Krautman

Well, I dare to disagree. Caesar did not know that Pompeius was dead until he landed in Alexandria. But anyway, he was the victor of Pharsalos, so he probably didn't expect any serious opposition there. What was reckless was not the fact that he landed there, but rather his involvement in Egyptian throne policy (Ptolemaios was almost fully accepted before Caesar arrived and supported Cleopatra) and his demand for a monetary contribution and long forgotten debts from Egypt, which had supported Pompeius in the previous war. You are certainly correct about the arrogance Caesar displayed; I guess you were alluding to his march into Alexandria with the lictores in front. But again, political blunders, and not military ones, started his problems there. From what little I know of the actual fighting, Caesar, although in some dire situation, did quite well; he managed to keep his drinking water clean, which his enemies tried to poison, and took and held Pharos until Mithradates arrived, then took Ptolemaios' stronghold. Even though the whole situation was born from various blunders, Caesar was able to solve it pretty nicely, from his perspective. I furthermore disagree with your repeated assertion that Caesar was not into preparatory planning. You keep mentioning his faulty policy in Egypt to support this, and you also quoted Fuller. All historians agree that what Caesar did in Egypt was probably unnecessary due to Pompeius' death, and astonishingly fault-ridden. In my previous post I emphasized that. But you can't regard his performance in Egypt as a general indicator of what Caesar's policy and his whole character was like, it was the contrary. As I said, Caesar, while surely being audacious like few others, was known for his meticulous research and had a staff collecting all kinds of info. Do you think he could have conquered Gallia without the best possible preparations? The way he exploited the oppositions within the Gallic tribes, the way he used Diviciacus, the way he made the Helvetii give him enough time to prepare his defences... What he was excellent at was logistics and planning; marching and living through the winter with an army wasn't easy in antiquity, considering the low agricultural production. Caesar was much better at that kind of preparation and planning than his numerally superiour Gallic foes, who were familiar with the climate and the terrain. Do you think Caesar's initial withdrawal from Alesia was due to a loss of determination from Caesar's side? He just knew when it would become difficult to provide food for his troops. I'm sure that Phillippe could go into more detail here, but I anyway guess he would second that Caesar won the Gallic wars mostly due to superiour planning + logistics. Apart from military issues, his whole cursus honorum was a masterpiece of planning and preparation. You know, this is what I was alluding to when I said a military historian might be unaware of the larger picture. Fuller, judging from your posts, saw an overly audacious Caesar blundered with his military operations in Egypt -which I'm sure he is correct with- but then concluded that Caesar was a man who did not plan ahead in general. This is, in my opinion, a wrong conclusion, if you have a look at the rest of what Caesar did and how he did it. I guess a better example of a military commander who is talented but overly audacious and does not plan ahead too well is Rommel; but he had his Westphal. Do you remember the "Luftwaffe Infantry" thread? You claimed Goering accumulated more + more influence in the course of the war. I would guess you read this in a book focused on military history, or drew that conclusion yourself, after reading military history about how his Luftwaffe pilots admired, even adored, Goering up to the end of the war (I recall these air-to-air-kamikaze-squadrons). But then, outside the military, and therefore perhaps outside of the focus of some military historians (sorry, no offense intended), there was another Goering. He was ridiculed by the populace (Hermann Meyer comes to mind), became increasingly infantile with his rituals and ways of dressing, was informed about Unternehmen Barbarossa comparatively late, took more and more morphine, and didn't even visit military meetings anymore. His bragging that the Luftwaffe would smash the Tommies at Dunkirk and easily support the 6th army was merely a sign of his increasing alienation from Hitler and the real political power. Thus, drawing a conclusion by transferring military matters into general ones is perilous. In my opinion, and judging from my knowledge, you are wrong about the non-military aspects on both Goering and Caesar. Again- no offense intended. I think this discussion is interesting, and I wish Phillippe would drop in again, his knowledge of the Commentarii could prove useful in the question whether Caesar conducted intense planning or not. Furthermore, even though I criticised military history in a way, I don't think its not a serious discipline. Amazon is currently packing "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg", Band 4 (Germany in WWII, on the invasion in the east) for me- my entry into military history. Greetings Krautman

