Vanir Ausf B

It's the EU elections in June. Macron isn't a candidate but his party has candidates and they are trailing in the polls.

It's the EU elections in June. Macron isn't a candidate but his party has candidates and they are trailing in the polls.

Afraid to put a bit of a dampener on this.
Macron did say again that troops on the ground in Ukraine, in some capacity, should not be impossible. He also said that France will step in to make sure that Russia cannot win if needs be.
But he also said that the time for doing something like that "is not today".
And the French troops in Romania arrived for regularly scheduled NATO training. There is no unusual troop movement there. 
As far as I have seen from some French commenters, this speech was mostly aimed at a domestic audience and is part of Macron's re-election campaign.
Still, the rethoric is new and has been coming too consistently for too long to be just a gaffe. It may be part of a new consciousness for Cold War acting, giving Russia messages to think about.

Near Novopavlivka, Dnipropetrovsk oblast.
Helicopters of 12th Army aviation brigade. Two pilots killed.

There are rumors, sharply increased successes of Russian strikes in last two weeks it's not because their rised recon&strike capabilities, but because of possible information leakage from higher HQ level - all episodes were in Donetsk oblast or close  

This article may explain an increase in Russian ISR:
Russian Shahed-136 With Camera, Cellular Modem Could Be A Big Problem For Ukraine (twz.com)
Co-pilot summary
 

If the speculations about the reasons for Zaluzny's removal are to be believed, it was rather the other way round. Zaluzny was rumoured to be pushing for new round of mobilisation, and Zelensky to be refusing it because of the mobilisation's unpopularity.

Russia starts to work like a modern military. Concerning if this becomes routine. 
Ukraine does not have enough systems for consistent air denial for drones over the whole frontline and behind.
Unless something new appear (drone interceptors to counter drones), this will continue to be painful.

RUS get to 3 [in fact 2- third fly away] Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters. Everything observed from RUS drone. First, one missile with a cluster warhead flew (judging by the number of charges, Tornado rather than Iskander) and after two damaged machines could not fly away - single hits with precision ammunition.
Unfortunately, in the current conditions, the Russian reconnaissance and strike complex has achieved the efficiency it was expected to have before the war. In 2022, for many reasons, it did not work out, in 2023 it worked on average, but unfortunately this year we already see the mythical <5 minutes for HVT (high-value targets). Currently, there is no margin for error for Ukrainians. Of course, this is only the result of the fact that RUS drones fly 40-80 km at home in the Ukrainian hinterland.
Event took place 11.03; in one of helicopters both pilots were killed according to other Ukrianian channels (as always,treat his considerations with grian of salt whenc omes to details, but clip seems genuine. Early geolocation- 50km behind frontlines)
 
 

Apropos the above, the new US weapons package will include ATACMs
The White House is expected to announce as soon as Tuesday that it will send a new package of weapons worth $300 million to Ukraine, and it will include a number of Army Tactical Missile Systems, according to U.S. officials with knowledge of the discussions.
The package will include a number of the Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel, or APAM, an older version of the long-range ATACMS, which travels 100 miles and carries warheads containing hundreds of cluster bomblets, according to one of the officials.
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/12/white-house-aid-package-ukraine-00146487

Apropos the above, the new US weapons package will include ATACMs
The White House is expected to announce as soon as Tuesday that it will send a new package of weapons worth $300 million to Ukraine, and it will include a number of Army Tactical Missile Systems, according to U.S. officials with knowledge of the discussions.
The package will include a number of the Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel, or APAM, an older version of the long-range ATACMS, which travels 100 miles and carries warheads containing hundreds of cluster bomblets, according to one of the officials.
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/12/white-house-aid-package-ukraine-00146487

That's what I interpreted him as saying. Asking when Russia will run out is like asking when the world will run out of oil. The answer is never, it just becomes more scarce. In fact the IISS estimate I posted above does not actually predict a run dry date, but rather how long Russia will be "able to sustain its assault on Ukraine at current attrition rates".

Apropos the above, the new US weapons package will include ATACMs
The White House is expected to announce as soon as Tuesday that it will send a new package of weapons worth $300 million to Ukraine, and it will include a number of Army Tactical Missile Systems, according to U.S. officials with knowledge of the discussions.
The package will include a number of the Anti-Personnel/Anti-Materiel, or APAM, an older version of the long-range ATACMS, which travels 100 miles and carries warheads containing hundreds of cluster bomblets, according to one of the officials.
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/12/white-house-aid-package-ukraine-00146487

So, the Germans have in fact given more % to Ukraine than US and have been hurt the most economically with Nord stream shut down etc. 
Let's keep this in mind in the next round of German bashing. 
 

IISS says 2-3 years.

