DMS

Internationalism is not that. Internationalism is opposite to nationalism. It is a belief that humans of all races and nations are equal and have common interests. 

This is Strela-10 in Kiev. Ukrainian government sources claim that Russian saboteurs are dressed in VSU uniform and crashed into this car.

Internationalism is not that. Internationalism is opposite to nationalism. It is a belief that humans of all races and nations are equal and have common interests. 

An excellent review of the prospects of US winning with Active Defense doctrine and why they moved to AirLand Battle. The presenter notes in no uncertain terms that after a 100+ wargames by V Corps, General Starry concludes they never win using Active Defense.
 
 

I am not a big expert on U.S. internal politics, but I think that your rhetoric is somewhat ultra conservative, like right wing in Republican party. And outdated a bit, from 1970-s may be. It's ironic that Biden supports exact copies of his internal opponents.  In addition, many Ukrainian nationalists think, that Russians are actually "Asiatic race". Ideals cost nothing nowadays. (

Russia is ruled by same right conservatives, to be fair. Best receipt for war - to let your local rightists become a government.

This is false dichotomy: you support Putin or you support Ukrainian government! If you note crimes of Ukrainian ultra right government, then you support invasion and destruction of independent state. No. Military threats don't excuse government, that committed many crimes against own people, prohibits opposition political parties and media. But this doesn't justify aggression against this country either. I hope that situation will deescalate.

This is false dichotomy: you support Putin or you support Ukrainian government! If you note crimes of Ukrainian ultra right government, then you support invasion and destruction of independent state. No. Military threats don't excuse government, that committed many crimes against own people, prohibits opposition political parties and media. But this doesn't justify aggression against this country either. I hope that situation will deescalate.

In the critique of the Active Defense doctrine, the US are meant to maneveur its forces to reduce the force ratios of expected soviet attacks, eg from 6:1 down to 3:1 or better so the US defender could apply more of the advantages of the defenders edge in firepower, terrain etc. The idea was the some parts of US battle front was left thinly held and forces transferred to the likely venues of a Soviet massed assault. Could such gaps be safely managed?
Now one of the critiques of the Active Defense doctrine was that it relied on seemingly outdated Soviet concepts of a mass assault, ignoring intelligence on how the Soviets were training and expected the Soviets to ignore experience of the 1973 Arab Isreali War that the US themselves were updating their doctrine to incorporate.
"If the revised doctrine of 1976 was to prove vulnerable on any point, it was one based on a scenario that mayalready have ceased to be realistic by1976: the classic massed armor break-through as the assumed Soviet opera-tional maneuver. Since the manual's tactical descriptions proceeded in reac-tion to this type of penetration, the issue was of no small importance. The doctrinal manual depicted an attack by the enemy on very narrow fronts ingreat depth, with massed firepower in the breakthrough sector. Warsaw Pact forces might throw as many as 600 tanks against a U.S. division in the leading echelon, followed shortly by 600 more. "This doctrine . . . is deeply ingrained in the Soviet Army and if weshould go to war in Europe, those are exactly the tactics we would face."17
By 1976,, "a major shift in tactical operational concepts" had occurred.l8
The Soviets' concern since 1973 about antitank guided missiles had pro-duced a strong awareness of the vulner-ability of their BMP infantry fighting vehicle-the indispensable support ele-ment to the tactics of the rapid and deep classic armor breakthrough. The consequent revival in recent Soviet exercises of another operational maneuver-the concept of multi-pronged attacks by BMP regi-ments reinforced with armor across the entire battlefront seeking holes and weakspots. In training, the Soviets were spending quadruple the time practicing the multi-prong attacks and meeting engagements as they were rehearsing conventional frontal break-throughs. Though many combat sup-port, logistical and leadership problems were evident in the new maneuver,there was no doubt,  about a "tactical revolution" in Soviet militarydoctrine.l9
"Severe ramifications fall from FM 100-5 having built its edifice on but oneof the possible Soviet operational maneuvers."22
So what I'm suggesting is not so much whether its right or wrong, but as an avenue for scenario designers to consider the possibilities of BMP or BTR battalions reinforced with tank companies to attempt breakthrough against thinly held US lines or positions, say with US receiving late game reinforcements (or not as the US intended to operated without tactical reserves) attempting to close the gap before more soviet follow on forces appear. This approach would stand in contrast to the Soviet training scenarios and similar scenarios.
What thoughts could there be from scenario designers on these concepts and could BFC pick them up and issue them as a Battlepack?

Sometimes I think that Haiduk is Kremlin's troll, who infiltrated to this forum for anti Ukrainian propaganda.  He must add "but we will correct them in labour camps", but it would be too fat.

Sometimes I think that Haiduk is Kremlin's troll, who infiltrated to this forum for anti Ukrainian propaganda.  He must add "but we will correct them in labour camps", but it would be too fat.

