Combatintman

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Maciej Zwolinski - to give a varied career in terms of postings "Join the Army, see the World" (which was very much a thing then) and all that.  With most mechanized and armoured units based in Germany it meant that, in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps, units would swap between BAOR and the UK and the UK-based units would cover other commitments such as UNFICYP and Belize with everyone getting a Northern Ireland tour thrown in.  Likewise for the infantry, light role was mainly UK-based but also got Gibraltar, Cyprus, Belize, Hong Kong and of course Northern Ireland.  All of the armoured and mechanised types would be in Germany with Northern Ireland thrown in as well.
From an efficiency/role specialisation and treasury point of view it was hugely wasteful .... guess why the arms plot ended?  Bottom line though, it worked well enough and it was useful having units with experience in all of their likely disciplines and it stood officers of those regiments in good stead as they moved on in their careers to do staff jobs and command formations because of the more rounded experience they had gained.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

Funny you should mention the professionals - it was a recruiting slogan for many years. the two videos from the 70s reinforce the professionals slogan plus the requirement to have a whole bunch of skillsets plus the see the world piece:
 

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Maciej Zwolinski - to give a varied career in terms of postings "Join the Army, see the World" (which was very much a thing then) and all that.  With most mechanized and armoured units based in Germany it meant that, in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps, units would swap between BAOR and the UK and the UK-based units would cover other commitments such as UNFICYP and Belize with everyone getting a Northern Ireland tour thrown in.  Likewise for the infantry, light role was mainly UK-based but also got Gibraltar, Cyprus, Belize, Hong Kong and of course Northern Ireland.  All of the armoured and mechanised types would be in Germany with Northern Ireland thrown in as well.
From an efficiency/role specialisation and treasury point of view it was hugely wasteful .... guess why the arms plot ended?  Bottom line though, it worked well enough and it was useful having units with experience in all of their likely disciplines and it stood officers of those regiments in good stead as they moved on in their careers to do staff jobs and command formations because of the more rounded experience they had gained.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour.  To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour.  Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have.  Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup.  According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Acorn 1980 by LGregsec - Issuu
Acorn 1981 by LGregsec - Issuu

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

You've had answers of the required depth from people who've been there and done it and here's one from another 'been there done that guy' - short of putting on a green suit and trying it yourself what has been posted here is as good as its going to get to convey the message.  From the information and analogies in your posts, it is clear you are focused on each individual tank and its operation by the crew in complete isolation.
You seem to be in rather a hurry and the reasons you articulate for that are sound but, the weather and ground conditions are iffy for large scale mechanised operations so the time is better spent training rather than rushing that kit to the front line.  History is replete with examples of how rushing stuff to the front line causes problems, British tanks at the Somme in 1916 and Tigers and or Panthers at Kursk being two vaguely comparisons relevant to the situation now.  Time spent in training and rehearsal is well-spent and lots of people here have rightly criticised the Russian military for launching this operation in a half-bottomed manner and equally criticised the quality of the troops that have turned up as a result of the mobilisation.  It would be unwiser than an unwise thing for Ukraine to adopt exactly the same courses of action as its never time for amateur hour in warfare.

Because they were in the TO&E for the organizations in the engagement.