Vanir Ausf B
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Posts posted by Vanir Ausf B
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Update from Tatarigami_UA
- Russian military is expected to deploy at least a brigade-sized force with enhanced offensive capabilities in the near future.
- Russian forces made multiple unsuccessful attempts to reclaim positions south of Bakhmut, resulting in significant losses.
- Russians are currently facing challenges with their artillery barrels, but they are actively pursuing solutions to address them.
- Recent Ukrainian forces' attacks deep into russian territory have necessitated adjustments to russian logistical routes and methods, leading to added challenges.
- Russian command appears to maintain confidence in their ability to defend Tokmak and its surrounding areas.
- At the same time, it continues to struggle with communications and the supply of high-quality communication devices to its units.
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1709291611539087368
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It's an anonymous source so caveat emptor, but the UK may be nearly tapped out on weapons for Ukraine, at least from UK stocks.
Quote“We’ve given away just about as much as we can afford,” they added.
“We will continue to source equipment to provide for Ukraine, but what they need now is things like air defence assets and artillery ammunition and we’ve run dry on all that.”
“The Challenger 2s that we have will become Challenger 3. We need them to upgrade them to become Challenger 3. Every tank we give away is one less that we have.”
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41 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Do we think this is true? because it implies a later model version of the Abrams than I thought they were getting. It also seems like the perfect round for how so much of the fighting in Ukraine seems to go. And yes I understand a guided mortar shell works just as well, but this does imply that at least we are trying to make the Abrams we sent as effective as possible.
I could be wrong, but AFAIK the APM munition has not yet entered serial production. AMP also requires the SEPv3 data link. Could the Pentagon have upgraded the M1A1s to SEPv3 and shipped some pre-production AMP rounds to Ukraine for real-world testing? I wouldn't rule it out but it seems unlikely since the main rationale for sending the M1A1 was to get it into Ukraine as fast as possible.
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It's Scott Ritter...
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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:
groping our weak places.
"Show me on the map where the Russians touched you."
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14 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:
On positive side- I almost forgot how high political standards of conduct looks like; well, that .^
Correct, I am not even sure if source didn't made this up; no formal confirmation of any official request. Anyway, if this particular persona is guilty, evidence against him will probably pop up and he should be investigated (given his age, it will ofc go nowhere). If not, it's just another twitter drama made from opaque understanding that we will forget in a week.
This. The Canadian government says it has received no extradition request. The Polish official calling for extradition is known for bombastic public statements. It also seems unlikely he has any authority to extradite anyone given his job description: "In the fall of 2020, he was appointed minister of education and science, putting him in charge of pre-school, general, special and vocational education in the country. He also oversees the approval of textbooks and issues related to the employment of teachers."
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/yaroslav-hunka-poland-minister-extradite-1.6978266
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1 hour ago, dan/california said:
I have a strong suspicion they are providing the DPICM version because it WON'T drop the Kerch Bridge.
While that would not shock me I'm guessing it's because there are a lot more DPICM warheads in inventory than unitary.
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Poland to stop supplying weapons to Ukraine over grain row
Weapons from other nations can still transit through Poland.
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Quote
In the end, Truman issued Executive Order 10340
On June 2, 1952, in a 6–3 ruling, the Supreme Court declared in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that the President lacked the authority to seize the steel mills. Writing for a heavily-divided majority, Justice Hugo Black held that the President had no authority under the Constitution to seize private property on the grounds of national security. Since Congress had not otherwise authorized the president to seize the steel mills, the President could not do so.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_steel_strike
Who wants to put odds on Congress authorizing Biden to nationalize SpaceX?
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5 hours ago, Carolus said:
The real numbers are likely somewhere in between.
There was a Ukrainian military source quoted in an interview late last year (which I now cannot find) that said the Oryx numbers for tanks under count Russian loses by 50% and Ukrainian loses by 60%.
What is more difficult to wrap my head around is the aircraft loss numbers. Ukraine claims 315 fixed wing kills and 316 helicopters. Oryx counts 89 and 105, respectively.
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Fascinating insights into NATO training for Ukraine; what worked and what didn't.
https://twitter.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1699193558685618235
QuotePlease consider this text as a supplementary piece interjected with opinions - my own and those I spoke to in the field.
I got in touch with not only the 32nd but also the 92nd Mechanized Brigade. The 92nd fought alongside the 32nd and can provide unique insight, as they are experienced and saw firsthand the schism between theory and practice.
Our new infantry brigade did a heroic job in the given circumstances: limited time, resources, and ammunition. My conversations with everyone outside of the 32nd were marked with gratitude, as nobody appreciates people willing to do the job of infantry more than infantry.
Don't doom over this text. My effort is to give another small input into making Western training more effective.
Let me also point out that when dealing with losses, emotions run high, and there is an opening for toxicity to seep in. The disconnect between expectations set by the training and the reality of the Ukrainian battlefield can be explained better with a lack of communication at the higher level than with "Western arrogance". It can still get you angry, but you would be a fool to escape into a simple narrative that relies on a lack of intelligence or empathy. You can not expect Western militaries to be perfectly in tune with the requirements of the Ukrainian battlefield at the institutional level when our own institutions run into similar problems with less distance to the front. If you think Ukrainian training is perfect, I have an illegal bridge to sell you.
You can watch the videos of Western instructors saying farewell to Ukrainian recruits anytime. Twitter replies made by armchair generals do not represent them. I think they very much care.
Background:
The 32nd Mechanized Brigade was formed at the beginning of 2023 and partially equipped with Western equipment with the core of its mechanized infantry utilizing the American M113 armored personnel carrier.
Its infantry battalions underwent training in the spring of 2023 in a NATO country. After the return to Ukraine, the brigade received equipment and ammunition and was fully staffed. During the summer, the 32nd brigade was deployed alongside the 92nd brigade, which had been fighting for the past nine months in the Svatove axis in the northeast of Ukraine.The deployment quickly became problematic and resulted in heavy casualties, eventually forcing the command to reconsider.
The training:
I’ve spoken to one of the sergeants in the brigade with the call sign “Nestor” about the training they received abroad.
Overall, the training included basic infantry, reconnaissance, and assault tactics.
Nestor said the most interesting and useful part was the reconnaissance training. “We learned how to get close to the enemy and build secure observation posts. It was essential.” They also learned how to adjust artillery and navigation. “Navigation was useful; spotting was interesting, but it was not particularly useful on the battlefield so far.”
However, his overall verdict of the training was mixed: “It was like the instructors were in a vacuum. We received training in infantry tactics, while this war is a war of artillery and drones.”.
On one occasion, Nestor’s commander asked if trainers would at least consider the presence of drones on the battlefield. The answer was a damning “No.”.
“You didn’t take your drones with you, and the only drone we have available is DJI Phantom 4, but we can’t even use it for bureaucratic reasons.” he recalls them saying. So they continued the training as is.Western-provided training fell short of considering current realities on the battlefield. The brigade’s first deployment in Ukraine was to hold the defense in the Svatove direction. However, Nestor commented: “Our battalion received zero defensive combat training. It was all assault oriented.”
On a positive note, the sergeant says that our infantry learned to move and storm buildings and trenches. “If you consider this basic infantry training, it was good.” The infantry companies spend seven days practicing assault combined arms operations, storming different objectives. One day, it was a small town. Another day, it was an enemy trench. “We went through swamps, mud, and cold nights. Once, our instructor said that living through it on the battlefield would be easier if we experienced these conditions now. He was right.”
But the companies received too little training on surviving the battlefield: “There was no camouflage training. The infantry didn’t learn how to conceal positions, build bunkers, and no defensive combat training.”
In the end, Nestor adds that one of the things that they needed was EOD awareness and training. “You must understand the battlefield is littered with booby traps, mines, and explosive ordinance. We knew it before the deployment. Everyone in Ukraine knows it. We asked trainers if we could get any training on the topic.” But for some reason, the trainers refused to even discuss it. It was a taboo. “We regret the lack of EOD training specifically. It could have saved lives.”
The deployment:
After the training in Germany by a NATO country was complete, and after a short period in Ukraine, they were sent to reinforce Svatove direction.
Problems appeared immediately. Nestor’s battalion was deployed shoulder to shoulder with one of the battalions of the 92nd brigade. The 92nd brigade soldier with the call sign “Zero” explains, “It appears that they were trained on another planet. What was obvious to us was a terra incognito for them.” He continues with a story of one of their first encounters with 32nd infantry: “We were driving 15km from the front line, and I noticed a military Ural (truck), with a full platoon clustered around near one of the small local grocery stores. They acted like they didn’t know it was a war zone. We had to stop and tell them that ZALA (russian) drone was reported around. The platoon commander did not know the enemy had such capabilities.”.
A grave mistake in NATO training was that a company commander stayed in the trenches with the company. While it sounds heroic and may work when facing a poorly equipped enemy, russia is well-equipped and has hundreds of drones. This costly mistake was corrected after they lost a couple of positions. “The company commander has to have the eyes in the sky. He has to have his own drone stream and communicate with platoon or group commanders.” - It was a costly lesson for Nazar’s unit; “It cost us lives.”
