Koenig

Sorry, I missed that a refinement of the air system is being considered for further developments. I hope it will. Koenig

In a battle against fortified positions it would be normal having massive minefields. Normally engineers had to provide safe corridors before any advance could be undertaken. This could even take a few hours. Are mines/engineers rules adequate to cover this issue? I wonder, as in CM the time of engagements was too short to consider serious mine clearance; in CMC it would make sense, instead.

I thought that later on in ww2 there were many developments between ground commanders and tactical air strike fighters. I seem to remember something about fighters queing up in the air awaiting targeting commands as and when required by ground forces ? Scott </font>

OK, I discovered that if insert disk 1 instead of disk 2 I can reinstall...lol I also discovered that the 1.03 patch, if merely directed to the 'run' folder as suggested will create a 'new folder' in 'Run' and it should not. Just delete the 'new folder' from the path generated by the installer and it will install correctly in 'Run'. I remember this is for the CDV version only. Thank you very much for your help. Koenig

I installed CMAK on a new PC, with XP SP2. After installing 1.03 patch the game would not run. Tried to uninstall, but to no avail, even from the control panel. I manually deleted the CMAK folder and went where I should not go, the registry, and deleted the CDV directory hoping for the best. Nothing else. It did not help. Now even with autorun nothing happens when I insert my CMAK CD. I'm sure autoun is working with other CDs. Setup is not an .exe file (it's labelled as Setup.W02) and if I double click on it I'm told it's impossible to open the file. I can't figure a way to install CMAK. It's a CDV disk and had no problems at all with my old PC running WIN ME. Thank you for any support you can give to me. Koenig

I'm sorry, The Enigma, as the map is well crafted, but there was no action at Mogadishu. After the feeble defense on the Giuba river was overcome, the Italian troops withdrew towards Neghelli and Harar, leaving Mogadishu undefended. There was only a one day delay action at Vittorio d'Africa, some 50 miles from Mogadishu; the small detachment was easily outflanked and overcome. When Vittorio d'Africa fell Mogadishu surrendered and the South Africans rushed to the town without firing a single shot. I wrongly thought the sites you had been directed to would give you this information. Well, you can always design a 'what if' scenario... Regards Koenig

A map of 'where'? Mogadishu? Koenig

The Blackshirts were the remains of the fascist revolution. They were difficult to control and opposed by the Army, which was monarchic. As such in 1940 they had a very limited military value, being poorly trained and under-equipped. The Blackshirts in East Africa were composed by farmers, technicians and civil servants who had come to colonize the new territories of the Fascist Empire. They were the poorest among the poor in Italy, and had come to East Africa with their families as settlers in the search of new eldorado, certainly not to fight a world war. The Blackshirts in EA were a militia meant to be used against local rebels and bandits, and it was largely composed by men in their late thirties or forties, with a family to protect in a hostile environment. A few were fanatic fascists, but the majority just the gave up the fight as soon as the situation became dangerous. The comparison with the German SS could not be more misleading, when we talk about their combat effectiveness. Actually the Blackshirts were among the worst Italian units. There was a notable exception, however: the Regiment 'Giovani Fascisti' (Young Fascists). It was made up of volounteering students of strong fascist faith and fought with distinction in North Africa. the_enigma, should you have specific questions about the East African campaign please ask, I hope I can help. Regards Koenig

Is ownership of CMBB a pre-requisite to enter ROW V? I'd like to enlist, but I just have CMAK. Koenig

