TrailApe

In my opinion it was not who had the better generals, better equipment or whatever but it was who waged the war most effectively. The German War Machine seems to have been ideally suited to a limited war for a limited period, however once the conflict spread beyond France and with the USSR and the USA becoming involved it was no longer enough. In some ways the 1939 Wehrmacht reminds me of the 'Old Contemptibles' of 1914. Superbly trained, but once the war dragged on their skill was diluted by casualties. The Wehrmacht was not enough to win the war because it was a tactical force with a limited reach. they were never a fully motorized army and lacked an amphibious capability. They did have an Airborne element but that was totally gutted in one operation. With the army lacking in projection power the Germans neglected to develop a strategic airforce and although the U Boats did cause concern in the Battle of the Atlantic, by 1943 the technology and numbers had shifted the momentum to the Allies. As an American phrase puts it - they brought a knife to a gunfight. Instead of patting the defeated German generals on the back and telling them they put up a blinking good show against the hordes of the East and the Industrial might of the US and the British Empire you should really ask them what the phek were they thinking of - invade the USSR - really? Decalare war on the USA? - absolutely bonkers. Of course then they blame Hitler - 'we were forced to do it'. Ha!

[quote]Is it your impression that the German generals really thought the allies were fighting "unfairly", or were they actually just doing an objective analysis of the situation? Would any of the Allied generals have succeeded where the Germans failed in the Ardennes, if they had been in their shoes? [/quote] Ahh – Mr Emrys has obviously came away with the same impression – glad it’s not only me. 1)Dirty Rotten Allies I probably overdid the ‘dishonourable’ bit, but from the various memoirs there emanates a feeling of frustration. The Germans were fighting the war as it should be, with maneuver being the driving force – they were military professionals and even had the language going for them with Auftragstaktik, Schwerpunkt and Schwerpunktprinzip. This worked well for them in the early years however (in the West) after Alamein the Allies started to fight to their own strengths and began a war not on maneuver but of material. This became more evident after D-Day. So you as a German Infantry Battalion commander have laid out your defences immaculately, overlapping fields of fire, kill zones, the terrain has been used to force the enemy into corridors and even if things go badly you have an appreciable reserve to counter attack immediately. You are just waiting for the first Yank/Tommy to stick his head out and by god he’s toast! Then the RAF/USAAF strategic heavy bombers unload on your defenses. Then you are hit by 16” naval guns Then an Army Group of Artillery open up on you, Then your armoured reserve is attacked by jabos. Only when your defencess are in tatters and half your men are mad do the enemy then start appearing – but they are so CAUTIOUS, even hesitant, and have a never ending amount of heavy, accurate artillery on call. Even when the Allies did go head to head – as Operation Goodwood, you shoot their tanks down like rabbits, but within a week they will be back up to strength yet your own losses are never made good. You successfully defeat the biggest Airborne operation of the war in September (Market Garden) but six months later they hit you with an even bigger one (Varsity) Enough to make a grown man weep. So whilst it’s true the German army might have had better tactics, better trained men and certainly snazzier uniforms and sexier camouflage schemes, it was the Allies that were better at fighting war. Why piss about using fire and maneuver to outflank a dug in platoon when you just need to keep them under observation and hit them with artillery, then go in to pick up the bits? I think that’s when the German Generals really ‘got’ what war was about, and they had nothing to counter it. 2) Eisenhower does Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein Just not going to happen is it? The Allies didn’t have to gamble with a **** or bust throw of the dice, they were winning. Even if you went to the most press on type of Allied General – Old Blood and Guts Himself he would have like the idea but would have looked at the terrain and logistics and regretfully refused. Even if they had went ahead, the equipment and logistical support was probably better suited to the task than the fuel hungry mecanically unreliable panzers the Germans used. Can you imagin Monty doing this type of madcap thrust (we’ll ignore Market Garden) – he would only do it if he had enough artillery to blast his way through. Horses for courses, the Germans had some brilliant doctrine but sometimes they were a slave to it. I suppose it depends on what books you read. For a long time the German Army was portrayed as a superb machine, and in the UK especially, the Brit portion of the Allied army was given a reputation of slow half hearted bumblers “The British had fought workmanlike campaigns in North Africa, Italy and France since their victory at El Alamein in November 1942. But their generals had nowhere shown the genius displayed by Germany’s commanders in France in 1940, and in battles since” Max Hastings “The real link between D-Day, Villers Bocage, Epsom and Goodwood is that none of them were carried out within the spirit of mobile warfare…What the British Army lacked were officers who could recognize such momentary opportunities when they arose and a military culture that encourage them to sieze those golden moments” Robert Citino Carlo D’Estes ‘Deciscion in Normandy’ devotes a whole chapter - The Price of Caution’ to British tendency to evade close quarter fighting where possible and rely heavily on indirect firepower. Just read any book from the 60’s through to the 90’s and the Allies are often portrayed as timid bunglers (British) to enthusiastic amateurs (US) whilst the Wehrmacht are praised for their skill and superior equipment. In my opinion of course.

