Rokko

This was the usual annual (or biannual?) draft for mandatory military service in Russia. These don't end up in Ukraine. The same happened in 2022 and 2023, btw.

This was the usual annual (or biannual?) draft for mandatory military service in Russia. These don't end up in Ukraine. The same happened in 2022 and 2023, btw.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This has be to be a joke, right? No way Germany would have sold any weapons to Ukraine pre-02/22. Even the second hand sale of a handful ancient East German howitzers was through Latvia was out of the question. Best we were willing to do was sending 5000 helmets. Supplying arms to "conflict zones" was simply not a possibility in pre-war German politics.

This would be an effect of the meat-for-money exchange between Russia's poorer regions and the central government, no? The question is, where does this money come from and how is Moscow paying for it?

So basically what he is saying is:
1) GER will not get involved in the war directly under any circumstances.
2) Taurus requires GER boots on the ground for target data programming
3) Therefore, sending Taurus is impossible, RU might retaliate against GER, leading to 1).
But if we think this through to conclusion:
- UK and FRA have put boots on the ground for target data programming.
- UK and FRA are allied to GER.
- If RU were to retaliate against UK/FRA, GER apparently does not intend not assist on their behalf, despite being in a military alliance, because 1) otherwise sending Taurus would not make a difference.
I'm fairly sure a RU attack on either UK/FRA/GER in retaliation for them providing personnel for programming cruise missile targeting data would be grounds for invoking Article 5, maybe NATO allies should press Germany on this.

So basically what he is saying is:
1) GER will not get involved in the war directly under any circumstances.
2) Taurus requires GER boots on the ground for target data programming
3) Therefore, sending Taurus is impossible, RU might retaliate against GER, leading to 1).
But if we think this through to conclusion:
- UK and FRA have put boots on the ground for target data programming.
- UK and FRA are allied to GER.
- If RU were to retaliate against UK/FRA, GER apparently does not intend not assist on their behalf, despite being in a military alliance, because 1) otherwise sending Taurus would not make a difference.
I'm fairly sure a RU attack on either UK/FRA/GER in retaliation for them providing personnel for programming cruise missile targeting data would be grounds for invoking Article 5, maybe NATO allies should press Germany on this.

So basically what he is saying is:
1) GER will not get involved in the war directly under any circumstances.
2) Taurus requires GER boots on the ground for target data programming
3) Therefore, sending Taurus is impossible, RU might retaliate against GER, leading to 1).
But if we think this through to conclusion:
- UK and FRA have put boots on the ground for target data programming.
- UK and FRA are allied to GER.
- If RU were to retaliate against UK/FRA, GER apparently does not intend not assist on their behalf, despite being in a military alliance, because 1) otherwise sending Taurus would not make a difference.
I'm fairly sure a RU attack on either UK/FRA/GER in retaliation for them providing personnel for programming cruise missile targeting data would be grounds for invoking Article 5, maybe NATO allies should press Germany on this.

On the other hand, to my knowledge nobody tried to "weasel out" in 2001 on technicalities, like "oh but the US did this and that first" either. Granted, the stakes of going to war were much much lower in that case, so unity came cheap.

Agent Murz published a new post. The most interesting is the number of losses that is being discussed in RU Nats TG channels.  
Unreturnable 16 000 are KIA, MIA (mostly dead as well), and gravely wounded (had to be medically discharged). That gives as plus around 32,000 wounded and total losses around 48,000.

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

I'd like to a bunch of back-of-the-envelope calculations and present them here for "public scrutiny". Lately I have been fascinated by this data set on confirmed RU KIA. Sadly, I can't embed the individual interactive plots, so I'll just use a screenshot or two, but I'd encourage everyone to take a look for themselves. Especially the breakdowns by branch of service and by time are really interesting.
So these people have been collectively gathering data on at least 43,460 killed RU soldiers from all branches (including PMCs and convicts), sampling from a variety of sources, ranging from social-media obituaries to on-site graveyard visits. I am not sure, if this data set includes L/DNR KIA figures or not, but it seems likely to me, since I found a couple of individual records of KIA high ranking officers that fought in (former) L/DNR formations. Now the total figure is obviously too low and one must also keep in mind that the degree of inaccuracy in the weekly KIA figures may also vary, but I think it is not totally unreasonable to assume a factor of roughly 7.2 for total casualties, overall (x3 for WIA/MIA, x2.4 for unreported losses). Note, the site makes a convincing argument, putting the probable WIA:KIA ratio in a range between 1.4:1 and 4:1. Using a 3:1 ratio would put the total figure at around 315,000, which matches with the CIA estimated as stated on this site (I didn't double check this figure or how recent it is). The UKR MOD currently claims just short of 400k for total personnel losses, btw.
Below the figure I am referencing here it says that only for 34,388 out of the total of 43,460 KIA (~79%) the exact date of death is known. I take that to mean the remainder is not included in this figure and, assuming an even distribution of these cases, will include a factor of ~1.26 in all subsequent calculations, i.e., x3.033 for probable KIA and x9.099 for probable total casualties, based on the number of (date) confirmed KIA.