Great pic!
To build up:
M1 thermal sight modelled in Steel Beasts. You can see one t-62 in the open and one behind bushes at the distance of 1800 meters.

Optical sight:

Concerning Soviet Agava thermal sight. The sight has successfully passed the tests, more than 50 devices were made, but it was not accepted into service. The official reason was not announced, the Army mentioned small vertical field of view. But, as the developers argued, the true reason possibly was military bosses were afraid that field units were not ready to work with sophisticated helium equipment. 

 

Well, the Soviets have not been shy to invest in money when they think it's worth it - missile-armed tanks, gas turbine tanks, night vision, titanium hulled subs, all of which would demand the best available at the time. I think one of the big reasons is that ... the early thermal imagers just aren't that good, due to their very low number of elements.
This is what a M1 might look like through an optical sight with vertical FOV of 35 milliradians (~2 degrees) at 1000m:

Here's what it might look like in thermal. It's hot, so it's white, but we are now in grayscale:
A "Generation 0" sight (such as 1PN59) is said to use only 50 elements, so the vertical resolution is 50 pixels:

↑Despite the picture being maximally simplified and the tank is white to simulate how a tank pops out from its environs due to heat, does that even still look like a tank? It might be a good toy for specially trained recce troops, perhaps by making the straw even narrower. As a tank sight ... needs work.

↑This, with 100 lines, is about the level of a 1st generation tank sight. Agava-1 is said to be 100 lines. Leopard 2's first sight, EMES 15, would also be about this level (at 120 elements). Definitely getting better, but if it is say at 2000m, or the tank is hull down so its bottom is blocked, or you are thinking your target are much smaller and cooler infantrymen, or we degrade its contrast ratio by putting a real background behind it, put coverings on it to reduce its heat transmission ... etc, do you want to pay a substantial amount and look through 35 mrad straws for this?

↑Agava-2, at 256 elements. Ah, definitely becoming useful here. That's when the Soviets decided they finally had a viable tank sight ... but then the Soviet Union broke up.
That may well be the main differential point between NATO and the Soviets - whether to accept a resolution less than the 144p which is the crappiest resolution on Youtube or wait for 240p. I think NATO can accept the lower resolution because they are thinking they need to attack hot, mobile Soviet tanks and are willing to shoot at blobs that are only a bit better than a dot. The Soviets wanted something that can help them hunt down hull down tanks, small TOW jeeps and infantry.

Yes. Here is image from BMP-1 manual. "ЗКВ" - PL assistant. By the way, in this TO&E squad had 2 machine gunners with PKM. ("П" on the picture) Soviet "heavy squad".

Well, in this manual is written that commander must observe the battlefield and find targets. For spotting also.

Yes. Here is image from BMP-1 manual. "ЗКВ" - PL assistant. By the way, in this TO&E squad had 2 machine gunners with PKM. ("П" on the picture) Soviet "heavy squad".

Well, in this manual is written that commander must observe the battlefield and find targets. For spotting also.

More from the article:
Maybe Ukraine should try doing some thinking for itself. 
Seems to me like the west (& especially their media) are fully ready to fight Russia, right down to the last Ukrainian. 

Man, do I also belong to the "we" and the "our" you are writing about? I am from the same country, you know? I have no solidarity with it. Still in the previous ****-storm, and THEY are ramping up the next one already (or just bluffing about it). But I will have no part in any of it.

