Claus B

According to a 17-pdr Mk V manual, the accuracy life of the gun was 425 EFC (Effective Full Charge) rounds. APCBC Full Charge = 0.5 EFC APCBC Reduced Charge = 0.03 EFC (doesn't make much sense..?) HE Full Charge = 0.25 EFC HE Reduced Charge = 0.03 EFC APDS = 1 SV (Super Velocity) charge = 0,75 EFC Smoke = EFC neglible So converted to rounds fired, barrel life would be between ~14.000 (HE reduced charge) and 566 (APDS) with APCBC full charge giving a life of 850 rounds. Claus B

Kingfish gave a good, simple explanation. So lets immidiatly try to complicate it a bit, just for the fun While it is correct that L/x equals barrel length divided by bore diameter, it is not always measured the same. In the US, barrel length was measured as "bore length" i.e. from the front (or inner) surface of the breech block to the end of the muzzle, not counting the muzzle brake. In Germany, they took the measure from the rear face of the breech to the end of the muzzle, not counting the muzzle brake. What his means is that the Shermans 75mm M3 gun was 37.5 calibers long (L/37.5) if measured in the US, but when the Germans put the measure on it, it was 40.1 calibers long (L/40.1). And the numbers, even when the measure is the same, can sometimes be confusing. As an example, the Germans had three different 75mm guns of roughly the same calibers length: - 7,5cm PaK 40 L/46 (i.e. the anti-tank gun) - 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43 (i.e. the early Panzer IV tank gun) - 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48 (i.e. the later Panzer IV tank gun Why three different lengths? Actually, the rifled part of the barrel on the L/46 and the L/43 was exactly the same length, the different comes from the fact that the anti-tank gun had a longer chamber while the chamber on the tank gun was shorter and wider. In the L/48 gun, they lengthened the rifled part of the barrel. So when you say that the longer barrel has better accuracy (all other things being equal), it is true, but only if the rifled part of the barrel is longer. Having a longer chamber does not add anything to accuracy. So for all intents and purposes, the L/43 gun and the L/46 gun would be equally accurate, while the L/48 would be more accurate than both - at least in principle. cbo

And hello to you too Dug up the old thread, just for the fun of it: http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=16;t=022446 If anyone is interested, vol. 1 - 3 of the SAIC study can be downloaded from SAIC: Vol 1: Technical Report Vol 2: U.S. Anti-Tank Defense at Mortain Vol 3: U.S. Anti-Tank Defense at Dom Butgenbach Go to http://stinet.dtic.mil/index.html and do a search for "anti-armor defense data study" cbo [ February 19, 2008, 02:06 AM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

John, Seems that the book only repeats what the SAIC study has to say about the use of 6-pdr APDS in US 57mm guns and as you may or may not recall, Jeff Duquette brought that to our attention on this very forum in 2001 It's on p. 21 of the SAIC study, if you have it downloaded. US Army ammunition expenditure data found at US Army Military History Institute by Kurt Laughlin in 2002 confirms that the US Army had APDS available and recorded its use from August 1944 to May 1945. I dont mean to be obnoxious about it, I just thought the issue of US use of 6-pdr APDS had been cleared up years ago Claus B

So that would be the collection of penetration data, you were looking at? I worked a bit with David Honner back then and he incorporated some of my data on his "Gun vs Armour" site. That died, but there is a mirror here: http://gva.freeweb.hu/ Claus B

I've never played Panzer Elite, so perhaps not. I used to have a site running ("On Armour"), but that has been down for years. I was just checking something in an old thread here and saw Michaels post on the 7,62cm gun and thought I'd chip in Claus B

I thought they were rechambered to take the German 75mm round. :confused: Michael </font>

It is my understanding, that in an armoured attack, it was up to the tanks to deal with anti-tank guns and any other heavy weapons that presented themselves, ideally in cooperation with artillery and infantry. It would be contradictory to the concept of the tank in the German Army to have it stop and wait for the infantry (and artillery) everytime it ran into an AT-gun. As you can see in one of the examples above, even lightly armoured SPWs could succesfully engage enemy anti-tank guns as long as they could utilize superior speed, firepower and mass - a mixture to which the tanks could add fairly heavy armour. Claus B

You seem to be in good company in not knowing what the best approach is. The latest British Army Review (no. 133) contains a piece by Sydney Jary MC titled ""The Form" -- What you can and, more importantly, what you cannot do". This is about how junior commanders learn what is practicable on the battlefield (from Jary's own experience, recounted in "18 Platoon", now in its fifth edition). The following, quoted verbatim from the article, I hope may be of some interest: <SNIP> [/QB]