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/30664/ukraine-battlefield-dynamics-manpower-fortifications-and-ammunition/
My notes:
They made another trip to UKR front lines. They are doing these around every 3months. 
Ukraine's Challenges: Ukraine faces a triple threat with manpower, fortifications, and ammunition shortages. Mobilization remains stalled at political level, hindering long-term force generation. This decision also has a long lead time to effects on the battlefield Last year we saw you cannot make brigades in couple of months  Fortifications are being worked on now, but only lately. Ammunition depends on external factors like US aid and Europe commitment drones are going to help to bridge the gap to an extent. These problems are the same as last trip three months ago. Ukraine leadership changes are still an unknown. Generally seems the leadership is on the same page about the main challenges as the front line troops The war is at an intersection. Many things can go either way, US support, UKR mobilization... Depending on these the war can change radically. Even a Harkiv-style collapse for the Ukrainians is not out of the question on the "bad timelines".  Overly extended summer offensive and pointless commitment of reserves to those attacks have depleted Ukraine Especially Ukrainian infantry has been under extreme strain, battalion might be in OK condition but only have a couple of platoons of fully mission-capable infantry.  Unlikely to see any strategic level offensives from the Ukrainians in 2024  Some Russian challenges:   Russian Force Quality: While a concern in 2023, Russia has demonstrated a capacity to sustain casualties and maintain a baseline level of force quality. This has been shown in practice during the summers stubborn defense and the bloody assaults we are now seeing. UKR has reported increased discipline and executions by the RU Manpower: So far Russia has been able to compensate for it casualties with recruitment. This has been surprisingly successful. Several 100k last year and now in the tens of thousands a month. Unkown how long Russia can keep up. If they cannot a new mobilization wave is going to be required. Equipment availability: Main limiting factor for the Russians at this moment. Ukraine's Evolving Tactics: Shortage of Soviet-era AA ammunition is a major concern. and now also western ammunition  UKR is having increasing success with small mobile AA defenses (MANPADS, AAA, HMG) supported by well integrated sensors and coordination. This is against RU cruise missiles and suicide drones. Especially in parts of the front UKR is developing integration of assets, intelligence and troops to a whole new level. Big steps compared to three months ago Drone war moving more towards competition in quality and integration rather than quantity. 
Ukraine Battlefield Dynamics Manpower, Fortifications, and Ammunition.mp3

That's what I interpreted him as saying. Asking when Russia will run out is like asking when the world will run out of oil. The answer is never, it just becomes more scarce. In fact the IISS estimate I posted above does not actually predict a run dry date, but rather how long Russia will be "able to sustain its assault on Ukraine at current attrition rates".

That's what I interpreted him as saying. Asking when Russia will run out is like asking when the world will run out of oil. The answer is never, it just becomes more scarce. In fact the IISS estimate I posted above does not actually predict a run dry date, but rather how long Russia will be "able to sustain its assault on Ukraine at current attrition rates".

I think he means that technically speaking, Russia will probably never exactly run out of war material, because before that happens it will reduce consumption/exposition to risk when faced with a shortage. Therefore one can not just draw a graph with one line representing average production, the other average consumption and at the point where they meet, the Russian army will stop firing guns or have no more tanks. He says this in all his podcasts in particular whenever ammo production is discussed, so I am fairly confident this is what is meant here as well.
And whereas the Russians can decide to reduce the firing rate/usage rate pretty much at will, they cannot increase the production rate by will alone, therefore the replacement rate is the more objectively observable variable.
 

On the forum and in various discords, the topic has been raised more than once as to whether there was a ground-based radar on the BRM-1 in our gaming time of 1979-1982. Last week I started researching the topic and came across a reconnaissance vehicle operating manual from 1982. All that is known about the radar itself is that it began production in the mid-1970s. Perhaps the information provided will give us in the future a ground radar on the BRM-1K in one of the patches, since I can judge that a ground radar could initially be on all reconnaissance vehicles.
Documentation of BRM-1K operation

 
 
In addition, I studied the topic of thermal imagers in the USSR and learned some interesting things.
The first Soviet zero-generation thermal imager to go into small-scale production was 1PN59 "Posobie-1", which consisted of 50 sensitive elements and had a scanning frequency of 16 Hz, and a target recognition range of 2000 m. This device was installed on PRP-4 (1984) - a mobile reconnaissance point used for reconnaissance and target designation of missile and artillery systems.
The second thermal imager of the first generation was 1PN71 "Posobie-2" with 64 sensitive elements and a scanning frequency of 33 Hz. The target recognition range increased to 3000 m. This device was installed on PRP-4M (1988).
The first two thermal imagers did not find widespread use in sighting equipment and were used only for monitoring the terrain on highly specialized reconnaissance vehicles. However, even if one wanted to, 1PN59 could not be used as a sight due to the low scanning frequency.
Directly for equipping tanks, work was carried out on "Agava-1" thermal imager, which already had 100 sensitive elements and could recognize a tank-type target at 2000 m. "Agava-1" successfully passed tests, but the military abandoned it due to unsatisfactory characteristics, so the timing equipping Soviet tanks with thermal imagers moved back again. After this, the development of an improved version, "Agava-2" began. The number of sensitive elements was increased to 256 pieces, and the target recognition range increased by 20-30%. “Agava-2” suited the military, but its mass production took place in the early 90s, when the country no longer had time for thermal imagers, however, this sight will be installed on some Russian T-80U/UK tanks.
 

Image from the screen of thermal imager 1PN59.
 
 
 

Some good vision here of Challenger 2 on the training range.  Includes an example of one of the things that the reporter says is an issue fielding this vehicle in Ukraine when it gets bogged in a ditch.  He comments at the end re mobility and maintenance being the main problems they've been facing.
 

https://twitter.com/wolski_jaros/status/1766460369357168921
He modified after consultations. More discussions here, sorry but have little time to translate now. Mandarins on the matter seems to disagree, except that these are likely MAN KAT trucks (which could also be used outside Patriot battery) and that convoy was likely carrying some rocket assets; some afterexpolsions are visible, reportedly (I don't see any though).
Russian claim in clip in not necessarly valid, description could be made by anyone and TASS and other ragencies claimed Patriot. I guess we will need to wait, probably milnets close to AFU circles in many coutries will have valid rumours in incoming weeks.
What is concerning and Wolski is right about is that we have plenty more videos with precise Russian strikes deep behind Ukrainian lines in last weeks/months, where they fly pretty unmolested with their drone assets.

Russians are reading the forum.
 

Russians are reading the forum.
 

Mashovets offers a long analysis of how  Avdiivkafail to the Russians:
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1688

He concludes with: