Lethaface

This is such a weird take to me as to be somewhat incomprehensible. Like, we seem to be operating in different factual universes. Italians bogged down in Albania? How is that an apt comparison?
What particular weapons systems are we depleting the reserves of? We've been culpably stingy with our second and third tier weapon systems. Your points contradicts one another. If China is learning to fight a western military that doesn't use any of its airforce, any of its modern deep strike capability, any of its naval capability, any of its modernized mech force... learn on, I guess?
On the contrary, everyone is learning that the shape of the battlefield has changed, and changed in ways that seriously favor the defender. The PLAN has to be looking at the videos of the SeaBaby double taps and thinking hard about what their losses crossing the Taiwan strait would look like.
Everybody is looking at the rise of low-energy precision fires and wondering how totally that's broken mechanized mass.
Everybody is looking at the totally illuminated battlefield and wondering how complete their ground-to-space ISR system is.

Crocus saga and very accurate comic. How, tell how one cannot think in stereotypes about Russian state apparatus :
Still worth to note he wrote "tsar" twice not by capital letters; he is getting out of from. Also, I think it is more "Dove Book" in English, but Pigeon sounds nicer.

There was all sorts of jiggery-pokery going on with UK force structures at the time involving the usual suspects - cap badge rivalry and saving cash on the defence budget.  In essence this played out along the lines of all recce assets being owned by the RAC and anything that the RA could claim being owned by the RA.  Recce regiments are a good example - all armoured and infantry regiments lost their recce CVR(T) platoons/troops to RAC recce regiments and all infantry/MBT-equipped tank regiments lost their antitank assets to the RA.  In the case of anti-tank stuff, the RA formed independent antitank batteries (all RHA) followed by the inevitable discussion about how they would be employed - as batteries in their own right, parcelled out etc etc until ... surprise, surprise, everyone changed their minds again and all of the stuff returned from whence it came.  Have a look here ...
(69) Swingfire 1977-1984 | Army Rumour Service (arrse.co.uk)v
 

How is this really a problem, though? I mean, it's not like we paid money up front or something. Sure, we don't get our curiosity satisfied but that is all the hurt that is done, right?
Some do, some don't. Communication costs money, either because the devloper can't spend the time used for communication on finishing the product or because a dedicated communications guy is hired. You invest the money if you think it pays off. You keep potential customers up to date to get the hype train started, to get feedback early on or to find investors, for instance. But this is a double-edged sword. The hype train, once going, is hard to stop or to steer in another direction and customers, especially in gaming, get hyped about what they want to hear not what was actually said. Feedback is rarely representative because it is usually a loud minority that demands X and claims to speak for the whole community. And then there is always the danger that people form a negative opinion based on a product they've never actually seen and won't buy it later when it is released.
I just develop a stupid little tool in my free time and I am very cautious about when and what to tell you guys. 😉

Also, while we all want to know how long we have to wait, I'll take "when it's done" over a fixed release date at which the product has to ship at all costs every time if it ensures the product is properly finalized.
 

...   

Any reason why Mikey?
Oh, I see.

It is and always has been. There are things you can do to stack the odds in your favor, and it sounds like you did that to a degree. But in Combat Mission, and I would argue in real life, doing everything the right way doesn't guarantee success. Of course, the corollary to that is sometimes you can screw up and still win.

That bit is pretty uncontroversial; imposing a sanctions regime means that theoretically no goods or services or money goes in to the target country and nothing (again, ideally) comes out. So the US loses a market for its exports, and also loses a source of cheap or otherwise desirable imports. That's at the very least disruptive, and likely to cause at least some damage in terms of missed opportunities. For example, take the economic pain and disruption a couple of winters ago when Germany abruptly stopped importing Russian gas.
The gamble/assumption is that "your" economy can handle the disruption, and "theirs" cannot.
Now, whether that is "really" hurting the US economy ... well, I mean, it's Swanson McNear. He couldn't tell you the current weather or the time right now without putting some dishonest spin on it.
"Sure, it's sunny outside but it's going to rain this afternoon because Biden is old" or "it's just turned 11am but in only a few weeks it'll be midday - lunchtime! - when the Democrat's con of daylight savings starts! Having lunch while it's still the morning makes no sense!"

dumbest he ever heard eh?  Guess he doesn't listen to his own broadcasts.

😁

Now that is the kind of statement I would like to hear from more countries.
Honestly getting tired of seeing Ukrainian civilians be killed and Ukrainians not even being able to strike legitimate military targets inside Russia, with some of the weapons that they are provided.
You go Finland! 🇫🇮

Because Scholz won't send Taurus ;-).

