Narses

Great a little bit of contested China. Kicked out of Burma, about to be totally beaten by the Soviets, no longer in the Philippines. In addition no navy and the entire country open to B29 strikes. Only islands controlled those we didn't care about. Japan was starving, no oil was getting in, no coal from Manchuris. They were handing out bamboo sticks to the population to kill the invaders. US subs, surface ships and aircraft sunk 2,534 ships of 8,897,393 tons. They had no merchant marine. Subs got 1178 ships of slightly over 5 million tons and another 214 naval craft of 578,000 tons. Nukes were used to avoid US casualties and Japanese casualties and wind up the war. The point here is we could've done nothing but blockaded Japan in 1945 and waited for them to beg for peace after millions died of starvation. In addition we wanted our few still alive POW's back that hadn't been murdered already.

Uh, really ? "....Japan held on to almost all their gains until they got nuked. Even then they weren't invaded and they got to keep their Emperor." Wow! Lets see the US had totally throttled Japanese shipping and resources and food could not get into Japan. The US was in Okinawa !!!! They had lost most of their islands except the ones the US decided to bypass. They were nuked so the US could force surrender and not have to invade and then the US occupied the country and hanged the war criminals.

Why not just consider: Why declare war against the USA. That was the killer.

Correct. In Millett & Murray's book, Military Effectiveness, Vol II, The Interwar Period, pg 245 it talks about the great expansion taking place with the Wehrmacht in the Nazi period and says, "... NCOs and reserve officers being constantly added to the active force as officers, ...".

I did some research and found that in the peacetime WW1 German Army plt leaders were Lts. Of course the peace time 1914 army was only about 550,000 men (backed up by 6 million trained reserves of which 3 million were older men of the Landstrum). By 1917 Gudmundsson in his book Stormtroop Tactics, pg 105, (pub 1989) says "By this time most platoon commanders were staff sergeants (Vizefeldwebel), temporary officers (Offizierstellvertreter or Feldwebelleutnants), or very junior 2nd Lts. Most companies were commanded by second Lts, while most battalions were commanded by captains." This statement comes from a page on the introduction of the German LMG in Dec 1916 so I believe he is saying around mid 1916 at least the plt leaders were mostly NCO's or "temporary" officers (NCO). In the 1918 Germany Army Handbook published by the US it says these Offizierstellvertreter did not receive officer privaleges. I can guess but not sure exactly what that means. Haven't gotten to the 1930's yet. So if true in VV1 and it was true in WW2 it seems they probably did it under the restrictions of Versailles in the 20's and 30's.

Well, BF gave you the answer. I would've said "I think so or else what is the point in selecting in QB or Editor the skill level of your units. Its very frustrating of course to watch your unit go to nervous and rattled but **** happens.

You are so right - the arcs don't always work and the fausts or schresks will fire from too far away. Frankly, depending on the quality of your unit this is very reasonable. Under the stress of combat this will happen. Many inf units in Normandy were not yet fully trained (even in 17SS) and some of the static units had poorly motivated ethnic Ost troops or whole units of men over age 30 with various issues (medical, training, previously highly skilled and deferred, etc, etc). However firing your personal weapons does not seem like combat stress to me. More likely the rattled troops would fire the anti tk weapon at too long a range and then try and get away or totally freeze and not fire. It might make more sense not to let them fire their pers weapons while they still have a antitk weapon and rockets to fire. Complicated writing that in the program perhaps.

Your thoughts seem correct especially on the holding of the faust. I note on the first video as you said the clean look. Also no other Germans anywhere in view. Many of the other videos are obviouly authentic like the GI firing one.

No one in their right mind would've tried after July 20 ! There were several good attempts to kill Hitler. The best was the bomb placed on his plane that failed to go off. Then there was the officer wearing a strapped on bomb at a show of new uniforms that Hitler suddenly for no apparent reason decided at the last minute not to go to. And others........

Great response. Didn't the old gentleman also say something to the effect that he couldn't even change the guard outside his door without OKW (Fuehrer) permission.

I think you're right on the Panther. It was designed as a much lighter panzer. In Jan 42 the final determination was for a pz of 36 tons. It ended up on the A version (most common in Normandy I think) at nearly 45 tons. The final drive and numerous other components were mostly not redesigned to accomodate that weight (added armor). I would expect crews would be extremely careful even under threat. I don't see the point of comparing a modern tank (ok a kanjagdpz) with the WW2 tanks. I have seen most of the then modern German armor while stationed in Germany in the early 60s thru late 1979. although not running under stress. They were designed in peacetime and Im sure they were not compromised in design as the Panther was under severe wartime pressures.