No quote, just a general feeling from the various reads I've done. Nothing ground-breaking just human nature. You invest time and energy in a plan and it doesn't come off (especially given the cost of failure under the Nazis) you are hardly going to hold up your hands and say - "Sorry lads - bit of a cock up - I underestimated the enemies resolve, totally blew the logistics but I'll get it right next time" No it's because of the weight of resources against you or because your troops weren't up to it. Even Allied Generals were guilty of this - Monty questioned the quality of his troops in Normandy, comparing them unfavourably to the soldiers of WW1, it stands to reason doesn't it - they were not making the progress that he anticipated, it couldn't be the plan ergo it was the soldiers not being up to the job. Simples.

What the German Generals said post WW2 was very much dependant on who was interviewing them - they were not daft and were obviously trying to keep all options open. I've seen plenty of quotes from German generals that said the Brits were crap, usually when being interviewed by US representatives. The thing is either way - which ever Allied army they were criticising, it must have sorely hurt them to be kicked all the way back to the starting point - although of course it was the sneaky way the Allies fought rather than their skill at waging war - fancy resorting to such underhand tactics as Strategic AND Tactical bombing, and how cowardly to use all that artillery...

Ah well, Falcons beat Tigers, England are going to stomp the Italians so it's not a TOTALLY wasted weekend. Hurry up though lads eh?

I thought it was a brilliant campaign and never noticed anything missing. Only whinge is that historically the Brits would have had much more arty, but then that would effect the balance.

I'm just up the road in the Toon. Nice knowing there's a CM buff not too far away.

geordietaf - is that Washington DC or CD?

Brilliant - cheers mate.

nah - just the computer needed a lot of TLC which it didn't always get. With reference to the math (s), I have the same talent at numeracy as a dead badger, but it's all broken down into small tasks on proforma's so the hardest thing you have to do is a bit addition and subtraction, easier than the mental calculations you have to do when playing darts. That's the Army for you, breaks things like Angle of Sight, Jump (the barrel moves in-between the charge igniting and the shell leaving the muzzle), rotation of the earth, met (meterology), muzzle velocity and a few other things into simple calculations. Amazing stuff. I think the WW2 people had it harder, especially as the British used imperial (yards/minutes instead of metres/mils ) but they did recruit people who were VERY good at hard sums.

Thanks for keeping this going RockinHarry. You bring up a couple of good points – for example severe terrain is always going to have an effect on procedures and those big old dense dark forests of Germany will effect ALL procedures, not just CB and not even just Arty. That type of environment will have infantry, armour and all support arms SNCO’s and field officers digging out different doctrinal pamphlets about ‘What the Fck to do in Big Frigging Forests’, so yes the Hurtgenwald was not the ideal place to try and use the standard drills. Local practice and best fit is the order of the day in those types of situation. The Commonwealth Arty always tried for ‘Neutralising’ – their definition being “To prevent enemy movement and observation, and in cases of greater effect to prevent the effective use of enemy weapons. Effect to last during the bombardment.” So if that can be obtained by flying an Auster around at tree top level – well let’s do it! I must read up on this campaign, I only know what’s in general circulation – it was a bitch and possibly not worth the effort – any recommendations? However I would take exception to your other line of thought around ammunition expenditure. The requirements and end effects of CB were well known and despite this CB was always practiced (where they had targets to fire against) – any planning for major pushes would always have a CB input and even in day to day ops a CB plan would be in effect and applied. Those Heavy Arty lads had to do something to keep them busy, H&I and CB were their bread and butter. Different Artillery had different jobs – what the Commonwealth called Field Artillery (25lbers up to 105mm) would not normally give a thought to CB, they didn’t have the range and they had a different role. Medium Artillery (4.5” and 5.5”) would indulge in CB, sually at the start of an operation then switch to targets of opportunity and then their efforts were more aligned with Field Artillery. Heavy Artillery leaned more towards the strategic role in an Army Groups area and CB would form large part of that. Also bear in mind the Heavy and Mediums were further back and easier to supply, so while the 25lbrs, 75mm and 105mm Batteries/Companies might have been strapped for rounds at certain times, the bigger stuff would not have the same problems. Having said all that, in the Western Theatre by the end of the war ‘pure’ CB opportunities were few and far between as the German artillery were on their last legs and just as in the tank arm, the CB lads had not a lot to fire at.