 
If we now look, for example, at the weekly breakdown of all recorded KIA for the duration of the summer/fall 2023 offensive (roughly 01/06 through 4/10, or 18 weeks) we come up with a total of 5,591 confirmed KIA, with the intensity of the fighting seemingly steadily declining after June. So a probable total KIA count for this timeframe would be around 17,000 and 50,900 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this is 310 confirmed KIA, 940 probable KIA and 2,820 probable total casualties. These weekly averages are much lower, by a factor of ~2, than those during the two bloodiest months of the war (01/23 and 02/23) and lower by a factor of ~1.2 than weekly RU losses in 10/23 (right after cessation of the offensive, when the assault on Avdiivka began). Between 29/12/22 and 01/03/23 (9 weeks), which is somewhat arbitrary but roughly coincides with the deadliest fighting for Bakhmut and Vuhledar, the Russians suffered a total of 5,878 KIA, 17,800 probable KIA and 53,500 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this amounts to 653 confirmed KIA, 2000 probable KIA and 5,900 probable total casualties.
I am not totally sure what to make of these figures, maybe others can gather meaningful insight from them, though. I really hope I didn't miscalculate anything. If I did, please correct me. To me, they seem to underline that, considering a RU replacement rate of about 20k per month or 5,000 per week (although we don't know since when and for how long this rate has held or will hold), a strategy focused on personnel attrition is probably not a viable option. Not that anyone would have made that claim. Even in their worst time, this replacement rate would have been almost sufficient to absorb their casualties (at 5,900 weekly casualties only 84.5% over a period of 9 weeks). There are some further caveats to that, I think: Before the fall 2022 mobilization and through early 2023, the RU replacement rate seems to have been much more inadequate before they managed to reach the current high levels, that allow them to absorb even absurdly high casualty rates. So there would have been a serious backlog of unreplaced losses, that would only slowly have been filled by that time. This might serve to explain the RU unwilligness to demobilize (or even just rotate) the fall 2022 mobiks and to just keep them for the duration. These figures also seem to indicate that the 2023 summer/fall offensive was probably never adequate at inflicting debilitating losses to the Russians, at least from a global perspective. How serious these losses affected RU troops locally can not really be concluded from this, although my gut feeling tells me that it probably never got all that serious for them, given that they managed to absorb roughly the same number of casualties in half the time during the winter (while on the offensive).

I'd like to a bunch of back-of-the-envelope calculations and present them here for "public scrutiny". Lately I have been fascinated by this data set on confirmed RU KIA. Sadly, I can't embed the individual interactive plots, so I'll just use a screenshot or two, but I'd encourage everyone to take a look for themselves. Especially the breakdowns by branch of service and by time are really interesting.
So these people have been collectively gathering data on at least 43,460 killed RU soldiers from all branches (including PMCs and convicts), sampling from a variety of sources, ranging from social-media obituaries to on-site graveyard visits. I am not sure, if this data set includes L/DNR KIA figures or not, but it seems likely to me, since I found a couple of individual records of KIA high ranking officers that fought in (former) L/DNR formations. Now the total figure is obviously too low and one must also keep in mind that the degree of inaccuracy in the weekly KIA figures may also vary, but I think it is not totally unreasonable to assume a factor of roughly 7.2 for total casualties, overall (x3 for WIA/MIA, x2.4 for unreported losses). Note, the site makes a convincing argument, putting the probable WIA:KIA ratio in a range between 1.4:1 and 4:1. Using a 3:1 ratio would put the total figure at around 315,000, which matches with the CIA estimated as stated on this site (I didn't double check this figure or how recent it is). The UKR MOD currently claims just short of 400k for total personnel losses, btw.
Below the figure I am referencing here it says that only for 34,388 out of the total of 43,460 KIA (~79%) the exact date of death is known. I take that to mean the remainder is not included in this figure and, assuming an even distribution of these cases, will include a factor of ~1.26 in all subsequent calculations, i.e., x3.033 for probable KIA and x9.099 for probable total casualties, based on the number of (date) confirmed KIA.

