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BletchleyGeek

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Everything posted by BletchleyGeek

  1. Really is that the best answer you can offer to a honest technical question? How is that "obtuse flanking"? For your information, I have been in that journey for a number of years. Seeing your source now I understand your confusion. There is plenty of data that shows barely any correlation between force ratio and engagement result when considering large datasets of engagements. Factors such as force employment and surprise/shock trump superior numbers almost always. Chapter 2 of Steven Biddle's "Military Power" contains an extensive literature review addressing the point of view in the paper you shared and many others. What a disappointment.
  2. I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated? I am ESL and perhaps we understand different things for the expression "to break through". Yet I do not think one can classify how the initial phase of the war played out as anything other than breaking through all axis but one, which has barely moved since February 2022. The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis. No major retrograde movements were appreciated in the south (the biggest success of the Russian armed forces, until they tried to reach out to Mikolayev and Kryvyi Rih, and became hopelessly overextended) and the NE (where they flanked the JFO forces covering the DNR and LNR proxies). Mariupol was devastated, surrounded, besieged, and conquered. That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini! On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. The Russian Army was still overextended after their initial retreats (or rout, I don't know it seemed quite touch and go)... and the dangerous thing for them was that they weren't aware of it. So they were surprised in Kharkiv and routed in what I consider was a masterful demonstration of the very same warfighting principles that lead to the smashing victory of the German army in very much the same area in May 1942. But, and this is a big one, the Russian Army managed to evacuate most of its personnel (yet not their material). On the campaign for Kherson, I have mixed opinions. To my mind, that one clearly did not meet its most immediate objectives. The Russian Army was better entrenched and had (for the most part) better troops. But the logistics were not workable: it just took nearly two months for the Russian Army to realize that, aided by the progressive crumbling of their right flank, which was anchored on the Dnipro. I have the sense that the secondary offensive (Kharkiv) turned out to be the one that exceeded expectations. I think it is indicative that the Ukrainian forces didn't have reserves to further exploit all the way to Starobi'lsk. Which did indeed seem doable for a fleeting moment in September. Yes, that is a fact that can be duly appreciated. I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully. That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut. Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it? As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen. On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere. Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion. Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain. Agreed. This is indeed the benchmark. I recently finished reading B. A. Friedman "On Operations", and he made a very compelling case about the so-called "operational level" being something that has no purchase as an idea (that's now coming out with some balls). Clearly, in what respects the "operational level" (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time. From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance). I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes.
  3. Definitely he sounds a lot like Peter calling wolf... yet, as recent events suggest, if the US/NATO is the (reluctant) Arsenal of Democracy, the other side may have China play the role of Arsenal of Tyranny. And like in 1941-45, when the Stumbling Colossus regained its feet and smashed the German Army in great part thanks to the arctic supply line, this "Sick Man of Eurasia" that is the Russian Federation may regain its feet too, and do even more damage.
  4. One year one I think it is clear that Michael K. (and other like-minded people, like Rob Lee) is concerned about reaching for conclusions prematurely. That's his job: to think out of the box and try to seek out the black swan. In particular, his concern is that the Russian ability to win this war is discounted prematurely due to the "Winter War"-like experience of Feb-April 2022. There were lots of comparisons out there with the first part of the Finnish-Soviet war of 1939 and 1940. Interestingly, those analogies seemed to forget how the war ended: with the defeat of the Finnish forces, crushed by the material superiority of the Red Army. He has been quite consistent for the time that I have been following him and reading his stuff. And now he's gone to check things by himself (how close to the heat I don't know, but I think we are in agreement that hands-on experience on a topic has intrinsic value). Certainly, the Ukrainians are very good at selling the story that they are in trouble, and use this for maskirovka to misdirect the Russian Army (and also out of necessity, as otherwise, it would be even more difficult for them to get the equipment and ammunition that they do _desperately_ need, like mortars). My thoughts about how hard things may be for the Ukrainian army follow from a very simple mathematical model which has been adopted by NATO war planning for a very long time. If you have blue suffering 1% losses per day, and red 10% losses per day, as long as Red has the ability to replenish the ranks, it won't be long until Blue casualties are also catastrophic (e.g. like losing 20% of fighting personnel, which I think is a heuristic used to determine loss of combat effectiveness). Then there is the tactical psychology angle in all this: the more casualties a well-trained, close-knit force suffers, the less willing it will be to come under fire. Inserting well-trained replacements into those formations (in the style of the US Army in 1944-45) is generally deemed to be a bad policy, so the alternative is to pull out entire formations and let them reconstitute. There is a breaking point for everyone, and I think that making the question re: Bakhmut is valid. It is good to quote Nathaniel Greene regarding Bunker Hill "I wish I could sell them another hill at this price", but like also happened to the Continental Army later in Brooklyn, the roles of "buyer" and "seller" of hills can be traded inadvertently with pretty bad results. I do think though, that drawing further inferences about what this means for hypothetical Spring counter-offensives treads on thin ice.