Well, I'm not too comfortable with the term "general historian" (since such a person might have spent 10 years researching e.g. the social composition of ancient Athens), and I don't think these people judge by "impressive externals" - anyone, but not a historian - but I admit that a military historian is perhaps better at simply deciding who is a better strategist, so, you're probably correct on that one. A pure military historian, however, might be unaware of other factors. I will admit that I'm not familiar with military history, with the exception of what CM taught me... You mean the landing in Alexandria, right? Well, as Caesar wrote in de Bello Civili, he relied on the psychological effects of his victory against Pompeius at Pharsalos. It was him Caesar wanted to fight in Egypt, and not the Egyptians, who anyway were, at least at the time of the landing, inclined towards the victorious Caesar. Judging from the military point of view, I can only guess, but as far as I know, battles of antiquity often weren't decided by numbers, as Caesar's experienced legions proved at Pharsalos. And if I recall J.G. Droysen's [well, not a military historian either] Alexander biography, Alexander won the battles at the river Granikos and at Gaugamela against overwhelming numbers, and later on fought his battles with an increasingly heterogeneous force, and still won against the odds. - Thus, Caesar might have relied on psychological effects and quality, instead of quantity. His involvement in Egyptian throne policy, however, was not really brilliant, there you are correct- but that doesn't make him a good or a bad strategist, just a bad politician! I'm not sure on this one, but Caesar was made Dictator in 48, probably as soon as word of Pharsalos got to Rome. Many of those who previously followed Pompeius made peace with him (and benefited from the clementia Caesaris!). So why would he need to return if his political position was secure, at least for the moment? More urgent was the consolidation of Cleopatra's power, which he needed to re-establish his political credibility and his purse, and this is why he waged the Alexandrinian war. The war on Pharnakes (this is the "sideshow in the east" you mentioned, right?) was immediately necessary to defend the province Asia minor; he couldn't have gone somewhere else, I would think. He had returned to Italy to collect the necessary money for the war against the Pompeians and wanted to leave as quickly as possible, although upheaval in Rome and mutiny in Campania held him up. But after he just even restored order, he went for Africa. I would guess he feared any more time would make the Pompeians stronger, thus the unsupported landing. And, as history tells, the Numidians weren't always reliable as allies; probably (just a guess) Caesar did not expect them to fight that bravely. Yes. From a non-military point of view, his refusal of being divorced from his first wife Cornelia, Cinna's daughter [sulla himself ordered the divorce], was a first indicator of this dominating character trait- The Roman nobility were married and divorced quite frequently, thus it wouldn't have been a moral problem, but Caesar didn't like being ordered around, even as a teenager. Later, the reckless expense of money in his election campaigns was unique to him. Daring it all and knowing when one can do so- isn't that what made all great commanders/politicians/writers/musicians etc. great? I disagree. Caesar had people doing preparatory research for him and collecting data, e.g. on political enemies. In Egypt though, he really blundered frequently. As far as I know, you are fully correct there. The famous clementia was merely used as propaganda. Cato knew that and commited suicide before Caesar could amnesty him and make him an item of propaganda. The Gallic wars killed ~1 million (Caesar: 1.2 m.) and enslaved another million (the whole population being estimated at approx. 10 million) I hope this was not boring... Greetings Krautman EDIT: Probably "general historian" is the generally used term for "historian primarily concerned with social and cultural history" in English. If so, I apologize. [ November 29, 2005, 11:55 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Whether I have "authority" or not does not matter, because it is not my personal ideas I'm presenting, but someone else's. Citing sources is always good- would you disagree with JC without providing sources, as he does in most of his history-related posts? If he cites Jentz or Glantz, that tells me nothing, because I've never read anything they wrote. But I'm happy whenever someone cites Jentz or Glantz- it shows the poster has read a respected historical work I could, if I wanted, check for the poster's interpretation. Just as you could go and get a Bleicken book. Well, since you mentioned Theodor Mommsen: Jochen Bleicken is in contemporary Germany's ancient history almost what Theodor Mommsen had been (most respected writer of benchmark works read by all students of the subject), except for that he didn't win a Nobel price in literature. I didn't want to mention this, just wanted to give sources - I don't expect non-Germans to know either one, just as I wouldn't know e.g. which US historian is considered most important over there. Basically, you completely agree with me and Bleicken in your post, and you obviously read a few books, so that tells me he isn't that bad. On the problem telling propaganda from truth in the Commentarii: Since there is no any other independent report on what happened in Gallia, not only those second-year latin students you mentioned have problems. Surely, he was brilliant as a propagandist, but his "daunting task" was made slightly easier by the facts that a) there was no other report on Gallia than his available in Rome the Romans were terribly afraid of Germans c) the Senate had no clue of Gallia's geography and d) did not know that the Rhine wasn't really dividing Germans from Gallii (Gallians?). I don't study latin like you, but I'm currently translating de re publica as a hobby. Compared to the parts of the Commentarii I did before, Cicero is better by far. Caesar's language is clear and simple, but (or: thus) rather boring, don't you agree? Greetings Krautman