There was an interesting discussion on Soviet and Western tank comparative capabilities in "International Security" magazine between Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher on one side, and Steven Zaloga on the other side in 1988-1989. Those debates, that happened almost 35 years ago, resemble the discussions we have today on this forum.
First, Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford, UK)and Lutz Unterseher(Chairman of the European Study Group on Alternative Security Policy, Germany) published an article "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets". In this paper they compared Warsaw Pact and NATO tank armies both quantitively and qualitatively. They argued that, despite WP had slight advantage in number of tanks, qualitive advantage of NATO equipment closed the gap and even provided some superiority to NATO.
This article is a real goldmine for those who want to prove that Soviet tanks were inferior, but for the purpose of intellectual honesty I will cite it here and do their homework for them 🙂 It really translates CMCW underlying concept. Anyway, as we will see later, this claims were confronted  by Steven Zaloga. 
Authors estimated that  a ratio between Warsaw Pact and NATO tank numbers in Central Europe of 1.47:1 three days after mobilization, 1.41:1 after ten days, 1.24:1 after 40 days and 1.31:1 after four months.
The average Warsaw Pact tank weighs only 38 metric tonnes compared with 49 metric tonnes for NATO. While the Warsaw Pact has a 2.1:1 lead in numbers of tanks worldwide, therefore, it has a lead of only 1.6:1 in total tank tonnage.
NATO's comparative advantage is also stocks of older generation models. NATO has followed a policy of carrying out major upgrades to ensure that, although the bodies of these tanks are 20 or more years old, the technology is almost comparable to that on its most modern tanks. As a consequence, the quality gap between old and new-generation models is relatively small. In contrast older models of Pact tanksave not been significantly upgraded.
As Chalmers and Unterseher argued, NATO tanks had technological edge in almost every aspect.
They claim, that earlier Soviet tank models are far inferior to any post-1950 Western tank in the all round orientation capability which they give the crew. Soviet tanks have fewer and smaller viewing points on commanders' cupolas, and commanders still have to stick their heads out more in order to observe their surroundings. All Soviet tanks rely on "active" illumination of their nighttime surroundings with clumsy searchlights.
In Soviet tanks, the commander's and gunner's sights used in targeting generally exhibit a low level of sophistication. Soviet range-finding technology lagged for many years well behind that of the West.  The Soviets did not begin to incorporate the more accurate optical base-on-own-vehicle range-finders into some of their tanks  until 20 years after the U.S. had begun to do so.
With the introduction of its T-62 tank in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union pioneered the extensive use of a large caliber, smooth-bore gun. Muzzle velocities of kinetic energy rounds fired from these guns are high. But this advantage is largely wasted because of the gun's poor accuracy, a result of stability problems with the gun barrel and of inadequate quality control on ammunition production.
The difficulties caused by these cramped and dangerous conditions are such that Soviet tank crews must be less than 1.65 meters tall, a constraint that severely limits the recruiting pool for tank crews and could therefore have adverse effects on crew quality.
To conclude, USSR actual numerical advantage is relatively small, ranging from 1.24:1 to 1.64:1. But the qualitive difference transforms it into a NATO combat potential lead of between 1.06:1 and 1.42:1.
In 1989 well known tank expert Steven Zaloga published his answer in the same magazine ("The Tank Gap Data Flap"), where he called  Chalmers and Unterseher arguments "too one-sided and simplistic". In his words, they "in many respects  overstated their case".
Although the authors spend a great deal of time pinpointing technical deficiencies in older Soviet designs like the T-55 and T-62, The Soviet forward deployed forces have been in the process of removing these older tanks from their units in favor of T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks. 
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank design suffer from factual inaccuracies and Western biases in tank design. For example, their assertion that "all Soviet tanks rely on 'active' illumination" is simply false. All Soviet tanks do carry an active infrared search light for nighttime illumination, but the same is true for most NATO tanks produced up to the early 1980s, including the M60A3, Leopard 1 and Chieftain.
In fact Soviets introduced passive night gunner's sights using image intensification technology in the late 1960s with the T-64 and in the early 1970s with late model T-62s; they have been using them ever since. NATO enjoys a comfortable lead in second generation night sights using thermal imaging technology. About a third of NATO tanks have thermal imaging sights, and about 15 percent still rely on the older image intensification sights. But over half of NATO tanks still rely on older active infrared night sights or have no night fighting capability at all. The Soviets have been adopting thermal imaging sights at a much slower pace due to high cost, but over a third of their tanks now have passive image intensification night sights.
The authors' description of shortcomings in Soviet tank fire controls reveals a distinct NATO bias in favor of long-range tank engagements. The use of ballistic computers, wind sensors, and other fire control improvements greatly increase tank gun accuracy at long ranges (over 1000 meters), but have little effect at close ranges. The Soviets feel that simpler fire controls are adequate due to the prevalence of "close-grain" terrain in Central Europe. In German border region, 55 percent of the terrain has sighting ranges of 500 meters or less, 28 percent from 500 to 1500 m, and 17 percent over 1500 m. 
Stadiametric sights, as used on the T-62 and earlier types, are not substantially inferior to advanced fire controls when using Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) ammunition at ranges up to 1000 m, since the ballistic arc of the projectile is so flat. For example, U.S. Army trials suggest that at 500 m, a tank using a stadiametric sight has a 98 percent probability of hit, and a tank with a laser range finder has the same 98 percent probability.In any event, the tanks most likely to be encountered in the first weeks of a conflict in Central Europe, namely the T-64, T-72, and T-80, are all equipped with laser range finders and ballistic computers.
The authors' general conclusion that Warsaw Pact tanks are "much less capable" than comparable NATO tanks is a gross simplification. NATO tanks do enjoy substantial advantages during certain types of tank engagements, such as long-range duels, or night engagements where there is not enough ambient moonlight for image intensification sights to work. But under many average situations, such as tank combat at average (under 1000 m) ranges during daylight, NATO advantages rapidly diminish. 
To draw my own conclusion, I would say that both  Chalmers and Zaloga made strong arguments. It shows that there is no single, already scientifically proven point of view. The thing that we discussed here were debatable earlier and they remain debatable today (though we gain new knowledge and data since then ).   
In my opinion CMCW and CMBS designers have chosen the concept of force balance that is based on arguments as those that were proposed by Chalmers and Unterseher. This is their right of course, and they can provide some arguments to defense their position. 
But what Chalmers-Zaloga discussion showed is that this concept is far from being the only one.  There are other views that can be grounded in facts as well. Which one better for the purpose of game simulation, balance and - the last but not the least - fun, is up to game designers to decide and for players to evaluate. 