I love this sort of topic – being a former Gunner it strikes more of a chord than chin mantles on Panthers or which turret the Tiger II was using. “On the other side and from my readings the allies depended much on spotter aircraft (and good weather) to locate german gun positions, which were usually well camouflaged and if mobile enough, changed positions frequently” You are entirely correct that WW2 was the coming of age of the AOP although the spotter aircraft had operational limits imposed on them because of the fragile/slow nature of the aircraft involved and they were not the CB panacea you might think – although obviously they were immensley useful in the usual shoots. Target acquisition was a whole science in itself with units assigned to the role and the Allied gunners didn't have to depend on air assets for acquisition - even back in WW1 Sound Ranging and flash spotting - not from aircraft - was a well-developed art. You can even gauge the general direction of the enemy guns from crater analysis, yes it’s a bit vague but get enough of them and you can build a picture of where the enemy artillery is firing from. Factor in the oppositions orbat, look at the map and you start getting a fair idea of where the opposition arty may be lurking. Also remember the German artillery were in the main horse drawn, this limits where they can get and how fast they can relocate. As ever there is some excellent information on Nigel Evan’s site around this topic – Commonwealth orientated but what the Commonwealth did the US did just as well (without the panache and exorbitant usage of Tea) http://nigelef.tripod.com/tgtacqcb.htm#Introduction I agree that the in-depth parts of this are not suited to CM – who would pay for sound recording microphones and heavy arty to use ‘just in case’ your opponent bought a lot of arty assets, although the whole area could be dealt with in a generic fashion (just like air support and AAA).

I think it really depends on how BF is developing the modules. I don't think that CMBN is getting any more modules, in other words that time period is closed. There is the battlepack coming out shortly but all that does is bring in a Brit campaign and a bunch of standalone battles until the end of the CMBN time period (although I really am looking forward to it). CMFB is the next module and takes the next time slot -from October 1944 to January 1945. Obviously the main event that happened in that particular period (in the West) was the Ardennes Offensive, and equally obviously this particular event was almost entirely a US party, however there was still a war being fought in places other than the Ardennes, if you look at the CMFB manual you will see that they do cover other areas "Regions supported by Combat Mission: Final Blitzkrieg include: • Ardennes. • France. • Germany. • Holland" So it's almost certain that other allied troops will be included in the CMFB family. Perhaps we have been talking at cross purposes?