I dont think the reference allows for such an interpretation. It seems evident to me, that the armoured group broke through the enemy line and secured the village in one continuous motion. The thing is, that the reference does not say anything about it, so you interpret it in the light of you opinion that mounted attacks did not (or rarely) happen. I see this in the light of the stated doctrine as a typical case of mounted combat where SPWs are used to carry the troops right into and on top of the objective. There is nothing in these references from Meyers book that suggest that practice was different from doctrine - in fact they seem to show numerous cases where mounted combat by the SPWs was possible and desirable. I think the key here is, that if you try to follow the actions of the SPW battalion, there are many cases of the SPW being used as a combat vehicle as opposed to mere transport, and many cases where the action they take part in conforms with doctrine. But if you look at battles involving German armoured divisions in general, the few SPW units (12. SS had only one SPW battalion) does not really stick out. I suspect they do in Meyers account because one of his sources is a guy from the 9. kompanie of PzGrRgt 26 - i.e. one of the SPW companies As for the mounted/dismounted issue, some clarification may be in order. By dismounted combat, I refer to what I would call the "US doctrine": The APC (SPW) is a battle-taxi that can bring the armoured infantry onto the battlefield without getting hurt at the speed and to the locations where tanks can operate. But the APC is not used as a combat vehicle per se, nor is it driven into enemy positions with the infantry mounted. It may give some firesupport to the dismounted infantry, but thats its only combat role. By mounted combat, I refer to what I would call "German doctrine": The SPW is a combat vehicle that is used to drive the infantry across the battlefield all the way into and on top of the enemy position. In doing so, the weapons mounted on the SPW will be used while the troops are mounted, and the troops may contribute using their arms. In the actual attack, troops will mount and dismount their SPW as appropriate, but they will do so while in combat. In the examples I've found in Meyers book, the majority of the examples points to the latter form of combat, not the former. And the way SPWs are used seem to be in line with the stated doctrine as per the manuals. These cases are of course open to interpretation, but when interpreting them, I'd prefer to see them in light of the stated doctrine rather than what I may think is right and proper Claus B

Both cases are from Hubert Meyers history of the 12. SS-Panzer which I leafed through the other night. I think it is good for this purpose because it contains so much information and detail - even though it is still vague on the mounted-dismounted issue. In the span of some 30 pages, I found at least 8 cases of SPWs involved in combat one way or the other. Of these, two clearly states that the Panzergrenadiers dismounted, the others including the two mentioned above, doesn't specify, but I would tend to read them as the infantry being mounted, because the situation indicates that inside the SPW was indeed the safest place to be due to armour protection, speed and the ability to follow the tanks and take advantage of the results of their heavy firepower. As you point out, SPWs usually operated with the armour. Hardly surprising, that was their raison d'etre after all In Meyers book, the available tanks and the SPW battalion usually form up "the armoured group". It is my impression that this most often would involve the entire SPW battalion operating with a sizable tank force, typically battalion strength. Heres another one, apparently an early dawn attack: The Schützenpanzerbattalion advance along both sides of the Köbölkut-Muzsla road. The II. Panzerabteilung followed behind on the road because of suspected mine barriers. Interestingly, the SPWs advanced where there was a risk of mines. Because an SPW was a lesser loss than a tank, because mines could be spotted easier from the SPW or because the grenadiers walked? The III./26 [thats the SPW battalion] came under fire from anti-tank guns and artillery from the direction of Muzsla. Consequently, the Panzerabteilung .... moved forward to the point, with the 2. kompanie ... in the lead. This would appear to be right out of the field manuals. Once ATG fire is encounted, the tanks take the lead and deals with it by virtue of their heavier armour and superior firepower compared with the SPWs. The enemy was overrun before daybreak and the village was secured by the armoured group. The dismounted Panzergrenadiers of the I. and II./26 [these only had trucks for transport] followed and cleared the terrain. Again, it seems to be a text-book manouver. The armoured group taking advantage of its speed, firepower and armour to break into the enemy position and secure the objective, while the dismounted infantry mops up. Obviously, it does not say whether the SPW grenadiers were driving or walking, but given that this is a text-book attack, I dont see why they shouldn't have attacked mounted - or mounted-dismounted in rapid succesion - given the conditions. Heres another one: In bitter fighting, Panzergrenadierregiment 25 broke through the forward Soviet positions. When daylight broke, the regiment was stopped by artillery and mortar fire for some time. The SPW-battalion was brought forward and it overran the second network of positions under heavy Soviet fire .... Because of the difficult terrain conditions, the attack of the III./26 [the SPW battalion] could not be supported by the Panzers. If artillery and mortar fire stopped the grenadiers on foot, what advantage would the SPW battalion have, if they attacked dismounted? I'd say none and would assume that they took advantage of their armour and speed to get through the shellfire and into the Soviet position. It is interesting that the SPWs could apparently go where the armour could not. In this case, the Soviets were well entrenched in deepth and the brunt of the fighting fell on the dismounted grenadiers. Still, the SPWs found a usefull application when the grenadiers on foot failed. Claus B