I asked why a company commander couldn’t stay in the trench. My friend from the 92nd Brigade explained that when the company commander is in the trench, he becomes another link in the chain of command: “Please understand controlling 100 soldiers in combat is a hard task. The higher-level commander watches a drone stream and makes decisions. He gives an order to the company commander over the radio. The company commander has to understand exactly what is going on to make decisions and pass orders to the platoons. For that, you need to observe the battlefield from the top. Try sitting under tank shelling and yelling over the radio while being yelled over the radio yourself. It is much more efficient when the company commander has his own command and control room with drone streams coming in. He can make calm and weighed decisions looking at the battlefield instead of listening to what is happening, and it is no longer a game of telephone.”
“In the current battlefield, even the group or a platoon commander has to have a tablet with our special map application to be effective, and you can not rely on a stupid enemy anymore. They evolved.” summarizes Nestor, “We knew none of that, and no one could share the experience and knowledge with us. Now we are smarter, but the price was terrible.”
Another capability that was undertrained might surprise: driving. It might sound absurd to some, but those familiar with the battlefield know how hazardous and costly even a simple drive toward or away from the front can be. Our drivers must be more experienced in driving at night; driving during the day is too dangerous. Training for night driving operations is critical to avoid casualties and the loss of valuable equipment. It is also emblematic: It may not seem a top priority for NATO training personnel with a shortened schedule. However, its importance must be communicated just like any other discrepancy mentioned here and elsewhere.
Conclusion:
The disconnect of the NATO training leads to a brigade being unprepared on the battlefield. Specifically, the lack of UAV, defensive, mine awareness, and EOD training has led to unnecessary casualties on the battlefield.
To avoid a similar situation in the future, Ukraine needs to treat NATO training as basic infantry training instead of a complete cycle of brigade/battalion-level preparation. We need to perform post-training exercises and adapt the units to the newest technologies and tactics on the battlefield.
Ultimately, the brigade has gained enough experience to be effective, but the cost could have been much smaller.
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We may know what happened to the destroyed Challenger 2:
"Challenger 2 in Ukraine hit a mine - which immobilized it. Mine explosion caused a fire in rear fuel tank - at which point crew evacuated. Immobilized empty Challenger2 was then targeted by Lancet drone - all according to western Def source"
https://twitter.com/bealejonathan/status/1699144029324075518
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1 hour ago, Centurian52 said:
The real advantage of the rifled gun is that it makes it possible to fire HESH effectively. Which is why it's puzzling that the Ukrainians apparently aren't receiving HESH ammunition. A Challenger 2 without HESH seems to be missing the point. Retaining a rifled gun into the modern day was a serious design compromise that the British army made specifically because they believed HESH was worth it. HESH (while not effective against modern MBTs) is a fantastic anti-personnel, anti-bunker, and anti-light vehicle round.
I think the issue is that the supply is constrained. The UK seems to retain small stockpiles of most munitions and IIRC has not procured 120mm HESH rounds since the 2000s. The are no NATO allies to fall back on either.
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20 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
He says about this, literally "It's unlike our tanks with HE shells for infantry, no, these [Challengers] tanks were designed to fight Soviet tanks, not infantry, against infantry there are other infantry and artillery"
I think, maybe HE/HESH ammo for UKR Challengers are limited, so they use to hunt armor.
Thanks. That confirms my suspicion. The L31A7 HESH round has been out of production for years, AFAIK.
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41 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
This guy (he served on T-64, T-72, T-80) says, Challenger has very accurate gun and targeting system, which allows to hit enemy targets from very big ranges. This is tracked "sniper rifle", So, Challengers don't use like other tanks for "сarousel" and infantry support with HE shells. Challengers have a task to hit enemy armor from big distance in shoot&scoot way.
Very interesting. On paper the Challenger 2s main cannon should have anti-armor performance similar to Leopard 2a6 (both are 120L55), which makes me wonder if this dedicated anti-armor role is mostly because the Challenger 2s anti-personnel rounds are HESH rather than HE.
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Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante tells a defense industry conference that "I think a protracted conflict scenario...[is] not one that we have fully fleshed out the way we probably should have in terms of our budget planning."
https://twitter.com/paulmcleary/status/1696250321553473585
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5 hours ago, Anon052 said:
I found this article about the problems of NATO training of ukrainian troops very interesting.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-russia-training-nato-west-military/
Meshes with a (paywalled) FT article noting the language barrier is a significant issue:
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Teaching inexperienced soldiers how to operate a tank on the front line in just six weeks was never going to be easy.
But when German, Dutch and Danish officers gathered in a lush green patch of the North German countryside to train Ukrainian men, they were not expecting a shortage of competent interpreters to be the top issue.
“Interpreters are challenge number one,” said Martin Bonn, a Dutch brigadier general who is deputy head of the multinational EU training mission launched last November to educate Ukrainians on a range of weapons and tactics. Kyiv and western capitals are providing translators, who often struggle with the necessary vocabulary.