JasonC wrote "Caesar was not that good a strategist." On Caesar/Hannibal: It might be interesting that Jochen Bleicken, a German historian specialised in Roman + Greek ancient history, asserts that these two were "probably the greatest commanders [Feldherren] of antiquity", by virtue of the fact that they knew how to handle a battle on the tactical and a campaign on the strategical level, were men with character (untiring self-discipline, credibility, mercy, never giving up) and could thus influence people like few politicians could. Greetings Krautman

Without intending to be overly audacious, one could probably assert that Jason has the occasional tendency to be just a tiny little bit too gregarious considering the rather wordy character of this cognitive opus ingens he just recently produced, scientifically as well as linguistically impressive though it may be.

From the source you provided: "By means of minor design alterations, the Pz.B 39 was modified to a grenade throwing rifle (Granatbüchse 39). The attached launcher was the Scheissbecher which was the same type used on the Mauser Kar. 98K rifle." Yes, the Scheissbecher! This awesome device, the Scheissbecher SB 00/15, was developed by Mauser's contractor Faekalia Arms later in the war in order to help the Wehrmacht overcome the increasingly serious ammunition shortages. Soldiers would just drop their human waste into the Scheissbecher and attach it to their K98. Then, the SB-00/15, by chemical processes of great complexity, would turn the excrements into deadly projectiles of destructive power unheard of. The new type of ammo - the R.m.w.w.K. "Rektalgeschoß mit weichem warmen Kern" (~"rectal cartridge, soft warm core") was first tested by members of the Brandenburg division. It was by far superiour to the S.m.K.: Effects on the battlefield were devastating. In reaction to this new type of warfare, the Red Army drenched its soldiers with disinfectant. The SB 00/15 did not, however, achieve widespread use due to technical difficulties which could never be solved until the Reich collapsed. That is the reason why the Scheissbecher is barely remembered by veterans. Historians have also maintained silence about this rather unglamorous chapter of military history, which is why the SB 00/15 is only known to the most groggiest of grogs. Yet it is definitely one of those "wonder weapons" that Nazi officials referred to during the last months of the war. There can be no doubt that a mass use of these monstrous devices could have turned the tide in favour to the germans. [Edit: info: "Scheissbecher" is a typo, the correct form is "Schiessbecher". The translation of Schiessbecher would be "Shootmug" - A mug that is shot with - while "Scheissbecher" would be "****mug" - A mug that is **** in. Great typo. This german diphthong seems to get mixed up frequently, compare "Blitzkreig"] Greetings Krautman [ November 17, 2005, 06:22 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

A report on battlefront games even before they are released? In the country's biggest games mag? In my country, the games mags do articles on WWII games as well. Usually though, these games contain tanks with energy bars and infantrymen communicating as via headset. I'm actually envious!