Because Scholz won't send Taurus ;-).

Because Scholz won't send Taurus ;-).

Lol why is Germany always such a strange topic on here. Scholz says that Germany doesn't want to get directly involved in the war, he didn't say that he fears direct retaliation by Russia as a reason for not getting directly involved. He just said that they don't want to get directly involved as a policy. Now whether one agrees with the policy, or whether one does agree assisting Ukrainians with Taurus is actually being directly involved in the war isn't a relevant subject for speculation about Germanies involvement in article 5. Article 5 is in a whole other ballpark universe.

Now one can also speculate about article 5, but going there based of the supposed background reason for a policy not wanting to get directly involved in the war (given that one believes sending Tauris would be doing so), is rather farfetched to say it diplomatically. It is an attribution error based of speculative judgments, about what the reason might be for a certain policy and whether that policy might come from a tendency inside Germany to not uphold to their treaties. They certainly DON'T have treaty which obliges them to send cruise missiles to Ukraine and assist Ukraine with firing them,  neither does UK and FRA seeming to do so has any relevancy to Germanies interpretation of stuff and their sovereignty position (also neglecting any potential technical differences between Taurus / Stormshadow which might have impact; do I think that is the case? no but I don't have information to confirm/deny that premise).
Now to keep things much more simple, which I prefer and usually is good practice: it could just be that Germany / Scholz is less 'flexible' when it comes to interpreting whether assisting Ukraine firing Taurus is being 'directly involved in the war'.
UK and France might just 'bend the rules' in their mind and establish the position they are 'not' directly involved in the war even if they assist Ukraine firing their missiles, while Germany might feel it is if doing the same thing.
UK/Fra might reason that there is little difference between supporting Ukraine to use weapon system A or B, while Germany might reason there is a big difference.
In fact such differences are not surprising at all, if one has some experience within EU/countries in question. 

While the naval successes where/are impressive and had tangible strategic affects (grain corridor for one), those were imo not directly influencing the military operational reality. For that Ukraine would have to sink at least as much ships as they have done until now. Russia can (afaik) still launch cruise missiles and ferry supplies, just less then before.

The recent successes against the RU Air force are, however, going to have direct impact on the operational reality / military equilibrium if Ukraine can sustain these numbers. Because Russia, like others said, can't sustain these losses. 
And to my eyes at least it looks like these are not incidents anymore. Russia can't lose another couple of A-50s in a couple of weeks. 

Also, seriously degrading Russia's airborne early warning capability over Ukraine could have many implications, making life for Russian planes even harder then it already is. One can imagine planes dropping glidebombs getting ambushed by Ukr fighters, etc.
So, strategically the recent 'air show' is imo the most promising development with potential large strategic implications we have seen since, quite a while? 
Now add a few dozen f-16s in the mix and things might get even more interesting. Bye glidebombs, hi JDAMs. What might Ukraine be able to enable using those? I expect/guess/hope more then Ru can do with meat attacks supported by glidebomb artillery.

Anyway it's a bit too early to start a chant yet, but it's sure is looking promising imo!

While the naval successes where/are impressive and had tangible strategic affects (grain corridor for one), those were imo not directly influencing the military operational reality. For that Ukraine would have to sink at least as much ships as they have done until now. Russia can (afaik) still launch cruise missiles and ferry supplies, just less then before.

The recent successes against the RU Air force are, however, going to have direct impact on the operational reality / military equilibrium if Ukraine can sustain these numbers. Because Russia, like others said, can't sustain these losses. 
And to my eyes at least it looks like these are not incidents anymore. Russia can't lose another couple of A-50s in a couple of weeks. 

Also, seriously degrading Russia's airborne early warning capability over Ukraine could have many implications, making life for Russian planes even harder then it already is. One can imagine planes dropping glidebombs getting ambushed by Ukr fighters, etc.
So, strategically the recent 'air show' is imo the most promising development with potential large strategic implications we have seen since, quite a while? 
Now add a few dozen f-16s in the mix and things might get even more interesting. Bye glidebombs, hi JDAMs. What might Ukraine be able to enable using those? I expect/guess/hope more then Ru can do with meat attacks supported by glidebomb artillery.

Anyway it's a bit too early to start a chant yet, but it's sure is looking promising imo!

While the naval successes where/are impressive and had tangible strategic affects (grain corridor for one), those were imo not directly influencing the military operational reality. For that Ukraine would have to sink at least as much ships as they have done until now. Russia can (afaik) still launch cruise missiles and ferry supplies, just less then before.

The recent successes against the RU Air force are, however, going to have direct impact on the operational reality / military equilibrium if Ukraine can sustain these numbers. Because Russia, like others said, can't sustain these losses. 
And to my eyes at least it looks like these are not incidents anymore. Russia can't lose another couple of A-50s in a couple of weeks. 

Also, seriously degrading Russia's airborne early warning capability over Ukraine could have many implications, making life for Russian planes even harder then it already is. One can imagine planes dropping glidebombs getting ambushed by Ukr fighters, etc.
So, strategically the recent 'air show' is imo the most promising development with potential large strategic implications we have seen since, quite a while? 
Now add a few dozen f-16s in the mix and things might get even more interesting. Bye glidebombs, hi JDAMs. What might Ukraine be able to enable using those? I expect/guess/hope more then Ru can do with meat attacks supported by glidebomb artillery.

Anyway it's a bit too early to start a chant yet, but it's sure is looking promising imo!

Didn't they already do it, light? Kherson already has operational implications, as glide bombs and forces (etc) Russia deploys to that area can't be deployed somewhere else. 
Imo it's already a good opportunity for attriting Russia's capabilities in a favorable way. Sure the scale might not be same as other fronts, but every little bit helps. The risks are also not that high for Ukraine, sometimes one has to make a play with pawns / some pieces in one place, in order to force the opponent to react to it and enable other pieces/operations to come into play.
And indeed who knows what kind of options might come forth from it, surely Russia can't neglect it unless they want to test whether unopposed light might create an instance of deep infiltration and exploitation in the rear; this time without the traditional heavy mass breakthrough preceding it.
Not putting pressure on Kherson front would certainly be favorable for Russia, imo.

Well, yes. Is there somewhere else you think it should rest?

Didn't they already do it, light? Kherson already has operational implications, as glide bombs and forces (etc) Russia deploys to that area can't be deployed somewhere else. 
Imo it's already a good opportunity for attriting Russia's capabilities in a favorable way. Sure the scale might not be same as other fronts, but every little bit helps. The risks are also not that high for Ukraine, sometimes one has to make a play with pawns / some pieces in one place, in order to force the opponent to react to it and enable other pieces/operations to come into play.
And indeed who knows what kind of options might come forth from it, surely Russia can't neglect it unless they want to test whether unopposed light might create an instance of deep infiltration and exploitation in the rear; this time without the traditional heavy mass breakthrough preceding it.
Not putting pressure on Kherson front would certainly be favorable for Russia, imo.

You guys are dancing around the central reason of why a UA action in this area would matter - it is where the RA is weakest and least prepared.  The Krynki bridgehead has really been a proof of concept, not easy but the UA can sustain a light force against opposition on the other side of a river.
Now, can they do that in multiple locations?  The aim here is not to become Lords of Marshlands, it is to threaten Russian LOCs in the entire sector.  This will force an RA response and reallocation of forces (in the biz we call this “seizing the initiative”) or risk having to pull out.  That is the value of this operation, not water buzzard nesting grounds.
The next question is “can they do it, light?”  Can they upscale Krynki but not run afoul of the dangers of mass in this war?  This we do not know.  Light has done some pretty amazing stuff in this war, but mostly on the defence.  We saw hints at Kharkiv as Light forces broke out, not heavy.  But I am still not sure if light infantry, precision fires and unmanned can actually pull off a series of sustained raids that create (as opposed to enable) operational effects leading to decisions.  All I can say is that if I wanted to try out that theory, I would pick the Kherson sector.
My three points are 1) the value of the terrain is that it would put operational (and possibly) strategic pressure on Russia in an area of vulnerability. 2) The terrain favours a light force approach due to logistical and ISR realities, and 3) It expands Ukrainian strategic options, as opposed to locking them into a grinding war of attrition.
But as you say, we will have to wait and see.

... are you aware of how article 5 works?
When invoked, the NATO countries meet for a decision on whether article 5 was invoked for a good reason by a country based on available intelligence.
It's not a criminal court case in which guilt has to be proven "beyond reasonable doubt", so the standard of evidence is lower. 
But article 5 is not an automatism. And whichever head of government convenes for that meeting is aware of the gravity of what will be decided together.
 

I'm no expert but if a NATO member sends soldiers outside of NATO territory to participate in a war and then gets targeted by the other party, why should that trigger article 5? If the US defends Taiwan and China strikes the US, would that trigger article 5?
Anyway I'm not going to argue for or against one side but it's really up to each nation to decide if they want get actively involved in war (outside of NATO obligations, of course), I think. Just because France and UK do it doesn't mean everyone else is suddenly obliged to do it, too.