. Kfz. 251) from Panzergrenadier Regiment 304 plus some forward observers) The Infantrymen Moved Fast The leading tank fired its 75 rapidly, getting both graze and air bursts, while its machine guns, supplemented by those of the vehicles behind it, sprayed the top of every hedgerow. The noise was terrific, and the bursts in the shrubbery and the tops of trees and hedgerows were certainly impressive. Even before the shock of the guns discharged at close range and the garden hose spray of machine gun bullets, had taken full effect, German infantrymen were over the hedgerow and into the field and were advancing toward the next field with determination and courage. They knew where they were going and went there fast. At night the Germans reacted forcefully with fire and limited movement, whenever they detected any sign of an Allied approach. The German tanks moved slowly, and made very little noise. Immediately after firing, each tank moved to a new position 25 to 50 meters away. It should be emphasized that the noise discipline of the German tank crews and the accompanying infantry was superior. There was no talking or shouting except for machine gun and cannon fire and the starting of motor, no sound carried farther then 100 yards. On the other hand, the approach of US tanks and the passing of most US motor convoys was rapidly identifiable by the loud shouting, talking and issuing of orders by the US troops who approached or passed the general vicinity of a German position. The propensity of US tank drivers to "gun" their motors was a dead give-away, whereas the Germans always eased their tanks forward, traveled in low gear and were remarkably quiet in all operations except the firing. They used long bursts of their rapid-firing machine guns to discourage guests. If pressed at all, they sent up flares to obtain German artillery and mortar fire on their flanks. The way they handled their tanks was bold and sure. They acted as if they knew exactly what their destination was and by which route they wished to proceed. A U.S. Tank "Got the Works" At 0230, the darkest part of the night, a German tank moved out and headed toward the northernmost German column, making as little noise as possible. Later it turned out that a lone US tank on reconnaissance had pushed up against the nose of the ridge that the German tanks had organized, and the Germans were quietly laying plans to place a terrific amount of fire on it. Before long, it got the works. Because there were so few German infantrymen and because they were interested only in reaching and holding the team's objective, their mopping-up activities were negligible. Thus, of the Allied troops overrun in this fashion, a large percentage was neither killed, wounded, captured, or missing during the first two or three days. (The Germans claimed inflicting heavy losses on the Americans and the destruction of 25 American tanks). The ease and rapidity with which this small attacking force made its penetration, reached its objective, sat on the objective and cut traffic on an important road is of more than ordinary interest. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the Germans will employ small groups for similar missions in the future.

I did exactly the same as was wondering why life was so easy! Do you fancy doing an H2H?

Macisle thank you very much for sending the maps Kensal

ok, I have managed to set up a drop box account and installed GAJ's H2HH so hopefully I am 95% of the way there in terms of getting set up

I have noticed this too, in QBs and also possibly in BJ's Buron scenario. Very frustrating

*possible spoiler* Baron Played your Buron scenario as Germans and enjoyed it. Your love of artillery is apparent. I didn't play it historically as set up - I moved the German trenches and placements into Buron rather than on the outskirts and that was much more survivable for the landser I suspect. The point I wanted to ask you about - the flak guns behind the flanking hedge are set up outside the set up area and so can't be moved (which I assume was deliberate and I don't have an issue with). My problem was that they could not get LOS / LOF from behind the boacage on any of the Canadian assault force as set up - maybe a similar problem to Marders behind bocage. They were however fully visible to the Canadians and got pounded to bits by direct and indirect fire without being able to return fire.

I would be interested. I should mention that I have not played H2H before so I have no idea how to set that up - hopefully you will be able to guide me. I am running on a mac. Private mail me?

Certainly true that most modern reenactments of WWII fail due to the actors being too well fed. Not sure about shaving though. Most of the pictures I have seen of German and British soldiers in WWII suggest that being clean shaven was maintained in all but the most desperate situations. the other interesting point is that most of the pictures of German soldiers in Normandy I have seen show suggest that they are much younger than most film actors - in Umlaut's force specific background photos and other photos on the web some of the German soldiers and tank crews look ludicrously young, not just 12SS.

It says something about the respective national characteristics of the Italian and German peoples in the 1930s and 1940s. The outcome of WWI, the German education system from 1933 and Hitler's regime together created a mentality amongst many / perhaps most Germans that war was an acceptable or necessary route for the country and, as the war deteriorated, an acceptance or belief that losing involved an existential threat to Germany and the German people, leading to a fatalism amongst soldiers that they had no option but to fight to the bitter end and an unwillingness to accept the possibility of defeat. The situation in Italy was very different - they were winners in WWI, they did not have the same exposure to an education of the sort given to young Germans in the 1930s emphasising German racial superiority and the destiny of the German people to dominate Europe and their entry to the war was almost an afterthought by Mussolini following the collapse of France. The outcome of that was that the majority of Italians probably did not understand why they were fighting or what they were fighting for and they did not see an existential threat to Italy and the Italian people arising out of the possibility of losing the war. Hence the most pressing motivation for most Italian soldiers was surviving rather than fighting to the bitter end, with possible exceptions amongst the blackshirts.