Hey lads, I totally agree lets not make this into a 'my dad's bigger than your dad' contest. I - again - totally agree that the vast majority of the effort and casualties were made by the US. However what I don't agree with is this 'flavour' thing. CM does not 'do' flavours, accuracy and authenticity are a huge part of what they do, so I'd be very surprised if they released a game that should include other Allied troops and closed the module down without featuring these Allied troops. Hollywood would do it but not Battlefront. This is what the Fat Lad said (he's not venerated in our household - we remember his other exploits) Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war, and will, I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American victory.” I have seen it suggested that the terrific battle which has been proceeding since 16th December on the American front is an Anglo-American battle. In fact, however, the United States troops have done almost all the fighting and have suffered almost all the losses. They have suffered losses almost equal to those on both sides in the battle of Gettysburg. Only one British Army Corps has been engaged in this action. All the rest of the 30 or more divisions, which have been fighting continuously for the last month are United States troops. The Americans have engaged 30 or 40 men for every one we have engaged, and they have lost 60 to 80 men for every one of ours. That is the point I wish to make I think it was in response to Monty's Press Conference of 7th Jan, 1945 which didn't fully underline the limited contribution of the British forces - although to be fair to the Short Arsed Prima Donna - he did personally make a larger contribution to the north side of the Bulge than is generally acknowledged nowadays 1. Object of this talk. I have asked you to come here today so that I can give you some information which may be of use to you, and also to ask you to help me in a certain matter. 2. The story of the present battle. Rundstedt attacked on 16 Dec; he obtained tactical surprise. He drove a deep wedge into the centre of the First US Army and split the American forces in two. The situation looked as if it might become awkward; the Germans had broken right through a weak spot, and were heading for the Meuse. 3. As soon as I saw what was happening I took certain steps myself to ensure that if the Germans got to the Meuse they would certainly not get over that river. And I carried out certain movements so as to provide balanced dispositions to meet the threatened danger; these were, at the time, merely precautions, i.e., I was thinking ahead. 4. Then the situation began to deteriorate. But the whole allied team rallied to meet the danger; national considerations were thrown overboard; General Eisenhower placed me in command of the whole Northern front. I employed the whole available power of the British Group of Armies; this power was brought into play very gradually and in such a way that it would not interfere with the American lines of communication. Finally it was put into battle with a bang, and today British divisions are. fighting hard on the right flank of First US Army. You have thus the picture of British troops fighting on both sides of American forces who have suffered a hard blow. This is a fine allied picture. 5. The battle has been most interesting; I think possibly one of the most interesting and tricky battles I have ever handled, with great issues at stake. The first thing to be done was to 'head off' the enemy from the tender spots and vital places. Having done that successfully, the next thing was to 'see him off', i.e. rope him in and make quite certain that he could not get to the places he wanted, and also that he was slowly but surely removed away from those places. He was therefore 'headed off' and then 'seen off'. He is now being 'written off' and heavy toll is being taken of his divisions by ground and air action. You must not imagine that the battle is over yet; it is by no means over and a great deal still remains to be done. The battle has some similarity to the battle that began on 31 Aug 1942 when Rommel made his last bid to capture Egypt and was 'seen off' by the Eighth Army. But actually all battles are different because die problem is different. 6. What was Rundstedt trying to achieve? No one can tell for certain. The only guide we have is the message he issued to his soldiers before the battle began; he told them it was the last great effort to try and win the war, that everything depended on it; that they must go 'all out'. On the map you see his gains; that will not win the war; he is likely slowly but surely to lose it all; he must have scraped together every reserve he could lay his hands on for this job, and he has not achieved a great deal. One must admit that he has dealt us a sharp blow and he sent us reeling back; but we recovered; he has been unable to gain any great advantage from his initial success. He has therefore failed in his strategic purpose, unless die prize was smaller than his men were told. He has now turned to the defensive on the ground; and he is faced by forces properly balanced to utilise the initiative which he has lost. Another reason for his failure is that his air force, although still capable of pulling a fast one, cannot protect his army; for that army our Tactical Air Forces are the greatest terror. 7. But when all is said and done I shall always feel that Rundstedt was really beaten by the good fighting qualities of the American soldier and by the team-work of the Allies, I would like to say a word about these two points. 8. I first saw the American soldier in battle in Sicily, and I formed then a very high opinion of him. I saw him again in Italy. And I have seen a very great deal of him in this campaign. I want to take this opportunity to pay a public tribute to him. He is a brave fighting man, steady under fire, and with that tenacity in battle which stamps the first class soldier; all these qualities have been shown in a marked degree during the present battle. I have spent my military career with the British soldier and I have come to love him with a great love; and I have now formed a very great affection and admiration for the American soldier. I salute the brave fighting men of America; I never want to fight alongside better soldiers. Just now I am seeing a great deal of the American soldiers; I have tried to feel that I am almost an American soldier myself so that I might take no unsuitable action or offend them in any way. I have been given an American identity, card; I am thus identified in the Army of the United States, my fingerprints have been registered in the War Department at Washington â which is far preferable to having them registered at Scotland Yard! 9. And now I come to the last point. It is team-work that pulls you through dangerous times; it is team-work that wins battles; it is victories in battle that win wars. I want to put in a strong plea for Allied solidarity at this vital stage of the war; and you can all help in this greatly. Nothing must be done by anyone that tends to break down the team spirit of our Allied team; if you try and ' get at' the captain of the team you are liable to induce a loss of confidence, and this may spread and have disastrous results. I would say that anyone who tries to break up the team spirit of the Allies is definitely helping the enemy. 10. Let me tell you that the captain of our team is Eisenhower. I am absolutely devoted to Ike; we are the greatest of friends. It grieves me when I see uncomplimentary articles about him in the British Press; he bears a great burden, he needs our fullest support, he has a right to expect it, and it is up to all of us to see that he gets it. And so I would ask all of you to lend a hand to stop that sort of thing; let us all rally round the captain of the team and so help to win the match. Nobody objects to healthy and constructive criticism; it is good for us. But let us have done with destructive criticism that aims a blow at Allied solidarity, that tends to break up our team spirit, and that therefore helps the enemy." So that's what Churchill & Monty had to say. Of course by this time the US were the main partner in the on the Western Front and a lot of Monty's previous comments were coming home to roost so he wasn't the flavour of the month in certain (including British - Tedder HATED him) quarters.

Infantry? Armour? pfft - boring. I want to see SPG's rocking up and dishing out FFE unto each other - now that's real class!