Thanks to both of you for taking the time. That was very helpful. As far as i can remember, Goering was the one to whom the buildup of the Luftwaffe was entrusted to in 1935, starting from the Deutscher Fliegerverband/Deutscher Luftfahrtverband (?), which was a kind of paramilitary organisation built to avoid the Versailles treaty regulations. Wouldn't this make the Luftwaffe Goering's personal playtool right from the start? And didn't Goering lose more and more influence after the battle of britain? Very useful for possible scenario design! Greetings Krautman

On some photos, you can see Luftwaffe crews operating AA guns, presumably attached to a Heer unit. Were AA guns generally manned by Luftwaffe crews? If so, did these AA batteries have infantry protection also consisting of Luftwaffe men? Was there a general-purpose Luftwaffe infantry force (not the airborne units) prior to those makeshift field divisions made up of former mechanics? Greetings Krautman

Yes, that's a great description. Carell does often use "we" when one would rather write "the german armed forces" (even as a german). In 1992, he also published a book whose english title would be "Stalingrad: Victory [!] and Downfall of the 6th Army". Looks like Pauly missed some facts there. A quote: "They died so that NS-Germany would live". Another rather bold theory is that the war was not lost after Stalingrad... I've done a little googling, and it is incomprehensible to me how Carell could launch a second career after 1945. In 1944, he actively forwarded an initiative to hunt the Budapest jews. This is what he wrote in an official letter to state secretary Wilhelm Keppler, among other things Hitler's personal advisor in economy questions (my translation, sorry in advance for any mistakes): "The planned action [against the Budapest jews] will, considering its dimension, attract great public interest abroad and will surely arouse a fierce response. The adversaries will scream and talk of manhunt etc. and, using atrocity propaganda, try to adrenalise their own sentiment and that of the neutrals. I would like to suggest guarding against these things by creating inducement and justification for this action, e.g. findings of explosives in jewish club houses and synagogues, sabotage arrangement, upheaval plans, attacks on police officers, large-scale illegal currency transfer ("Devisenschiebungen großen Stils") aiming to undermine the hungarian currency. The capstone under [=base of] such an action ought to be an especially gross case, which is then made use of to justify the great raid ("Großrazzia")." I can't understand why he was not prosecuted at Nürnberg, this document was available to them. Greetings Krautman

Some CMBB scenarios mention his work as a source, so just recently, i bought Carell's two books on the war in the east at a used books sale. Right now I'm a few hundred pages into "Unternehmen Barbarossa" (the one covering 41-43). The first thing i noticed was his writing style, different from any other book's i've read before. Carell makes ample use of scant military language with all this dashing special vocabulary for attack, defense etc. and word omissions (e.g. "South-east Rshev" instead of "South-east of Rshev"). Even more strange is the use of Landser slang, which he himself, as one could assume, probably never used in spoken language. Isn't designating a bomb "Höllenei" (~"infernal egg")in a (history!) book on the verge of laughableness? Carell's soldiers, Russians and especially Germans, never (at least as far as i've read) question the nature of the war they're caught in, they only care about their unit's military success. They're all good buddies, who stick together in any situation. And, of course, both sides pay deference to each other. They were just soldiers doing their job etc. Carell's evocation of the image of an epic chivalrous struggle, a great adventure any participant can be proud to have taken part in, is inappropiately dramatic historiography at the very least, but not necessarily propaganda. But then, in-between some nice anecdotes on Richard Sorge, the British secret service and the newly invented aerial reconnaissance in high altitudes, there is this bold theory that Stalin wanted to attack Europe after ~"the capitalist and the fascist gamecocks had exausted themselves"... (page 58 of my 1965 German copy) Is there any truth to this? It sounds ridiculous to me. Stalin had much work consolidating what he already had, right? But if you carry on Carell's thoughts, then attacking Russia was a preemptive strike from the German point of view... The "Polish attack" on the Gleiwitz broadcast staion comes to mind... And further on into the book, mutilations of Germans captured by the Red Army are described in detail. The treatment of Russian POWs isn't mentioned at all. The Generalplan Ost, Einsatzgruppen genocide and W-SS/Wehrmacht war crimes do not exist in Carell's world. This makes me wonder why this book is on sale in Germany- though Carell could always claim the book is merely focused on frontline fighting, and thus doesn't contain these things. The military facts are something i cannot comment on, although the history buffs around here will know. The Russians are usually described as brave, hardy soldiers, which they surely were, but Carell probably stresses that just to make the Germans stand out even more. The casualty rates he gives are questionable from my perspective. In battles like the sieges of Libau (Latvia), the Brest-Litowsk fortress or the Bialowicza forest (Poland), the Germans took, according to Carell, much less casualties than the Red Army, which is strange considering the nature of a siege. Additionally, the mass-suicide assaults are there. In the Jelnja/Yelnya area, for example, Carell's Russians attack in rows, arms linked, over and over again in the same spot. Later on in the book, a mongolian (44th?) cavalry division conducts a mass cavalry assault against Mg- and artillery-reinforced defenders. Is this falsified? What's you opinion on Carell? I have read books on war before, but Ernst Jünger uses decent prose and not that shameless "Völkischer Beobachter"-style propagandistic language, and he has his marble cliffs and his original name, as opposed to Carell. And Jünger never claimed to write historiography. I do confess that Carell's book is imho somewhat fascinating if regarded as an adventure novel, but repulsive if you consider it's supposed to be a history book of sorts. Greetings Krautman

