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LongLeftFlank

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  1. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from LuckyDog in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    1.  There are migrants in desperate parts of the world who would man the modern equivalent of Birkenau crematoria blocks if they could wire home 700usd per month.
    2.  That said, they can't wire home that monthly pay if they are missing arms, legs or their heads; or if it's simply getting stolen. And word will get around, fast.
    3. My personal KPI for Russia running out of mercenary cred, FWIW, is Norks. The Kim dynasty has sent thousands of young men to awful jobs in inclement parts of USSR/Russia (logging camps, mines) to earn money for the glorious Juche state ever since the Gulag tailed off. Their opinion in the matter is not requested.
    I suspect there are already some DPKA military specialists working to support the RUAF. When tiny corpses of (underfed) Korean kids start showing up in the storm units, we'll know other options for mercs are running down for Putin Inc.
  2. Thanks
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Vanir Ausf B in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    This may have been posted before but a thread search didn't find it. Important points here though by Watling.
    https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024
    The Russian military began 2023 with a highly disorganised force in Ukraine comprising approximately 360,000 troops.... By the beginning of 2024, the Russian Operational Group of Forces in the occupied territories comprised 470,000 troops....
    Russian forces have reverted above battalion level to the traditional Soviet order of battle of regiments, divisions and combined arms armies, but have been significantly altered below the level of the regiment.
    Battalions are organised as line and storm battalions, and tend to operate in company groups which fight in small, dispersed detachments [due to a] shortage of trained officers able to coordinate larger formations, with a significant proportion of Russian junior officers currently being promoted from the ranks....
    Units can generally be rotated out of the line once they have taken up to 30% casualties – the point at which they are judged to be ineffective – and are then regenerated.... In this way, the Russians are maintaining a consistent pressure on a number of points....
    If Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025.  

  3. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from paxromana in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  4. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from paxromana in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Duuude, this is the LongLeftFlank© gambit I've preached before here; others have too.
    As our @The_Capt hath taught us, this is the very thing that the AFU has been doing brilliantly since 23 Feb: set the RU up in no-win situations and then force them to ride the hell ride anyway.
    Planting bushels of landmines and lobbing in giant bombs won't help Ivan out of this one. There's just too much squishy ground to cover. Their only possible counter is to feed in equally tough swamp rat infantry, but even after 2 years my read is even VDV just don't have the C4ISR to match the Ukes.
    Kinburn spit.

     
    ...All that said, those Ukrainian forces are going to suffer heavy losses, make no mistake.
  5. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Carolus in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Duuude, this is the LongLeftFlank© gambit I've preached before here; others have too.
    As our @The_Capt hath taught us, this is the very thing that the AFU has been doing brilliantly since 23 Feb: set the RU up in no-win situations and then force them to ride the hell ride anyway.
    Planting bushels of landmines and lobbing in giant bombs won't help Ivan out of this one. There's just too much squishy ground to cover. Their only possible counter is to feed in equally tough swamp rat infantry, but even after 2 years my read is even VDV just don't have the C4ISR to match the Ukes.
    Kinburn spit.

     
    ...All that said, those Ukrainian forces are going to suffer heavy losses, make no mistake.
  6. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from paxromana in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    1.  There are migrants in desperate parts of the world who would man the modern equivalent of Birkenau crematoria blocks if they could wire home 700usd per month.
    2.  That said, they can't wire home that monthly pay if they are missing arms, legs or their heads; or if it's simply getting stolen. And word will get around, fast.
    3. My personal KPI for Russia running out of mercenary cred, FWIW, is Norks. The Kim dynasty has sent thousands of young men to awful jobs in inclement parts of USSR/Russia (logging camps, mines) to earn money for the glorious Juche state ever since the Gulag tailed off. Their opinion in the matter is not requested.
    I suspect there are already some DPKA military specialists working to support the RUAF. When tiny corpses of (underfed) Korean kids start showing up in the storm units, we'll know other options for mercs are running down for Putin Inc.
  7. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Fernando in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  8. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to The_Capt in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    This kind of demonstrates the "western military thinking box".  In western doctrine when we say "river crossing" it is exactly as you describe - getting heavy and mech across a water obstacle and then sustaining them as they push out and drive the opponent far enough back to build bridging infrastructure up to the point the obstacle is no longer an obstacle...and in this war that approach is pretty much broken.
    Russian ISR - even as lower quality as it is - will see pontoons, ribbon bridges and large build up of forces.  They will then lob everything they can at the crossing and any forces in the bridgehead.  Hopeless, impossible...modern technology has made it "impossible".
    So what?  Well be something else. Light fast and distributed forces on ATV, motorcycles...hell bicycles.  All armed to the teeth with FPVs and loitering munitions of their own.  All linked into the massive C4ISR architecture.  Only thing missing are UGVs which can reinforce distributed mass.  Then let them loose on the enemy.  Logistics are not zero but they are much lower than AFVs and tanks.   
    The real question is can one go this way and sustain firepower?  Are you losing fires for lighter forces?  In the past the answer was unequivocally "yes".  After seeing a video of 5 FPV teams stop a RA tank company, I am no longer so sure.
    So a modern Kherson break out could be a bunch of light teams on quads, all with ATGMs and FPV.  The follow up with conventional fires once you push them out of support ranges...however, given RAP rounds and HIMARS, that is a good bubble.  Once you get that in place...then try the heavy/mech stuff.
    Will it work.  No idea.  It is taking a raiding force and making it into something else.  But right now it definitely would be worth exploring because that last sentence of yours is not the better option.
     
  9. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to danfrodo in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Did LLF get hacked?  The above post is rather ..... positive?  Uncharacteristically positive.  There is a Sun Tzu reference which certainly makes it seem like LLF.  
    But seriously, excellent points, LLF.  
  10. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Reclaimer in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for the clarification, but you might consider thumbing down the ad hominem attacks a bit.
  11. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from keas66 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  12. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Holien in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  13. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from danfrodo in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  14. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from kimbosbread in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Thanks for this, and as of 2022 I might have agreed with most of this.
    But consider the following:
    1. The Krynki bridgehead remains after 4+ months, in spite of nonstop attacks by Russian heavy forces + VDV. And that's a zone the Russians can actually supply via a major highway. It's hell for the Uke marines who are there, indeed, but they and their support forces are also giving better than they get, by plastering the RU attacks and LOCs.
    2. The further you get down the delta (past the Kherson bridge), the harder it is for the Ivans to deploy and sustain heavy forces -- AFVs, shells, in that boggy, poorly roaded area. I'd actually argue that their logistical challenge out there is WORSE than the Ukrainian one.
    At a bare minimum, this zone is flypaper to chew up their best remaining troops (VDV/Spetsnaz) as sustaining mech is going to be a nightmare. Pure Sun Tzu.
    3. On the other hand, there's plenty of space in those bayou lands for savvy crack troops to spread out and minimise the damage from glide bombs. Drone airlift/medevac and drone ships can keep Ranger battalions supplied indefinitely; heavy forces, no, but they're not useful here.
    The Cossacks invented these tactics hundreds of years ago.
    4. The RU aircraft and helos are going to need to make attack runs from the southeast, given that the Western Black Sea is quickly becoming a Ukrainian lake....
    5. In spite of being marshlands, Kinburn spit east to Oleshky sands is probably the most essential strategic territory for Ukraine to recover, as the Russians can be expected to build another Sebastopol there in a cease fire situation so as to menace the entire Kherson-Mykolaiv-Odesa portion of Ukraine. I'd actually argue that this is a must have!
    Look forward to your reply, as none of the above is going to be easy....
  15. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I'm looking at RU MOD directives on how to defend vehicles from FPV. Interesting bit:
    FPV-suicide drones
    «Hawk» airplane type - max speed 120 kmh «Kross» quadcopter type - max speed 60 kmh [Insane speed] Warheads
    PG-7L PG-7M PG-9C PG-18 [Bar armor and spall liners are still effective. RU vehicles do not have either that or ERA]
    P.S. 
    I checked it. Well, the directives are not really interesting to us. They describe how to build cope cages and install RU crappy EW devices on various RU vehicles. The diagrams of Cope Cage installation would be interesting if the RU intelligence officers understood how the FVP attacks in practice. But they don't. So, the diagrams have glaring mistakes and are mostly useless.
  16. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from cesmonkey in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/022224-feature-russia-defiant-two-years-into-war-reshaping-global-energy
    Nice infographic, for those interested:

    Interesting that in spite of its stated intent to remain neutral in the conflict (partly in gratitude to Russia for its past support), energy-hungry Vietnam is not a significant importer of Russian oil.
  17. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from kimbosbread in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Ha ha, no. They might possibly be, if China wasn't sitting on the Spratlys.
  18. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from dan/california in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/022224-feature-russia-defiant-two-years-into-war-reshaping-global-energy
    Nice infographic, for those interested:

    Interesting that in spite of its stated intent to remain neutral in the conflict (partly in gratitude to Russia for its past support), energy-hungry Vietnam is not a significant importer of Russian oil.
  19. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from zinz in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/022224-feature-russia-defiant-two-years-into-war-reshaping-global-energy
    Nice infographic, for those interested:

    Interesting that in spite of its stated intent to remain neutral in the conflict (partly in gratitude to Russia for its past support), energy-hungry Vietnam is not a significant importer of Russian oil.
  20. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.
  21. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to Grigb in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    The artillery situation there is not as dire as we believe. Agent 13th reported three days ago.
    At the very least, UKR CB has been successful there.
     
    I watched a new RU video regarding FPV drone suppression. The most fascinating remarks, however, are those concerning the current situation:
    UKR took Million Drones program seriously Reports from different [front] locations say that life of RU fighters is getting worse and harder [due to FPV drones] [Situation] is getting hotter [for RU troops] Unlike RU, UKR regularly suppresses control of RU drones because RU drones en masse are not prepared to counter EW. UKR drones are prepared [RU FPV programs are seriously lagging behind UKR]   
     
  22. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to Zveroboy1 in What WW2 hex wargame/map is best to reuse for the current Ukraine War?   
    A new WIP wargame:  Miracle on the Dnipro covering the initial phase of the war and the assault on Kyiv.

    The designer's diary might be of interest to some:
    https://sdhist.com/first-draft-of-history-russo-ukraine-war-d-b-dockter-mark-herman/
  23. Like
    LongLeftFlank reacted to The_Capt in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    I don’t think anyone of serious power in the West wants a full Russian collapse.  The overall Western grand strategy since the end of the Cold War has been “stable status quo”.  We have spent the last 33 years pretty much working on all fronts to sustain “the system”.  We toss scarfs and hats on it but at its core is a central unchanging stability.  Why?  Because stability is good business.  The West, with the US at the centre built the scheme that “won” the Cold War and want that party to keep going because we get very rich off it.  The rest of the world makes our stuff for cheap, while also buying our other stuff.  
    But pretty much from Day 1 “the others” pushed back.  First was the intra-war years, interventions and then terrorism.  Now this has upscaled to “revisionist states” and “power competition”.  Russia invaded Ukraine for several reasons but one of them definitely was to demonstrate that they are not going to be bound by western rules (Hell, Putin said exactly this in that speech back in Sep ‘22).  This puts the West in a dilemma, they can either do too little and Russia threatens the system, or they crush Russia…and it threatens the system.  So they appear to have chosen the middle path, which of course is getting hijacked by the internal movements who want to…wait for it…change the system.  MAGA, alt-right, nationalists, whatever, all disagree with “the system” even though it has made everyone richer.  The reality is that it did not make everyone equally rich so discontent is natural.  Worse, power spheres exploit this so they can get more powerful (and richer).  So Rust-Belt yokels eat this stuff up and start to dismantle “the system”, which includes democracy apparently.  The reality is Trump is a symptom, not a cause and I am not sure even they realize how dangerous this game they are playing is.
    So Ukraine happens and becomes a symbol of a “war for, and against, the system.”  It isn’t about the fact that killing innocent Ukrainians is wrong - hell if morales like human life mattered we wouldn’t have Gaza.  No, Ukraine is all about “the system” and both sides appear to be waging it viewed through that lens.  Russia needs to show that they are going to play by their own rules, but not completely break themselves.  One could ask “why is Russia fighting this war by half measures?”  Do they enjoy a quagmire?  No, Putin understands what he has gotten himself into and is adopting a slow burn strategy, hoping we will get distracted and caught up in our own nonsense…and he might be right.
    The rest of the West is trying to step up, but frankly we have grown awfully fat, dumb and happy on the back of the US - who now is having a bipolar fit.  In the end, we can live with a fallen Ukraine.  We can shore up the borders and lock Russia out.  We can live with a partial victory in Ukraine, do we really care about Crimea, LNR and DNR?  No, we did not in ‘14 and we don’t now.  We can’t live with a completely imploded Russia.  Those are where the real risks lie.  Too many unknowns that could really break the system.  So we wind up with a half hearted war designed to punish Russia for challenging the system but not destroy them.  Ukraine is, and I am being brutally honest here, is almost secondary to the entire conversation.  It was simply a very unfortunate country where both sides could try and prove a point.  We love Ukraine all of a sudden because they are an opportunity to show that 1) Russia was wrong to challenge the system, and 2) the system still works.  
    I strongly suspect this is why this war is also so muddled in military circles.  We are watching a war to defend the system..that is demonstrating the weaknesses of our own military system at the same time.  So we put blinders on and try to pretend it isn’t happening.  Our military power has to still be relevant…otherwise how can we defend the system?
    So to answer your question, “yes, the US and the West know exactly how important Ukraine really is and are fighting this war based on that calculus.”  The answer however is “somewhat important”.  We care and feel bad, but care much more about our own issues.  Putin read the short game about as wrong as one can.  He may have read the long game extremely well.  The way to beat the West is not outright confrontation, it is apathy.  2 years is forever for a culture addicted to clicks and flashing lights.  Putin’s off ramp is being able to draw a victory line somewhere of his choosing and he is shooting for that.  And we might just let him get there.
    Now I would not start freaking out and worry about a second attack on Kyiv.  Something that dramatic might actually get our attention again.  No, this needs to become a boring war - I am starting to think Putin’s Tucker Carlson interview was smarter than we thought.  What better way to get Western audiences to yawn and start to change the channel than a history lesson?
  24. Upvote
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from quakerparrot67 in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    Yeah, I was enjoying a beautiful clear night last summer on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, only to see a line of 5 satellites ascending, all in perfect line.
     
  25. Like
    LongLeftFlank got a reaction from Probus in How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?   
    @Grigb is one of the best contributors to this thread. Just sayin'.
    ****
    VERIFICATION REQUEST. Is it true Russia only has one more A50 AWACS?  Or is this yet another Sushko disinfo special?
     
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