“The big challenge is the translation of words used in a military or technical context . . . Words no one uses in everyday life,”
European trainers were full of praise for the “tremendous motivation” of the recruits, despite the stress of the brutal war they are fighting and the daily dangers to friends and family back home.
But they also said that the age and ability of the soldiers they are sent varies wildly, as Ukrainian commanders on the front line are often unwilling to spare their best men. One volunteer who turned up in Germany was 71 years old.
https://www.ft.com/content/5bcb359e-f0ae-475d-9773-b89c0ebe0a1b
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5 minutes ago, IanL said:
And what were the shots to first hit of the first PzIV? I think I can guess but I figured you had the data
None of them hit on the first shot but I did not actually count Group 1s shots to first hit, to be honest. The point of the test was a quick sanity check, not an in-depth statistical analysis.
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16 hours ago, Chibot Mk IX said:
The weird part is a multiplier to one engagement. it seems like the ability to zero in is not based on each individual shooter, but based on the total number of shots one side have fired,
10 hours ago, PEB14 said:As you rightfully point out, more testing is required; but the test I described above seems to confirm that "the ability to zero in is not based on each individual shooter, but based on the total number of shots one side have fired".
I put 3 pair of Pz IVs 1250m across from 3 isolated IS-2s, let one of each pair of Pz IVs (call them Group 1) fire for two turns (9 shots each) to ensure every subsequent shot was a hit, then let the other Pz IVs (Group 2) start shooting. The number of shots taken by Group 2 tanks to achieve the first hit was 2,4 and 3 respectively.
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19 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
This may not be a feasible idea due to resistance within NATO
The Vilnius summit showed there will need to be a dramatic shift in Western perspective for a wartime NATO entry to be seriously considered.
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7 minutes ago, G.I. Joe said:
That's definitely a stumbling block and it may prevent both types from serving together in the short term. But in the long term it has to be addressed either way because 8 pilots is really too small a cadre even for one type and English proficiency is going to be required with NATO integration regardless of equipment choice. My guess is they will probably end up both entering service eventually.
"Eventually" being the operative word. Of course there is no reason Ukraine can't operate more than one type of fighter. They do that already. But transitioning to two different types simultaneously seems like a bad idea unless it cannot be avoided, e.g. there are too few fighters of each type available.
For what it's worth, I came across an article from June in which Sweden called Ukrainian pilot training an "operational evaluation":
"The armed forces are tasked with orientation training for Ukrainian pilots and associated aeronautical personnel on the JAS-39 [Gripen]," a machine translation of the release says. "The Ukrainian armed forces have expressed requests to be able to operationally evaluate the JAS-39 as one of the most urgent measures is to strengthen the Ukrainian air defense with a modern combat aircraft system."
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Just now, Haiduk said:
Ukraine officially asked Sweden about JAS-39. So, with very high probability they can fight together %)
More power to them if they can make it happen but I see only 8 pilots in the first F-16 cadre and wonder how many more are available.
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59 minutes ago, Teufel said:
These Swedes some sly and sneaky bastards, wouldn’t surprise me if this “already started” been ongoing for some time. The SAAB 39 Griffin is available in around 100-120 units across friendly countries of Sweden, Czech Republic and the UK. Let’s exclude South Africa, Brazil and Hungry that also have these but unlikely to transfer to Ukraine.
The Czech Gripens are leased (as are the Hungarian) and the UK only has one of them, so it's probably Sweden or nothing.
I suspect Haiduk is correct that this is Plan B in case Plan A (F-16s) doesn't happen. I don't think we will see both F-16s and Gripens in Ukraine.
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The Drive has a nice article on why F-16s should be viewed as a long-term investment rather than a short term solution.
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“They're young pilots that barely have any hours at all. So they're not currently fighting the war,” he said.
The Ukrainian pilots are currently undergoing language training in the U.K.
“And then they're going to get a little bit more training on propellers, and then go down to France and fly in the [Dornier Alpha Jets] for a little bit, that all is going to take time,” said Hecker. “And that's probably not going to happen before the end of the year. So that takes a while to make that happen. So that's why it's going to be at least until next year until you see F-16s in Ukraine.”
Also, a thoughtful thread from Justin Bonk regarding western contractors.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
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Tokmak probably isn't really closed for Russian logistics. If it were that simple it would have been done months ago, as you alluded to. One of the most pervasive myths in this war is that you can "close" a supply route with indirect fires. That's not how it works. Russian and Ukrainian forces are separated by only a few kilometers in most places yet those forces are resupplied. There is attrition, yes, but plenty gets through.