Probably I didn't get your message, but you obviously twisted the words in my mouth. In case anyone makes me a Nazi apologist for the reason of argueing the attack on the SU was a war of conquest (invading army moves in and stays) as opposed to a plundering war (invading army moves in, plunders, and leaves): The two definitions are not mine in origin, and both of them (intentionally) do not say anything about how the native populace was treated. I did not mention the genocide in an article concerning Kursk because any sane person already knows it to be a historical fact. I know in a forum like this you have to be aware of possible Nazi-friendly posters, but this is turning out like a witch hunt. If someone would accuse me of having sexual relationships with sheep or so, I wouldn't even take the time and answer. But alluding to me as a Nazi apologist is rude to say the least. That really hurts. Krautman [ November 03, 2005, 04:29 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Oh, crap- i'm really tired + confused... I meant my 2nd post, and was talking of this: Yea, me need sleep.

Please have a look at my new edit of my first post, if you haven't already. I'd love to, but its 11pm now! Sorry, Krautman

Hello! Just quickly on the plundering war thing: I thought i made that clear. A plundering war, as opposed to a war of conquest, would mean plundering the country by force and then leaving it. (At least that's how one of my professors defines it- opinions, thus definitions, vary) Yet Hitler wanted to conquer, making it a war of conquest by definition. Though with all the plunder, abduction, murder and torture you could imagine. EDIT: "To say that the war was solely for plunder, based on this definition, would seem to be inaccurate, given the plans to germanicize the conquered territories." You are surely correct on that. A historian like Aly needs to make his stand against a dinosaur like Hans-Ulrich Wehler ("Der Führerstaat"), thus stressing that the war was FIRST AND FOREMOST a plundering war, while ALSO might've been better. I gotta get up early tomorrow, that's why i'll leave now, but your post is surely interesting; i'll try and give a longer answer tomorrow. Greetings + Good night, Krautman [ November 02, 2005, 02:02 PM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