I just hope that game engine 5 improves optimization for more modern machines. It's understandable that optimization doesn't always keep up if you have a small team, but lag does hamper my enjoyment quite a bit. 😥

The main problem shooting with open sights is to see the target. Large APC with head above, with sky at background is the best target.

The main problem shooting with open sights is to see the target. Large APC with head above, with sky at background is the best target.

The main problem shooting with open sights is to see the target. Large APC with head above, with sky at background is the best target.

This is right way. Mounted attack was conducted against weak enemy without strong AT defence. During usual attack against strong enemy infantry was moving behind tanks, BMPs stayed behind and moved by leaps from one position to another. (This is written in company/battalion manual 1982)

First of all, after working with the TOW MISSLE SYSTEM for 8 years in the USMC ,it don't make me a TOW MISSLE EXPERT, BUT we had issues with the Regular TOW, Then the ITOW , then finally the TOW 2 came out and we had big issues with the TOW2. Shooting just the regular TOW Missile 10 times, we would have a failure rate of approximately 3-4 missile failures. most of those issues being a Broken Wire from the gun platform to the missile itself. We also had 2 missiles that blew up only 20-30 yards, which was an issue by itself because the TOW missile wasn't supposed to arm its warhead until it went over 50 yards. Here is my last issue about the TOW, they are way to accurate at short ranges. When you fired your TOW MISSILE after the missile leaves the launch tube  the gunner is trying to reacquire its target, then while that's going on , the flight motors kick in and you can't see ****!!!!! around after 10-15 seconds now you can finally make sense out of everything, you can now see the target, see the IR light on the missile and now your heart is pumping hard now because in another 6-10 seconds, your target is getting ready to be obliterated, and they don't even know it!!!!  So if the BF Community can start making the Tows Less Accurate at shorter ranges would be a start, Say from 50 yards to 1,000 yards the hit rate should only be around 60 to 65 percent, From 1,000-2,000 yards the hit accuracy will now be getting better so I would say 70-90 percent, then from  2,000-just over 3,000 yards my percentage would go from 80-95 percent. During Desert Storm during the battle the M2-M3 Bradley had a Huge problems

Although I also think that certain applications of artillery against AFVs (especially in CMBS) seems underwhelming at times, imo Soviet tactics / doctrine does 'work' or have application in CM.
But imo Soviet doctrine / tactics aren't to brainlessly rush into the enemy objective command & conquer style. Imo would the war actually have played out according to CMCWs backstory, I don't think many Soviet commanders will try to push a MRR blindly into a route where the whole recon / forward security element (or both) have become smoldering wrecks.
In my experience in CMCW the USA forces shine when used as one would use a scalpel or similar precision tools, which can be neatly used to cut away the strongest enemy assets while bounding forward under overwatch. Scout, smoke, shoot & scoot, suppress, flank, etc.. (aka recon pull). Engage enemy at distance with TOWs etc, cut off their head than move in for the kill.
The Soviet forces work better with the 'sledgehammer' approach. Choose a place for a main effort (imo ideally after your recon/forward security got a feel for the composition of enemy defenses), bombard the crap out of any potential strongpoints / defenses threatening your main effort. Setup strong firesupport positions (ATGMs, AGL, etc), isolate the main effort / objective by smoking off other parts of the battle field. Than fully commit to the push, move boldly from fire position to fire position and keep shooting anything vaguely suspicious. Continue shooting for good measure. (aka more like a command push).
The sledgehammer approach does usually produce casualties faster. But that's a different issue than the question of whether it 'works' in CM imo. It certainly works better for USSR forces than trying to play them like they are US forces (at least for me).

Of course all battles are different but some things are universal, which don't care about doctrines. Don't rush all your tanks into the open if there's a bunch of potent ATGMs / enemy tanks in good positions waiting for your to do exactly that. Whether your playing USSR, USA, modern or WW2; it will remain true.
Maybe you can get away with it if it if your rolling with a bunch of M1A2SEP against AT-3 Malyutka's or T-55s. But than you're not getting results because of good tactics anyway. 

So, if I didn't save manually, game is lost. Server just transmits current file, without saving previous. But why to delete local files? For disk space? I would better delete them manually.
I like auto PBEM system, but risking long game doesn't worth it...