Combatintman

The BTG discussion has been interesting - I did find it strange that people leapt on the US BCT vs Russian BTG study because it is an apples and oranges comparison.  As has emerged during the links unearthed during the discussion, the BTG in terms of its look is really no different to a standard NATO Battlegroup or Battalion Task Force.  However the less obvious things are those that matter. 
BTGs were a compromise based on the fact that Russia could not man all of its regiments/brigades so just allocated those combat, combat support and combat service support bodies they had available across the regiment/brigade to either a single or maybe two BTGs.  It is debatable whether these BTGs had any form of collective training before they crossed the border - the ones that went to Belarus should certainly have given the amount of time they sat there before this 'special military operation started.'  Anyway it is a moot point because most of what we have suggests that either the training didn't happen or was insufficient.
Then there is the C2 aspect.  Most of the Orbat diagrams that we look at show that conceptually the BTG can deliver a heavy punch - for instance they are not short on tube or rocket artillery but they have been unable to bring it all together.  Those same diagrams illustrate why in physical terms alone - not many command vehicles in the HQ being the obvious indication.
To add to Steve's point in the quoted post above about parent brigades or regiments.  The revelation of the last week (or so) that in the absence of a Supreme Commander or even a single Land Component Commander to run the whole operation, divisional commanders were just told to do their own thing until an overall commander was appointed a few days back.  This will have compounded the difficulties further down the food chain for any BTG commander who found themselves in the brown smelly stuff - who do they call for help? where are they? what help can they deliver? etc ...
Then there's logistics - which has been done to death, but worth saying again - the CSS slice for BTGs was not up to the task and Russian Army reforms of recent years weakened CSS in the Russian Army from top to bottom.

Indeed ... illustrated perfectly here ...

Ok - I get its a cat and not a human but @TheVulture is bang on.  I recall remarking very early on in this thread during the first 24 hours of this conflict that all I was seeing on MSM was journos on the rooftops of hotels in Ukraine miles away from the shooty-bangy end of the conflict bumping their gums about nothing that added any value regarding the shooty-bangy part of the conflict.  My analogy is it would be like coverage of a football match where 90% of the footage and commentary is about who is in the crowd, the dressing room, in the carpark outside the stadium etc and the final 10% is Liverpool won 2-0 and here is footage of the goals.
They need to give their heads a wobble.

The BTG discussion has been interesting - I did find it strange that people leapt on the US BCT vs Russian BTG study because it is an apples and oranges comparison.  As has emerged during the links unearthed during the discussion, the BTG in terms of its look is really no different to a standard NATO Battlegroup or Battalion Task Force.  However the less obvious things are those that matter. 
BTGs were a compromise based on the fact that Russia could not man all of its regiments/brigades so just allocated those combat, combat support and combat service support bodies they had available across the regiment/brigade to either a single or maybe two BTGs.  It is debatable whether these BTGs had any form of collective training before they crossed the border - the ones that went to Belarus should certainly have given the amount of time they sat there before this 'special military operation started.'  Anyway it is a moot point because most of what we have suggests that either the training didn't happen or was insufficient.
Then there is the C2 aspect.  Most of the Orbat diagrams that we look at show that conceptually the BTG can deliver a heavy punch - for instance they are not short on tube or rocket artillery but they have been unable to bring it all together.  Those same diagrams illustrate why in physical terms alone - not many command vehicles in the HQ being the obvious indication.
To add to Steve's point in the quoted post above about parent brigades or regiments.  The revelation of the last week (or so) that in the absence of a Supreme Commander or even a single Land Component Commander to run the whole operation, divisional commanders were just told to do their own thing until an overall commander was appointed a few days back.  This will have compounded the difficulties further down the food chain for any BTG commander who found themselves in the brown smelly stuff - who do they call for help? where are they? what help can they deliver? etc ...
Then there's logistics - which has been done to death, but worth saying again - the CSS slice for BTGs was not up to the task and Russian Army reforms of recent years weakened CSS in the Russian Army from top to bottom.

Indeed ... illustrated perfectly here ...

Ok - I get its a cat and not a human but @TheVulture is bang on.  I recall remarking very early on in this thread during the first 24 hours of this conflict that all I was seeing on MSM was journos on the rooftops of hotels in Ukraine miles away from the shooty-bangy end of the conflict bumping their gums about nothing that added any value regarding the shooty-bangy part of the conflict.  My analogy is it would be like coverage of a football match where 90% of the footage and commentary is about who is in the crowd, the dressing room, in the carpark outside the stadium etc and the final 10% is Liverpool won 2-0 and here is footage of the goals.
They need to give their heads a wobble.