[This is basically a translation of parts of an article in the journal "Der Spiegel (Special)" 2/2005. Might be nothing new to most around here, though you should take a look at the Russian historians' view of the Prochorowka battle. Sorry in advance for any translation mistakes.] Karl-Heinz Frieser, member of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr [=MGFA; German army department of military history] has thoroughly scrutinized the German retreat in the east. To him, the war was definitively lost after the German attack froze to a halt in winter 1941. After the initial Unternehmen Barbarossa had failed and it turned out that Stalin's army was not an easy prey, the war -just like the first world war- was decided in the factories, were Stalin' organisers were superiour as well. Hitler's workers -both skilled labourers and captured slaves- produced an impressive amount of 61,700 tanks and assault guns until the end of the war, yet the Soviet armed forces could come up with 105,232. Soviet historiography has always emphasized the moral superiority of the defenders during the Great Patriotic War, thus stigmatizing those as unpatriotic dissidents who dared to ask for the price of victory. It was not until the collapse of the system one and a half decades ago that a new generation of Russian historians began to dissect the aggrandizing legacy [hope this works in English] -carefully, in most cases, without blurring the elemental differences between a plundering war [probably a lexical mistake here- the Germans did want to conquer; a plundering war would mean taking everything and then leaving the plundered country to itself. Yet some major German historians, most recently Götz Aly ("Hitlers Volksstaat"), classify Hitler's wars as plundering actions- the 3rd Reich was basically broke in 1939] and a defensive war. The Soviet march to Berlin, formerly being described as a pure heroic epic, didn't have much to it that was commendable on the top leadership level [sorry, that was bumpy]. Assaults were ordered without consideration for own casualties, even in situation where they could have been avoided. The Russian historians Michail Heller and Alexander Nekritsch sum it up: "Human lives were utterly worthless in the SU". Just like during the largest battle of the war, for the Kursk salient [...]. The most legendary encounter being the "Panzerbegegnungsschlacht" [~armor meeting engagement] at Prochorowka south-east of Kursk. Was its outcome this "enormous triumph" which "enhanced the SU's reputation" -as Schukow's semi-official depiction, considered valid for decades, said? Or rather "careless evisceration of Soviet tank commanders" as nowadays Wjatscheslaw Krasikow, a military publicist, argues? Frieser seconds that. The German offensive "Zitadelle" and the two Soviet counter-offensives between July 5 and August 23 1943 are "the most misconstrued conflicts of the war". Soviet historians have previously excellently "veiled the dimension of their own casualties and mistakes", especially when assessing the battle of Prochorowka. More than 1500 tanks -700 German, 850 Soviet ones- are said to have clashed on July 12 near Prochorowka in a close-quarters-battle. The II. SS-Panzerkorps was reportedly defeated, 400 of its tanks damaged or destroyed- much of these being Tigers or Panthers. [...] Sure enough, this engagement occured only in Soviet history books. In fact, Lt.Gen. Rotmistrow's newly formed 5th mechanized guard army , lead to the German lines almost unnoticed, suffered a vicious defeat. Rotmistrow's units attacked "one tank next to another, wave after wave" in "incomprehensible masses, racing forwards at maximum speed", as a German eyewitness reports. But right in front of height 252,2, which they were attacking, runs [the author switches to praesens historicum here] a tank ditch at right angles to the front dug by own engineer troops. Despite the fact that it is visible on all operation maps, it has obviously simply been forgotten upon giving the assault order. Thus, as another German witness reports, "the soviet T-34s come racing across the slope one by one, partially dashing down the slope, overturning in the tank ditch which we were positioned in front of." Others [of the Soviet tanks] discover the single remaining bridge across the ditch, accumulate in front of it, [like a traffic jam, I don't really know whether "accumulate" is the right word] thus giving the two SS tank companies on the other side an opportunity to do "target practice at mobile targets". At least that is what company commander Rudolf von Ribbentrop, [son of Joachim], who for this receives the knight's cross, reports. As Russian archives reveal nowadays, Rotmistrow loses at least 334 tanks and assault guns within 5 days of combat. 3597 of his men are dead ore missing in action. German records, on the other hand, mention only three total losses [=tank totally destroyed] for July 12 at Prochorowka. Stalin considers having the dashing general court-martialed. But a "huggermugger cartel" (Frieser) saves him: The debacle becomes a "titanic duel" (marshal Wassilewski) and a "swansong" of the German Panzertruppe (Konjew). The legend prevails in the history books. The only true fact, however, is that Rotmistrow's men fought "heroically and undaunted by death", as the official Russian army account has it. Yet for internal use, a fact-finding commission states that "Prochorowka is an example of a badly conducted operation". -- Greetings Krautman