I see there is a general incredulity about the option of an Allied airdrop on Rome to cut off the German defenders in the south. This was not an armchair general's fancy, but was a planned operation by the Allied GHQ. As part of the Armistice signed at Cassibile on 3rd September 1943, the Americans agreed to support the Italian withdrawal from the war by dropping the 82nd Airborne Division on Rome. 100 AT guns were to be landed on the coast and ascend the river Tiber to the capital. The Italians were to provide trucks for the entire division, alert to AA defences not to open fire during the airdrop and delimitate the landing areas with lights. The operation was called Giant II. It must be said the Italian were not told when the Armistice was to be divulgated and, subsequently, Giant II take place. They were to be ready when called. It was not the case. Why? Rivers of ink have flowed on the subject. Each of the persons involved has his own personal truth on what happened on those dramatic days. Incredible, bizarre, distasteful, absurd...these are some of the adjectives that come to my mind when I think about it. Explaining the events of September 1943 would take several pages. And even after that many misteries would remain, many contraddictions. Just take the words that Eisenhower had for the Armistice: 'a crooked deal'. He even refused to sign it, demanding the task to Bedell Smith... Let's stick to facts. At 18.00 hrs of 7th September General Taylor secretly lands at Gaeta to prepare Giant II, due the day later, and is transported to Rome in an ambulance. After a series of meetings ranging from farsesque to surreal, at 11.30 hrs of 8th he communicates the signal to stop Giant II because the Italians can not assure the control of the airfields. At 13.00 Eisenhower order to cancel Giant II: 5 hours before the planned take off of the paratroopers!!! You may question the soundness of the plan, but certainly Ike believed in it. You are wrong when you doubt the Italian units would fight Germans. They did it in many places, Rome included. This is an extract from the War Diary of the German 3rd Pz. Gre. division advancing on Rome on 9th September: 'The Italian defence is very skilled, capable of surprise attacks, well camouflaged, with the employment of single tanks. Near Bracciano strong enemy resistance, the village is taken as night approaches. ... Locally we suffered considerable losses.'. What is completely lacking is...command. Well, if only the units had orders to obey, apart from a generic resistance... The King, the Government and all the GHQ flee Rome, leaving the soldiers alone without a guide. So the men of the Ariete, the Granatieri di Sardegna and many other units fight and die...for nothing! It's one of Italy's darkest pages. Eugen Dollman, commander of the SS in Rome, says about the 9th September: 'at 3 a.m. I went to Frascati...where I met General Student: pessimism in the offices was rampant...at 11 Student was very worried: a detachment of paratroopers landed at Monterotondo was in dire straits. Some (Italian) units of Grenadiers and Carabinieri were fighting gallantly. There were rumors about the escape of the royal family and the government, but nobody believed them.... Student, after examining the charts on the table, said that everything was lost if during the night American paratroopers would land...' A missed opportunity. The problem is that on 8th September 1943 the political conditions for the defence of Rome did not exist. But from a military point of view it was feasible. The best, modernly equipped and most loyal units of the Italian Army were placed around Rome. The only exception was the Centauro division, ex Divisione M (Mussolini), equipped and trained by the Germans, which had many fascist elements. In fact this unit did not take part to the fighting around Rome. The responsibilities of the King, Badoglio and the many other major and minor Italian actors of this tragedy are enormous and unforgivable. But...there is a but. If the Allied had trusted the Italian at least a little and had revealed them in advance the date the Armistice was to be made known, probably Giant II would have been undertaken. But this would give the Italians too an important role. I can guess Churchill considered this unacceptable. The Armistice was not only to be an unconditional surrender, it was to be the fall of a ruling class who thought to absolve itself from all its responsibilities of the war blaming it all on Mussolini and the fascists. So it happened, and probably it was right it happened. The Allies certainly did not need Italy's help to win the war. Had they accepted it, however, maybe the thousands of deaths of Cassino and Anzio could have been avoided. And without doubt the landing at Salerno would have been much facilitated. It is not rare to see the reasons of politics to dictate a military campaign, even when these reasons are in contrast with its strict military aspect. The capture of Rome in September 1943 was possible, but at a political price the Allies were not willing to pay. The King and the Italian government made a gamble on this and they lost. And when they had to face the risk of countering the Germans, they were caught unprepared and decided to abandon the country. Anyway the players of this tragedy had the option to try to drive the Germans south of Rome in September 1943. Ike was ready to bet the 82nd Airborne on it. They decided otherwise. Koenig

An important point: the invasion of mainland Italy was a prerequisite of the Italian surrender, according to the armistice clauses. After Mussolini's arrest on 25th July 1943 Germany (rightly) questioned Italy's loyalty. From then on, it was a race with time. The Allied wanted to put Italy out of the war. The Germans wanted to occupy the boot before such a thing happened. A delay would allow the German to seize the peninsula. If I remember well, the armistice of the 8th September was just one day ahead a German ultimatum that pratically cancelled the Italian sovranity and gave the Germans units complete freedom in Italy. The idea of invading Sardina and Corsica was not bad at all, but it should be considered that it was easy to do because the Italian troops had already surrendered. Well, actually they did more than surrender as there were several clashes with their former ally when the Germans tried to seize Italian positions. Invading them before the armistice would require a much more considerable effort. As I already stated, the most effective option would be an American airdrop on Rome on 8th September. Mutual mistrust, misunderstandings and a general incapacity to grasp the political situation by several characters on the Italian side provoked the cancellation of the operation on the eve of the armistice. If successful it would have spared the Allied a long and bloody campaign. But honestly I think that most of the blame for this not to have happened is on the Italian side. Koenig