Indeed ... illustrated perfectly here ...

Ok - I get its a cat and not a human but @TheVulture is bang on.  I recall remarking very early on in this thread during the first 24 hours of this conflict that all I was seeing on MSM was journos on the rooftops of hotels in Ukraine miles away from the shooty-bangy end of the conflict bumping their gums about nothing that added any value regarding the shooty-bangy part of the conflict.  My analogy is it would be like coverage of a football match where 90% of the footage and commentary is about who is in the crowd, the dressing room, in the carpark outside the stadium etc and the final 10% is Liverpool won 2-0 and here is footage of the goals.
They need to give their heads a wobble.

Indeed ... illustrated perfectly here ...

Ok - I get its a cat and not a human but @TheVulture is bang on.  I recall remarking very early on in this thread during the first 24 hours of this conflict that all I was seeing on MSM was journos on the rooftops of hotels in Ukraine miles away from the shooty-bangy end of the conflict bumping their gums about nothing that added any value regarding the shooty-bangy part of the conflict.  My analogy is it would be like coverage of a football match where 90% of the footage and commentary is about who is in the crowd, the dressing room, in the carpark outside the stadium etc and the final 10% is Liverpool won 2-0 and here is footage of the goals.
They need to give their heads a wobble.

Took me three weeks to make that map ...

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

Great video mate - I rarely get further than 5 minutes into these but yours drew me in with a succinct explanation of the ground, objectives and plan.  You followed up during execute with some great vignettes of the battle which were easy to place within the overall situation and some great cinematography.  All in under half an hour - definitely one of the best video AARs I've seen - have a like.

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

Took me three weeks to make that map ...

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

Hi all, I have a new video AAR out today. Since the battle plan kind of flows from the doctrine of the time one on one, it's a bit lighter on the "explaining my plan, showing how that works out, what goes wrong and how to I improvised" content than my last videos. But I hope it's a fun report of this very enjoyable scenario non the less.
 

And about that idea of the Russians 'digging in like ticks'.
UA:  Make my day....
This was flagged as 'sensitive content' but I  can't really see anything very graphic going on.
Mariupol streetscape. Either they fight for every house or they're wasting tons of ammo blasting them all.
 
 

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

But embrace the finished ones:

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

Good to see the media focusing on the core issues.  Jesus wept etc ...

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.

With 36 years' employment in the field I can reassure you that any such biography in 20 years time will be a work of fiction from someone bigging themselves up.  The US, having recently and with popular assent somewhat untidily extricated itself from one conflict last year is in no rush to become involved in another one directly. 
Enablers such as providing situational awareness, intelligence sharing plus lethal and non-lethal aid are of course being provided.  The old adage of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it" will certainly be uppermost in the calculus of the US and its NATO allies which again makes direct intervention or other capers like officially sanctioned 'American Legions' highly unlikely.  History proves that 'deniable ops' simply aren't and that is particularly so in the current information environment.
'Almost perfect situational awareness' resulting in stuff mysteriously blowing up is also in the realm of 'doesn't happen.'  People are quick to tell me that "the int was rubbish" - "we weren't warned" etc, which is frequently an excuse to hide their own failings (not reading the intelligence or ignoring it (Mr Putin refers) being fairly common) or their misperception about the art of the achievable by the intelligence cell, unit or agency.
The factors for Ukrainian success are well-documented, roadbound columns, little or no attempt to enforce tactical spacings, little or no attempt at camouflage and concealment and the use of insecure communications on the part of the Russians.  On the part of the Ukrainians, once the limited axes of advance have been identified a combination of mark one eyeball, UAVs and tactical SIGINT provide sufficient means to develop a tactical picture of sufficient granularity to strike.   That they have been able to do so is because they have developed a command and control architecture which has allowed this information to be shared and acted upon quickly.  Some of it is very unsophisticated as explained on some of the videos we have seen:  UAV team goes out, launches from a wood near one of the identified road, flies the UAV until a target is seen and passes the target grid over VHF direct to a mortar unit.  BDA sent over same means, rinse and repeat as necessary.  Combat or tactical intelligence isn't particularly hard if you have a tactically incompetent and undisciplined opponent moving along easily identified axes of advance.