XXV

Weren't there also several occasions during the early war period on which soviet commanders were threatened with the death penalty if their attack was not successfully conducted in the exact way the higher officers ordered, leading to those desperate assaults being stubbornly repeated at the very same place over and over again? Greetings Krautman

That was someone else's conclusion, as far as I can tell. Sergei, do you now more about this, or is the issue of a european CMC version not yet clear? I don't know about Scandinavia, but in Germany we'll need a special CMC version, since the original contains the swastika- it won't be allowed here, which presumably means it won't be for sale. Are the developers already considering a german version? Greetings Krautman

This CMC looks awesome! Let's hope i'll not be forgetting about other things after i got it installed, such as sleeping and eating and stuff. Will there be a german cdv CMC, or will CMC be usable with the cdv version? Please, one of the questions MUST be answered with "Yes"! EDIT: I just found the answer in an older post. If i understand correctly, the original cmc will be usable, though in-game language will be messed up. [ October 16, 2005, 04:50 AM: Message edited by: Krautman ]

Thx

A story about Hitler promising some self-propelled 88s to a divisional commander in france made me think. As far as i know, 88s were used in batteries to take a certain area under fire through which a larger long-range bomber force was about to fly through; probably they were firing grenades that could be set to detonate at various altitudes. Yet the planes the germans were having trouble with in france were mostly the light fighter-bombers rendering close air support, right? So would an 88 be of use against e.g. a small group of quick fighter-bombers by direct fire?

I guess the average sniper's daily life at the front was much more prosaic than the events described in those famous-sniper-guy-(auto)biographies. These are written for people with a special interest in military "action", probably much like a Tom Clancy book or the like. I once read a book by a german publicist and pacifist (Wellershoff, Dieter: "Der Ernstfall"; sehr zu empfehlen) who recalled his youth. As a young man, he volunteered for military service in 1944 (out of patriotism, but also to avoid being drafted) and, with help of his father, a Luftwaffe officer, became part of the Hermann Göring ground forces. He thought that being part of an "elite" unit would increase his chances of survival, but didn't want to enlist in the SS, about which eerie rumours were afloat. After a while of training, parts of the division were moved to italy, others, among them Wellershoff, to prussia. There his company was ordered to defend the "Ostpreussenschutzstellung II" (~"East Prussia defence emplacement II"). Wellershoff and his platoon had to move into a very exposed position in front of the main line for two weeks. There, and here finally is the link to the thread topic, the group came under frequent sniper fire. The men who were shot at were not officers or specialised technicians, but just those who were sent to fetch food or had to go pee- the enemy sniper would pick any target he had the opportunity to hit, then wait a few days until the german soldiers were less careful again. Finally, a sniper was assigned to Wellershoff's group, not necessarily to fight the enemy sniper (though that was also intended), but most of all to kill some russians in return. This was a static front line situation in a rural environment, in Stalingrad it might have been different. Yet i consider Wellershoff's book a great description of what war is like for the individual- he is an excellent writer and knows the human mind, and he has no interest at all to euphemize or heroize anything he describes, which makes the book even more believable and impressive; its focus not being on "action".

All, thanks again for the info. Since when are armies actually divided up into "modern" battalions, regiments, divisions etc, i mean as opposed to the antique and medieval army organisation? Does anyone know why some german NCOs were called Wachtmeister? I thought this was a police rank.

Great info! Do regiments themselves have added support units, e.g. an infantry regiment having an extra artillery battery/battalion? Or is an infantry regiment just a couple of infantry battalions? What about AT guns and HE chuckers? In CMBB, most infantry battalions have ~2 AT guns. How many AT guns would a battalion have if all (if they exist: regimental and) divisional AT guns were distributed among the infantry battalions? (Might be useful for a battalion-sized scenario) And what the heck is a brigade? EDIT: Damn, i guess there are as many different ways of writing "battalion" as there are languages, and i always have to check other posts to get it right. "Bataillon", is that french?