DavidFields

Thank you for the courteous replies to my post. Or, 3. The primary purpose of the flank attack was to ensure the withdrawal from the city of Bakhmut was not hampered? I think I learned from this forum that Bakhmut was not strategically important, and also that advance planned, massed, artillery grid fires against fixed or small geographic areas is one thing that Rus seems to be able to do. In addition, and yes, as wargammer, I think people like you have tried to make me understand: 1. That to control a position, sometimes it is better not to occupy it, but to be able to put effective fires in and around it. (Which, possibly, the two UKR flank positions can do to the Bakhmut area, if they do not withdrawal nor get pushed back.) 2. If an opponent does "recon by pushing units ahead, and watching what blows them up", a counter to that is to move the defense revealed units (over an hour, day, week--depending on the operational level), so that no effective information is gained by that recon style. This, from what I have read here, is something Rus has largely not solved for. And thus a dispersed, mobile, defense by UKR west of Bakhmut will likely be effective? Again, giving Rus the choice of commiting high quality offensive troops to try pursue, or letting the area go quiet. DF

Perhaps the attacks north and south of Bakhmut are in preparation for UKR to leave the city proper. With a fighting, mobile, withdrawal, the Russians would either have to commit offensive resources to pursue (which they might want to hold for counter attacks later elsewhere), or let the area go quiet (they can have their little parties in the rubble), which might suit UKR well at this time.

I don't think we can exclude Putin saying: 1. Ukraine does not exist. That land is now considered by Russia to be part of Russia. 2. The Baltic States are in the Russian sphere of influence. It is unfortunate that they are currently in NATO, but they will be forced out of it. 3. The same for various countries in Eastern Europe, which he might name specifically. 4. If Finland applies for NATO membership, Russia will consider it an act of war. We, Russia, can do this because we are a nuclear power, and therefore no one can definitively stop us, even if it takes years of fighting. Isn't this what you want, the Russian people? You want to belong to something great. (He might throw in some "Nazi" language--but that is marketing, and ultimately not necessary for his assertion of Russia's supposed place. He might put a long, fiery, but ultimately dreary, historical preamble to the above. And some religion. He feels both intensely, and feels --so-- slighted. But, again, ultimately such verbiage is not necessary. It is a sheer Power/Will exercise. ) At least, from what I had read, the above was sort of what he was telling everyone prior to Feb 24. Didn't he say something like "Now will you listen to me!", shortly after the invasion? David

Sorry for the sort of double post. Do not understand this.

What?

Gamer, not a military person. I do not understand the analysis I quoted. Is there anyone from ... the US, to Thailand, to UAE, to any military grog in Argentina (just to say, everyone)...who do not see that the Ukrainians are likely massing NE and NW of Kyiv, in sniper and AT units, to move west and east, respectively, to cut off all supply from the Russian units around the capital? Probably already happening. On the other hand (as a more neutral remark), could the ditching of bridging equipment, and what appears to me a lot of air defense equipment, just be a local soldier decision (however monetarily costly according to those above) that they just don't need them--or not a priority. Whether as a result of fuel or staffing issues, at the very lowest soldier decision, not sanctioned by those above. "Rather than achieve original operational objectives of the invasion." With all due respect, I think the objective was strategic: the integration of Ukraine into Russia. I don't see drones accomplishing that. "Ukraine is not Chechnya". Decisively, I think.

"The picture of that gentleman should be on the front page of the New York Times tomorrow.

