Well I wouldn't call it a full blown mod, but the tools are certainly superb. What I would call a mod is what I am working on right now - which is the 6B48 crew individual protection kit. Once it is done I will release it, the AKS-74U fix for Ru force and the 6Sh122 kitted infantry (like the pic above) all in one pack. While I was on the fence about the 6B48 initially as it is used only in several formations atm (all western MD but the arctic brigades) but there is no way to assign different crew models to different vehicles and the 6B48 provides something fresh for the game.
Here's a modification of the movie mode shader that gives it a night vision effect for those night scenarios. It's designed to be used in conjunction with the artificial brightness mode (Alt+B), so to use it all you have to do is hit Alt+B and Alt+M. Here's a link to download it right now, and I'll also upload it to the repository. DOWNLOAD A couple screenshots:
Thanks to SLIM for the idea and BarbaricCo for making it known it was possible to mod the shader.
"Greed" is used when someone thinks they can extort something from YOU in order to give it to THEM. Work, and the freedom to self-value your own labor, is a concept fraught with opportunity and risk. Those who are afraid of the risk take the opportunity to try to take your labor for themselves.
I don't like the price of new cars. Those manufacturers are so greedy. They should cut the price in half. Back in '60, a new car cost 1/10 of what they cost today. It isn't "fair".
By using terms such as "fair" and "greed", they try to impose a false morality on the marketplace, and thereby upon the free laborer. You want more money? Work harder, work longer, work smarter. Or, in many cases, just work. How about I look at your possessions, meager though they may be, which you have earned through your labor (or been given by a government which coerced the wealth from the productive members of society and transferred some of it to you), and tell you which possessions of yours that I deserve? If you refuse to give them over to me, you're just being "greedy".
I love redistributionists. Or thieves, as they used to be called.
And, yes, this comes from someone who once bought diapers and formula on credit cards and went hungry on alternate days, and I'd almost shed a tear when I had to break a $20...
This. (Been there, when $5 had to buy 2 days worth of lunch or I'd go hungry one of those days, so if $60 is a budget breaker, then you need to step away from playing computer games and focus on your work, bills, debts, and opportunities.)
It's not that the price is high (or "too high"). The problem is that wages are too low. Obviously, this is not fair. The only redress is a world-wide "game fairness tax". Of course that sounds bad. We'll call it the "leveling the playing field for all" act, and impose "fees" on anyone buying...milk. Or eggs. Or cheese. Because dead cows are in the game, so people who use cow stuff should help. It's only fair. I mean, if they can eat cow stuff, then I should be able to pay for my game without making a choice about giving up my own milk, eggs, or cheese. (Cows do make eggs, don't they?) Really, why should I work for something which fills a need or desire in my life? Others can afford it, and I can't. It's not fair.
Hang on, I just heard my Mom come back in.
"Hey! Mom! I'm hungry and the basement is chilly! Cook me something and turn up the heat!"
Where was I? Oh, yeah. It's not fair. BFC needs to give up some profit.
Except, of course, the price of the game *isn't* high. Steam is a parasite company. Why do people keep suggesting BFC attach a parasite to its neck just to suck its profits? BFC prefers to keep its own profits for itself.
In the thread on Russian doctrine in CM, we went through how the Russian attack, especially their Rifle formation branch. That method applies the principles of attrition warfare, depth, firepower, relentlessness, last man standing stuff. German doctrine on infantry attacks was entirely different. SlowLarry asked about it in the previous thread, and rather than bury an answer there, I am moving that part of the discussion to its own thread, here.
Elements of German attack doctrine apply to panzer forces as well, but the focus here will be on infantry division attacks. Which may include StuG support or similar, generally divisional artillery FOs, battalion and company mortars - and squad infantry up at the pointy end. Obviously there are some requirements of overall odds, suitable terrain, fire support, and enemy strength that are needed for infantry formations to attack successfully. But the German doctrine uses everything differently, because the focus of their attack doctrine is positioning and articulation of forces - maneuver warfare stuff - not primarily force ratios and losses and attrition thinking.
In the German doctrine, the chief element of the offense is surprise. The idea is always to hit where and when one isn't expected, to catch the enemy napping, unprepared, with the wrong dispositions to deal with your chosen point and method of attack. To achieve that, the focus is on information on the one hand, and adaptation on the other. Adaptation includes mobility, heightening your own safe, feasible shifts of forces and weights, and restricting those of the defender. Those can then all be used to arrange many on few fights at chosen points, which once won, further disarticulate the enemy force. His elements are supposed to become less able to help each other, to find their proper combined arms targets, or to have the conditions of terrain and range and such they need to fight effectively. Some local advantages may be "cashed in" for dead enemy to move the overall forces in your favor, but most will be focused instead on continually reducing the enemy's options and moves.
In the ideal case, this ends with a surrounded and trapped enemy unable to move an inch without taking murderous fire. Fire lanes into open ground wrapped around an enemy position are like ropes binding his legs. Once all sides are covered around a given enemy this way, his "movement allowance" has been reduced to zero. His ability to pick what firefights he will engage in has therefore disappeared. You can decide whether to engage him, and he can't make an equivalent decision. By fire and movement principles, that is as good as a kill. An artillery barrage can then be laid on that immobilized enemy to destroy him at leisure.
In short, the idea is to surprise the defender, hogtie him, and fight the remainder of the battle with him in that condition. Needless to say, this places considerable greater demands on the attacking commander than the comparative straightforward methods described in the Russian doctrine thread, and it can readily be screwed up, and will fail if it is screwed up. The German approach in the matter was to take risks and generate chances for lopsided wins, and expect enough of those to pay off, to defeat the overall enemy more efficiently than the attrition method. The Germans don't ever want to fight fair - meaning no even engagements of like arm vs like arm without a big edge in their favor from one factor or another. If there isn't yet such an edge, maneuver for one before engaging too closely.
That difference in approach is easily stated, but what does it mean in practice for infantry attack methods? Three ways, really, each with some variations and subject to mixing with the others, at different distance, time, and force scales. The three ways are (1) broad front, recon pull, aiming at envelopment (envelopment for short), (2) the coup de main, which is effectively trench raid tactics on a grander scale, and (3) infiltration tactics proper, which stresses getting well into the enemy defended zone, by slow and stealthy processes, before the main engagement occurs.
Broad front recon pull means that a skirmish line of infantry sweeps forward like a single wave, and finds *all* the enemy positions. Not just one or two of them to chew on, but locating the entire enemy front line. Weak outposts are driven in by this wave to find the real enemy positions, the ones with enough strength to stop a single thin infantry wave. Besides finding the enemy, this leading wave is expected to pin him in place, to "find and fix". That works by not pressing hard anywhere, sitting down in the cover nearest the enemy but not physically held by him. Then reaching out by fire - from the LMGs the squad infantry brings forward, first of all - to cut up the enemy side of the field with fire lanes, around each body of cover on his side of the field. The goal is to freeze in place as much of the enemy force as possible, by making lateral movement far too risky, several hundreds yards deep into his own positions.
Then a reserve and assault group, which has been kept back out of that leading wave, picks targets found and isolated by it. The goal is to find gaps in the defenses already, and to widen promising fissures by destroying specific bits of the defense, to get deeper into it. The reserve maneuvers in the German "backfield", sheltered by the leading wave and the knowledge it has provided as to which locations are clear of the enemy, which routes already traversed drew no enemy fire, and the like. It sets up opposite its chosen targets. It brings with it heavier weapons - StuGs, FOs, 81mm mortars - and infantry weight in numbers. These supplement the fire of the elements of the scouting wave nearest the chosen target, and "escalate" the pressure on those chosen enemies. Meanwhile the rest of the battlefield is being ignored. The scouting wave is just waiting in the ground they took and preventing easy lateral movement by the enemy, to help the position chosen for the point of attack.
The overloaded point is thus destroyed. Now a new wave spreads from that point, into the deeper parts of the enemy defense. The scouts nearest follow in the wake of the now leading reserve, and form a new reserve behind the entry point. The new spreading wave finds the new enemy positions, and the process is repeated. The goal is to roll up the enemy defenses or break through them, always fighting only the new few that matter for the moves the attack is making next. But the attacker lets enemy weakness dictate where those points of attack should be. Always, hitting where they ain't, and trying to get into them before help can come from either side, or from the enemy rear and reserves.
Speed matters in this, because the enemy learns where the main point of attack is, as it gets going, and he will try to adapt. The attack wants to adapt too, faster, with better information. The scouting wave is also a counter-recon screen blinding the enemy as to one's own deployments. If a reserve is arriving at A, the point of main effort wants to already be over at B by the time they get to the front. Think of a running back making the defensive linebackers miss - it requires anticipation of enemy moves, faster reaction to new information. It helps if ranged weapons can also disrupt enemy movements - StuGs get missions like interdicting all movement across a certain road, pairs of HMGs put down fire lanes with a similar intent, an FO may plaster the only cover point that allows movement from the east side of the map to the west side. In other words, the role of fire is as much or more to restrict enemy movements as it is to hurt him directly.
Every area of open ground on the enemy side of the field is analyzed for its usefulness on cutting up enemy moves, and locations that can see each are determined, heavy weapons teams maneuvered to such positions long before the attacker knows he will need them. Enemy moves are systematically taken off the board by firepower threats into such open ground areas.
Frequently the scouting wave may start with a bias or direction, too. E.g. as a wing attack on the left 2/3rds of the field, with the intent of turning the enemy's left flank. Such routes or plans are made with an eye to being the least expected and likely to be the least defended against, *not* on the principle of the most promising terrain or routes for the attacker. Otherwise put, since the first principle of the attack is surprise, "most promising" normally equals "least expected" - even if it means crossing dangerous ground - as long as that can be done quickly.
The infiltration method can be thought of as a more extreme version of this on a wider scale and with less of an emphasis on fixing the enemy, and more on using stealth to find his gaps. Night actions, fighting in fog, use of smoke sometimes, are used along with this approach. The idea is to sneak into the enemy position. As much as possible, as deep as possible into his whole defense scheme, before first trigger pull. And after first trigger pull, the triggers are used as a distraction - look, look, over here, there are some Germans over here - while the haymaker is winding up from the other hand. The same principle of removing enemy moves by a tactically defensive stance and fire lanes to cut up enemy positions, executed by advanced wedges, is used here too, just like the scouting wave did in the previous method, once it went to ground.
There is a critical mental shift involved in this understanding of the value of positions pushed forward. They do not need to assault straight onto enemy positions. They do not need the weight to do so. They don't need the weight to shoot down enemies in good cover, nor do they need to press home to root him out of his holes. All they need to do is prevent him from leaving his present positions, without being cut up by ranged fire into the open ground bits he has to cross, to leave that cover and get to some other body of it. Anything isolated in this sense, by having all its useful safe moves taken away, is "hogtied". No reason to run up against them or fight that at all. They are already in a prison cell, and artillery can execute them later if need be.
There is also a new principle in true infiltration methods - to just bypass, wherever possible, rather than fight. Any position that can be ignored should be ignored. If there is a route that blocks LOS to that position, maybe someone watches it or at least prevents easy moves out of it, but for the rest, they might as well be on the far side of the moon. Consider anything that can't see you already defeated by poor positioning. Bypass and press deeper, all the way to the back of the defense. German infiltration attackers do not expect to keep the enemy in front of them. They expect to have enemies on all sides of them. Then blind them and pin them in place, and move between them. You can see how limited visibility conditions are critical to the full application of this method.
I passed over the coup de main. It is about surprise in the purest sense. Here, instead of waiting for recon pull to tell you everything about the defense, you need to guess it. Rapid, more limited scouting may be used, and there are certainly leading half squads going first - the usual drill. But you just guess where the enemy is and isn't going to be; you pick a key point you think you can get to that will put some portion of those enemies at a disadvantage, and then you drive like hell for that key point. Faster than the enemy can react. Others are trying to pin him where he is - heavy weapons from back at the start line, e.g., or a 105mm artillery barrage that discourages anyone from getting up and walking around from over on the right side of the field. But the basic idea is just "get there first with the most", where you picked the "there". Win at that point by weight of numbers and the right combined arms brought to that fight for the enemy faced, and do so before the enemy can adapt his positions to that new info about what you are doing.
The follow up can be another such adaptation, or just to exploit what was taken in more of the "fixed them, then pick the next spot to overload" method described in the first approach.
Coup de main differs from the broad front recon in that it is less driven by what the scouts first discover, more by your command push decision. But you are trying to base that on a guess as to where the enemy will be weak and won't be expecting you. If your guess is wrong, you back off and try something else, don't turn it in to an attrition attack on enemy strength.
The coup de main effort can be materially aided by having armor behind it, or as a second best, good approach terrain over a wide area (e.g. large continuous woods or city). It expects to win at the chosen point by getting a many on few fight there and winning that fight before the enemy can even the local odds. For that to work, it can't be the case that all the enemy weapons bear on the chosen point. You need to pick both the concentration objective and a route, such that only a modest portion of the enemy force has any chance to contest your approach, at first. Then you just want to go down that route so fast that "at first" equals "until the fight for that objective is over", because they only differ by 2 minutes (5 max, 2-3 a lot better).
Now, in all of this, you still have to pay attention to combined arms, meaning having 81mm mortars around and HQs to spot for them if there is going to be an enemy gun or HMG position, and a StuG or a panzerschreck up close if there is going to be an enemy tank, and 105mm or 150mm artillery fire if there is going to be a big block of woods full of Russian tommy gunners. Or you can put HMGs on fire lanes on 3 sides of those woods and just go around them, never into or by them. Remember, if they can't see your main force, and they can't safely move to change that, they are already dead (hogtied, same thing). They just don't know it yet.
I hope that helps explain the very different way German infantry attacks.
When I'm not being a nuisance on here or stacking mad loot from modding competitions, I'm making stuff.
I have been working on reworking some of the Red Thunder Master Maps into very large QB maps for CMBS.
v1.0 of this pack has three maps, an attack, assault, and meet on Radzymin Master Map 2. Each has an AI plan for both sides and functioning objectives, but would probably be better for versus play. I will do more plans for each map, and eventually convert all Radzymin Master Maps to CMBS.
Credits to the Master Map goes to BF Company.
I cant post screens because Im on my laptop and they look gash, but Ill try to at the weekend when I am back with my high spec machine.
Download Link v1.0
I have converted 85 of the Red Thunder QB Maps not found as duplicates in CM Black Sea over to be usable in CM Black Sea. All are ready to go as you can imagine.
AI plans are not perfect as they are designed for WW2 combat, but they are workable and more content is always a bonus right?
All credit for original creation and distribution of these maps goes to BFC.
Download Link @Dropbox:
Using Fast for a whole minute is asking someone to sprint for a minute in full body armour. In singlet and shorts, on a track, with spikes, you wouldn't expect most to get more than about 400m, and to be "Exhausted" (in game terms, i.e. can't even jog until they've caught their breath) by the end of that minute. In full body armour, with a modern (or even a WW2) infantryman's combat load, I'd be surprised if they can maintain top speed for 100m, in 15s or so. Try some shorter sprints at Fast and Quick (20, 50 or 100 metre) and you'll see a significant difference in the speed attained; they spend the rest of the minute jogging, so the average speed increase over a minute from Quick to Fast is significantly less impressive. Indeed, you can use short bursts of Fast (30-60m) without the troops becoming Tired.
It's a lot more complicated than "distance travelled between order phases", which gives a false impression of the running speed of the pTruppen.
Small arms fixation, rather silly. 70% plus of all casualties are caused by artillery fire, including the common medium mortars, but heavily dominated by divisional artillery, where all the fire control and ammunition supply was concentrated. Of casualties caused by bullets, machineguns are by far the leading cause, both infantry crew served and vehicle mounted. Maybe 1 in 6 battlefield casualties were caused by all smaller arms combined, and perhaps less. Those split between close range fire at broken enemies or very rapidly decided knife fights, and long range fire making up in time-extent what it lacked in specific lethality. Meaning rifles taking isolated potshots for *hours* on end, whenever a target briefly exposed itself.
CM players try to use infantry as an arm of decision in its own right, accepting very heavy casualties to mash like on like and trade with similar enemies, at ranges down to point blank. That did happen occasionally in the actual war, of course, but always as a sign of a fearsome stuff up in the chain of plans and maneuvering and combined arms application.
Normally SMGs don't kill many infantrymen because normally friendly infantrymen spend very little time within 50 meters of the enemy. Artillery and mortars and tanks and such all plaster him at 500 to 1000 yards. Then MGs, modestly supplemented by aimed rifle fire, mostly keeps him from getting within 200 yards - the MGs rather more effective in the 250 to 500 yard range envelope and the rifles and such kicking in from 250 down to 100 - with few ever getting that close.
When infantry does get that close to the enemy it is after the heavier stuff has seriously messed him up, to finish him off or force him to retreat or to take prisoners. Sometimes it has to threaten that to reveal the defenders by the threat of close approach in far superior numbers - then it mostly gets stopped as described in the previous, and the friendly heavy stuff finds something to "chew on" and goes to work. In all of which, infantry are targets far more than direct threats, and their firepower mostly defensive, suppressing their opposite numbers long before they can close.
Armies went to intermediate rather than full power cartridges after WWII because they had found that infantry only has to deal with the 300 yard and under range, because heavier stuff in the combined arms toolbox completely dominates all fighting at longer ranges. Everyone with a carbine caliber weapon capable of full automatic fire gave all the benefits of SMGs without their limited range drawbacks, while being fully capable out to the 300 yard mark, beyond which small arms fire was tactically irrelevant.
To get a realistic sense of these things in CM, you just have to play realistic scenarios that make full use of the combined arms "kit", and that reflect the "never fight fair" lopsidedness of real combat. When instead you artificially force everything to be a short range, even odds, infantry dominated encounter, and in lots of cover, you won't get historically realistic outcomes or importance of different weapons. You've cherry picked the occasions for automatic small arms carried by each man, to shine.
Fight in open steppe terrain and see how important SMGs are. Give the attacking side 12 tubes of 105mm artillery with 100 rounds per gun and see how important SMGs are. Give one side an SMG infantry company and the other side a Panzer IVG company and see how important the SMGs are. That war as a whole was not even knife-fights inside 100 yards between evenly matched infantry companies. When it was - some city fighting e.g. - infantry loss rates were astronomical and SMGs were highly prized. That just wasn't the whole war.
I finally finished off the training campaign.
I have never been a good RTS player since I have very slow reaction times, so I am thankful for the 60 second turn-based option (and the ability to save and continue games!). Quite a white-knuckle experience (in a good way) hitting the red button every turn and hoping for no major blunders in the plotting for the next 60s. I will follow the advice posted in another thread where a member recommended playing the training campaign several times to help learn game mechanics.
Earlier that day, I also got to see a pair of B-1B Lancers perfrom loops above Colorado Springs. (USAFA had graduated the day before, but IDK why'd they'd come back.)
These pictures, because I'm crazy enough to pull over on the side of the road at Fort Benning and take pictures of tanks. On two separate occasions.
The highway I frequent for travel has Anniston Army Depot up the road, which refurbishes the M1 Abrams (among other things - I see Strykers, Bradleys, and MRAPs pretty frequently), so I got to see a USMC M1A1 going in for an appointment.
There. I have now overloaded you with pictures of military vehicles. Everyone will now think I'm crazy. Or report me to the NSA. Probably both.
You put your finger on something there. Wargamers tend to buy games that depict some area of warfare that they are interested in. They probably already know something about it and want to learn and experience more. Nearly all wargamers have at least heard of Barbarossa and even some fraction of casual gamers have. But much smaller numbers have even heard of Bagration. As BFC have explained it, it made good sense to begin with 1944 for reasons of ease of production, but it also may have cut into sales to do so.
Let's hope it's truly dead. I've always been somewhat proud of gamer geekiness, in that we take in whoever due to our own propensity for being on the out of mainstream followings. At a party there's nothing more I'd like to do than talk about Soviet operational art and how it stood up to German tactical-operational theory, but I realize that would soon mean eating crackers alone at the snack table. So, being happy with anybody having an interest in wargames to the point of wanting to play was the only criteria back then.
But now it seems things have changed. Women start expressing their own thoughts and submitting their own objections to the way they're depicted in games and all hell breaks loose by a contingent of male gamers who are appalled. Why? I don't know. It's really unfortunate too, because it's embarrassing as hell. I expected a lot more from my odd/wonderful community and they totally let me down. What is up with that?
Anyway, mi dos pesos and all that. Hope this phenomena returns to the trash bin of cultural history and we can re-learn to cooperate with all genders and just enjoy playing games again.