Combatintman

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

That drew me into watching the clip ... and then I discovered this epic Ukrainian-themed jacket, shirt and tie combo wardrobe fail by the tinfoil hat wearing guy ...

Their info ops are, like most other things we've seen, mediocre beyond belief.

My read on British advances in tank invisibility are that they are called defence cuts. 😉

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

Hopefully they won't try and ship them through the Dardanelles, that ended badly the last time I seem to recall.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

Most of @George MC's stuff is large-scale with bags of armour and all of his stuff is top drawer.  I'm sure he'll drop in and give you his recommendations from his impressive catalogue of scenarios.

Most of @George MC's stuff is large-scale with bags of armour and all of his stuff is top drawer.  I'm sure he'll drop in and give you his recommendations from his impressive catalogue of scenarios.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

So we're back to the doubt thing - a word I used in my first post in this discourse.  I will concede the possibility of some of the contents of that facility being ring-fenced for military use but this does not stretch to the strike targeting  "invasion fuel" that was asserted to be "sure" to bring whatever major Russian formation is drawing supplies from the Belgorod vicinity to a grinding halt.

Hopefully they won't try and ship them through the Dardanelles, that ended badly the last time I seem to recall.

So we're back to the doubt thing - a word I used in my first post in this discourse.  I will concede the possibility of some of the contents of that facility being ring-fenced for military use but this does not stretch to the strike targeting  "invasion fuel" that was asserted to be "sure" to bring whatever major Russian formation is drawing supplies from the Belgorod vicinity to a grinding halt.

So we're back to the doubt thing - a word I used in my first post in this discourse.  I will concede the possibility of some of the contents of that facility being ring-fenced for military use but this does not stretch to the strike targeting  "invasion fuel" that was asserted to be "sure" to bring whatever major Russian formation is drawing supplies from the Belgorod vicinity to a grinding halt.

Hopefully they won't try and ship them through the Dardanelles, that ended badly the last time I seem to recall.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.

Hopefully they won't try and ship them through the Dardanelles, that ended badly the last time I seem to recall.

Most of @George MC's stuff is large-scale with bags of armour and all of his stuff is top drawer.  I'm sure he'll drop in and give you his recommendations from his impressive catalogue of scenarios.

You're missing my point which has been nicely demonstrated already by the citizens of Belgorod turning fuel stations into carparks following the strike desperate to get fuel - this wouldn't have happened had the attack hit a military fuel depot.  It has also been demonstrated in part by the response of the Russian authorities as they have publicly admitted it has taken place.  The net result is that there is a section of the population that now knows that the 'mighty' Russian armed forces cannot protect them, that this war is by no means over and for those living in Belgorod it has triggered panic buying.  It may trigger some of them to evacuate which means that the message propagates more widely.  A small additional bonus effect maybe, but this will also cause some traffic disruption thus hampering military movement down the highways in the area.
Now let's' say that those helicopters zapped some Russian logistical node in a remote area/"Nowheregrad".  The attack can be denied by the Russians and this has less effect in the information operations domain and its a rinse a repeat of other military logistical vehicles getting whacked which we have seen ad nauseum now.  Such attacks of course have an effect but it is more physical than cognitive, and it is very localized say to XX Motor Rifle Brigade's ability to manoeuvre.  
By attacking something in a city we have had a reaction and the Russian military now needs to consider ringing its border cities with SAM systems and/or committing aircraft to CAP coverage of the borders - all of which divert resources from the front.  Or it ignores the problem and risks a repeat attack and more civilian dismay.
There's been a lot of talk here about what 'new warfare' looks like and I think this is an example of it.  Small forces exploiting gaps in a dispersed battlespace attacking carefully selected and weakly defended centres of gravity/targets to achieve operational effects.