Some really good points here. Yes, an active defense which was von Manstein's choice on the Eastern Front for which he was fired. Rommel was wrong. A study of Italy would have shown the difficulty of destroying an Allied beach assault in the face of a huge naval and air advantage. Not just superiority but supremacy. Probably nothing would've worked, certainly not von Schweppenburg idea for a major armor counterattack from units held deep inland and waiting to determine the Allied main thrust. The German units were no longer completely mobile. Yes tank strength was impressive and qualitatively very good but trucks and SPWs were lacking and could not move because of Allied air supremacy. And qualitatively the infantry was a mixed bag in 1944 with many units in France being restored from the East Front losses while the permanent units based in Franch were in many cases not well trained, equipped or mobile ( no transport and often in the static divisions no towing vehicles to reposition PAK's or artillery). Perhaps instead of all that wasted concrete and rebar on the beach making impressive Wochenschau newsreels of the 14" guns a 100km deep successive defensive positions ala the Soviets at Kursk would've worked better along with small mobile all-arms brigades.

You certainly have a point about Grofaz even in the summer of 41 you will recall he refused to release newly manufactured tanks in Germany for the panzer units fighting in Russia so he could build further new panzer divisions. Guderian had to plead for engines for his 2nd Pz Group and received 300 but actually needed more. But after the bad winter of 41 the writing was on the wall. In order to make the 42 offensive in southern Russia effective the Wehrmacht had to strip the units of Center and North especially the armor in order to fit out the units in the south. The second pz bm of most pz divs in Center and North were withdrawn to South (actually Army Groups A and . But another issue was Gofaz's strategic planning as you will certainly recall. The Barbarossa campaign was to be over in the fall of 1941 and Hitler's strategic planning had already put in place a reduction in army forces, ammunition and material (all which was felt by fall and winter) to switch Germany's industry to a build up of the other services (Luftwaffe and Navy).

You are certainly right about panzer production in 1944. My point is for a country attempting to conquer all of Europe and GB the panzer production (tanks, assault guns, SP guns) figures for 1939 thru 1941 are shocking ( roughly 247, 1643,3790, 6180). In fact the UK alone outproduced Germany through 1942. For 1943 and 44 you are correct, they are very respectable at 12,063 and 19,002. The figures are from The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Sept 1945. Another factor was industrial capacity. Expansion was very difficult and workers were in short supply. Recall in 1943 Guderian as Inspector General of Armored Troops stepped in to stop the halt in production of the PzIV in favor of the Panther. Yes, he would've rather had the Panther but to stop production in PzIV plants to retool for the Panther would mean the loss of 4-6 mos production of Pz IV by industry's own projections - a loss the panzer divisions could not afford even for more Panthers. Hence the PzIV soldiered on. Not sure I want to open a discussion on Strategic Bombing here but the SB Survey I quoted does say (pg 66) "Only a few sporadic attacks upon the panzer industry were made before August 1944." Most of those were RAF strikes: Oct 43 at Henschel ( only Tiger producer) at Kassel, April 44 on the ZF gear box factory and the Mayback engine plant, etc. This Survey calculates from interviews with the Germans that the attacks of 1944 cost a loss of about 2200 panzers.

I agree and almost didn't post those numbers. Claims of tank kills are even more suspect like bomber crews reports of fighters shot down. One of the interesting things about several Allied examinations of German panzer losses in Normandy and France reflects the highest numbers, if I recall correctly (I think Zetterling for one quotes them), came from abandoned vehicles either destroyed or otherwise left by their crews - possibly a result of lack of fuel or breakdowns. Of course these kinds of losses happen when you don't control the battlefield and fall back. Then even minor damage or breakdowns can cause a loss that should not happen. So ion most cases the allies would be able to recover lightly damaged bu nonmobile armor.

Probably why the Stug did so well on the Eastern Front where ranges were usually much longer. Another important advantage for the Stug was it had better sighting equipment from what I've read.

17 Pz Grd Div had a pz abteilung but it was only equipped with Stugs. It received only 3 PzIV Befehlswagen and no Stug or Marder replacements during Normandy. Both 9 and 10 SS Pz Div had some companies in their Panzer Rgt equipped with Stugs. 21 Pz Div had only Pz IV, no Panthers and some captured French tanks. 116 Pz Div had 76 Panthers and 86 Pz IV but received no replacements during the summer ( but the Pzjaeger Abt did receive 21 Jagdpanzer IV in July). Actually panzer production was low compared to their enemies and was overwhelmed by Soviet and US production. Very roughly 50,000 each of Shermans and T34 (76 and 85) alon not even counting M10, 18, 36 and all the Sov SU types. Many pz divisions in Normandy didn't receive replacements for losses and/or had on hand less than authorized. Some of this was because the one thing Allied air supremacy did well was to tie-up, dislocate, hinder and slow down German rail movement.

I have a report showing during June, July, August the US lost 895 tanks (all types) and the British/Canadians 1535. Cannot verify this but it would seem legit that the Brit/Can lost more faced as they were around Caen by the main German armor. I'm assumig these are total write-offs - maybe but report doesn't say.

According to German reports from Normandy and the Bocage areas the troops did not like the Stug as it was very difficult to use effectively they said in the Bocage - profile too low and without a turret it was difficult in that restriced area to bring the gun to bear. This was in Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2.

Another issue is those "elite" divisions were in bad shape. France was used as the R&R location for East Front units. Only 21 Pz and 2 Pz were just about fully up to speed on personnel, training and equipment. For example 2SS Pz on 15 May was short 2000 trucks, all its authorized SPW (326) and 90 PzIV and 72 V's. By 1 June for this divison some things improved like receiving 235 SPW and having a few more panzers but still only 617 trucks. 1SS Pz was only transferred from the East Front in April 44 and like 2 SS was short of everythhing . On 1 June it had only 38 Panthers and 42 Iv's but did have 44 Stugs and over 1000 veterans were in Germany for training. Even Fallschirmjaeger-Rgt 6 with a mostly veteran cadre had only 70 French truck of 50 different types !! But it did have 4000 men - a big rgt - but a bit weak in artillery.

The SS-Panzeraufklaerungs-Abteilung 17 was organized with 5 companies: 1 (PzSp), 2, 3, 4 (Aufkl), 5 (schw). This unit started moving on 7 June and was past St Lo by 8 June. Since this division did not seem to have SPW (250 or 251) haltracks and the Marders and Stugs were on flatcars as part of the PAK Abteilung I don't know what was in the 1st or 5th company of the Aufklaerungs Abteilung. But CMBN has a correct Aufklaerungs set of units. It seems to me the 5th Co should have mortars or towed 7.5cm le.IG at least. Hope this helps.

To repeat my earlier post the positioning of the invasion forces were done based on the location in England of the forces. Ike's Chief of Staff (Bedell Smith) is referenced as saying it was because the US Forces were in cantonment ares in southwestern England and thus in position to take the Cotentin area. This could not be changed given the huge size of the forces and material.

The British and Canadians took the left flank of the invasion - Gold, Juno, Sword - and the Americans the right flank - Utah, Omaha - simply because of organizationl reasons. When US forces arrived in England they were placed in southwestern England and that directed they should come in on the right (Cherbourg to St Lo). Any movement of the US to the east of England and the British/Canadians west would have create transportation chaos. Monty was the invasion's ground cdr (21st Army Grp) and did anticipate having to secure his left flank around Caen ( Dempsey's Second Army) against heavy German armored counterattacks ( 47th Pz Korps and 1st SS Pz Korps) while his subordiante army cdr Bradley (First US Army) took the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg establishing ports and a logistical base for the Allied forces. ( Reference: Decision in Normandy by Carlo D'Este, pg 72 - Why the US was on the right flank, etc.)

I truly enjoy this game and the great effort by Battlefront and yes, even akd. I realize that at this time in the games life the game and interface, problems, etc stand first. When I get a great game like this (and thanks akd for all your hard work testing) I usually immediately start rereading about the events (and playing). When I relooked at 17th SS - one of the first large scale better units to engage (before 2ndSS Pz arrived) - I was amazed to see they had to no fausts and then saw the other problems so I thought I'd share. I choose the title as 17thSS thinking guys would realize it was about history not the game. Thanks JasonC, yes 12, 15cm SP.

This division which figures importantly versus the US and especially the US 101 Airborne Div mostly arrived near Carentan around 10 and 12 June 1944. The unit history of this division by H. Stoeber pg 64 (Die Sturmflut und das Ende) claims the division had no Panzerfaeuste and only received that weapon in mid-July. Another online site indicates it had many Germans from Romania serving. In addition Zetterling in Normandy 1944 ( pgs 363- 369) shows the division's manpower and weapons and records that the unit while having a strength of over 17,000 men was very short of officers and noncoms (40%). In addition, like many German units in France the 17th was critically short of trucks, prime movers and vehicles of all kinds. In a 15 May report it indicated it had only 257 trucks and towing vehicles this being short over 1600. It had no SPW (250 or 251). Otherwise it was fairly well equipped with 42 Stugs and 12 Marders (on 1 June). It also had 44 2cm Flak guns and 7, 2 cm Flakvierling as well as 99, 8cm mortars and 12, 8.8cm Flak. It also had 22, 7.5cm Pak and 37 tubes of artillery in its arty rgt.