"Blitzkrieg", as a phrase describing what the Germans were doing in 1939, was the invention of British journalists, but the word itself was used occasionally in German military litterature of the interwar period. "Blitz-" something was a used generally to indicate something fast and furious and not uncommon at the time (in Denmark where I live, the phrase "Lyntog" was coined in 1935 meaning "Lightening Train" ). In German military litterature "Blitzkrieg" was a broad phrase, referring to a strategic assault, hitting an enemy country without warning using all available assets. But AFAIK it contained no concept of tactics, doctrine or operational methods. It has its French equivalent in the "attaque brusque". The British newsmen may have lifted the term from a book by a German called Sternberg(?) published in Britain in the late 1930ies. Sternbarg was arguing, that Germany was in no position to wage a long war, only a "lightening war". Curiously, the book was first published in the UK Thats how I recall it, based on a couple of articles I've read on the subject - both recommended: - Fanning, William: "The Origin of the Term Blitzkrieg" in The Journal of Military History, April 1997 - Raudzens, George: "Blitzkrieg Ambiguities" in War & Society, September 1989 Claus B ----------- PS: I think Jason has done a good job of trawling the books. Currently, I dont have the time to go through my references and find the cases where mounted SPW attacks were conducted. However, I'm sure they are out there, but often it is not specified or unclear how the operation was conducted exactly. What would you make of this one, for example: “..taking advantage of the heavy snowfall, the attack moved ahead at a good pace, but it stalled just outside of Bütgenbach. Several armoured personell carriers penetrated into the village, but had to retreat again, as the Volksgrenadiers were unable to advance...” Did the PzGrens of the 9. Kp attack in their SPWs or alongside them? Wouldn't the fact that the PzGrens could enter the village while the Volksgrenadiers could not imply that the PzGrens took advantage of their armoured mounts? Or was it just the additional firepower of the SPWs that brought the PzGrens forward - on foot - where the VGs failed? There are plenty of such accounts that are rather ambigous and some which clearly deals with dismounted troops as well as some, like the one I qouted earlier from Fürbringers book on 9. SS-Panzer, which clearly refers to a mounted attack. What about this one: "The 9. Kompanie of the Schützenbattalion... was able to roll forward outside the Soviet minefield. It came under heavy anti-tank fire from the left flank. It pinned the enemy down with its 2cm triple and single barrel guns and overran the anti-tank gun positions." Mounted infantry or not, it seems to me to show SPWs in direct combat with Soviet anti-tank guns and winning! It continues: "The other armoured personell carriers continued to advance on Bart.... A number of the vehicles got stuck in a creek bed. Three armoured personell carriers with the.. [commanders names].. broke into the village from the north. They were effectively supported by the German Panzers. The armoured personell carriers pushed past the church and on to the southern edge of the village." Again, it does not say what the Panzergrenadiers were doing at the time, but clearly the SPWs were fighting, driving around in the middle of the enemy fire and getting away with it. [ March 27, 2004, 01:15 PM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

As suggested previously, there were some 6-pdr Churchills in NW Europe in 1944/45 and they do show up in photos as well. The 6-pdr often had a big counterweight on the muzzle which can be mistaken for a 75mm guns muzzle brake, but if you look closely, it is evident that some of those tanks with a thngy on the muzzle are in fact 6-pdr armed Churchills! According to some tables of tanks in 21st Army Group compiled by Peter Brown from archival material, there was 46 6pdr Churchills in 31st Tank Brigade and 57 in 34th Tank Brigade in June 1944. By December 1944 48 were found in 6th Guards Tank Brigade and 49 in 34th Tank Brigade. There was also a large number of Mk III and V 75mm conversions. Claus B

Assuming that the brigade was around the village of Vire on August 6th 1944, it would've been in a somewhat complicated area as it was not far from the joint between US 12th Army Group and UK 21st Army Group, but I think the most likely opposition would've been from US V Corps - perhaps Blumenson: "Breakout and pursuit" in the US Army Green Book series would be a good place to start, in order to establish which units were actually in the general area at the time. Claus B