 
If we now look, for example, at the weekly breakdown of all recorded KIA for the duration of the summer/fall 2023 offensive (roughly 01/06 through 4/10, or 18 weeks) we come up with a total of 5,591 confirmed KIA, with the intensity of the fighting seemingly steadily declining after June. So a probable total KIA count for this timeframe would be around 17,000 and 50,900 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this is 310 confirmed KIA, 940 probable KIA and 2,820 probable total casualties. These weekly averages are much lower, by a factor of ~2, than those during the two bloodiest months of the war (01/23 and 02/23) and lower by a factor of ~1.2 than weekly RU losses in 10/23 (right after cessation of the offensive, when the assault on Avdiivka began). Between 29/12/22 and 01/03/23 (9 weeks), which is somewhat arbitrary but roughly coincides with the deadliest fighting for Bakhmut and Vuhledar, the Russians suffered a total of 5,878 KIA, 17,800 probable KIA and 53,500 probable total casualties. On average and per week, this amounts to 653 confirmed KIA, 2000 probable KIA and 5,900 probable total casualties.
I am not totally sure what to make of these figures, maybe others can gather meaningful insight from them, though. I really hope I didn't miscalculate anything. If I did, please correct me. To me, they seem to underline that, considering a RU replacement rate of about 20k per month or 5,000 per week (although we don't know since when and for how long this rate has held or will hold), a strategy focused on personnel attrition is probably not a viable option. Not that anyone would have made that claim. Even in their worst time, this replacement rate would have been almost sufficient to absorb their casualties (at 5,900 weekly casualties only 84.5% over a period of 9 weeks). There are some further caveats to that, I think: Before the fall 2022 mobilization and through early 2023, the RU replacement rate seems to have been much more inadequate before they managed to reach the current high levels, that allow them to absorb even absurdly high casualty rates. So there would have been a serious backlog of unreplaced losses, that would only slowly have been filled by that time. This might serve to explain the RU unwilligness to demobilize (or even just rotate) the fall 2022 mobiks and to just keep them for the duration. These figures also seem to indicate that the 2023 summer/fall offensive was probably never adequate at inflicting debilitating losses to the Russians, at least from a global perspective. How serious these losses affected RU troops locally can not really be concluded from this, although my gut feeling tells me that it probably never got all that serious for them, given that they managed to absorb roughly the same number of casualties in half the time during the winter (while on the offensive).

Well, we don't really know whether they needed to be rotated only at the time that they were. My hunch is, they were kept on the line well beyond the point of diminishing returns (of continued deployment), basically until the point of virtual destruction, which has all kinds of negative implications for later reconstituting that unit. Loss rates may be highly in favour of UKR, but from the way they seem to be deploying and relocating their brigades (and particularly, which brigades) I think we can gather that UKR seems to be unable to adequately replace these losses, regardless of how high they are.
At this point, maybe even the Russians are not betting on an operational level breakthrough, anymore. I think they likely have settled for a slow grind through Donbas on a 2-4 year time schedule while grinding their social underclass into red paste (a win-win from their view, I bet) sort of deal. At least currently, it looks to me like this might work out for them, especially if UKR can't keep up with replacing their own losses. Whether this gains them anything of value in the long run is a different question, entirely, of course. And yes, obviously, we also don't know for how long RU can keep this level of recruitment going.
This is most likely true, unfortunately. Which makes me scratch my head even harder that people keep arguing that keeping grinding forward all summer and fall was a good idea. It seems like this Summer offensive only brought the worst of all possible outcomes for UKR: Squandered reserves, stockpiles and winding down Western support. At the least they could be sitting on a comfy stockpile of DPICM, GMLRS and so forth and two corps (probably more like divisions) worth of somewhat uncommited troops to fight for whichever fortified Donbas town RU decides to bash agains next.
I guess the only upside is that UKR is at least not totally screwed as long as China keeps up its military assistence in the form of selling them cheap plastic RC toy helicopters.

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

In the case of Europe I'd say UKR is cut off not due to political will (or lack thereof), but lack of means. The last aid package from Germany mentioned 2500 artillery shells. That's one day of firing and this was a couple of weeks back. And last time I checked, UKR seems to be losing around 3 artillery guns, self-propelled and otherwise, every other week. Europe can't replace those. Shell production will eventually reach useful levels (although we don't know how many of those will actually end up in UKR hands), but I am afraid they will have run out of guns at that point.
 
From what we know, Russia is recruiting 20k (GUR estimate) to 35k (Medvedev bragging) men per month. Their losses are obviously high, but I'd guess given these numbers they are ultimately sustainable, not so for UKR it seems. And how many brigades were they able to smash against Avdiivka, one after the other? If they can keep this up, they'll whittle UKR down eventually this way, if they don't get a grip on their own issues.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.

To me this looks more like desparation than sound military logic. Why throw a specialist assault unit into the fray after only a couple months rest to fend off long looming disaster at the last moment (and lose the fortress in the process), why throw in the 47th (basically already spent) right after the failed counter-offensive, why is a single brigade (110th) required to hold out in Avdiivka for 1.5yrs of war and 4 months of sustained assaults? If things were okayish, the 110th would have been pulled back sometime in October, replaced by the 111th and maybe later bolstered by the 112th (or whatever), both rested and fresh from the Belorussian border. Instead, UKR is force to pull one act of desparation after another. It almost looks as if they just don't have any strategic reserves, at all.
The underlying issue, at least to me, seems to be that RU has been running circles around UKR in terms of force generation for basically all of 2023 and ongoing. They may use these forces inefficently, but are able have brigade after brigade mauled while storming some fortress town, while UKR is forced to send the same couple of fire brigade units from hot spot to hot spot. The fact that UKR is basically cut off from foreign assistance and is likely going to be for the foreseeable future does not help in this matter, but their force generation issues seem to be a largely internal problem.