I think the risk with Stalin was a separate peace with the Germans. Before Kursk it was not seen as completely impossible. After the failure of the offensive the Russians felt strong enough to refuse any compromise. Koenig

And how, how much harder Kesserling's task would be, had the American executed the planned airdrop on Rome immediately after the Italy's armistice, assisted by the Italian army? Here the question is political, not strategic, but in the mix of greed, misunderstanding and incompentence, all dressed with a great dose of cynism that characterized the armisticial negoziations lies the great missed opportunity of the campaign. Koenig

This report seems to indicate two things: 1)Crew losses are affected by the the calibre of the offending gun. This might explain the reason of ligher losses in early war tanks and the discrepancy within AT and tank losses according to the theatre. In the desert war the 88mm 'AT' was king, as most tanks were 50mm Pz III; in Europe the situation was somehow reversed, with tanks armed with 75-88 mm and 50mm AT guns given higher chances by the terrain. 2)Crew losses we see in CMAK are maybe too light. Generally crews escape wrecks with only one casualty, or 20-25%. A solid shell penetrating the crew compartment does nasty things to those inside and often kills or injures more than one man. An explosive shell penetrating can be even worse. Koenig

For tank commanders training would be at the C.A.C. Later the crews would train together at their own unit too. On 12 March 1942 'Centri d'istruzione' (Instruction Centers) were created in North Africa, to teach newcomers the peculiarities of the theatre. A note: Semoventi crews were drawn from the Artillery (Infantry for tanks and Cavalry for light tanks), which in Italy was without doubt of better standard than Infantry. If you plan to use the Semovente 75/18 watch out: 1)Each platoon (battery) was lead by a command tank, armed with a twin 8mm Breda gun INSTEAD of the 75mm. Later tanks had a 13.2 mm MG. This vehicle had better radio and range finding equipment for spotting indirect fire of the battery. The tank was unpopular, as it had to lead the other tanks in combat virtually un-armed and was easily recognizable by the enemy, who would likely target the command semovente. Unfortunately we miss it in CMAK. You could simulate the combat tank by giving it 0 ammo, but were are the MGs? 2)I can't understand why the Italian tanks are denied their AA weapon: it was widely, and in the case of the Semovente I can say universally, used. Early models had a 6.5 mm Breda, which was soon substituted with an 8 mm Breda 38. The weapon was stored inside the tank and fitted to an AA mount when needed. Being supplied by clips instead of belts mounting and dismounting it wasn't a very diffucult operation. 3)In combat zone it was standard practice to protect the Semoventi with addictional steel plates, tracks and sandbags. Crews scavenged the desert wrecks to get what they needed. High echelon commaders forbade this practise as it reduced the already scarce performances and reliability of the vehicles, but the addictional protections magically reappeared as soon as commanders turned the corner. 4)I don't know when the 75mm HEAT round was introduced, but I suspect from the onset. Without doubt after the 21 July 1942, as there is a document of that date quoting its effectiveness on the field. In CM the Semoventi have only a few HEAT rounds. According to Pignato's book 'GLI AUTOVEICOLI DA COMBATTIMENTO DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO', the reference work on the subject, the Semovente da 75/18 had 1/3 HE, 1/3 AP and 1/3 HEAT rounds. This makes sense, as the Semovente would never be able to achieve its reputation with the ammo set we are given in CMAK. I must add that in combat accounts I never read about the scarsity of Effetto Pronto (HEAT) rounds. On the contrary, it was the standard ammo used against tanks. This is a major question that scenario designers using the Semovente da 75/18 must take into account. Unfortunately in quick battles the problem can't be cured. 5)Ammo for the Semovente da 75/18 is 44-50 rounds, but the crews went into combat with about one hundred rounds, stored on the floor! No, it wasn't written on the manuals, but the room was there and ammo were precious in the desert warfare. It was standard practice. I hope I've been of help. Regards Koenig