Interesting discussion (German SPW tactics that is ) A couple of points that may be of interest. German field manuals for the motorized infantry and Panzergrenadiers apparently started out viewing the SPW (then known simply as "gepanzerte Mannschafttransportwagen" ~ armoured troop transport) as nothing but an armoured truck, i.e. it would give the troops protection during transport, but they would leave the vehicle to fight. That appears to have been the situation in 1940. In this scenario, the infantry would follow the armour, clear any opposition left by the armoured attack and occupy ground, but when reviewing the 1940 combat experience, the German general staff suggested the creation of mixed combat groups, where infantry in SPWs would no longer follow behind the tanks but operate with them in close cooperation. The March 1941 regulations for the motorized infantry emphasized their characteristics as speed, off-road mobility, firepower and armour, but still gave the task of the infantry as clearing up after the tanks and occupying ground. But by 1942, things started to change. The term "gepanzerte Mannschafttransportwagen" was replaced by "Schützenpanzerwagen" ~ infantry armoured vehicle and for the first time the possibility of mounted combat was mentioned: "The issue of armoured vehicles (Schützenpanzerwagen) allows the company to fight from the vehicle. Depending on the opposition and terrain, [the troops can] rapidly switch between mounted and dismonted combat. The SPW is the main weapon of the armoured infantry company" - H.Dv. 299/4a May 1942. It goes on to emphasize that the infantry in SPWs should follow the tanks closely, that the superior vision from the open-topped SPW allowed the mounted troops an excellent view of the battlefield and gave them excellent opportunity to deal with Soviet anti-tank teams (remember, at this point, there were very few anti-tank rifles available). "Enemy points of resistance on the main battlefield, field emplacements (litt: "Feldstellungen") and foxholes that cannot be seen and thus not attacked by the tanks can easily be recognized from the SPW and attacked from the vehicle using mounted weapons, maschinepistols, rifles and handgrenades". As the war progressed, field manuals appears to have stressed this switch between mounted and dismounted combat, apparently increasing the emphasis on the former. In a 1944 training movie (commercially available on the "Panzer-Marsch" video by VAF, Code no. CHR 034), the method of mounted combat against a Soviet penetration is shown. Jagdpanzer IVs cover the area with fire, SPWs drive in at speed, occasionally stopping to fire, followed by SPW-flamethrowers, burning out foxholes etc. After having cleared the penetration, the troops dismount and take up defensive positions. Now, the point of all this is, that there seems to be pretty solid evidence that mounted combat was something the German army subscribed to in theory, at least. Of course, manuals often contain practices that are obsolete, rarely used or impractical, but it would seem to me, that changes were made towards more mounted combat, based on combat experience, as the war progressed. Interestingly, when researching Danish Army records from the 1950 and 60ies, when the Danish Army started to get its first armoured personell carriers (US M3 and M5 half-tracks, later the M113) I came across papers dealing with the practices of foreign nations. Here, it is emphasized that US practice was to drive the APC up to the front then having the troops dismount and fight on foot while German practice, based on their war experience, was to fight mounted whenever possible (see also http://www.freundeskreis-panzergrenadiere.de/c.htm). As for the practice of driving a group of infantry into combat in a big, thin-skinned SPW, I think it made good sense as long as the opposition was not well entrenched and lavishly equipped with anti-tank weapons. The SPW protected the troops from 90%+ of all the crap the flew around the battlefield, the exception being the odd anti-tank gun, anti-tank rifles and possibly heavy machinguns. Furthermore, the SPWs were intended to cooperate with tanks whose job it was to remove such obstacles, leaving the infantry to the SPWs against which the mounted, armoured infantry would've been clearly superior. And that is probably another important point: SPW tactics and mounted combat were developed in 1941-1942 on the eastern front, and I would suggest that it remained a reasonably usefull tactic there for the duration, clearly influencing the post-war Panzergrenadiere in the Bundeswehr. It may well have been another issue in the west, particularily in 1944/45. One may also wonder just how often there was opportunity to make the kind of fast, combined arms attacks in which mounted combat made any sense. After all, we are dealing with what was usually a small part of the armoured division, often a single battalion. It is a method of combat used only in the attack and only when conditions allowed and unit histories are often vague when it comes to the tactical details of combat. That said, I think it is great that JasonC has tried to find some examples of the practice or non-practice of mounted combat. I found one very unspecific example in Fürbringers history of the 9. SS-Panzerdivision, referring to mounted panzergrenadiers taking the village of Sokolow on April 9th 1944 near Tarnopol. There are many references to attacks by the divisions SPW battalion, but as it is often the case, no mention is made on the methods used. Claus B