Looking forward to the QB map, Macisle, thanks

which psychopath set up the ambushes in the videos...:eek:

That account suggests that German infantry was dug into the AT ditch on the day of the assault

Flak 36 had a high rate of fire too 15-20 rpm. That doesn't seem to be modelled in the game/

I've noticed this in Colossal Crack. I lined up my Marders behind bocage waiting for British armour to enter the fields in front of them, only to find that they can't engage. Marders not a very effective unit for that battle

I think it is clear that 12SS would never have been able to punch through to the beaches by itself. A successful German counterattack to the beaches on 7-8 June would have required at least two full strength panzer divisions with sufficient infantry divisions in support to follow up and hold captured ground. Even then it would have been unlikely given the number of British armoured brigades, AT regiments, air and artillery assets available. 7th Armoured Division also due to arrive imminently. As it was the Germans were never able to get the two panzer divisions in reserve in order to organise a realistic counterattack.

Presumably not a bug - perhaps the AI is not programmed to predict that the tank will cross its LOF when the tank is quite close. Instead it my be programmed to traverse to the tank's location which in most cases, when the tank is some distance away, results in the gun pointing in the tank's direction. In real life? I imagine it is quite difficult to traverse a relatively heavy AT gun quickly in the opposite direction in order to bear on a very close moving tank, plus the crew will probably be quite stressed and may not operate strictly according to training and could even be pushing / pulling in different directions

ok thanks to you all for your replies

JasonC I'm not convinced by this. I agree that some exceptional leaders could inspire and some dire leaders could make appalling decisions. But if you look at the majority of divisional commanders and upwards and you switched them all around so you had patton commanding Panzergruppe 1 in 1941 in Russia or Zhukov commanding Panzergroup West in 1944 in France or Rundstedt in command of the Allied armies in Italy etc, would the outcome have been any different in those theatres? I think not because in each case the outcomes of those and all other campaigns / battles were determined by other far more important factors like troop numbers, logistics etc. There are only a few cases I think where you can point to an outcome being dependent on decisions made by individuals - perhaps France in 1940 or Mark Clark going for Rome instead of seeking to cut off the German tenth (?) army following the breakout from Anzio.

Possibly a tech question but I have not yet purchased CMFI because (a) I am quite new to CMBN and am still enjoying working through that and ( because a Mac user I had could not get CMBN ver 2.0 working until the 2.01 patch came out. My question is whether the CMFI engine (which I think is the same as ver 2.0 for CMBN) has the same Mac issue, in which case I should wait for a CMFI patch to resolve it. Apologies if someone has already dealt with this query elsewhere

I think that the 'cult' (for want of a better expression) of WWII generals is a fascinating subject, comparable to that of the Napoleonic and US Civil War eras I think the reason is to do with the idea of "the war of movement" where one individual can supposedly influence the outcome of a battle with daring manoeuvre. Rommel, Guderian, Manstein, Patton epitomise this idea, but the reality is that all generals are subject to the circumstances of their situation, whether favourable or negative. Rommel is generally viewed as a tactical genius as a result of his supposed impact in the western desert but his own subordinates viewed him differently. Major General Streich was removed from command of 5th Light Division following the failure of the attack on Tobruk in April-May 1941. Rommel complained that "you were far too concerned with the well being of your troops". Streich replied "I can imagine no greater words of praise for a division commander". Major General Kirchheim, his subordinate wrote "I do not like to be reminded of that time, because so much blood was needlessly shed". In both cases they viewed Rommel's attacks on Tobruk as doomed to failure from the outset but that he was determined to press ahead nonetheless. Rommel's conduct of the Crusader battles, and Alam Halfa can be similarly criticised. All generals can be criticised as too reckless or too careless of their troops, or too cautious with the benefit of hindsight. The reality is though that most of the time, they all benefited or suffered (as the case may be) from factors over which they had little or no control and their reputations as good or bad generals, more often than not, relates to those factors, rather than their actual ability to control the outcome of the battles they were engaged in.

very good

Has anyone else experienced blue boots and helmets in EZ's US uniforms since 2.01 came out?

the link http://www.achtungpanzer.com/tiger-tamers-battle-for-sandomierz-bulge-august-of-1944.htm

A link to the site where I saw the info about Tiger II armour deficiencies

Not sure i agree that Tigers were operationally useless. But Russian tests on the armour of captured King Tigers suggested that the quality of the metal used by the Germans at that late stage of the war was deteriorating and that as a result, although the amour plating was thicker, it was not necessarily capable of withstanding ap as Tiger Is