I was very impressed with the video, and I was particularly impressed with the spacing and pacing of the squads and tank movements. "Don't just do something, stand there" can be, I think, a good mantra in CM2, as the spotting algorithm operates--and probably was the case at the time. I am the opposite with regards to pace, perhaps to slow. I seldom use scout cars as scouts, because they are so fragile, and large--so they can easily be destroyed without even seeing what his them. At the CM2 scale, if we already sort of know where the enemy is, than I figure their job is done and they should mostly retire--sort of like the threads on half-tracks. Hence, I would have missed that "overrun" experience on the scout squad--which was amazing, and appears realistic, to see. It would have also "killed" me to walk those platoons over open field to the town--I am not sure that I could have given the command. As it turns out, a mortar unit would, purposefully I am sure, have made staying in place with the two platoons and sending out a 2 person scout team a losing decision. I am conflicted, but also interested, when a scenario is built to seemingly challenge the "usual" decisions--I likely would have brought both platoons toward the center. In all, the video shows to me a very subtle and sophisticated scenario (and, one of its excellent solutions), with a nice small, manageable mix of forces. The Panzer IV is my favorite tank, from 41 to the end of the war. This video may have induced me to buy this module.

Looking at the table under the tree, I am having even more thoughts. I was thinking the decision with any of the campaign scenarios was "play or don't play". But is it correct for me to infer from the table that the German forces are largely persistent from one scenario to the next? (I did not think they were, and did not even realize that was possible or done in a campaign) [Rankorian palm-slaps his forehead] Which would mean that if I heavily damaged the enemy forces, and took the loss, I would be in much better shape for the next scenario than if I did not play it and took the loss? If so, that opens up a --LOT-- of interesting choices (interesting choices being most of what makes a fun simulation). Again, much different than the "if you don't win you are a --loser--, no fun." If that is true, I am almost stunned--because explaining that would have been so easy and to BFC, in my opinion, so important.

"Kobayashi Maru"--given the world wide expanse of the internet and these forums, I thought it was some distant Japanese saying. But, ah, it is a Star Trek reference--unless I am missing something more learned. The problem, I think, is that we cannot, unlike Captain Kirk, alter the underlying (CM2) programming to a win, and the result is a possibly frustrated public. Is it good for the character of the public?--could be a debate. Is it good for Battlefront? With all sympathy to BFC, my opinion is no.

As I read the table, if you "allowed" yourself to lose (in other words, did not keep playing each scenario until you win), you would be "rewarded" by getting easier versions of future scenarios. See, for example, the 3 different versions of "For those about to die"--8,9,61. This is interesting and admirable conceptually. Indeed, it raises the option of looking at a tactical situation in a scenario and taking the rational decision that the best thing to do is not to play it. (introduced, in think, in C and F "Hard Knocks"--yes the first in the series was winnable, but it is skewed toward not even trying to.) The problem, in my opinion, is that would have best to be explained--even right in the manual, if the main campaigns consisted of this type of arrangement. Put in the manual, also, that beautiful campaign tree (because to "derive it" from countless play-overs would take mind-bending hours) Perhaps "teaching people to lose", or to not fight, is an admirable.....societal goal. Or a skill that an actual commander might need (if given the authority). But for the casual gamer to run into this philosophy, so different than most of what they are given to expect elsewhere is, in my opinion, unnecessarily off-putting. Most of us try to "solve" a scenario, and do not realize that it may be there is, by design, no solution. I read so many comments about "impossible" campaign scenarios with MG and the Italian campaigns that I barely tried them--they sounded "broken". Seeing this tree gives me a far better understanding of what was going on.

Since to apply, you must have been in existence, and that likely meant you were a vampire--did you mention to the recruiting office that your night-time recon efforts were excellent, and you would not likely be drawing from the usual canteen rations? Seriously, depending on the situation, sometimes the troops that are willing to flee, and fight another day, are more situationally correct. And even if the troops are elite, having a big HE burst in the middle of them...the WW2 uniform was not much better than wearing a t-shirt with regards to shrapnel protection.

Nice blast from the past. It may get me to try Assault again in CMRT. I would like to eventually finish that scenario....and this gives me some ideas.

I am looking forward to see how your attack turns out--forget (almost) win/loss, I will be interested to see your tactical moves. The way you have moved your units thus far has (other than the recon jabs) has almost been poetic.

Your explanation is a fair one. Carry on