  5. I see your point re: professionals and not "zek"/shtraf personnel taking the brunt of the fight (and casualties). About Prigozhin's statements... well, he also announced a few weeks the immediate deployment of semi autonomous Wagner UGVs in significant numbers (the real ones that were tested in Syria with "discreet" results, not mannequins on buggies). So please excuse me if I cannot take what he says (or is reported to say) at face value. Having sad that, I have exactly zero knowledge of the Russian language. There may be a tinge of desperation that goes unnoticed.
  6. Bah, forum software ate half my message. Can't be arsed to rewrite it
  7. This was addressed as part of the discussion in the Twitter thread. As @Beleg85and @Haidukmention these are ad-hoc formations that seemingly can only be generated by "division-sized" organic formations. I think you may want to have a professional chat with this guy, btw. As @chrisl
  8. I missed that remark, thanks @LongLeftFlank. Seems that division-sized formations are coming on top as the most viable ones.
  9. I am finding this gentleman's tactical analysis to be a must read in the comments he foresee that these adaptations won't be very successful (?) in light of the top-down approach that dominates the Russian Army. I think this links up nicely the ongoing conversation about the duality of mission and direct command with a case study that is quite fresh. In this case, DC is needed to allocate the resources (manpower, supporting arms) that make up these units. Obviously, MC kicks in when these formations are set in motion (much like a robot but made by people and "dumb" vehicles and weapons) and they need to handle whatever contingencies follow from engaging the enemy (e.g. interesting to see the allocation of a demining vehicle). This is an example of adaptation rather than devolution. It's not clear though that they can implement it well due to materiel and personnel issues. But clearly there is someone, somewhere with both brains and time to come up with ideas...
  10. Thanks for the analysis Chibot. Offensive operations are difficult. One misstep or failure of synchronisation and that's all what a competent defender needs to throw the attacker off the rails.
  11. Luke Harding at The Guardian had an interesting piece touching how cultural legacy is perceived in times of existential war https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2022/dec/31/mikhail-bulgakov-museum-kyiv-calls-to-close
  12. Good luck with the search @Bil Hardenberger I suggest you make a posting on this list as well: SimulatingWar@groups.io
  13. It is definitely looking very rough for the Russian Army. Also and as noted by @Zeleban , the sheer pressure applied in this area is putting the AFU in the Siversk area between a rock and a hard place. As noted by Constantine in the video I linked earlier this weekend, the Siversk area doesn't look easy to defend now that the RuAF is pushing north from the Blahodatne area.
  14. My bad, I should have written "Iberian Peninsula". After ten years away maybe I am becoming something of an interpolation between nationalities.
  15. Totally okay and no need to apologise. If anything, what we need is to look at what things bring European countries together and don't involve football, singing or just mere free flow of money.
  16. Let me kindly indicate you where Galicia or Galiza is, the Old Kingdom of the Suevii. SW Spain is the Alentejo. And I would like also to remind everyone that between Morocco and Spain there is a significant body of water and the last large scale amphibious operation involving mechanised divisions happened in June 1944. Getting mothballed tanks out of storage is neither trivial or cheap. Monetarism and taking part in economic war with the Russian Federation aren't precisely compatible either. It may not seem that way right now, or tomorrow, but "something" in the public consciousness is shifting.
  17. I am halfway through the latest video of Andrew Perpetua and Constantine (two Twitter personalities I have been following for a while) in which they do a "battlefield walk" around Bakhmut I found quite enlightening to see what is the lay of the land in the area of those two pincers that the Russian Army is developing north and south of Bakhmut.
  18. Interesting that you left entirely out the South Western bit of Europe (better food, inflation more or less under control, etc.)... I guess that is the legacy of three hundred years of on-off warfare with France and Spain...
  19. That was what knocked Tank Crew dead in the water for me (and I bought into Tank Crew very, very early and I was happy to keep an open mind). GHPC at least have been showing infantry operating TOWs and stuff, not sure if they have those already integrated into the game.
  20. Bakhmut's defense left flank looks like it is a goner Helios also refers obliquely to some chatter about friction between the Ukr levels of command (which seems to have gone on for a while). Maybe our Ukrainian speakers can write an explainer about what's behind these stories re: lack of unity of command?
  21. Very fun tank sim. But I would auggest to wait for the dynamic campaign to be out.
  22. Well, some parts of the Russian Army may be starting to get some of their ideas right
  23. Apologies if posted already! I have finished reading this "sort of" AAR https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/01/anatomy-of-a-russian-army-village-assault/ I found it quite interesting, well-written and relevant to the recent "Russia's Way of War Sucks" sub-thread. The author seems to arrive at conclusions that diverge a bit from what I think is the sensible, prudent assumption that the Russian Army may be able to change some of its ways. Yet, judging from the reports in Vuhledar I really wonder... We will see what follows now in Luhansk oblast, the RF army has been conducting what look like classic "reconnaissance in force" operations to prepare for a major offensive operation. Or maybe that was it...
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